Policy Documentation Center

Gutsman, Maria

Shevliakov, Ihor

Shumylo, Olga

Inside Ukraine No. 4 (January 29, 2010) 
Inside Ukraine: Ukraine is an electoral democracy! Now what?

Parusinski, Jakub

European Focus No. 7 (April 01, 2010) 
Ukraine\u2019s Higher Education Institutions: Fighting isolation

 Press Release  
 
 
Institute of Public Finance • Smičiklasova 21 • 10000 Zagreb 
Tel. (+385 1) 4886-444, Fax. (+385 1) 4819-365 
www.ijf.hr • office@ijf.hr 
  
 No. 20                      Zagreb, April 26, 2010
 
 
Which Government to Trust? 
 
 
 
Katarina Ott, PhD. 
 
In only a couple of days the Croatian Government adopted two completely opposite 
programmes: first, the proposal of Guidelines for Aid to Ailing Companies, 
providing, among other things, for the conversion of government claims against 
such companies into equity stakes, and after that, a perfectly conceived Economic 
Recovery Programme, one of the main goals of which is to reduce government 
interference in business flows. Do we have one or two governments, and which of 
them should we trust - the one from Monday or the one from Thursday?  
 
On Monday, April 19 the Croatian Government announced its Economic Recovery 
Programme which is excellently conceived and should indeed be welcomed as a strategic 
document. The Programme incorporates almost everything that the Institute of Public 
Finance has been supported for many years - the state's withdrawal from the economy, the 
implementation of necessary structural reforms, public administration rationalisation and 
efficiency improvement, budget expenditure reduction, tax system simplification, state aid 
system reform, etc. The Program includes everything that we have desired, but similar 
documents, usually called 'strategies', have already existed before. Now that we are using 
this 'military' terminology, it should be noted that so far, strategies have never developed 
into tactics. The implementation has always been missing, and even in this Programme it is 
not clearly specified when it will become operational.  
 
The document lacks information on the persons responsible and time limits for its 
implementation, the allocation of tasks and methods of work, as well as the Programme 
costs and sources of its funding. 
 
More specifically, the Programme includes a fair number of activities which, if implemented, 
will be far from cheap. The promotion of investment projects, particularly in the field of 
energy (with an emphasis on renewable sources of energy), environmental protection 
(focused on 'green' technologies) and infrastructure (railways, sea, river and airports and 
water supply) is only one example of such activities. Which ministries are competent for the 
implementation of individual tasks? What are the deadlines for the completion of each phase 
of these activities? Who will do what and how? What will be the cost of each of these 
measures by phase? Has the funding been provided and from what sources? 
 
The Programme deadlines, when provided, are rather unambitiously set. A public sector 
employees register is envisaged to be set up by March 31, 2011. Most public sector 
employees receive their salaries through the State Treasury, so these data are already 
known. If the Government really wants a public sector employees register, public enterprises 
and extra-budgetary funds can submit the relevant data, at request, in only a week. But of 
course, an additional problem here is the public sector definition and scope which will be 
 1
 2
mentioned later in the text. A gradual reduction of the share of general government revenue 
and expenditure in GDP by 3 percentage points is not expected before 2020. Since the 
general government budget accounts for almost a half of GDP in Croatia (relative to the 
transition countries’ average of as little as about one third of GDP), its downsizing should 
really be accelerated. 
 
A question eventually occurring to the Programme reader is how, and on what basis, will the 
Government make monthly assessments of the effects and status of all the measures and 
activities, as provided at the end of the Programme.  
 
Only four days earlier, on Thursday April 15, this very Government proposed Guidelines for 
Aid to Ailing Companies. It is intended to support enterprises by two kinds of aid: by write-
off or partial write-off of their debts to the government, and by transforming government 
claims to equity stakes, i.e. recapitalisation. This relates to loans, taxes, contributions, 
customs duties and similar corporate debts. 
 
Applications for such aid will be processed by the responsible ministries, and subject to 
subsequent consent by the Ministry of Finance. After being consented to by the Ministry of 
Finance, the applications must be approved by the Croatian Competition Agency and then 
finally decided upon by the Government. In the case of agriculture and fisheries, the process 
excludes the Competition Agency. 
 
Regrettably, this gives rise to a lot of problems, in particular: 
- Who will decide, and on what basis, whether the debt to the government will be 
written off or transformed into government’s equity stakes? 
- The definition of an “ailing company” is very arguable, and besides, some exemptions 
have been envisaged. 
- It is questionable whether the ministries are capable of processing the applications in 
a professional and objective manner and of checking the applicant’s compliance with 
numerous criteria defined in the Guidelines. Who are the persons in the responsible 
ministries that are able to assess certain aid as minimally distorting market 
competition, or to estimate the impact on the state and economy? Who will grant 
such consents on behalf of the Ministry of Finance? Once again, the question arises of 
the public administration’s objectivity, capability and competence, especially given 
the ban on employment and inadequate employee remuneration system. Maybe the 
Competition Agency will manage to reject at least some unfounded applications, but 
agriculture and fisheries, being not within its competence might get out of control. 
- There are reasonable fears that the Guidelines would increase the state’s 
participation in the economy. Moreover, the employees of enterprises co-owned by 
the state will rightfully raise their expectations from the state. 
- Apart from all other things, the Guidelines create opportunities for arbitrary decisions 
and corruption. 
 
To sum up, the Guidelines and the Programme represent opposed Government views on 
tackling economic difficulties. 
 
 


English

Which Government to trust?

