Policy Documentation Center

English

The integration process as a tool of stability and security in the Western Balkans

US military bases in Romania and Bulgaria and their possible implications on regional security

Ethnic profiling in the European Union: pervasive, ineffective, and discriminatory

INJECTING DRUG USERS (IDUS) COMPRISE THE
LARGEST SHARE OF HIV CASES in at least 20 nations of
Asia and the former Soviet Union, including China and
Russia.1 Yet as these countries move to make HIV treatment
more available, IDUs remain disproportionately less likely
to have access to antiretroviral (ARV) treatment.2 Reasons
for this inequality include misconceptions about the impact
of drug use on treatment adherence, denial of basic supports
such as methadone that would facilitate HIV treatment, 
stigma in health care settings, and emphasis on incarceration
and punishment of IDUs rather than on their care.3,4,5,6,7,8
HIV Treatment Shortfalls:
Gaps in ARVs for IDUs 
Though nearly one in three HIV cases outside Africa is
attributed to injecting drug use, ARV treatment systems
continue to exclude IDUs.9
In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, IDUs represent more
than 80 percent of HIV cases, but only 14 percent of the
total number of people receiving ARVs.10
In Russia, where approximately 83 percent of total HIV
cases are IDUs,11 as many as 70,000 people are in need of
ARV treatment. Only 30,000 receive it. ARV stockouts 
are an ongoing problem in Russia.12
In Thailand, where more than 80% of people in need of
ARV treatment receive it, the country has failed to system-
atically extend treatment to drug users; some providers
openly deny drug users treatment.13
In China, Malaysia, and Vietnam, IDUs are interned for
months or years in forced detoxification and rehabilitation
centers. Though many IDUs are HIV-positive, few centers
offer ARVs.14,15,16
In Malaysia, IDUs comprise 75 percent of all HIV cases
but only 5 percent of those receiving ARV treatment.17
HIV Treatment Benefits: Clinical Efficacy 
of ARVs for IDUs 
Medical providers are often reluctant to treat IDUs, claiming
that their lives are too chaotic for them to adhere to anti-
retroviral treatment or that multiple illnesses make treatment
too difficult.18,19 While active drug use has been linked to
problems with access and adherence to ARV treatment,
IDUs offered appropriate supports can achieve adherence
and treatment outcomes comparable to those of other
patients.20,21
A 2006 study in France determined that a history of
injecting drug use had no significant effect on adherence
to ARV treatment.22
A 2004 study of patients in Vancouver (Canada) found
that drug users who adhered to ARV experienced the
same increases in CD4+ count as adherent non–drug
users.23
In a 2000 study in Sao Paolo (Brazil) active drug use 
had no impact on ARV adherence; 69 percent of patients
achieved adherence levels of over 80 percent, though
most were poor, had limited education, and were unem-
ployed.24
A 1999 study of patients receiving ARV treatment from
51 centers across Europe found no significant difference
between IDUs and non–drug users in CD4+ or virologic
response.25
HIV Treatment Tool: Opiate Substitution 
Therapy and ARVs for IDUs 
Prescribed medications such as methadone or buprenor-
phine are the best studied and most effective form of 
treatment for opiate dependence.26 Substitution therapy
allows patients to stop or reduce illicit drug use and injec-
tion, improve their health, stabilize their lives, and adhere
to ARV regimens.27 The World Health Organization added
methadone and buprenorphine to its list of essential 
medicines in 2005.
Despite its effectiveness, opiate substitution therapy
remains strikingly limited. Of 6 and a half million IDUs
estimated to live in countries where contaminated needles
are the main source of HIV infections, only 130,000 have
access to substitution therapy.28 In Russia, with more than
2 million IDUs, opiate substitution therapy is illegal.29
