Policy Documentation Center

Eralp, Yalim

   
  
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 POLICY	  BRIEF	  
	   	   	   	   	  GLOBAL	  POLITICAL	  TRENDS	  CENTER	  (GPoT)	  
	  
	  
NATO’S	  LISBON	  SUMMIT:	  
NEW	  STRATEGIC	  CONCEPT	  AND	  THE	  MISSILE	  DEFENCE 
	  
by	  YALIM	  ERALP	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  December	  2010	  |	  GPoT	  PB	  no.	  20	  
ABSTRACT	   The Lisbon Summit was important for two reasons. Firstly, the 
acceptance of a new strategic concept, the seventh since NATO  was 
founded. The new concept comes after the Al Kaide attacks, the Afghan and 
Iraq wars and a greater threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 
addition, relations with Russia were reset, making them of strategic 
importance. The second important aspect is the acceptance of a missile 
defence system whereby all  populations, territory and forces will be 
protected. 
	  
Every NATO summit in its own right is 
important. Yet when a new 
strategic concept is adopted a 
summit  can be considered as  a 
milestone. The Lisbon Summit 
adopted the seventh strategic 
concept since NATO’s inception, 
which means that almost every 
decade a new concept ihas been 
adopted. Given the changing 
circumstances of the balance of 
power among states this is 
inevitable. 
After the 1999 Washington summit, 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 
menace of Al Kaide necessitated 
the adoption of a new concept. 
NATO became engaged in 
Afghanistan, the US and some 
NATO allies invaded Iraq, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons 
became more acute and relations 
with Russia had to be “reset.” The 
world is no longer unipolar. Power is 
shifting to the East from the West. 
Moreover, the global financial crisis 
and defence costs are inevitably 
linked. Now NATO forces are 
engaged in “out of area” actions 
and their defence requires new 
force structures and weapons. Giles 
Merritt, Director of Security and 
Defence Agenda at the Atlantic 
Council of Turkey‘s 18th International 
Conference in Antalya on 
December 3, 2010 aptly pointed 
out that new force structures and 
2 NATO’S	  LISBON	  SUMMIT:	  NEW	  STRATEGIC	  CONCEPT	  AND	  THE	  MISSILE	  DEFENCE,	  YALIM	  ERALP	  
 
 
  
  
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weapons systems are necessary to 
meet the changing risks and 
challenges. 
Last but not least, the public wants 
to know why NATO is stil needed. 
 
The Strategic Concept 
The Lisbon strategic concept is 
shorter and punchier than the one 
adopted in Washington and one 
that the public can better 
understand. This is an important 
change, as In times of financial 
crisis, public and parliamentary 
support become all the more 
necessary. 
Regarding content, whereas the 
Washington text listed five core 
tasks for the Alliance – security, 
consultations, 
deterrence and 
defence, crisis 
management and 
partnerships – the 
new text has 
narrowed those tasks 
to three: collective 
defence, crisis 
management and 
cooperative security. 
This numerical 
change does not 
mean that 
consultations are left out, since 
paragraph five of the new text in 
indicates that NATO remains the 
unique and essential transatlantic 
forum for consultations. If one were 
to search for differences in wording, 
what catches one’s eye is that in 
the Washington text under crisis 
management the word consensus 
exists whereas the new text has 
omitted the word consensus. In 
addition, Article 10 of the Lisbon 
text puts greater stress on the threat 
posed by terrosim by indicating 
that it is a “direct threat.” 
NATO’s open door policy continues. 
However, there are two limitations, 
the first one geographic: only 
European democracies can be 
members. The second one, in my 
view, is political. How a potential 
candidate for membership affects 
relations with Russia is the key.  
And this brings me to relations with 
Russia. Here the biggest difference 
between the 1999 Washington 
concept and 2010 Lisbon concept 
is relations with Russia. Paragraph 
36 of the Washington text speaks of 
NATO-Russia Founding Act as the 
basis. In paragraphs 33 ve 34 of the 
Lisbon text, much 
stronger language is 
used on the 
importance of close 
relations with Russia, 
that cooperation 
with Russia is of 
strategic importance. 
Indeed, this is the 
consequence of the 
“reset” of relations 
between the US and 
Russia. Russia is not a 
member of NATO but 
has a weight almost that of a 
member. 
Similarly, Paragraph 32 of the Lisbon 
text is much warmer on NATO-EU 
relations than the old strategic 
concept, and the EU is now 
considered an “essential partner.” 
This is meaningful since President 
Obama has sometimes been 
accused of ignoring the EU. Here of 
NATO’s open door policy 
continues. However, there 
are two limitations, the first 
one geographic: only 
European democracies can 
be members. The second 
one, in my view, is political. 
How a potential candidate 
for membership affects 
relations with Russia is the 
key.  
3 NATO’S	  LISBON	  SUMMIT:	  NEW	  STRATEGIC	  CONCEPT	  AND	  THE	  MISSILE	  DEFENCE,	  YALIM	  ERALP	  
 