Aktar, Cengiz

  
 
 
 
 
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 POLICY BRIEF 
     GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) 
 
 
THE  PRESENT   AND  FUTURE  OF  TURKEY’S 
MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU 
by CENGIZ AKTAR 
                                             October 2010 | GPoT PB no. 19 
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the present state of affairs regarding Turkey’s 
European Union bid at the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the debut of 
the negotiations. At the first glance the tableau looks rather grim, the 
membership negotiations stalled, the political dialogue stuck and even 
the 15-years old customs union jeopardized by numerous political and 
administrative impediments. Parallel and due to this state of affairs, Turkey’s 
modernization process once triggered by its aspirations to join the European 
Union is now fully Turkish driven. Despite this development, Turkey, the author 
argues, still benefits from the techniques, principles and standards of the Bloc 
and would need to do so in a foreseeable future. 
 
 
October 3rd marked the fifth 
anniversary of the start of Turkey’s 
membership negotiations with the 
European Union (EU), yet there was 
little reason to celebrate. The latest 
poll published in September by the 
German Marshall Fund showed a 
rise in negative opinion among 
Turks regarding Turkey’s accession 
to the EU: Turkish public support for 
EU membership dropped to 38 
percent,  almost half of what it was 
in 2004.  
There are of course a number of 
reasons for the disaffection: The 
public losing touch with EU affairs; 
some EU politicians sending 
unvarying negative messages 
regarding Turkey’s membership; 
“visa harassment” for Turkish 
citizens; the Greek financial crisis; 
Turkish over-confidence due to the 
its economic successes as well as 
assertive foreign policy moves. In 
such an atmosphere policy-makers 
should listen to public opinion, find 
the most levelheaded answers to 
the public’s concerns, and devise a 
brand new communication 
strategy to garner domestic support 
for Turkey’s EU membership in the 
face of widespread, political and 
economic reluctance, fatigue and 
occlusion.  
2 THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU, CENGIZ AKTAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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At first glance the tableau looks 
gloomy 
By most all accounts, Turkey’s EU 
negotiation process has stalled. 
Only 13 out of a total of 33 chapters 
that were negotiated have been 
opened so far, while only one has 
been closed. The closure of 
chapters is currently impossible due 
to the European Council’s 
suspension decision of December 
2006, and not much  progress had 
been made in these chapters in 
any case. The EU is officially 
blocking eight chapters, while 
France and the 
Republic of Cyprus 
are unofficially 
blocking four and 
six, respectively. To 
put this situation in 
perspective, 
Croatia, which 
began its 
membership talks 
concurrently with 
Turkey, is now in the 
final stages of 
signing the 
Accession Treaty, 
and will probably become an EU 
member around 2013-2014. 
The political dialogue in EU 
countries regarding Turkey’s EU 
accession partly accounts for the 
current impasse. Discussions over 
the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy 
axis recently had repercussions in 
France and Germany, which 
oppose Turkey’s membership. Both 
countries exaggerated flaws in 
foreign policy decisions and have 
labeled these as proofs of a Turkey-
EU divide. Turkey’s over-confident 
attitude with regards to its foreign 
policy has made its political 
partnership with EU countries 
increasingly unworkable. This was 
particularly the case when Turkey 
did not embrace the EU’s move to 
place additional sanctions against 
Iran over its nuclear program. In 
turn, the EU abstained from voting 
on the United Nations Human Rights 
Council commissioned report on 
the deadly attack on the “Blue 
Marmara” humanitarian aid 
convoy by Israeli commandos.  
Key EU thus countries play a critical 
role in the overall negative course 
of the accession 
process. They have 
never truly 
supported political 
transformation in 
Turkey, with the 
result that Turkey 
today is enacting 
that transformation 
on its own without 
EU participation. 
A third factor 
concerns the 
Customs Union, 
which has become into a topic of 
controversy within the larger picture 
of good economic relations 
between Turkey and the EU. Visa 
limitations, transportation quotas 
and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
have become major impediments 
in the otherwise sound economic 
relationship. Turkish businessmen 
who, by virtue of the Customs 
Union, should be allowed to travel 
freely within the EU face constant 
visa problems. Since 
“transportation” is considered to be 
a service and thus not included in 
the Customs Union, Turkish export 
Turkey’s over-confident 
attitude with regards to its 
foreign policy has made its 
political partnership with EU 
countries increasingly 
unworkable. This was 
particularly the case when 
Turkey did not embrace the 
EU’s move to place 
additional sanctions against 
Iran over its nuclear program. 
 
