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Moldova\u2013Transdniestria: working together for a prosperous future

Belarus and the EU: New Opportunities or Manifestations of Cynicism?
J.Narkeviciute, V.Jurkonis, Eastern Europe Studies Centre
Visit of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana to 
Belarus gave a new impetus to the discussions related to the EU and Belarus dialogue. This event 
may be assessed both rationally and emotionally. Thinking in rational terms this seems to be a clear-
cut signal to Minsk that the EU is prepared to commence a new stage of pragmatic relations. On the 
one hand, this stands to reason since a passive stance and attempts to isolate Belarus brought no 
concrete results. On the other hand, assessing those alterations emotionally, an impression is formed 
that the EU made a cynical and amoral step by forgetting all sins of the regime.
Inconsistency of the EU
Two years ago the EU proclaimed a document to the authorities of Belarus wherein it clearly pointed 
out that the democratic reforms were a precondition for a closer cooperation. Prior to the election of 
2008 A. Lukashenka’s regime released political prisoners, gave a permit to register the movement of 
the former competitor A. Milinkevich and lifted the ban from two opposition newspapers. There 
were different opinions – from positive asserting that those were essential changes, to pessimistic 
claiming that those alterations were simply cosmetic.
Nevertheless, in the opinion of the expert on Belarus Alexandra Goujon (Bourgogne University, 
France)  “Having  made  some  concessions  to  its  opponents  and  having  slackened  the  rein,  an 
authoritarian regime fails to become democratic, it simply becomes less authoritarian”. This way or 
another, dynamics of the EU-Belarus relations shows that the majority of the Brussels’ requirements 
are if not forgotten, then simply not emphasized. True, J. Solana has met some of the opposition 
representatives but even after that stricter statements or concrete proposals related to human rights 
and democratic values were not made.
1
Content of the Meeting
Irrespective of the fact that  many people consider the meeting of J.  Solana with the Belarusian 
authorities to be an unprecedented event, the basic question that arises is related to the content of the 
given meeting. As Antoliy Lebedko, one of the Belarusian opposition leaders argues, “It is not the 
visit  that is important, it  is what J.  Solana’s briefcase contained”. Comments of the EU foreign 
policy leader and his answers to the journalists’ questions give no clue what the results of the visit 
might be.  Belarusian leader also stayed secretive.
 It is hardly feasible that for the Belarusian society, that found itself in the mist of high-sounding 
phrases about the “constructive dialogue” and “discussion of the essential problems”, the policy of 
the EU seems transparent. Let alone the fact that so far the EU failed to draw up an action plan for 
the normalization of the EU and Belarus relations. A plan that would provide for the measurable 
criteria to assess the progress of the reforms carried out in Belarus.
Situation of the Opposition
Supporters of rational politics would maintain that the work with the Belarusian opposition for more 
than  a  decade  failed  to  produce  any  tangible  results.  Strict  rhetoric  and  sanctions  to  the  A. 
Lukashenka’s regime also proved to be the examples of inefficient EU policy.
A. Lebedko argues that the EU passes on to the tète-à-tète dialogue format. A. Lukashenka expressed 
his  wish  to  communicate  with  Brussels  directly  without  any  mediators  –  leaders  of  opposition 
parties,  public  actors  and  non-governmental  organizations  –  quite  candidly:  “I  would  like  no 
mediators in  our dialogue and especially  those who fail  to show good will  to our country.  No 
mediators inside the country or outside it.”
Supporters of the democratic Belarus find themselves in an ambiguous situation. Representatives of 
the opposition, who for a long time supported the European values and were thereupon imprisoned 
by the regime, are not so sure now about the EU stance. J.  Solana failed to mention either the 
2
entrepreneurs who were recently imprisoned in Belarus, or the forceful conscription of the leaders of 
the youth  opposition  movements,  or  cosmetic  changes  of  the regime,  which  are  insufficient  to 
commence a mutual dialogue. In its turn, making use of the Brussels’ silence Belarusian regime 
receives a chance to find out what the limits of the behaviour that may be tolerated by the EU are.