HIV Treatment Needs: Integrated,
Comprehensive Care for IDUs 
Drug use is often linked to other factors that may affect
HIV treatment, including poverty, psychiatric illness, 
and infection with hepatitis C or tuberculosis. Offering
multiple services at a single site and creating strong 
links between HIV, TB, and drug treatment providers can
Antiretroviral Treatment for 
Injecting Drug Users 
International Harm Reduction Development Program
PUBL IC HEALTH FACT SHEET
increase accessibility and effectiveness of ARVs for IDUs.
Keeping programs open late, situating them in areas con-
venient for drug users, and including peer outreach work-
ers and counselors in treatment provision also increases
the effectiveness of health care for IDUs.30,31,32,33 Directly
administered antiretroviral therapy (DAART), in which
program staff supervise delivery of ARV treatment, can
also increase adherence.34,35
A New York City program offered patients peer education
and counseling, support in disclosing HIV status to 
family members, and referrals to drug treatment and
housing services. The caregiving team included a social
worker and a nurse as well as a physician. New patients
received prefilled pillboxes and counseling every week. 
In a 2004 study of the program, nearly nine in ten (86
percent) achieved an undetectable viral load after one
year. Only one in three patients who did not receive such
support achieved the same result.36
A 2004 study of a program in New Haven (USA) found
that 77 percent of drug users who were offered peer 
support and DAART at a mobile health clinic achieved
an undetectable viral load. Adherence among these IDUs
was 85 percent despite the fact that 35 percent were
homeless and 74 percent were depressed.37
A 2005 study in Baltimore (USA) showed that IDUs who
received DAART in methadone clinics were significantly
more likely to adhere than patients who self-adminis-
tered their ARV, including IDUs on or off methadone
and non-IDUs.38
“Access to HIV treatment should not be artificially
restricted due to political or social constraints.
Specifically there should be no categorical exclusion
of injection drug users from any level of care.”39
World Health Organization, Protocols on HIV/AIDS Treatment 
and Care for the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2004
1 IHRD (2008). Harm Reduction Developments 2008: Countries with Injection-
Driven HIV Epidemics. New York: International Harm Reduction
Development Program (IHRD) of the Open Society Institute, p. 11.
2 Aceijas, C., E. Oppenheimer, et al. (2006).“Antiretroviral treatment for inject-
ing drug users in developing and transitional countries 1 year before the
end of the ‘Treating 3 million by 2005. Making it happen. The WHO strate-
gy’ (‘3by5’),”Addiction (0),doi:10.1111/ j.1360-0443.2006.01509.x.
3 International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (2007). Missing the Target.
http://www.aidstreatmentaccess.org/itpc5th.pdf 
4 UNAIDS (2006). Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. Geneva: UNAIDS.
5 Human Rights Watch (2006).“Rhetoric and Risk: Human Rights Abuses
Impeding Ukraine’s Fight Against HIV/AIDS. New York: Human Rights
Watch. http://hrw.org/reports/2006/ukraine0306/ 
6 Human Rights Watch (2003). Locked Doors: The Human Rights of People
with AIDS in China. New York: Human Rights Watch.
7 Bobrova N, Rhodes T, et al (2006).“Barriers to accessing drug treatment 
in Russia: a qualitative study among injecting drug users in two cities.”
Drug and Alcohol Dependence (82 Suppl 1). S57-63.
8 Wolfe, D. and K. Malinowska-Sempruch. (2004). Illicit Drug Policies and the
Global HIV Epidemic: Effects of UN and National Government Approaches.
New York: International Harm Reduction Development Program (IHRD) 
of the Open Society Institute.
9 UNAIDS, op cit.
10 IHRD (2008). Harm Reduction Developments 2008: Countries with Injection-
Driven HIV Epidemics. New York: International Harm Reduction
Development Program (IHRD) of the Open Society Institute, p. 63.