3 THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU, CENGIZ AKTAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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goods are subjected to 
transportation quotas. Turkish 
exports thus face unfair 
competition in the EU. Regarding 
FTAs, Turkey automatically 
becomes party to the FTAs signed 
between the EU and third countries 
according to the Customs Union 
agreement. However, those 
countries are not 
bound by any FTA s 
vis-à-vis Turkey. This is 
yet another source 
of unfair 
competition. 
Though Turkey has 
not been harmed 
by such asymmetry 
to date, the most 
recent FTAs that the 
EU concluded with 
South Korea and 
India will create 
unfair competition 
and harm Turkish trade if similar FTAs 
are not concluded with these 
countries in the near future.  The EU 
has so far not used a constructive 
approach in addressing these 
issues. 
The positive side: Turkey still 
benefits from the EU techniques, 
principles and standards   
Despite numerous hurdles, 
however, harmonization of 
legislation continues in topics 
covered by different negotiation 
chapters that have been opened 
and even in those that have not 
been opened yet. When one looks 
at the open chapters, most of them 
contain procedures that will 
transform Turkey’s economic and 
legal infrastructure by addressing its 
shortcomings. Indeed, almost all 
legislative changes initiated by the 
government include, sometimes 
abusively, a reference to EU 
practice.  
Secondly, despite the problems it 
creates the Customs Union has 
overall strengthened the economic 
partnership between EU and 
Turkey. 2010 marks 
the fifteenth 
anniversary of the 
Customs Union, 
which generates 
100 billion Euros 
worth of 
commercial 
turnover yearly 
between Turkey and 
the EU, in addition 
to an ever-growing 
capital investment 
flow from EU 
countries. Turkey has 
been profiting from the Customs 
Union model (“teach catching a 
fish rather than selling the fish”) for 
fifteen years. Turkish industrial 
infrastructure has been 
transformed, and its exporting of 
high-quality products to the EU and 
outside the EU have increased. 
Today, despite the aforementioned 
problems and occasional 
opposition, the so-called 
“Anatolian Tigers” of the Turkish 
economy are working with the 
government to figure out how to 
smooth over flaws related to the 
Customs Union, certainly not how to 
remove it entirely. In fact, following 
the latest global economic crisis 
Turkey’s exports to EU countries, not 
neighboring markets in the Middle 
East, increased. Given that Turkey’s 
trade volume with the EU 
constitutes around 50 percent of its 
In fact, following the latest 
global economic crisis 
Turkey’s exports to EU 
countries, not the 
neighboring markets in the 
Middle East, increased. Given 
that Turkey’s trade volume 
with the EU constitutes around 
50 percent of its overall trade, 
developing alternative trade 
partners will take much time. 
4 THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU, CENGIZ AKTAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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overall trade, developing 
alternative trade partners will take 
much time. This structural situation is 
also valid for the expanding tourism 
sector: for the foreseeable future, 
the majority of tourists visiting Turkey 
will be from the EU. 
Within this framework, the most 
critical aspects of EU-Turkish 
economic relations are investment 
and finance. For the most part, EU 
countries provide Turkey with 
investment capital. Along this trend, 
Turkey as a “negotiating candidate 
country” has plenty of financial 
opportunities before itself. In 
addition to €4.9 billion grants from 
the EU for the period 2007-2013, 
other programs based in Brussels 
such as the Framework Program on 
research as well as tremendous 
credit opportunities that Turkey can 
take advantage of exist. Major 
credit sources include: The 
European Investment Bank (EIB); 
the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD); the Council of Europe’s 
Development Bank 
(CEB); international 
financial institutions 
like the World Bank; 
the United Nations 
sources like the UN 
Development 
Program (UNDP); 
the KfW Bank of 
German 
Development 
Cooperation; Japanese 
International Development 
Agency; and the French 
Development Agency. The Turkish 
financial sector, companies and 
public institutions benefit from 
credits provided by the above 
institutions.  
The status of being a country in 
accession talks with the EU present 
a considerable number of 
opportunities for the Turkish 
economy, which is in fact more 
integrated with the EU than any 
other country in the European 
neighborhood, including the new 
EU member countries. These 
opportunities can help the Turkish 
economy enhance its integration 
with the European market based 
on stronger and more durable 
foundations. 
Pragmatism versus over-
confidence   
The importance of the EU as an 
anchor for political and economic 
reforms in Turkey has been a topic 
of discussion for some time. The 
economic trouble the EU is going 
through and the bloc’s attitude 
towards Turkey on the one hand, 
and recent Turkish foreign policy 
initiatives and the 
resilience of the 
economy on the 
other have created 
a sense of over-
confidence among 
Turkish decision 
makers. There is 
some justification for 
this confidence: 
Turkey, perhaps for 
the first time in its 200-year-old 
history of modernization, is 
changing on its own without any 
recommendations by, requests 
from or obligations to the West. In 
this sense, the Customs Union in 
force since 1996 and the EU 
Turkey, perhaps for the first 
time in its 200-year-old history 
of modernization, is changing 
on its own without any 
recommendations by, 
requests from or obligations to 
the West.  
5 THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU, CENGIZ AKTAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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candidacy, extremely useful in the 
period 2000-2004 for the 
transformation of Turkey, have 
been fully assumed and 
internalized.  
However, Turkey’s ability to sustain 
this modernization process on its 
own should not be overstated. 
Turkey’s change and normalization 
processes still require the EU’s 
techniques, methods, principles 
and resources. The resolution of the 
Kurdish conflict, by far the central 
political stalemate and a major 
destabilizing factor in Turkey, is a 
prime example of this. And it will be 
so for some time until economic 
integration is ultimately achieved 
with a political partnership 
between the bloc and Turkey. 
Common sense shows that EU 
affairs need to be handled calmly 
and by duly considering Turkey’s – 
and for the matter the EU’s – long 
term interests. The end result is as 
important as the process itself. An 
open-ended and ambiguous 
membership process will no longer 
be a process per se and lose all 
meaning. The bottom line of 
today’s problems relates to the lack 
of a reasonable and meaningful 
accession date, i.e. 2023, the 
centenary of the Republic of 
Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CENGIZ AKTAR 
Cengiz Aktar is a professor and the 
Chairman of the Department of EU 
Relations at Bahcesehir University in 
Istanbul. He is also a weekly 
columnist for the daily Vatan. Aktar 
is an expert on Turkey-EU relations. 
He is intensively involved in civil 
society initiatives in Turkey dealing 
with minority issues, the Kurdish 
question, and historical 
reconciliation.  
The opinions and conclusion 
expressed herein are those of the 
individual author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of 
GPoT or Istanbul Kültür University. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ABOUT GPoT 
 
 
  
 
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research 
institution established under the auspices of Istanbul Kültür University in 2008.  
Our mission is to conduct high quality, independent and innovative research 
and education, acting as a link between policy-making institutions, 
academia, civil society and the media. 
The Center aims to achieve this by routinely bringing together opinion leaders, 
government officials and other policy-makers, analysts and members of the 
media from Turkey, the region and elsewhere. Our activities range from 
conducting projects and research that analyze the contemporary social, 
political and economic trends in regional and international politics and 
producing policy recommendations, contributing to public debate through 
roundtable discussions and international conferences to publishing policy 
briefs and monographs, among others. 
In accordance with its mission, GPoT Center has been active in virtually all 
fronts concerning not only Turkish foreign policy but the current regional and 
international agenda, including Turkey’s European Union accession process, 
the Cyprus issue, NATO, the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process, issues in 
the Middle East and North Africa, national and regional democratization, the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict and, most recently, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. 
 