Especially  skeptical  in  this  sense  was  one  of  the  independent  Belarusian  expert  Viacheslav 
Pazdnyak. According to the analyst, within the context of the dispersal of peaceful demonstrations 
and the act of the burning of the EU flag by the police officers in Minsk, reaction of the EU is 
inadequate and worsening its image.
Causes of the Changes
Changes in the EU foreign policy towards Belarus were called forth by some factors. First,  the 
absence of a long-term strategy related to Belarus. EU fails to possess either any clearly defined 
instruments to influence Belarus, or the strategy and tactics of their use. This gives a possibility to 
alter the foreign policy course in the light of the existing conditions. And by the end of 2008 the 
international as well as economic conditions did change considerably.
Second, it is economic factors. It is nobody’s secret that quite a few EU states have their economic 
interests in Belarus. Besides, the consequences of the economic crisis make Minsk start looking for 
alternative sources itself. Reciprocal interests determine the commercialization of mutual relations.
Third, naturally, is Moscow. On the one hand, it is agreed that if the EU fails to be active in its 
relations with Belarus, the latter “will find itself” in the sphere of complete influence of Russia. This 
attitude was consolidated by the Russian aggression in Georgia. On the other hand, it is for some 
years already that A. Lukashenka himself makes attempts to keep balance between the West and the 
East. The issue of the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is one of the basic Minsk’s tools of 
manipulation.
3
Thus J. Solana’s visit may be assessed in different ways: as a chance for Belarus seeking mutually 
beneficial  cooperation and as cynical step of the EU by keeping silent  about human rights and 
democratic values. However, talking about the chance, we have to ask, whether it is a chance to 
liberalize the political and social life and economics, or to receive an economic and financial benefit. 
And, second, is this a chance for the Belarusian society, or a chance for the ruling elite to stay in 
power?
What has to be done?
Critical attitude to J. Solana’s visit does not mean that democratically minded part of the Belarusian 
society  assesses  negatively  the  very  dialogue  of  the  EU  and  Belarus.  Such  stance  simply 
demonstrates the fear that the representatives of the opposition will not get any chairs in the given 
dialogue.
Independent  Belarusian  experts  are  of  the  opinion  that  for  the  EU and Belarusian  dialogue  to 
promote democratic processes, and not the authoritarianism, the European Union must at present 
devise  a  plan  on  the  normalization  of  mutual  relations.  This  means  that  the  delegation  of  the 
European Commission in Belarus and the team of the European Commission working with Belarus 
in Brussels have to be reinforced.
Rationally thinking, actions of the EU seem to be logical – work with the opposition failed to be 
fruitful, thus alternatives have to be sought. One of them could be an attempt to introduce changes 
from the top,  to tame the authorities and little by little “push forward” the democratic changes. 
Lithuanian experts, however, are right in stating that EU conditions have to be softer that those of 
Russia. This means that promotion of democratic values will be very restricted.
The emotional side, seemingly, has the right to fear that cooperation of Belarus and the EU threatens 
to turn into a real simulation of democratization. Simulation, whereby participants of the dialogue 
will pursue their economic goals,  will  publicize cosmetic, allegedly democratic reforms, perhaps 
some opposition players will be invited to join the game.
4
There’s no use crying over the spilt  milk.  The visit  did take place,  democratic values were not 
mentioned. At present,  the main challenge for the EU is  to find ways to inform the Belarusian 
society. To give information on what has been agreed upon. To draw attention to the fact that it is 
not only the elite of power that is important for the EU, but ordinary people of Belarus as well. To 
inform that such meetings may not legitimize all crimes committed by the regime. Lithuania as the 
member state of the EU and the closest neighbour can make an important contribution to the given 
work.
Otherwise  the greater  part  of  the  Belarusian  society  will  continue  to  suppose  that  humble  EU 
officials arrive to the Minsk Tsar.
5


Belarus and the EU: new opportunities or manifestations of cynicism?

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Russia’s Profile VS Changes
22 July 2008
 
  Russia
 
 
Regrettably enough, Ukraine’s image created by the Russian mass media and Russia’s image as created by the Ukrainian mass media are far from the truth. So what is Russia
really like today? In the common stereotyped view, Russia appears to be an authoritarian energy state with military and law enforcers dominating the highest echelons of power
and practicing a unique form of government called “sovereign democracy”. According to American historian Richard Pipes, Russia strives to become a superpower by using its
advantage of natural resources over other countries, and as long as it does so, it poses no threat to more developed economies.