11 IHRD (2008). Harm Reduction Developments 2008: Countries with Injection-
Driven HIV Epidemics. New York: International Harm Reduction
Development Program (IHRD) of the Open Society Institute, p. 37.
12 International Treatment Preparedness Coalition, op cit.
13 Human Rights Watch (2007).“Deadly Denial: “Barriers to HIV/AIDS Treatment
for People Who Use Drugs in Thailand.” New York: Human Rights Watch
14 Human Rights Watch (2003). op cit.
15 Wolfe, D. and K. Malinowska-Sempruch, op cit.
16 Vu Doan, T. (2001). Harm reduction for injecting drug users in Vietnam:
A situation assessment. Report for Macfarlane Burnet Centre, Victorian
Public Health Training Scheme. Melbourne, Australia.
17 Aceijas, C., E. Oppenheimer, et al., op cit.
18 Human Rights Watch (2004).“Lessons Not Learned: Human Rights Abuses
and HIV/AIDS in the Russian Federation.” New York: Human Rights Watch.
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/russia0404/ 
19 Human Rights Watch (2006), op cit.
20 Peretti-Watel P, Spire B et al. (2006).“Drug use patterns and adherence 
to treatment among HIV-positive patients.” Drug and Alcohol Dependence
(82 Suppl 1). S71-9.
21 Wood E, Montaner JS, et al. (2004).“Adherence to antiretroviral therapy
and CD4 T-cell count responses among HIV-infected drug users: implica-
tions for program replication.” Clin Infect Dis 2004:1 (38 Suppl 5):S376-87.
22 Peretti-Watel P, op cit.
23 Wood E, op cit.
24 Nemes, MIB (2000). “Aderencia ao Tratamento por Anti-retrovirals em
Servicos Publicos no Estado de Sao Paulo,” Brasilia, DF. Sao Paolo:
Ministerio da Saude do Brasil.
25 Mocroft, A., S. Madge, et al. (1999).“A comparison of exposure groups in
the EuroSIDA study: starting highly active antiretroviral therapy and CD4
T-cell count responses among HIV-infected injection drug users.” Antivir
Ther 2004:9(2):229-35.
26 Institute of Medicine (1990). Treating Drug Problems, vol. 1. Washington,
DC: National Academy Press; 187.
27 Palepu A, Tyndall MW et al (2006). “Antiretroviral adherence and HIV 
treatment outcomes among HIV/HCV co-infected injection drug users.”
Drug and Alcohol Dependence. In press.
28 IHRD (2008). Harm Reduction Developments 2008: Countries with Injection-
Driven HIV Epidemics. New York: International Harm Reduction
Development Program (IHRD) of the Open Society Institute, p. 72.
29 IHRD (2008). Harm Reduction Developments 2008: Countries with Injection-
Driven HIV Epidemics. New York: International Harm Reduction
Development Program (IHRD) of the Open Society Institute, p. 76.
30 Kazatchkine, M and Lert F (2004). “France: Meeting the Needs of Injecting
Drug Users in HIV Care.” In IHRD, Breaking Down Barriers.
New York: International Harm Reduction Development Program (IHRD) of
the Open Society Institute.
31 Broadhead RS, Heckathorn DD et al. “Harnessing peer networks as an instru-
ment for AIDS prevention.” Public Health Reports. 1998,113 Suppl 1: 42-57.
32 Kerr T, Small W et al.“Harm reduction by a “user-run” organization.”
Int J of Drug Policy. 2006, 17: 61-69.
33 Grund, JP, Blanken P et al. “Reaching the unreached.” J of Psychoactive
Drugs. 1992, 24(1): 41-7.
34 Altice F, Mezger J, Hodges J, Bruce R, Marinovich A, Walton M, et al.
Developing a directly administered antiretroviral therapy intervention for
HIV-infected drug users: implications for program replication.
Clin Infect Dis 2004; 1 (38 Suppl 5):S376-87.
35 Lucas GM, Weidle PJ, Hader S and Moore RD (2004).“Directly Adminis-
tered Antiretroviral Therapy in an Urban Methadone Maintenance Clinic:
A Nonrandomized Comparative Study.” Clin Infect Dis, 38:S409–13.
36 Dobkin, JF (2004). “New York: Antiretroviral treatment for multi-problem
patients.” In IHRD, Breaking Down Barriers. Op cit.
37 Altice F, op cit.
38 Lucas GM, op cit.
39 WHO (2004). HIV/AIDS Treatment and Care Protocols for Countries 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Geneva: World Health
Organization.
NOTES
A N T I R E T R O V I R A L  T R E AT M E N T F O R I N J E C T I N G  D R U G  U S E R S