 
CONTACT DETAILS 
 
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) 
Istanbul Kültür University 
Atakoy Campus, Bakirkoy 
34 156 Istanbul, Turkey 
 
www.gpotcenter.org 
info@gpotcenter.org 
Tel: +90 212 498 44 65 
Fax: +90 212 498 44 05 
GLOBAL POLITCAL TRENDS CENTER  


The present and future of Turkey's membership negotiations with the EU

 
September 2010 1 
BELARUSIAN MONTHLY 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 
• The date of the Presidential elections was set. 
• Inventories of finished products declined. 
• A deficit in trade with non-CIS countries. 
• Budget deficit if growing. 
Politics: The date of the Presidential elections was set 
In September, Belarusian Parliament set Presidential elections 
on December 19, 2010. According to the Constitution, the 
elections should take place not later than February 6, 2011. 
The date chosen was justified by the members of the Parlia-
ment as one, which allows to complete a new government by 
the beginning of 2011 (current government should surrender 
office according to the Constitution) and minimize the impact 
of political issues on economic trends. This choice of the date 
is likely to intensify the usage of the instruments directed at 
the stimulation of the economy, while high GDP growth rates 
and average salary of USD 500 are essential political pur-
poses set by A. Lukashenka. This policy may lead to increas-
ing structural distortions in the Belarusian economy. Through 
this, the probability of system-based economic reforms after 
the elections is definitely high irrespectively of their results. 
Real sector: Inventories of finished products declined 
In July, the growth rate of GDP proceeded strengthening: in 
Jan-Jul real GDP grew by 7.0% yoy (6.6% yoy in the first half 
of 2010). In industry the growth rate amounted to 9.6% yoy 
(8.8% yoy in the first half). Partially, it was due to the low 
base, while during the summer of 2009 there was a bottom in 
industrial production. However, the improvement in external 
environment should be emphasized as well, which resulted in 
reduction of inventories of finished products down to 59.1% of 
the average monthly output (60.7% and 88.3% as of July 1, 
2010 and 2009 correspondingly). Furthermore, the growth of 
accounts receivable moderated from 19.1% down to 12.2%, 
which signals about more revenues received by the enter-
prises. In agriculture, July was characterized by a sharp boost 
in output, which provided a cumulative growth rate increase 
from 4.3% yoy in the first half up to 8.4% yoy in Jan-Jul. 
Mainly it was due to earlier harvesting in this year. 
From the demand side, the investment growth rate was still 
increasing: in July, it amounted to 10.3% yoy and cumulative 
growth rate increased from 4.0% yoy in the first half up to 
5.0% yoy in Jan-Jul. Thus, the GDP growth is strengthening 
mainly due to the stimulation of the domestic demand, which 
may lead to a higher demand for imports as well. 
Structural trends: The development of relations with 
China 
In September, the delegation of the Chinese Parliament headed 
by its speaker Zian Shu Shen visited Belarus. The delegation 
met with the representatives of the Belarusian Parliament, busi-
ness and public institutions. The meeting of Zian Shu Shen with 
A. Lukashenka became a core event of the visit. During this 
meeting Belarusian President stated his hopes for intensification 
of political and economic cooperation with China. Furthermore, 
Belarusian party expects China to become a main foreign inves-
tor in Belarus. From this view, a meeting between 
A. Lukashenka and Paramount Leader of China Hu Jintao that is 
planned in October may become a push for development of bi-
lateral relations. Belarusian expectations from developing the 
relations with China up to the strategic partnership level seem 
to be connected with attraction of more direct investments and 
 
 
 
No. 09 (96) 
September 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population: 9.67 m 
Industry / GDP: 28.1% 
Agriculture / GDP: 8.4% 
Investment / GDP: 27.9% 
Export destination: Russia 32%, EU 44% 
Import origin: Russia 60%, EU 22% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real GDP growth 
4.7 5.0
6.8
11.4
9.2
9.9
8.2
10.1
0.2
5.8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
% yoy
Source: National Statistical Committee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IPM Research Center 
 
German Economic Team 
in Belarus  
 
50Б Zakharova St., Minsk 220088, Belarus 
Tel./fax (+375 17) 210 0105 
E-mail: bmer@research.by 
Internet http://research.by/ 
 
 
© IPM Research Center, 2010 
 
Belarusian Monthly Economic Review №09 (96) 
 
 
 