 
  
  
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course, Turkey-Cyprus relations 
remains a sticking point. 
 
Missile Defence System 
For the implementation of the 
concept, political guidance will be 
prepared. Naturally, the Lisbon 
Summit and the strategic concept 
should be read together with the 
summit declaration. Paragraph 37 
of the Declaration deals with 
Ballistic Missile Defence, which was 
the main menu of the Summit. 
Conceived in 2002 by President 
Bush, the system then intended to 
defend NATO deployed forces and 
was to be fixed on the ground. It 
was not a NATO project aimed at 
protecting from ICBM’s. President 
Obama changed the concept to 
also protect NATO European 
populations, territory and forces. 
President Obama has promoted a 
less costly, more flexible and 
phased system of radars and anti-
ballistic missiles that 
will have 
components in 
Europe and at sea. 
(the phases of which 
are against short 
range missiles, 
medium range 
missiles and long 
range missiles and 
ICBM’s.) The cost, 
according to a NATO spokesman, 
will be 1.5 billion to be managed 
over ten years. In President 
Obama’s words, for the first time 
“we have agreed to develop a 
missile defence capability that is 
strong enough to cover all NATO 
European territory and populations 
as well as the United States.” 
According to a document that 
appeared in the Wikileaks cables, 
there was a fear that Turkey might 
spoil the party. There was 
recognition that Turkey’s voice 
would be louder. Turkey had said 
three things on the missile defence: 
a) The system should not be placed 
against a certain country (which 
means Iran should not be named). 
b) It should cover all NATO territory. 
c) It should be a NATO project 
under NATO command and 
control. 
According to a cable published by 
Wikileaks, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
told President Barack Obama that 
“the project must be implemented 
in a NATO context to diminish the 
political cost that his government 
will likely bear both in terms of 
domestic politics and in Turkey’s 
relations with Iran.” The American 
side wondered “how much NATO 
will be enough for 
Turkish leaders.” 
Despite denials by 
Turks that the US had 
made a proposal to 
base an AN/TPY-2 
(transportable radar 
surveillance) and 
other missile defence 
assets in Turkey, a 
secret cable from the US Embassy in 
Ankara says the opposite. Indeed, 
the cable reads the following: “We 
have made the point to the Turks 
that a decision to not base the 
AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey is 
essentially a decision to opt out of 
missile defence coverage for 
Turkey; this would not be a political 
Obama said  that for the first 
time “we have agreed to 
develop a missile defence 
capability that is strong 
enough to cover all NATO 
European territory and 
populations as well as the 
United States”.  
4 NATO’S	  LISBON	  SUMMIT:	  NEW	  STRATEGIC	  CONCEPT	  AND	  THE	  MISSILE	  DEFENCE,	  YALIM	  ERALP	  
 
 
  
  
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consequence, but just a fact based 
on physics and geometry.” Turkey’s 
main concern seems to be relations 
with Iran as Foreign Minister 
Davutoğlu, called the Iranian 
Foreign Minister after the Lisbon 
Summit to brief him on Summit 
decisions, which, in my view, is an 
unprecedented act. Another 
unmentioned concern on the part 
of Turkey seems to be whether 
Israel will benefit from the missile 
defence system. Turkey believes 
that this would not be necessary 
since the system exists already for 
Israel. 
The missile defence system has 
been the main menu of President 
Obama’s NATO approach 
strengthening the transatlantic link. 
If Turkey had vetoed that system at 
Lisbon, this would have 
marginalised Turkey in 
NATO and would 
have damaged US-
Turkey relations 
immeasurably. Still, 
tough negotiations 
are ahead of us until 
the report on 
basing, command 
and control 
technical details are 
presented to NATO 
defence ministers. If 
the radar is based in 
Turkey, Patriot and 
THAAD systems will 
probably be 
needed to protect 
the radars. It is said that radars will 
be provided by the US at no cost. 
The US will provide the missiles 
protecting the radars. Costs of anti-
ballistic missiles will be borne 
nationally as needs of each country 
are different. Should Turkey opt out 
of the system, this would have 
political consequences. Turkey has 
said that it is not threatened by 
Iranian missiles. However, Turkey 
was planning to set up its own 
national missile defence system. If 
that were not for Iran, then one can 
legitimately ask who then? 
 
