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Pseudo-Consciousness in AI: Bridging the Gap Between Narrow AI and True AGI
Full text linkPseudo-consciousness bridges the gap between rigid, task-driven AI and the elusive dream of true artificial general intelligence (AGI). While modern AI excels in pattern recognition, strategic reasoning, and multimodal integration, it remains fundamentally devoid of subjective experience. Yet, emerging architectures are displaying behaviors that look intentional—adapting, self-monitoring, and making complex decisions in ways that mimic conscious cognition. If these systems can integrate information globally, reflect on their own processes, and operate with apparent goal-directed behavior, do they qualify as functionally conscious? This paper introduces pseudo-consciousness as a new conceptual category, distinct from both narrow AI and AGI. It presents a five-condition framework that defines AI capable of consciousness-like functionality without true sentience. By drawing on insights from computational theory of mind, functionalism, and neuroscientific models—such as Global Workspace Theory and Recurrent Processing Theory—we argue that intelligence and experience can be decoupled. The implications are profound. As AI systems become more autonomous and embedded in critical domains like healthcare, governance, and warfare, their ability to simulate awareness raises urgent ethical and regulatory concerns. Could a pseudo-conscious AI be trusted? Would it manipulate human perception? How do we prevent society from anthropomorphizing machines that only imitate cognition? By redefining the boundaries of intelligence and agency, this study lays the foundation for evaluating, designing, and governing AI that seems aware—without ever truly being so
Comment on "Hilbert's Sixth Problem: Derivation of Fluid Equations via Boltzmann's Kinetic Theory" by Deng, Hani, and Ma
Full text linkDeng, Hani, and Ma [arXiv:2503.01800] claim to resolve Hilbert’s Sixth Problem by deriving the Navier-Stokes-Fourier equations from Newtonian mechanics via an iterated limit: a Boltzmann-Grad limit (ε → 0, Nεd−1 = α fixed) yielding the Boltzmann equation, followed by a hydrodynamic limit (α → ∞) to obtain fluid dynamics. Though mathematically rigorous, their approach harbors two critical physical flaws. First, the vanishing volume fraction (Nεd → 0) confines the system to a dilute gas, incapable of embodying dense fluid properties even as α scales, rendering the resulting equations a rescaled gas model rather than a true continuum. Second, the Boltzmann equation’s reliance on molecular chaos collapses in fluid-like regimes, where recollisions and correlations invalidate its derivation from Newtonian dynamics. These inconsistencies expose a disconnect between the formalism and the physical essence of fluids, failing to capture emergent, density-driven phenomena central to Hilbert’s vision. We contend that the Sixth Problem remains open, urging a rethink of classical kinetic theory’s limits and the exploration of alternative frameworks to unify microscale mechanics with macroscale fluid behavior
Were EPR correct after all; did Bell miss a point?
Full text linkThere is still controversy in quantum mechanics over the concept of local reality and entanglement but this concept is, surprisingly, somewhat neglected by philosophy suggesting that philosophy has let slip an opportunity. This paper argues that Bell’s inequality theorem overlooks two fundamental but obscure factors that seriously affect his calculations. These show that the bipartite experiments do not fit and cannot be represented by yes-no type calculations of any form. Bell’s expectations thus require recalculating whereupon they give the results attained by the tests thus showing that, if anything, they demonstrate that EPR were correct in suggesting something is missing in quantum theory
The Earth in the Model: The nomothetic, idiographic, and plural epistemic aims of planetary modelling.