Many experts regard the Russian “tandemocracy” [Putin-Medvedev tandem democracy] as a component part of some “transition stage” (which, in fact, has been characteristic of
that country for centuries of its existence).
This transition is permanent and unpredictable. Russian mass media work hard to paint a light at the end of this tunnel of transition, but the picture is not adequate to what is
really happening in the country. Winston Churchill was right in calling Russia an enigma wrapped in an enigma inside an enigma.
“Go Russia Go!”
This yell of Russian football fans sounds louder and louder all over the vast expanse of the country. Every success achieved in sports or music is praised and exalted as a historic
exploit and accompanied by patriotic campaigns. Take, for instance, that huge banner with a portrait of Peter the Great at the Euro-2008 match versus Sweden. (And what if
Russia had played the final match versus Germany?) At the same time, any phrase, even harmless and unintentional, that goes “against the grain” dooms even pop stars to blame
and censure.
Interestingly, in the recent national poll “Name of Russia” televised by the Rossiya channel, the pedestal was topped by Peter the Great, Stalin, and Lenin. Two and a half million
votes that came in via the Internet changed the picture a little: Peter the Great was replaced by Nicholas II. Such names as Ivan Bunin, Alexander Block, Ivan Turgenev, and
Fyodor Shalyapin were at the bottom end of the list. Of course, Russia is still the homeland of Alexander Pushkin and Mikhail Lomonosov, but it is already a nation idolizing czars,
military leaders, and conquerors.
Such chauvinistic patriotism is part and parcel of the political course set by Vladimir Putin in an asymmetric response to endless accusations of “defective democracy”, “limited
freedoms”, and “persecution of the opposition”. However, since this process involves “alien enemies” and “homebred renegades”, it is double-edged. According to experts with the
Russian analytical center Sova, “the ideas of grassroots ethnic nationalism have moved from the margins to the mainstream of public conscience” and “the ethnic language” has
become an important tool in the hands of political leaders”. Sova experts assess the situation as “alarming”, noting a steady 20-percent annual increase in the number of crimes
committed in Russia on ethnic grounds.
The recent parliamentary and presidential election campaigns in Russia, which were sickeningly predictable and Soviet-fashioned, were actually built on the ideology of “fighting
internal and external enemies”.
Addressing a huge canvassing rally in Moscow in November 2007, incumbent president Vladimir Putin dotted the i: “Those who confront us are against our plan, because they
have entirely different goals and views. They need a weak and ailing state. They need a disoriented and divided society… Unfortunately, there are some people in this country who
haunt foreign embassies and offices and count on support from foreign funds and governments, not from their own nation.”
Ukraine is also in that number. The well-balanced, well-greased, and well-fueled Russian propagandistic machine exposes it as a country where a) the leadership drags its people
into the hostile North-Atlantic Alliance; b) the Russian language and culture are mercilessly scrubbed out; c) the Russian Black Sea Fleet is forced to leave the “primordially
Russian” peninsula of Crimea; d) WWII criminals are lauded; and e) common history is distorted and abused.
The results of such ideological lobotomy are as evident as they are predictable. The poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Study Center in April showed that 25 percent of
Russians viewed the USA as an enemy of their country; the same number of people called Georgia their enemy; and 21 percent mentioned Ukraine among Russia’s worst enemies.
Such an attitude is definitely detrimental to relations between the two nations.
Just a year ago, in August 2007, opinions were not so negative: only seven percent of respondents admitted to enmity in relation to Ukraine (while the USA, Georgia, the UK, and
the Baltic countries were called enemies by 24, 19, and 7 percent of respondents, respectively). Moreover, in May 2007, according to the same center, 42 percent of Russians
believed it would be good to unite with Belarus, 36 percent were for a union with Ukraine, and 30 percent – with Kazakhstan. Just one year – and the gap between Russia and
Ukraine has become so strikingly wide!