Fact sheet: antiretroviral treatment for injecting drug users

Political consolidation in a Crimean way

Abashdze, Archil

Labour migration from Georgia and bilateral migration agreements: Needs and prospects

Albrycht (ed.), Izabela

The Eastern Partnership in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy

ICPS, GfK Ukraine – Consumer mood continues to improve [25.05.2009] 1 
CONSUMER MOOD CONTINUES TO IMPROVE 
Press release Results of consumer confidence survey in Ukraine, a joint project 
between GfK Ukraine and the International Centre for Policy Studies 
25 May 2009 Contact: Maksym Boroda, Project manager 
www.icps.com.ua, www.gfk.ua Tel. (044) 484-4400, e-mail: mboroda@icps.kiev.ua 
 
April 2009 was the third consecutive month to see an improvement in the consumer mood in 
Ukraine. The Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) rose a further 13.2pp to reach 65.6. After having 
fallen to a record low in January 2009, the CCI has jumped a total of 23.8pp, indicating that a 
certain amount of optimism is returning among Ukrainian consumers. This is most likely because of 
the relative economic stability of the last few months and a strengthening of the hryvnia against the 
US dollar. 
Economic expectations continue to improve more quickly among Ukraine’s consumers than their 
estimate of the current situation. Thus, the Index of Economic Expectations (IEE) jumped 16.3pp in 
April, to reach 73.2. This indicates that the economic expectations of Ukrainians are already within 
range of their pre-crisis levels. This rise in the IEE was largely driven by an improvement in 
expectations of personal financial standing. The related index x2 grew the most, leaping 19.0pp to 
76.6.  Assessments of the prospects for economic growth in Ukraine also improved, with the index 
for short-term expectations x3 jumped 16.4pp to 83.3. This suggests that the residents of Ukraine 
are ever more expecting their personal material standing to improve in the next while, along with the 
overall economic situation. 
Still, assessments of the current situation among Ukrainians show a substantial gap with economic 
expectations in terms of the level of optimism. The Index of the Current Situation (ICS) grew a 
modest 8.5pp in April, to reach 54.1. Assessments of current personal financial standing remain 
quite negative. This index x1 grew only 6.8pp to a still very low 47.1, indicating that the material 
standing of more than three quarters of Ukrainian consumers has grown worse over the last half-
year. At the same time, the propensity to make major household purchase has begun to rise again, 
pushing the index of propensity to consume x5 up 10.2pp to 61.2. 
Inflationary expectations also continue to improve in Ukraine, as do expectations of changes in 
unemployment. The Index of Expected Changes in Unemployment (IECU) fell 16.4pp to 138.8 in 
April 2009, which is close to its pre-crisis levels. The Index of Inflationary Expectations (IIE) 
improved somewhat less, falling 5.6pp to 180.2. This is one of the lowest levels it has shown over 
the last few years of this survey. It could be caused by the strengthening hryvnia as demand for most 
categories of goods and services continues to slide. 
Consumer Confidence Index in Ukraine 
 
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
06
’0
5
09
’0
5
12
’0
5
02
’0
6
04
’0
6
06
’0
6
09
’0
6
10
’0
6
12
’0
6
02
’0
7
04
’0
7
06
’0
7
08
’0
7
10
’0
7
12
’0
7
02
’0
8
04
'0
8
06
'0
8
08
'0
8
10
'0
8
12
'0
8
01
'0
9
02
'0
9
03
'0
9
04
'0
9
CCI
ICS
IEE
 