September 2010 2 
promotion domestic goods on the Chinese market. However, 
the success of such a strategy is not evident, while Chinese 
foreign activity is mainly based on the promotion of its own 
exports, including granting tied loans. In relations with Belarus 
during last years the Chinese approach seems to dominate: the 
basket of products imported from China is widened and its vol-
ume is increasing, while Belarusian exports to China is still 
based on potash fertilizers and its growth rates are lower than 
those of imports. Hence, there is a tendency of growing deficit 
in trade with China during last years. Furthermore, the share of 
Chinese funds in the structure of the Belarusian external public 
debt achieved 10%, while the share of China in the cumulative 
amount of attracted FDI is still negligible. 
Foreign trade: A deficit in trade with non-CIS countries 
In the first half, the merchandize trade deficit decreased by 
9.8% yoy down to USD 3.5 bn. This was due to higher growth 
rates of exports (23.7% yoy) than those of imports 
(13.7% yoy). In June, the tendency of higher exports growth 
rate changed and imports grew faster, resulting in the increase 
of the deficit by 14.0% yoy. 
In the first half, exports to non-CIS countries grew by 
3.0% yoy, while imports by 21.4% yoy. Hence, a deficit 
reached USD 469.7 m (in the first half of 2009 there was a sur-
plus of USD 385.3 m). It was consequent to the reduction in the 
physical volume of oil products exports. However, the supply of 
potash fertilizers grew substantially during this period. As for 
the growth of imports from non-CIS countries, it was in a great 
extent (by 21.4%) provided by imports of cars. In June, some 
trends in trade with non-CIS countries changed. The physical 
volume of oil products exports increased in comparison to May 
by 19.3% mom, while the exports potash fertilizers and ferrous 
metals dropped by 18.9% and 10.4% correspondingly. 
In trade with Russia, exports during the first half grew by 
48.9% yoy, while imports by 6.6% yoy, and the deficit reduced 
by 20.7% yoy. In the structure of imports, the reduction of en-
ergy goods by 6.8% yoy was most sensible. As for the exports 
growth, partially it was explained by the low base effect. In 
June, it grew by 1.3% mom, while imports grew by 
10.0% mom (at the background of increased crude oil supply). 
The trends in the supply of main exports goods were heteroge-
neous. For instance, exports of milk and diary products, building 
and agricultural machinery, trucks and truck-tractors dropped 
considerably in monthly terms. At the same time, the exports of 
meat and meat products, tractors, metal-working machines 
grew. Thus, the demand on Belarusian goods is still unstable. 
Public finance: Budget deficit if growing 
In the first half, consolidated deficit amounted to 3.2% of GDP 
(2.6% of GDP in the first half of 2009). Consolidated revenues 
during this period amounted to 31.8% of GDP, which is lower 
by 2.2% of GDP than in Jan-Jun 2009. Tax revenues declined 
from 30.7% down to 29.1% of GDP. This reduction was driven 
by lower revenues from external economic activity by 0.9 points 
down to 4.2% of GDP, and from taxes on goods and services by 
0.8 points down to 14.5% of GDP. Non-tax consolidated reve-
nues decreased by 0.6 points down to 2.6% of GDP. 
Consolidated expenditures amounted to 35% of GDP in the first 
half of 2010, which less by 1.7% of GDP than in the first half of 
2009. A significant reduction of expenditures on national econ-
omy took place (from 11.2% down to 9.2% of GDP), which is 
consequent to the abolishment of subsidies to the oil-traders. 
Moreover, expenditures on education were reduced by 0.2% of 
GDP down to 5.7% of GDP. The most severe increases were 
peculiar to the expenditures on social policy (by 0.2% of GDP) 
 
GDP and Industrial Output 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ja
n.
09
M
ar
.0
9
M
ay
.0
9
A
ug
.0
9
O
ct
.0
9
D
e
c.
0
9
Fe
b.
10
A
pr
.1
0
Ju
n.
1
0
A
ug
.1
0
real GDP growth
real industrial output growth
% yoy cum.
Source: National Statistical Committee. 
 
 
 
The Structure of Industrial Production in 
Jan-Jul 2010 and 2009.. 
 2010 2009 
Industry, total 100.0 100.0 
Electric power 7.1 7.1 
Fuel 17.1 20.2 
Ferrous metallurgy 3.7 3.4 
Chemical and  
petrochemical industry 
10.9 10.6 
Machinery and  
metalworking 
18.9 19.8 
Logging, woodworking, 
pulp and paper 
2.7 2.8 
Building materials 3.9 4.1 
Light 3.2 3.3 
Food 15.6 15.5 
Flour-and-cereals and feed 
mill industry 
2.2 2.5 
Other branches 14.9 10.7 
Source: Calculations based on the National Statistical 
Committee data. 
 
 
 
Merchandise Trade 
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Ja
n
.0
9
Fe
b
.0
9
M
a
r.
0
9
A
p
r.
0
9
M
a
y
0
9
Ju
n
.0
9
Ju
l.
0
9
A
u
g
.0
9
S
e
p
.0
9
O
ct
.0
9
N
o
v
.0
9
D
e
c.
0
9
Ja
n
.1
0
Fe
b
.1
0
M
a
r.
1
0
A
p
r.
1
0
M
a
y
.1
0
Ju
n
.1
0
Ju
l.
1
0
-1000
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
balance (right axis)
exports
imports
USD m
Source: National Statistical Committee. 
 
 
 
Consolidated Revenues from Taxed on 
Goods and Services, % of GDP 
 2009 2010 difference 
VAT 9.3 10.1 0.8 
Excise 2.6 2.8 0.2 
Other 3.3 1.6 -1.8 
Total 15.3 14.5 -0.8 
Источник: Минфин. 
 
Belarusian Monthly Economic Review №09 (96) 
 
 
 