At the same time, Ukrainian’s attitude to their aggressively disposed neighbor remains more than amicable. According to returns of the December 2007 poll conducted by the
Razumkov Center of Economic and Political Studies, 67.3 percent of Ukrainians were for closer cooperation with Russia. They believed in the power of family bonds, the shared
history, common economic interests, and, to a lesser degree, the two leaderships’ political will and common political interests…
What Is Medvedev?
George Bush calls Dmitry Medvedev “a clever guy” and speculation still continues on whether the new Russian president is an independent leader or Putin’s proxy. The Economist
gives a clear answer – “neither” – and describes Putin as the real manager of the government, treasury, and television. Besides, he is more popular than Medvedev: Putin’s name
in the Kremlin is “boss” and Medvedev’s is diminutive – “Dima”…
According to sociological surveys conducted in June and July 2008, Putin’s popularity rating varied between 57 and 62 percent while Medvedev’s stood at 37-42 percent. Between
73 and 76 percent of Russians approved and 10-13 percent disapproved of Putin’s activity at the head of the government. Medvedev’s rating was 66-68 percent vs. 10-13 percent,
respectively. Time will show how long this iconic image of Putin will last.
Putin still enjoys the highest guest status in his country and abroad. The Russian mass media give balanced coverage to Putin’s and Medvedev’s activities – something new for
that country. Addressing the Duma right upon his appointment, Prime Minister Putin sounded like the one and only leader of the nation.
However, Medvedev has already stated very clearly that the country’s foreign policy is the president’s prerogative. His new anticorruption initiatives and unambiguous statements
about Russia’s “eternal karma” of centralized presidential governance have sent clear signals to those who may have devised a parliamentary model of government. Medvedev
unswervingly follows the guidelines set by his predecessor – with the same philosophy, content, priorities, and even vocabulary. Actually, Medvedev took off in one plane with
Putin as the copilot, but he is too ambitious to play second fiddle.
The real correlation between the president’s and the prime minister’s powers will become clearer in a few months. This fall, Medvedev plans to reform the Security Council and
vest it with serious powers: its resolutions and directives will be ultimate and binding for all executive bodies, including the central government.
According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, an authoritative Russian sociologist, despite permanent reshuffles in the top echelon, the “backbone” remains the same: there are always 60
percent of top-rank officials who come from law enforcement agencies and special services. Yet, the new president has to liberalize Russia’s political life if he wants his country at
least to resemble a democracy and be on par with European states with their system of values and to lead other post-USSR countries.
Addressing German politicians and businesspeople in Berlin in June, Medvedev stated, “The Russian and European democracies share common humanitarian roots and we have
the same set of values.” So far, his words deserve little faith, judging from the way Russian authorities “handle” freedom of expression, especially during election campaigns
where foreign observers are unwelcome.
Legacy
On one hand, Putin managed to lead the country out of post-Yeltsin prostration, cement vertical power, take control of the provinces, achieve sociopolitical and macroeconomic
stability, and strengthen Russia’s international authority. On the other hand, he achieved all this through administrative methods and largely thanks to unprecedented price hikes
on the global fuel market . In 1999, when FSB chief Vladimir Putin was promoted to prime minister, one barrel of Brent oil was $17.9, and now the price has soared to $140. The
price of Russian natural gas in the EU has grown from $64 per 1,000 cu m in 1999 to $410. Subsequently, according to expert estimates, Gazprom’s annual proceeds from gas
exports have increased from $6.8 billion to $38 billion.
At the same time, Russia’s macroeconomic stability is increasingly affected by high inflation and food price hikes; considerable financial resources are pumped into state-run
corporations and spent on social needs; and economic growth is hampered by widespread corruption. Last year Russia slumped down from 120th to 143rd position in the
At the same time, Russia’s macroeconomic stability is increasingly affected by high inflation and food price hikes; considerable financial resources are pumped into state-run
corporations and spent on social needs; and economic growth is hampered by widespread corruption. Last year Russia slumped down from 120th to 143rd position in the
Transparency International corruption rating of 160 countries, joining Gambia, Indonesia, and Togo. In 2007 Russia led all CIS countries in the WEF integral competitiveness
rating but was only 58th in the list of 131 economies.