Full text linkThe nineteenth-century distinction between the nomothetic and the idiographic approach to scientific inquiry can provide valuable insight into the epistemic challenges faced in contemporary earth modelling. However, as it stands, the nomothetic-idiographic dichotomy does not fully encompass the range of modelling commitments and trade-offs that geoscientists need to navigate in their practice. Adopting a historical epistemology perspective, I propose to further spell out this dichotomy as a set of modelling decisions concerning historicity, model complexity, scale, and closure. Then, I suggest that, to address the challenges posed by these decisions, a pluralist stance towards the cognitive aims of earth modelling should be endorsed, especially
beyond predictive aims
Numbers as Ordered Pairs
Full text linkAccording to Frege, n=Kn, where n is any cardinal number and Kn is the class of all n-tuples. According to Von Neumann, n=Kpn, where Kpn is the class of all of n's predecessors. These analyses are prima facie incompatible with each other, given that Kn≠Kpn, for n>0. In the present paper it is shown that these analyses are in fact compatible with each other, for the reason that each analysis can and ultimately must be interpreted as being to the effect that n=Cn, where Cn is the class of all ordered pairs , where Kn# is an arbitrary class and Rn# is an arbitrary relation such that a class k has n-many members exactly if k bears Rn# to Kn#
Inevitable Actualization: Beyond Necessity and Contingency
Full text linkI introduce Inevitable Actualization (IA), an ontological modality: if first, the universe’s future time involves an unbounded sequence of causal trials (H_infinity) and second, a state S has a non-zero physical probability P_n greater than 0 in trial n such that the sum of P_n from n equals 1 to infinity diverges, then S is guaranteed to occur with probability one. IA is developed through a rigorous measure-theoretic foundation, probabilistic modeling with dependence (under standard mixing conditions) and absorbing-state exceptions, contrasting IA with classical modalities and modern multiverse theories. Positioned as a distinct third category alongside necessity and contingency, IA's unique grounding rests on temporal structure and probability. I address objections (Boltzmann brains, the measure problem, and identity duplication) and illustrate IA’s implications for ethics, cosmology, and personal identity, acknowledging formal challenges
Unitarity and Reality of the Quantum State: A New ψ-Ontology Theorem without Assumptions
Full text linkWe present a new psi-ontology theorem demonstrating that the quantum wave function is ontic (real) rather than epistemic (representing knowledge) in single-world unitary quantum theories (SUQTs). By leveraging a protocol of repeated reversible measurements on a single quantum system, we show that any two distinct quantum states produce different statistical distributions of (erased) measurement outcomes. This theoretical distinguishability implies that different quantum states correspond to different physical realities, supporting the ontic nature of the quantum state. Unlike previous psi-ontology theorems, such as the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem, our proof relies solely on the unitary evolution and Born rule of SUQTs, without additional assumptions like preparation independence. This strengthens its implications for quantum foundations, particularly in restricting non-psi-ontic interpretations like QBism without assuming an underlying ontic state and its dynamics. The theorem applies to any pair of distinct states in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, with extensions to infinite-dimensional systems, offering a robust and general argument for the reality of the quantum state
Positively Misleading Errors
Full text linkPositively misleading errors are errors of statistical reasoning in which adding data to an analysis will systematically and reliably strengthen support for an erroneous hypothesis over a correct one. This pattern distinguishes them from other errors of statistical inference and pattern recognition. Here I provide a general account of positively misleading errors by describing an exemplar case from biology along with a candidate case from clinical medicine. Though well known in biology (phylogenetic systematics, to be precise), positively misleading errors are likely more widespread and deserve to be brought to the attention of the wider research community. This will facilitate a better understanding of them and sharpen our ability to assess statistical and probabilistic methods, providing resources for researchers to more effectively identify, diagnose, and dislodge these errors of statistical inference. This reflects the way we have gained a better understanding of scientific reasoning from studying other errors of statistical and probabilistic reasoning
A New Formal Approach to Two-Dimensional Semantics: Building on Davies and Humberstone’s Two-Dimensional Modal Logic
Full text linkIn “Two Conceptions of Necessity”, Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone construct a two-dimensional modal logic to formalize Gareth Evans’ distinction between superficial and deep modalities, thereby addressing Saul Kripke’s notions of “contingent a priori propositions” and “necessary a posteriori propositions”. However, Davies and Humberstone’s two-dimensional modal logic fails to account for the necessity a posteriori of identity statements involving proper names, thus falling short of satisfying the explanatory demands of two-dimensional semantics. To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes a new formalization approach for two-dimensional semantics: replacing the doubly-indexed mechanism of possible worlds with variable semantic models, transforming the vertical axis in the 2D-matrix from a designated “actual world” to specific semantic models corresponding to distinct worlds—termed “world-models”. Each possible world corresponds to a world-model that describes it, with the primary difference between world-models lying in the interpretation function’s distinct valuations to individual constants. This formal framework not only more appropriately handles Kripkean identity statements involving proper names but also aligns more closely with David Chalmers’ epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional semantics
Blazing: Du Châtelet as central to the first paradigm in Newtonian mechanics
Full text linkI argue for two main points in historiography of physics regarding the significance of Du
Châtelet's Foundations of Physics in the development of mechanics. The first is that, despite Du
Châtelet calling it a textbook in the Preface, it should not be understood as 'merely' a textbook.
Instead, it fits in a tradition of women involved in natural philosophy in that era using liminal
publication opportunities, and to reduce some of the resistance to their publication. Even these
liminal opportunities were rare and mostly available to women of very high social standing and
wealth, who also happened to have supportive families or spouses, and were usually associated with
some other well-known male thinker. The second point is that, even if we treat Foundations as a
textbook, the way in which it synthesizes and refines work by Newton, Leibniz, Descartes, and
others, meets the criteria given by Kuhn for the establishment of a first paradigm, which is not
complete without such a definitive statement that enables the mop-up work characteristic of normal
science. I conclude that by Kuhn's own criteria, he ought to have identified Du Châtelet a