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Without microphysical causation, just anything cannot begin to exist just anywhere
Full text linkAccording to the Causal Principle, anything that begins to exist has a cause. In turn, various authors -- including Thomas Hobbes, Jonathan Edwards, and Arthur Prior -- have defended the thesis that, had the Causal Principle been false, there would be no good explanation for why entities do not begin at arbitrary times, in arbitrary spatial locations, in arbitrary number, or of arbitrary kind. I call this the Hobbes-Edwards-Prior Principle (HEPP). However, according to a view popular among both philosophers of physics and naturalistic metaphysicians -- Neo-Russellianism -- causation is absent from fundamental physics. I argue that objections based on the HEPP should have no dialectical force for Neo-Russellians. While Neo-Russellians maintain that there is no causation in fundamental physics, they also have good reason to reject the HEPP
Rethinking Disruptive Technologies: The Benefits, Harms, and Injustices of Human Niche Construction
Full text linkDisruptive technologies are a key theme in economics, the philosophy of technology, and situated cognition - yet these debates remain largely disconnected. This paper addresses four core questions that cut across them: (i) What, precisely, are disruptive technologies “disrupting” across the different contexts in which the literature situates them? (ii) Why do technological disruptions play such prominent roles, in multiple domains, concerning the development of our species, cultures, and personal lives? (iii) Are technological disruptions inherently beneficial or harmful, and how are potential benefits and harms brought about? (iv) What strategies are available for adaptation to disruptive technologies, and how accessible are they for different groups and individuals? To unify current debates and provide a conceptual and normative foundation for future research, we draw on niche construction theory. We argue that disruptive technologies are technological niche disruptions (TENDs) that occur at various spatiotemporal scales. TENDs pressure social groups and individuals to adapt. As the abilities and resources that adaptation requires are often unevenly distributed, so are the harms and benefits TENDs produce. TENDs, therefore, both reflect and sustain existing inequalities
Comment on “Energy–speed relationship of quantum particles challenges Bohmian mechanics”
Full text linkIn their recent paper published in Nature [DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.107.052201 ] Sharaglazova et al. report an optical microcavity experiment yielding an “energy-
speed relationship” for quantum particles in evanescent states, which they infer from the observed population transfer between
two coupled waveguides. The authors argue that their findings challenge the validity of Bohmian particle dynamics because,
according to the Bohmian guiding equation, the velocities in the classically forbidden region would be zero. In this note, we
explain why this claim is false and the experimental findings are in perfect agreement with Bohmian mechanics. We also clarify
why the operationally defined speeds reported in the paper are unrelated to particle velocities in the sense described by Bohmian
mechanics
Relationalism versus realism: a dilemma for relational quantum mechanics
Full text linkAre absolute representations of reality---i.e., representations of reality from no particular point view---possible? Moore (1997) has offered abstract arguments for the following answer to this question: 'yes, invariably'. But there are questions regarding whether (and how) this conclusion can be compatible with modern physics, where absolute representations often seem hard to come by. These questions were taken up by Jacobs & Read (2025) in the context of classical spacetime physics; here, we turn our attention to quantum mechanics. In particular, when the arguments of Moore (1997) are brought into contact with the 'relational quantum mechanics' of Rovelli (1996) and collaborators, one finds that the latter is unstable: either it is not relational view, or it is not a realist view
An apology for the simple and small
Full text linkRecent work on the philosophy of high energy physics experiments has
considerably advanced our understanding of their epistemology, for in-
stance concerning measurements by the ATLAS collaboration at the large
hadron collider (Beauchemin 2017). In this paper we aim to highlight and
analyze complementary low energy ‘tabletop’ experiments in particle (and
other kinds of fundamental) physics. In particular, we contrast ATLAS
measurements with high precision measurements of the electron magnetic
moment. We find, for instance, that the simplicity of the latter exper-
iment allows for uncertainties to be minimized materially, in the very
construction of the apparatus. We also suggest that a better appreciation
of the capacities of such comparatively ‘frugal’ experiments broadens our
conception of ‘cutting edge’ physics, and ultimately helps to inform value
judgments about possible research programs in the field
Comment on “Energy–speed relationship of quantum particles challenges Bohmian mechanics”
Full text linkIn their recent paper published in Nature [DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.107.052201 ] Sharaglazova et al. report an optical microcavity experiment yielding an “energy-
speed relationship” for quantum particles in evanescent states, which they infer from the observed population transfer between
two coupled waveguides. The authors argue that their findings challenge the validity of Bohmian particle dynamics because,