September 2010 3 
and expenditures within state investment program (by 0.2% of 
GDP). According to the economic budget expenditures classifi-
cation, the latter tendency mirrored in rising capital expendi-
tures (by 1.1% of GDP up to 7.7% of GDP). Current expendi-
tures grew by 0.3% of GDP up to 26.6% of GDP, due to the 
growth of the current transfers. However, the share of expendi-
tures on wages declined by 0.4% of GDP. Finally, a crucial re-
duction of the expenditures on provision of budget loans and 
subsidies (by 3.2% of GDP down to 0.9% of GDP) according to 
the economic classification took place. 
Monetary policy: The growth of credits strengthened 
In July, net foreign assets of the monetary authorities de-
creased by 2.7% of GDP (by USD 138 m). In its turn, NBB’s 
claims on banks kept on growing (by 3.0% mom). Further-
more, withdrawal of government deposits from the accounts at 
the NBB (they dropped by 7.2% mom) became an important 
source of the base money dynamics. Hence, base money grew 
by 12.3% mom in July, while in annual terms its growth rate 
reached 98.7% yoy (95.2% yoy in June). 
Active expansionary policy of the NBB determined strengthening 
growth of the banks’ claims on the economy. In July, they grew 
by 4.2% mom, while in annual terms the growth rate amounted 
to 34.1% yoy (31.5% yoy in June). As for the interest rates, 
they were almost unchanged at the all segments of the deposit 
market, despite in July NBB reduced refinancing rate again. In 
its turn, interest rates on loans decreased somehow, which 
means that banks reduced the value of the interest rate spread. 
On the one hand, it reflects more intensive competition in the 
banking sector. On the other hand, it reflects the pressure of 
the NBB, which stimulates the reduction of the cost of borrow-
ings, simultaneously trying to provide attractiveness of the ru-
ble deposits. In the structure of the deposits, those held by the 
households in rubles still performed the biggest growth rate (by 
57.0% yoy). However, an acceleration of growth of the deposits 
in foreign currency began in July: they grew by 10.0% yoy 
(5.4% yoy in June). Ruble money grew by 8.6% mom, while 
broad money grew by 7.0% mom. In annual terms, their gowth 
rates amounted to 42.0% and 29.1% correspondingly (36.3% 
and 24.8% yoy in June). 
Consumer prices grew by 0.3% mom in July, and in annual 
terms inflation amounted to 6.8% (6.9% in June). During Jul-
Aug, Belarusian ruble devalued vs. the currency basket of the 
NBB by 1.7%. The value of the Belarusian ruble vs. US dollar 
amounted to 3012 USD/BYR by the end of August. 
Banking sector: Belarusbank entered into agreement 
on multipartite credit line 
In September, Belarusbank signed framework agreement on 
opening multipartite credit line with a French BNP Paribas, 
and a Belgium Fortis. Furthermore, a credit line opened for 
Belarusbank by a French agency on export loans insurance 
COFACE with the credit limit of EUR 500 m should be men-
tioned. Such agreements facilitate Belarusbank in fulfilling the 
task of attracting funds from abroad, which is on the agenda 
for the bank. Additional funds in foreign currency will widen 
its abilities of credit provision for Belarusian residents. More-
over, at the macro level such loans enhance stability at the 
domestic currency market. However, it should be emphasized 
that these loans are tied ones and as a rule are provided for 
purchase of import goods from the country, whose bank grant 
such loans. Hence, this approach to solve the problem of the 
lack of the foreign currency at the domestic currency and 
credit market is unlikely to be sustainable solution in a long-
term both at micro and macro level. 
 
 
 
Consolidated Budget 
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ja
n
.0
9
M
ar
.0
9
M
ay
0
9
Ju
l.
0
9
S
e
p.
09
N
o
v.
0
9
Ja
n
.1
0
M
ar
.1
0
M
ay
.1
0
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
balance (right axis)
revenues
expenditures
% of GDP
 
Note: Since 2010 Social Security Fund is not included 
into the consolidated budget. Data for 2009 assessed 
basing on the quarterly data. 
Source: Calculations based on the National Statistical 
Committee data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Monetary Base and СPI 
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ja
n.
0
9
M
ar
.0
9
M
a
y.
0
9
Ju
l.
0
9
S
e
p.
09
N
o
v.
09
Ja
n.
1
0
M
ar
.1
0
M
a
y.
1
0
Ju
l.
1
0
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
CPI (right axis) monetary base
% yoy eop % yoy
 
Source: calculations based on the National Statistical 
Committee and the NBB data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refinancing rate 
10
11
12
13
14
15
Ja
n
.0
9
M
ar
.0
9
M
ay
.0
9
Ju
l.
0
9
S
ep
.0
9
N
o
v.
0
9
Ja
n
.1
0
M
ar
.1
0
M
ay
.1
0
Ju
l.
1
0
-2
0
2
4
6
8
real (right axis) nominal
% per annum
Source: calculations based on National Statistical 
Committee and the NBB data. 
 
Belarusian Monthly Economic Review №09 (96) 
 
 
 
September 2010 4 
Economic Trends  Q3 08 Q4 08 Q1 09 Q2 09 Q3 09 Q4 09 Q1 10 Q2 10 
Jun. 
10 
Jul. 
10 
Aug. 
10 
GDP growth % yoy 11.2 7.5 1.1 -0.4 -1.1 1.8 4.0 8.9 -- -- --
GDP growth % yoy cum. 10.7 10.0 1.1 0.3 -0.3 0.2 4.0 6.6 6.6 7.0 6.1 
Industrial Production % yoy cum. 13.1 10.8 -4.5 -3.6 -4.5 -2.8 5.9 8.8 8.8 9.6 9.8 
Agricultural Production % yoy cum. 6.9 8.9 6.3 6.6 2.4 1.3 5.3 4.3 4.3 8.4 0.1 
CPI % yoy eop 16.3 13.3 15.5 13.4 11.7 10.1 6.4 6.9 6.9 6.8 7.7 
PPI % yoy eop 18.5 14.2 21.4 15.4 10.0 11.3 9.4 12.6 12.6 12.9 14.7 
Merchandise export (USD)* % yoy 44.9 -11.6 -48.9 -47.7 -35.4 2.9 29.2 18.9 10.8 -- -- 
Merchandise import (USD)* % yoy 53.1 -1.5 -31.7 -33.4 -37.2 -1.7 8.9 18.1 12.4 -- -- 
Merchandise trade balance 
(NBB data) 
USD m cum. -3835 -6104 -1779 -3799 -4797 -6971 -1165 -3316 -3316 -3964 -- 
Current account USD m cum. -3006 -5263 -1925 -3597 -4408 -6402 -1127 -3181 -3181 -- -- 
Current account % GDP cum -6.6 -8.7 -18.7 -17.1 -12.4 -13.1 -9.8 -13.5 -13.5 -- -- 
International reserves USD m eop 4120 3061 3955 2650 3879 5653 6074 5525 5525 5332 5569 
Monetary base % yoy eop 48 12 -14.2 -21.5 -15.0 -11.3 14.0 95.2 95.2 98.7 79.3 
Lending rate** % p.a. aop 11 14 17 17 17 17 17 12.9 12.9 12.1 -- 
Exchange rate 
(official) 
USD aop 2114 2147 2772 2809 2821 2768 2907 2991 3014 2998 2990 
Exchange rate 
(official) 
EUR aop 3183 2827 3614 3822 4032 4093 4028 3810 3683 3815 3866 
* Growth rates in value terms (source: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis). 
** Nominal rate of commercial banks for new loans for legal entities in national currency. 
Sources: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis, NBB. 
 