Sources: GfK Ukraine, International Centre for Policy Studies 
ICPS, GfK Ukraine – Consumer mood continues to improve [25.05.2009] 2 
Dynamic of Consumer Confidence Index in Ukraine 
Month, year Consumer Confidence Index 
(CCI) 
Index of the Current Situation 
(ICS) 
Index of Economic 
Expectations (IEE) 
03’09 52.4 45.7 56.9 
02’09 42.3 38.8 44.7 
01’09 41.8 40.4 42.8 
12’08 53.9 56.0 52.6 
10’08 69.3 72.6 67.2 
08’08 96.0 98.5 94.3 
06’08 90.2 88.7 91.3 
04’08 88.0 91.8 85.5 
02’08 97.9 101.2 95.7 
12’07 100.2 101.9 99.0 
10’07 95.0 96.6 93.9 
08’07 102.7 105.8 100.7 
06’07  96.9 102.8  93.0 
04’07  92.3 98.8  88.8 
02’07  92.2 92.4  92.1 
12’06  90.6  95.9  87.1 
10’06  91.2  96.6  87.5 
09’06  87.5  93.9  83.3 
06’06  84.9  92.2  80.0 
04’06  97.1  98.4  96.2 
02’06 103.7 103.5 103.8 
12’05 103.1 105.8 101.3 
09’05  95.5  95.5  95.5 
06’05 105.2 100.5 108.4 
Sources: GfK Ukraine, International Centre for Policy Studies 
ICPS, GfK Ukraine – Consumer mood continues to improve [25.05.2009] 3 
How the indices are calculated  
 
From January 2009 consumer confidence survey is conducted on a monthly basis. 
 
In Ukraine, the Consumer Confidence Index is determined through a random survey of domestic 
households. The poll involves 1,000 individuals aged 15–59, an age group that represents 61.3% of 
Ukraine’s population and the country’s most active consumers. A representative sample is selected by 
gender and age, also by type and size of settlement. The margin of error is 3.2%.  
To define the CCI, respondents are asked these questions:  
1. How has the financial standing of your family changed over the last six months?  
2. How do you think your family’s financial standing will change in the next six months?  
3. Looking at economic conditions in the country as a whole, do you think the next 12 months will be 
good or bad?  
4. Looking at the next five years, will they be good ones or bad ones for the country’s economy?  
5. In terms of large purchases for your home, do you think now is generally a good time or a bad time to 
make such purchases?  
Each of these questions is related to a corresponding index:  
 
• Index of Current Personal Financial Standing (x1);  
• Index of Expected Changes in Personal Financial Standing (x2);  
• Index of Expected Economic Conditions in the Country Over the Next Year (x3);  
• Index of Expected Economic Conditions in the Country Over the Next 5 Years (x4);  
• Index of Propensity to Consume (x5).  
 
Indices are constructed thus: the share of negative answers is deducted from the share of positive 
answers, and 100 is added to this difference in order to eliminate negative values. On the basis of these 
five indices, three aggregate indices are calculated:  
 
• Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) as the arithmetic average of indices x1–x5;  
• Index of the Current Situation (ICS) as the arithmetic average of indices x1 and x5;  
• Index of Economic Expectations (IEE) as the arithmetic average of indices x2, x3, and x4.  
 
Index values range from 0 to 200. The index equals 200 when all respondents positively assess the 
economic situation. It totals 100 when the shares of positive and negative assessments are equal. Indices 
of less than 100 indicate the prevalence of negative assessments.  
To determine the Index of Expected Changes in Unemployment (IECU) and the Index of Inflationary 
Expectations (IIE), the respondents are asked these two questions:  
1. Do you think that within next 12 months the number of unemployed (people who do not have job and 
are looking for work) will increase, will remain roughly the same, or will decrease?  
2. How do you think that prices for major consumer goods and services will change in the next 1–2 
months?  
The IECU and the IIE are calculated thus: the share of answers that indicate a decrease of 
unemployment/inflation is subtracted from the share of answers that indicate the growth of 
unemployment/inflation, and 100 is added to the difference to eliminate negative values. The values of 
indices can vary from 0 to 200. The index totals 200 when all residents expect an increase in 
unemployment/inflation.  
GfK Ukraine is a Ukrainian research company, offering a comprehensive range of survey services and 
market research in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. GfK Ukraine is a member of the worldwide GfK 
Group which is the No. 4 market research organization worldwide. The Group has 115 companies 
covering over 100 countries.  
The International Centre for Policy Studies is an independent research organisation whose mission is to introduce 
public policy concepts and procedures in Ukraine. ICPS focuses on key programs of importance for the reform 
efforts of the Ukrainian government 
 