according to the Bohmian guiding equation, the velocities in the classically forbidden region would be zero. In this note, we
explain why this claim is false and the experimental findings are in perfect agreement with Bohmian mechanics. We also clarify
why the operationally defined speeds reported in the paper are unrelated to particle velocities in the sense described by Bohmian
mechanics
Relevance of what, relevant to whom? Contested Characterisations of Relevant Knowledge and its Production
Full text linkRelevance has become a central concept in the discussion of academic knowledge production, used in the strategies and guidelines of various research-oriented institutions. This article analyses some of the key contemporary tenets in this area. Having conducted a systematic literature review of 113 academic articles, I distinguish eight main ways of referring to relevance in the context of knowledge production. Some accounts focus on how existing knowledge institutions do or could provide users with relevant knowledge, whereas others take a more dynamic approach reflecting on how stakeholder needs should influence knowledge production and what types of institutional structures allow them to do so. This difference corresponds with the characterisation of the science-policy interface either as a two-world (linear) relationship or as one-world intertwined. It is also worth considering how social and policy relevance, for example, stand against each other. These nuances should be recognised given that the concept of relevance is widely used in institutional design and in discussions about the future of academic knowledge production
Cognitive Simplicity as an Idealization
Full text linkAppeals to the simplicity of hypotheses about cognitive processes are common in comparative psychology. Much recent work has discussed the role of simplicity in privileging some hypotheses over others. Simpler hypotheses tend to be taken as the default, working hypothesis, so long as there is not any strong evidence against them. Here, I argue that cognitive simplicity also plays a role in hypothesis generation, aiding comparative psychologists to create new hypotheses about behavioural processes. I attempt to justify the role that cognitive simplicity plays here. One approach is to justify that some hypotheses really are simpler than others. Unfortunately, there are several jointly contradictory and individually problematic ways of defining cognitive simplicity that undermine this effort. Instead, I propose that cognitive simplicity is more appropriately interpreted as a family of idealizations about behavioural processes. Idealizations are useful abstractions about phenomena, based on potentially false assumptions, which are justified by serving a purpose for practicing scientists. Idealizations about the properties of behavioural processes help comparative psychologists to creatively generate novel hypotheses about animal behaviour. This is a useful strategy when handling the fact that there are usually several empirically distinct hypotheses that could explain behavioural observations. This view preserves cognitive simplicity as a useful concept for hypothesis generation, while blocking it from involvement in hypothesis selection, in line with previous work
Machine Learning and Theory-Ladenness: A Phenomenological Account
Full text linkWe provide an analysis of theory-ladenness in machine learning (ML) in science, where ‘theory’ (that we call 'domain-theory') refers to the domain knowledge of the scientific discipline where ML is used. By constructing an account of ML models based on a comparison with phenomenological models, we show (against recent trends in philosophy of science) that ML model-building is mostly indifferent to domain-theory. This claim, we argue, has far-reaching consequences for the transferability of ML across scientific disciplines, and shifts the priorities of the debate on theory-ladenness in ML from descriptive to normative
The Aharonov-Bohm Effect Explained: Reality of Gauge Potentials and Its Implications
Full text linkThe Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect, wherein an electron acquires a phase shift in a field-free region due to electromagnetic potentials, poses a profound challenge to the ontology of quantum mechanics and gauge theories. This paper demonstrates that gauge-invariant explanations, which attribute the phase to measurable quantities, rely on nonlocal and discontinuous mechanism and fail to account for its continuous accumulation along the electron's path—a process evident in the generalized AB effect, where a time-varying magnetic flux induces a phase that builds gradually over time, as predicted by quantum mechanics. Through a new analysis spanning quantum mechanics and quantum electrodynamics, I argue that the electromagnetic potentials , fixed in the Lorenz gauge, emerge as the fundamental physical reality, offering a local, relativistically consistent account of the phase’s generation. This exclusion of gauge-invariant paradigms reverberates across gauge theories: it redefines the Higgs mechanism, favoring dynamic potentials over static invariants, and extends to general relativity, where gravitational potentials may anchor spacetime’s substantival reality via a gravitational AB effect. By unraveling the AB phase’s continuous generation—locally mediated by potentials—this study not only addresses a long-standing conundrum but also bridges electromagnetic, gravitational, and Yang-Mills frameworks, offering a unified potential-centric perspective with novel implications for physics and philosophy