Key Economic Indicators 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Nominal GDP* BYR trn 36.565 49.991 65.067 79.231 97.165 128.828 136.789 
Nominal GDP** USD bn 17.7 23.1 30.2 36.9 45.2 60.3 49.0 
GDP Growth % yoy 7.0 11.4 9.4 9.9 8.6 10.0 0.2 
Industrial production % yoy 7.1 15.9 10.5 11.3 8.5 10.8 -2.8 
Agricultural production % yoy 6.6 12.6 1.7 6.1 4.1 8.9 1.3 
CPI % yoy aop 28.4 18.1 10.3 7.0 8.4 14.8 13.0 
CPI % yoy eop 25.4 14.4 8.0 6.6 12.1 13.3 10.1 
PPI % yoy aop 37.5 24.1 12.1 8.3 16.2 14.7 14.5 
PPI % yoy eop 28.1 18.8 10.0 8.5 17.1 16.4 11.3 
Exports (gs, USD) % yoy 24.4 35.7 15.8 21.8 24.3 35.5 -33.0 
Imports (gs, USD) % yoy 25.1 40.3 3.0 33.0 27.9 37.6 -27.1 
Current account USD m –424 –1206 510 –1512 -2944 -5263 -6402 
Current account % GDP –2.4 –5.2 1.7 –4.1 -6.6 -8.7 -13.1 
FDI (net) USD m 170 163 303 351 1770 2143 2149 
International reserves USD m 474 770 1297 1383 4182 3467 5653 
Fiscal balance % GDP –1.6 0.0 –0.6 2.2 0.6 0.9 -0.7 
Domestic public debt % GDP eop 5.5 5.7 5.8 6.5 6.4 6.7 5.8 
External debt (total) % GDP eop 23.7 21.4 17.9 18.6 28.4 24.6 45.0 
Monetary base % yoy eop 50 42 74 20 38 12 -11 
Exchange rate (official)* USD aop 2075 2160 2154 2145 2146 2136 2793 
Exchange rate (official)* USD eop 2156 2170 2152 2140 2150 2200 2863 
Exchange rate (official)* EUR aop 2353 2684 2681 2692 2937 3135 3885 
Exchange rate (official)* EUR eop 2695 2956 2550 2817 3167 3077 4106 
Sources: National Statistical Committee, Ministry of Finance, NBB, IPM Research Center. 
 
Notes: 
aop average of period gs goods and services 
avg average trn trillion 
bn Billion NBB National Bank of Belarus 
cum. cumulative p.a. per annum 
eop end of period yoy year-on-year 
m million ytd year-to-date 
 


Belarusian Monthly Economic Review No. 09 (96) September 2010

1 
 
 
 
 
 
REPORT ON LOCAL ELECTIONS IN GEORGIA 
 
 
Eastern Europe Studies Centre (Vilnius, Lithuania) 
 
ZUGDIDI 
31 May 2010 
 
 
Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC) has been registered by a Decree No 285 of the 
Georgian Central Election Commission on 18 May, 2010 as an international observer 
organisation. EESC has organised Lithuanian Election Observation Missions during Georgian 
Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in 2008 having 100 Lithuanian observers each, 
which allows for empirically based comparisons. This year 15 representatives of Lithuanian, 
Latvian, Estonian and Belarusian nongovernmental organisations were deployed to 4 regions 
of Georgia: Samegrelo Zemo-Svaneti (Zugdidi, Mestia), Shida Kartli (Khashuri), Kvemo-
Kartli (Marneuli) and Samtskhe-Javakheti (Adigeni, Akhaltsikhe, Aspindza, Akhalkalaki).  
 
The main objective of the short-term EESC observation mission at the Georgian Local 
election has been to observe the election, to undertake an analysis of the election process and 
to provide its assessment. The final report of the EESC presents the observations and 
evaluation of the Election Day. 
 
The report is based on findings which were collected using formalized questionnaire and 
which has been filled in by every EESC observers’ team. All EESC observers were divided 
into teams and allocated to polling stations. Observers have been present in 36 polling stations 
in 6 election districts during all of the Election Day. 
 
The EESC observers assessed the opening of polling stations, the voting process, the closing 
of polling stations and the counting of votes. 100% of the observers evaluated the opening of 
polling stations as good or very good. 77% stated that the voting process was good or very 
good. 77% evaluated the closing and the counting of votes as good or very good. Activity of 
the voters was rather high though inconsistent. At the end of the Election Day overall average 
turnout was 47% (with the dispersion from 22% to 70% in different polling stations). 
 
2 
 
According to the reports from polling stations, the voting process can be evaluated as 
essentially consistent with the main principles of democratic and free elections. Polling took 
place in a peaceful atmosphere and within well-organised election framework. The EESC 
observers have not reported any serious violations although few shortcomings have been 
noted.  
 
Georgian election legislation provided favourable conditions for domestic and international 
observation. Observers' reports did not highlight any significant problems in the exercise of 
their functions.  
 
The observers of the EESC have reported that in all polling stations at least one independent 
observer was present. In the polling stations EESC observers worked together with the other 
observers from national and international organisations. 
 
Positive aspects of the election process included:  
• Agitation material in polling stations during the Election Day has been present only in 
rarely isolated cases (1 out of 36) which is an obvious improvement in comparison 
with previous elections; 
• The election environment/atmosphere during the Election Day has significantly 
improved since Presidential and Parliamentary Election in 2008; 
• The progress in the knowledge of election procedures in the precinct election 
commissions should be also emphasized; 
• Counting of the votes has been conducted in a transparent way, which ensured the 
smooth process. 
 