Global NATO 
As far as membership in NATO is 
concerned,  membership cannot 
be global at least for geographic 
reasons: the Alliance is limited to 
Europe. But the challenges are 
global and this forces the Alliance 
to act globally. To what extent the 
Alliance will act globally will 
depend on several factors. The first 
is the war in Afghanistan. How will 
Afghanistan and 
Pakistan look like after 
Alliance forces leave 
is an important 
element. The second, 
no less important 
factor, is relations with 
Russia. If cooperation 
with Russia goes well 
then the Alliance will 
tend to act more 
freely globally. 
Perhaps the litmus test 
lies in Russia’s 
partnership in the 
missile defence 
system. If relations with 
Russia sour, will the latter try to beef 
up Collective Security Cooperation 
Treaty Organisation as a rival to 
NATO? Or will it turn to Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation? How 
will the EU’s military capacities fare 
in the coming decade? The present 
 
The costs of anti-ballistic 
missiles will be borne 
nationally as needs of each 
country are different. 
Should Turkey opt out of the 
system, this would have 
political consequences. 
Turkey has said that it is not 
threatened by Iranian 
missiles. However, Turkey 
was planning to set up its 
own national missile 
defence system. 
5 NATO’S	  LISBON	  SUMMIT:	  NEW	  STRATEGIC	  CONCEPT	  AND	  THE	  MISSILE	  DEFENCE,	  YALIM	  ERALP	  
 
 
  
  
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financial crisis does not augur well 
for  the EU in the military field. Last 
but not least is the question of the 
cohesion of the Alliance. Giles 
Merritt believes that ”unthinking EU 
support for US ‘adventurism‘ is over; 
Europeans would  support the US 
when its strength is needed and US 
policies are acceptable.” This is in 
addition to Turkey’s new attitude. 
The challenges and risks are global; 
just how global they will be will 
largely depend on those factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YALIMERALP 
Ambassador Yalım Eralp (retired) is 
a member of the High Advisory 
Board at the GPoT, a faculty 
member in the Department of 
International Relations of Istanbul 
Kültür University, and a diplomatic 
commentator at CNN TÜRK. In 1962 
he received his bachelor’s degree 
from the Faculty of Political 
Sciences at Ankara University. His 
career at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs spanned from 1962 to 2000, 
during which time he worked in 
New York, Brussels, Washington, 
D.C., Rome, Vienna, and India, 
where he served as ambassador.  
 
The opinions and conclusion 
expressed herein are those of the 
individual author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of 
GPoT or Istanbul Kültür University. 
 
6 NATO’S	  LISBON	  SUMMIT:	  NEW	  STRATEGIC	  CONCEPT	  AND	  THE	  MISSILE	  DEFENCE,	  YALIM	  ERALP	  
 
 
  
  
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 ABOUT	  GPoT	  
	  
	  
	  
 
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research 
institution established under the auspices of Istanbul Kültür University in 2008.  
Our mission is to conduct high quality, independent and innovative research 
and education, acting as a link between policy-making institutions, 
academia, civil society and the media. 
The Center aims to achieve this by routinely bringing together opinion leaders, 
government officials and other policy-makers, analysts and members of the 
media from Turkey, the region and elsewhere. Our activities range from 
conducting projects and research that analyze the contemporary social, 
political and economic trends in regional and international politics and 
producing policy recommendations, contributing to public debate through 
roundtable discussions and international conferences to publishing policy 
briefs and monographs, among others. 
In accordance with its mission, GPoT Center has been active in virtually all 
fronts concerning not only Turkish foreign policy but the current regional and 
international agenda, including Turkey’s European Union accession process, 
the Cyprus issue, NATO, the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process, issues in 
the Middle East and North Africa, national and regional democratization, the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict and, most recently, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. 
	  