Consumer Confidence No. 45 (May)

Ending \u2018ghettoisation\u2019 of the Western Balkans visa liberalisation prospects

 
 
BISS BLITZ 
BB #19/2009EN, 24 June 2009 
 
 
 
 
LUKASHENKA MAKES ATTEMPTS TO COME TO AN 
AGREEMENT WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 
Andrei Liakhovich 
 
 
Resume 
 
Lukashenka had a meeting with Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU 
Commissioner responsible for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Minsk on June 21, 2009.   
The Minister of Finance of Belarus A. Kharkaviets informed the 
public on June 24, 2009 that Belarus had appealed to the 
European Union for financial assistance.  
These events are linked with certain logic. De facto, Lukashenka 
was negotiating conditions of providing financial support to 
Belarus during the meeting with the EU Commissioner. At the 
same time, these events show that a period of more intense 
cooperation may be started in relations between Belarus and the 
European Union.  
 
 
Just like during a meeting with Javier Solana in February 2009, Lukashenka has offered 
another geopolitical contract to the European Union this time. He proposes to develop 
cooperation on the following basis: Belarus is an independent state (from Russia) and the 
Belarusian government rejects to make concessions to Russia.  
However, presently, the development of relations between Belarus and the European 
Union will rather be determined by the EU than by Lukashenka’s regime. It is absolutely 
excluded that Lukashenka’s regime will come back to its policy line of balancing between 
Russia and the West. The threat on the part of Russia is getting more and more evident.  
If the EU continues to demand Lukashenka to take a number of further steps towards 
political liberalization, despite his hopes, it is quite possible that the regime will dare 
make these concessions. Firstly, they will be related to the release of political prisoners 
and improvement of working conditions of non-governmental organizations in the 
country.  
It is hardly possible that the Belarusian official side will make any other political 
concessions. Both the European Union and Belarus value high cooperation in other fields, 
including the Eastern Partnership program, power engineering etc. 
If the official authorities provide more opportunities for the activities of the political part 
of opposition (politicians, political parties and movements), the voters will get it even 
more clearly that the opposition in its present state does not make an alternative to 
Lukashenka’s regime. They will see that the opposition is more harmful in its present 
poor state than the incumbent regime, among other taking into account the attempts of 
Russia to reinforce its positions in Belarus. 
 
 
 
BB  #19/2009EN      
 
www.belinstitute.eu 
 
2 
Lukashenka's Dead-line Is December 2013 
 
The first visit of the European Commissioner to Belarus, during which her meeting with 
Lukashenka was planned, was scheduled for March 12 and 13. On March 11 Lukashenka 
defiantly went on a working visit to Armenia. By doing so, the authorities indicated to the 
European Union that they had no intention to discuss the subject of human rights and 
political liberalization in Belarus. Lukashenka did not see it fit to repeat to Ferrero-
Waldner what he had said to Javier Solana in February.  
By all appearances, the authorities counted on Russia's assistance during the economic 
crisis. In spring 2009 Lukashenka, Prime Minister Sidorski and other officials repeatedly 
stated that they counted on Russia issuing credits. They voiced confidence that Russia 
would issue a multibillion credit on preferential terms to build a nuclear power plant in 
Belarus (because it will be built by Russian company "Rosatom"). In similar statements 
at the end of May there was more and more irritation. Russian government's measures to 
restrict Belarusian exports become more and more evident. And there were less and less 
hopes on credits from Russia. 
At the height of "trade war" with Russia, on May 28 Lukashenka and Sidorski met Putin in 
Miensk. It became clear that authorities' hopes that Russia would act as an ally and help 
Belarus were vain. Russia started to act as a predator. It made public its appetites 
towards a growingly weaker (according to Russia's Finance Minister Kudrin's statements) 
Belarus. 
The credit of USD five hundred million was denied. Russia did not believe that the credit 
for building the nuclear power plant would be used for the purpose specified. A refusal 
ensued on this issue as well. 
On June 10 Russian company "Transneft" started building BPS-2 (Baltic Pipeline System). 
By December 2013 when the second stage of BPS-2 will be put into operation, Russia will 
get important levers of pressure on Lukashenka's regime. It is probable that these levers 
were missing to "put the squeeze on" Lukashenka in May 2009. 
 