Another problem is the inability of its outdated post-Soviet infrastructures and inflexible human resources to meet growing consumer and investment demands. Russian
economists are seriously concerned about salaries growing faster than labor productivity – basically owing to the surplus of “oil dollars” rather than higher quality labor. According
to Rosstat [State Statistics Committee of Russia], in the past twelve months, the number of employed Russians has grown by a mere 300,000. The federal migration program is
slack and cannot solve this issue. Neither can the relatively cheap immigrant workforce from other CIS countries or China.
Besides the rapidly increasing influx of Chinese workers to the Far East, the Kremlin is confronted by ethnic disproportions in birth rates in different regions of the country. In a
couple of decades the Muslim community is expected to become the most numerous and Islam – the dominant religion in the country.
Putin also “handed down” unresolved social problems. In 2007 more than 22 million Russians lived below the poverty line. In the past two years, the number of very rich citizens
has grown sharply while the number of low-income citizens has decreased by a mere seven percent.
According to a July poll, Russians are primarily concerned about growing prices (82%); poverty (45%); and the sharply widening gap between the richer and the poorer (35%).
Notably, this year the Russian market rated first in Europe by the number of sold cars (1,645,000 worth $33,800M sold in the first half of the year).
At the same time, only two percent of Russians are concerned about trampled civil rights and limited democratic freedoms.
Putin’s parliamentary legacy is quite agreeable for his successor. The December 2007 election gave the president total control over both houses of the parliament with very
moderate opposition in the person of the tractable Liberal Democrats and the “reasonable” Communists. The democratic opposition represented by the SPS, Yabloko, the United
Civil Front, and separate groups of human rights organizations was pressed back to the political periphery.
On July 10, the united democratic opposition made public its program, “300 Steps to Freedom”. The first step consists in “immediate and unconditional abolition of censorship and
return to full freedom of speech”. The last step should be “transfer of capital from Moscow to the middle part of the country”. If such a surrealistic scenario ever came true, the
country would be anything but Russia.
Many-Faced Russia
Russia keeps searching for its place in the global community and geopolitical processes. On one hand, it acts as “a superpower” with convincing “carbohydrate responses” to
challenges. It did so in early January of 2006, when it demonstratively shut off its gas tap “to put Ukraine in its place”. It did so last September in response to the “undesirable”
returns of the preterm parliamentary election in Ukraine. Last week Russia halved its crude oil supply to the Czech Republic in response to the Prague agreement on deployment
of a U.S. missile defense radar there.
On the other hand, Russia is uniquely self-sufficient in terms of gold currency reserves, which can help it weather any fluctuations on the global fuel market.
It should be noted that “energy pressure” is not the only element of the Kremlin’s policy. Moscow tries to initiate new international mechanisms of partnership. Recently it
suggested creating a kind of “grain alliance” similar to OPEC. On June 5, in Berlin Medvedev proposed to convene a European summit for concluding a regional security and arms
control pact. He specifically proposed to proceed from “purely national interests, not distorted by any political motives”.
It is obvious that a comprehensive and unbiased assessment of the current processes in Russia can help Ukrainian policymakers to overcome stereotypes and abandon black-and-
white approaches, make their dialog with Moscow more transparent and pragmatic, and dissolve the ideological discrepancies. And finally, the better they come to know Russia
and its development trends, the sooner they can choose the right strategy in relation to Russia.
Ukraine and Russia, which have proclaimed each other strategic partners, are today acting in a mode of confrontation not caring about future partnership. As a result, out medium
term relations might be a combination of cooperation, competition and conflicts; numerous declarations and threats might turn into real actions and challenges, in response to
which our politicians would have to review the National security strategy of Ukraine.
***
These are just several features of Russia’s profile. Undoubtedly, Russia is a great country with an amazing history and unique people. However, understanding of this is coming
not only from official propaganda, victorious statements of the high and mighty and emotional speeches of inveterate patriots but from the hope that the new generation of the
Russians will build a competitive, modern European state with high democratic and social standards. Partnership with such a country would be attractive for its neighbors, which
also feel a severe pain of post-Soviet division but nevertheless, they try to build their future not resurrecting shadows of the past.
 
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Russia\u2019s profile vs changes