CONTACT	  DETAILS	  
 
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) 
Istanbul Kültür University 
Atakoy Campus, Bakirkoy 
34 156 Istanbul, Turkey 
 
www.gpotcenter.org 
info@gpotcenter.org 
Tel: +90 212 498 44 65 
Fax: +90 212 498 44 05  
GLOBAL	  POLITCAL	  TRENDS	  CENTER  


NATO\u2019s Lisbon Summit: new strategic concept and the missile defence

GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
 
 
 
 
   Policy Brief 
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
The Bermuda Triangle: Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia 
 
Yalım Eralp 
May 2010 
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
  According to some Turkish officials, April 24th 
2010 was averted with no damage, since the US 
President Obama did not use that “magical” 
word; genocide. In reality, Obama talks of   
genocide without using the word. Meds 
Yeghern, meaning the Great Calamity, is a term 
synonymous with genocide for Armenians. 
 
  This brought to mind the future, or rather the 
ratification, of the Protocols, signed between 
Turkey and Armenia in 2009. The text of the   
Protocols ensure a compromise in terms of each 
country’s priorities. For Armenia, the opening of 
the border is the biggest issue, while for Turkey 
it is Armenia’s recognition of the mutual border 
and the establishment of a historical commission 
to investigate the Armenian question. The      
Protocols faced fierce criticism in both countries. 
In Armenia, those opposing the historical     
commission are against opening up the genocide  
for discussion at all. In addition, according to the 
Armenians objecting to the Protocols, the clause 
that refers to the establishment of diplomatic ties 
and reads “recognition of the border along     
international treaties” translates as an indirect 
recognition of the 1921 Kars Treaty. 
 
In Turkey, those opposing the Protocols focus on 
the same clauses. Some say that the lack of a real 
mention of the Kars Treaty is a big mistake, that 
it will mean for Turkey giving up its special    
observant (droit de regard) status on 
Nakhchivan, and that the historical commission 
will open up a bargain on the genocide question. 
And of course there is the objection that the    
Protocols cannot be ratified while Armenia’s   
occupation of Azeri lands continues. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The Protocols signed between Armenia and Turkey constitute a significant 
threshold in the relationship between the two countries. The process of ratification has 
been stalled, especially due to issues in Turkish domestic politics, and the Protocols have 
been shelved for now. However, it is important to not completely kill the process. It would 
thus be helpful in terms of a soft transition into the future if both parties implement those 
clauses in the Protocols that do not require ratification. 
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
  Azerbaijan also made its move as the Protocols 
faced objections in Turkey. Ministers from the 
brother country, which was being continuously 
informed of the Turkish-Armenian negotiations, 
came to Turkey and almost became a part of the 
domestic politics. They acted out in ways that 
would have created an avert reaction in Turkey 
had Azerbaijan not been “the brother country”. 
AK Party officials and the Prime Minister were 
startled by the situation. Prime Minister Erdoğan 
went to Baku and gave guarantees that the     
Protocols would not be ratified before the       
Nagorno Karabakh conflict is resolved. In fact, 
the Prime Minister’s words were taking it a few 
steps further than the rhetoric and conceptions 
of the Foreign Ministry and Minister Davutoğlu. 
Up until then, Turkish governments were       
talking about certain steps to be taken towards 
the resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict in 
order to open the border, as Armenians and    
Azeris themselves had come to an                    
understanding to defer the solution of the     
problem. The core of the problem was the       
disagreement over whether a clause specifically 
referring to how the Karabakh issue would be 
resolved should be put in the text; Armenians 
want the word referendum mentioned, the      
Azeris object to this. Armenians refuse to     
withdraw from the occupied rayons as long as 
the method of resolution remains undecided. 
 
  Turkey’s condition that the Armenian-Azeri 
conflict should be resolved in order for the    
Protocols to be ratified got a negative reaction 
from Armenia. Those who objected to the       
Protocols in Turkey criticized the absence of this 
subject in the text. In fact, it is not common to 
put an issue having to do with a third country in 
these kinds of Protocols. The three co-chairs of 
the Minsk Group, the US, France and Russia, 
stressed that the ratification of the Protocols 
should not be tied to any conditions and thus 
indirectly criticized Turkey’s attitude. What 
caused this limp? During the Yerevan visit      
organized by the Global Political Trends Center 
of Istanbul Kültür University, Armenian officials 
told the Turkish delegation that during the     
negotiations, the Turkish side did not mention 
the resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. 
Instead the Armenian side brought up the    
question of how the conflict will be managed in 
the process, and they were told that the problem 
was already solved at the highest level. The    
officials from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, on 
the other hand, claim the opposite; that the   
problem was brought up by the Turkish side. 
There is thus a serious uncertainty, while the 
Swiss side that chaired the negotiations remains 
silent. There are then three possibilities here:  
 
A. The Turkish side did bring up the subject 
during negotiations, but not as a             
precondition for ratification. 
 