Firstly. Russia will get possibilities to transport its oil by-passing Belarus. 
Secondly. The modernization of the large oil refinery in the town of Kirishi will allow to 
refine those volumes of oil that were previously sent to Belarusian oil refineries ("Naftan" 
in Navapolacak and Mazyr Oil Refinery). Belarus will lose an important source of currency 
proceeds. Even in 2008, the unfavourable year for Belarusian oil refinery because of the 
drop in oil prices in the world market, two above-mentioned oil refineries were on the 
second and third positions on the list of major donors of the Belarusian budget. 
Building of BPS-2 was for a long time a threat of the Russian authorities. This threat 
became a reality when relations between Belarus and Russia were already white-hot. 
Russia's intentions towards integration with Belarus became transparent to the 
Belarusian authorities. 
On June 12 Lukashenka called Ferrero-Waldner and asked her to visit Belarus "as soon as 
possible"… 
 
 
Position of Lukashenka’s Regime in Relations with the EU: New Aspects  
 
The construction of the Baltic Pipeline System-2 deprives the regime of any hope to 
improve relations with Russia, to avoid the Russian pressure and demands to become its 
puppet state.  
A considerable gap will appear in relations between Lukashenka’s regime and Russia. 
This “breach in the wall” has to be plastered. Otherwise, Russia will burst into the 
country. The breach can be fixed with the assistance of the European Union and the West 
only.  
The issue of cooperation with the European Union in the fields of power engineering, 
technologies and diversification of export becomes a matter of life and death for the 
Belarusian official authorities. 
At the first glance, it seems that Lukashenka’s regime hasn’t changed its position. Once 
again, Lukashenka has proposed the EU to develop cooperation with Belarus, as firstly, 
BB  #19/2009EN      
 
www.belinstitute.eu 
 
3 
Belarus is an independent (of Russia) state and secondly, as Belarus declared taking 
concrete steps on development of cooperation with the European Union. Thus, 
Lukashenka stated on June 21, 2009 as follows: “Although some people (in Russia) 
dislike it, we are eager to build good relations with you (i.e., the EU).” 
It is highly significant that the EU Commissioner visited Belarus on Lukashenka’s personal 
invitation. At the same time, a number of important emphases in Lukashenka’s appeal to 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner show considerable changes in the dialogue between the regime 
and the European Union. 
 
1. Lukashenka was doing his best to show that he didn’t play a game and that he wasn’t 
blackmailing the West. The possibility of terminating the dialogue with the European 
Union is excluded.  
During a meeting with J. Solana in February 2009, Lukashenka was talking about a range 
of pre-conditions for starting a dialogue with the European Union. Presently, the official 
authorities make it clear that they are ready to discuss the issues of political liberalization 
in Belarus as well. 
 
2. The governmental authorities have shown the EU that facing threats on the part of 
Russia, they are more interested in development of cooperation with the European Union 
than the EU is interested in development of cooperation with Belarus.  
In the light of Russia’s intrusion to Georgia, the Belarusian government used to 
emphasize that the West was more interested in the dialogue. However, presently the 
Belarusian official authorities are proceeding from an assumption that Russia constitutes 
a larger menace to the incumbent Lukashenka’s regime than to the West. 
 


Belarus Info Letter 19/2009 Lukashenka tries to come to an agreement with the EU