Some breaches of the election process included:  
• Technical problems with marking procedure in several polling stations were observed 
as ink detectors have not been functioning properly; 
• Some insignificant number of family voting or voting in groups have occurred 
especially in rural areas (2 out of 36 polling stations), although such cases have 
decreased to an absolute minimum in comparison with the previous elections; 
• Instructions for the voters were not visible in 2 out of 36 polling stations. 
 
 
 
3 
 
Some specific remarks on voting process can be made: 
• Both main and the mobile ballot boxes were not properly sealed in Mestia. The CEC 
representative has responded to that problem relevantly quickly; 
• There were cases in Mestia when voters were allowed to vote without producing all 
documents required for identifications; 
• Several cases of experience and proficiency inadequacies of precinct election 
commissions in Mestia were observed. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations: 
• The overall observations made by the EESC representatives allow to evaluate 
Georgian Local election being in accordance with the principles of democratic, free 
and fair elections and organised with a general respect for fundamental rights; 
• Significant improvement in proficiency of the precinct election commissions should 
be emphasized, however specially tailored training programmes for distant precinct 
election commissions (e.g. Mestia) are recommended; 
• Political actors and interested parties are advised to consider introducing mechanisms 
ensuring a balanced and consistent turnout of voters for elections. 
 
 
Eastern Europe Studies Centre (Lithuania)  
31 May 2010, Zugdidi 


Report on local elections in Georgia

Gros, Daniel

  
Daniel Gros is Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. This commentary 
was syndicated to newspapers worldwide by Project Syndicate. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. The 
views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with 
which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) ? © CEPS 2010 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 ▪ http://www.ceps.eu 
Europe in the IMF 
Daniel Gros 
4 October 2010 
urope’s leaders never tire of reminding their constituencies, almost like a mantra, that the 
major emerging-market countries are overturning the existing global economic order. But 
when it comes to recognizing that reality in the world’s international financial institutions, 
they adopt a different tune. This is particularly true of the eurozone. 
The eurozone as such has no representation in the international financial institutions. Instead, 12 
eurozone countries are represented on the board of the International Monetary Fund via six different 
“constituencies,” or country groups. The two largest, Germany and France, have a constituency all 
their own. Ten other eurozone members are part of four other constituencies headed by Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy. However, these four constituencies also contain more than 20 
other countries, most of which are not even EU members. 
Together with the Scandinavian and British constituencies, there are thus eight EU representatives 
on the IMF’s executive board. Given that the IMF’s Articles of Agreement stipulate that there can 
be only 20 board members, this means that 40% of all the IMF’s executive directors are Europeans, 
with one-third coming from the eurozone. 
The IMF is a prime example of the over-representation of Europeans in international fora. Counter-
intuitively, however, the excessive number of Europeans actually diminishes Europe’s influence, 
because they usually defend national interests, which are often divergent. The net effect is that 
common European interests are not represented at all. 
Contrast this current condition of extended misery with the only sensible long-term solution: a 
pooling of IMF quotas by all eurozone countries. The eurozone would then have one constituency, 
or seat, on the Fund’s executive board, filled by a candidate nominated by the eurozone group of 
finance ministers. 
The European Central Bank could also, perhaps, be involved, nominating the deputy of the 
eurozone executive director at the Fund. In this way, Europe’s fiscal and monetary authorities 
would be forced to cooperate in shaping their input into IMF decisions. Many countries (including 
Germany) already follow this “double-headed” approach. 
E 
2 | Daniel Gros 
The eurozone representative would be very influential, because he would represent an even larger 
quota than that of the US. Indeed, the US Treasury’s de facto dominance within the IMF would 
become a thing of the past. 
But, given the scant interest of European Union members in transferring further competences (and 
juicy international positions) to the EU level, the chances that this solution will prevail seem 
remote. Germany, in particular, feels that it has no reason to share its IMF representation with other, 
fiscally weaker eurozone members. And the French seem scared of contagion: once France agrees 
to a common eurozone seat at the IMF, others could cite it as a precedent to be applied to the United 
Nations Security Council, where France would then risk losing its permanent seat to a common EU 
representative. 
Until now, the rest of world could only grumble at Europe’s obstinate refusal to recognize its 
relative decline. Since no European country would agree to give up its seat on the IMF’s executive 
board, the only way out was to add more and more temporary seats for the dynamic and 
underrepresented emerging economies. 
Such a process, however, cannot go on forever, because with each increase in size, the IMF’s board 
becomes less and less effective. This is why the US has now decided to throw a cat among the 
European pigeons. 
The US (which has veto power) has now taken the stance that it will no longer approve the higher 
number of executive directors (24 at present). This has confronted the Europeans with a quandary: 
if they do not agree to give up some seats on the IMF board, some emerging countries, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, and perhaps even India, would lose theirs. The EU does not want to be held 
responsible for this. 
The pigeons are thus fighting among themselves over who should be sacrificed. Until now, it could 
be argued that the eurozone did not have a common fiscal agency that could represent common 
eurozone interests. But this has now changed with the creation of a European rescue fund in the 
form of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
Funding the next intra-eurozone rescue will be rather cumbersome and costly, because financial 
markets distrust complicated structures like the one set up to finance the EFSF. This suggests a 
golden opportunity for Europe to make a virtue of necessity by pooling its access to much-cheaper 
IMF funding. 
If, for example, Ireland (or Spain) needed emergency support, the other eurozone countries could 
simply agree to lend it their IMF quotas. The troubled country could then rapidly obtain a large IMF 
loan, given that the eurozone countries’ quotas total about €60 billion – and that IMF loans can 
easily reach multiples of the quota. 
Creditor countries like Germany would also gain, because they would not need to extend vast sums 
in guarantees to the EFSF while still safeguarding their interests within the EFSF’s existing 
structure. All eurozone members, then, have an interest in concentrating in a smaller number of 
constituencies, with the EFSF representing their collective interests within the IMF.  


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