B. The Turkish side, as Armenians claim, did 
not bring up the subject.  
 
C.  The reason being that the co-chairs of the 
 Minsk Group gave guarantees for         
 progress on the resolution of the                 
 Armenian-Azeri conflict to the Turkish 
 side. 
 
 
 
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GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
  For a while now the co-chairs of the Minsk 
Group have made it a tradition to make           
optimistic statements on the Armenian-Azeri 
conflict. Statements such as the conflict being 
95% solved have been abounding. In                 
international relations, “the devil is in the        
details.” The most sensitive part of the issue is 
that 5% that remains to be solved. 
 
  In addition to this stumbling block before     
ratification, the Turkish side claimed the          
decision by the Armenian Constitutional Court 
confirming the compatibility of the Protocols 
with the Armenian Constitution also cast a 
shadow over the Protocols. The Court’s 6-page 
conviction mainly stated that the Protocols could 
not be interpreted as to contradict the preamble 
of the Armenian Constitution or Article 11 of the 
Declaration of Independence. In other words, it 
is stressed that Armenia would not give up on 
the idea of, or the work towards, “having the 
Armenian Genocide, including in Western      
Armenia, recognized by the international       
community”. The message is that the historical 
sub-commission envisaged by the Protocols   
cannot be interpreted as having given up on 
genocide recognition. It is assumed that it will 
not be easy for Turkey to convincingly argue on 
the international stage that this decision by the 
Court cast a shadow over the Protocols. Indeed, 
it is more significant that President Sargsyan 
said in an interview he gave to the Russian      
media that the committee would not discuss the 
genocide, but rather the consequences of the 
genocide. Those who oppose the Protocols put a 
similar claim forward in Turkey. The relevant 
provision of the Protocol mentions “dialogue 
towards establishing mutual trust between the 
two peoples, including a scientific and objective 
investigation of historical documents and        
archives.” In this regard, Sargsyan’s statement 
does not conform to the text, but shows how    
Armenia interprets this provision. 
  The stall in the ratification process in Turkey 
prompted action on the Armenian side as well. 
First, legislation was passed that allowed the 
government to withdraw their signatures from 
the Protocols. Later the President announced 
that the Protocols were suspended and Armenia 
would not take action until Turkey ratified them. 
Thus Armenia leveled up with Turkey in terms 
of ratification. If Armenia wanted to put Turkey 
in a difficult position internationally, it would 
ratify the Protocols and shift the pressure        
towards Turkey. The content of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan’s meeting with Sargsyan in Washington 
DC in April during the Nuclear Summit is       
unknown, but it is presumed that his statements 
that Turkey is behind the process and the        
signatures impeded Armenia’s tendency to 
withdraw from the process. The remarks      
President Sargsyan made when he announced 
the suspension of the process on President Gül’s 
political honesty could evoke an important     
subject. Turkey was not the party to bring up 
Karabakh during the Turkish-Armenian          
negotiation process, as President Gül had not 
made any statements implying the ratification 
process was conditional on another issue either. 
 
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GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
  The Protocols serve an important function in 
the normalization of relations. It would not only 
be wrong to give up the process, but that would 
also make it even harder to restart in the future. 
The opening of the border might not mean as 
much to the Armenian economy as it did in 
early 1990s. Still, the opening of this door would 
both allow Armenia to breath better and also be 
perceived there as a moral victory against 
Azerbaijan. 
 
  For Turkey, keeping the border closed is an 
anomaly. However, an equally important issue 
for Turkey is the desire to curb Armenia’s 
international campaign for genocide recognition. 
To counter this campaign Turkey would try to 
use both the historical sub-commission and the 
article on “avoiding policies that are not 
coherent with good neighborly relations” in the 
Protocol on Building Diplomatic Relations. It is 
important that the historical sub-commission is 
established. In fact, President Clinton had 
pointed to a history commission against the 
genocide campaign. In reality a history 
commission on genocide would conduce to a 
document exchange, like it was done through 
the University of Vienna in 2004. Arriving at a 
decision regarding the genocide would be the 
task of an international court, which the 1948 
Charter points to as well. A historical 
commission cannot take such a decision. The 
Armenian side would say they are discussing 
the genocide through the commission, while the 
Turkish side would be sending the message that 
documents are being investigated in a scientific 
and objective manner. 
 
 
 The process of normalization in                     
Turkish-Armenian relations is shelved for now. 
But it is not dead. There are a number of          
possibilities in this area that could keep the    
process alive to an extent, even if the Protocols 
are not ratified. 
 
The Minsk Group:  
 The three co-chairs should put more effort in 
solving the conflict. Specifically, Russia should 
not view the conflict solely from the perspective 
of energy corridors. It is apparent that Russia 
would like to tie the solution of the conflict to 
shaping its energy    issues in its favor. The       
occupation is as much of an anomaly as the 
Turkish-Armenian border   being closed. There 
is the impression that the idea in 1990s of       
solving the conflict in accordance with          
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity has shifted     
towards the region being integrated to Armenia. 
Azerbaijan’s idea to solve the conflict with arms 
is faulty and would cause   larger problems. For 
the Madrid Principles to be implemented, the 
Minsk Group has to work in unity. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
 Turkey:  
 Even though the Protocols remain not ratified, 
there are steps that could be taken without 
having to wait for ratification. As foreseen in the 
Protocols, establishing dialogue between the 
Foreign Ministries of both countries, student and 
specialist exchange in the fields of science and 
education are the principal among those steps. 
The Protocols do not have to ratified to do these. 
Moreover, protecting and improving Turkey’s 
Armenian heritage and culture is something that 
needs to be done regardless of the Protocols. In 
addition, there are many steps that could be 
taken with neighboring Armenia in the field of 
culture, including TV programs. Building close 
dialogue among the two people with assistance 
from civil society organization is essential for the 
future and a soft transition in relations. 
 
 
Armenia:  
 Expecting Armenia to give up the genocide idea 
is unrealistic. Nonetheless, it is possible for 
Armenia to act more carefully even when 
pursuing this idea. Vilifying Turkey everyday 
cannot be very beneficial. It would also prevent 
a rapprochement between the two people. 
Armenia should not push aside the 
“constructive ambiguity” formula in regards to 
implementing the Madrid Principles within the 
Minsk Group framework. 
 
 
 
Page  5 
Azerbaijan:  
  The leaders of this brother country, who are 
informed on the Turkish-Armenian negotiation 
process, are expected to be more careful in their 
remarks concerning Turkey. Threatening, 
screaming and playing the Russia card may 
seem profitable in the short run, but still cause 
unforeseen damages. Since the Armenian 
occupation has gone on for the past 15 years 
despite the border being closed, the border has 
ceased to be a factor in the solution of the 
Armenian-Azeri dispute. Just as the annulment 
of Karabakh’s status had been wrong in the 
beginning, a new military operation might 
complicate matters even further. 
 Ambassador (R)Yalım Eralp 
Yalım Eralp is a member of the High Advisory Board at the Global Political Trends Center, a 
faculty member at the Department of International Relations of Istanbul Kultur University and a 
diplomatic commentator at CNN TÜRK. Yalım Eralp was born in 1939 in Istanbul. In 1958, he 
graduated from Forest Hills High School, New York City. In 1962, he graduated from the Faculty of 
Political Sciences, Ankara. Between 1962-1983, he served as a diplomat in New York, Greece, and 
in Rome NATO Defense College from where he graduated. Later on, he was appointed as Counselor 
at the Turkish Delegation within NATO, Brussels. He served in Washington D.C. as the Deputy 
Chief of Mission. Having served as the Spokesman of the Ministry for four years, he became 
Ambassador to India in 1987. Between 1991-1996, Ambassador Eralp served as Principal Advisor 
to Prime Ministers Mesut Yılmaz and Tansu Çiller and was also the Director of NATO Affairs at the 
Ministry. In 1996, he became Ambassador to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) Delegation in Vienna. In 2000, Ambassador Eralp retired from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
About GPoT  
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) was established as a research unit under the auspices of 
Istanbul Kultur University in 2008. 
 
GPoT Center aims to produce innovative and distinctive policy recommendations by analyzing the 
contemporary trends in regional and international politics. 
 
 
*The opinions and conclusion expressed herein are those of the individual author and does not necessarily reflect the views 
of GPoT or Istanbul Kultur University. 
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
Page  6 


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