University of Idaho College of Law

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-17-2021 
State v. Zavala Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48094 
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Recommended Citation 
"State v. Zavala Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48094" (2021). Not Reported. 6932. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6932 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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1 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
EMILIO ZAVALA, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
     No. 48094-2020 
 
     Ada County Case No. 
     CR01-19-34348 
                
     RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
     
      Issue 
Has Zavala failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 
sentence of five years, with three years fixed, for unlawful possession of a firearm? 
 
Zavala Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
 According to the Presentence Report (“PSI” 1), Zavala was driving a Chrysler SUV and 
tried to pass a Subaru that was attempting to turn left from a center turn lane.  (PSI, p.3.)  When 
                                                          
1  PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Confidential Exhibits 
Appeal 47769-2020.pdf.”  All documents in that electronic file will be identified as “Zavala 48094 
psi.pdf.” 
Electronically Filed
3/17/2021 4:39 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2 
 
Zavala tried to pass the Subaru on the left, he drove into the oncoming lane of travel and crashed 
into the Subaru as he tried to go back into the proper lane.  (Id.)  The Chrysler rolled onto its 
driver’s side and blocked a lane.  (Id.)  Zavala, the only occupant of the Chrysler, was placed under 
citizen’s arrest for reckless driving by an eyewitness.  (Id.)  During the crash, a loaded Sterling .22 
L.R. pistol was thrown from the Chrysler, and after Zavala was given Miranda warnings by a 
police officer, he “admitted to knowledge of a gun being in the vehicle and was in possession of a 
.22 caliber bullet matching the caliber of the gun.”  (Id.)  A “narcotic K-9” positively alerted to the 
odor of narcotics coming from inside the Chrysler, and a vehicle search resulted in the discovery 
of a glass jar which contained a crystal like substance that “NIK tested positive for amphetamines.”  
(Id.)  Law enforcement determined that Zavala had several felony convictions in Texas.  (Id.)   
 The state charged Zavala with unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), possession of drug paraphernalia, and reckless driving.  (R., pp.29-
30.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Zavala pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and the 
remaining charges were dismissed.  (R., pp.48-59, 62; see generally Tr., p.5, L.10 – p.12, L.19.)  
The district court sentenced Zavala to five years, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.61-64.)  Zavala 
filed a Rule 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence (R., p.69), which, in the absence of any order on 
that motion in the appellate record, was presumably denied.  Zavala filed a timely notice of appeal.  
(R., pp.71-73.) 
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of 
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed 
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement.  State 
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory 
3 
 
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant 
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to 
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  Id.  The district 
court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding 
upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 
185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, 
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In deference to the 
trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148-49, 
191 P.3d at 226-27).   
Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily 
not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 
89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).  The maximum prison sentence for unlawful possession of a 
firearm is five years.  I.C. § 18-3316(1).  The district court imposed a sentence of five years, with 
three years fixed, which falls within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.61-64.)   
Zavala claims to have the support of his family, and that he has accepted responsibility for 
his crime and begun to conform his behavior to jail expectations.  (Id., pp.5-6.)  Though laudable, 
those factors do not show that Zavala’s sentence was excessive.      
Of the four sentencing criteria, Zavala focuses primarily on rehabilitation, contending that 
“the biggest issue when it comes to his rehabilitation is his dual diagnosis” of substance abuse and 
mental health issues.  (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  Zavala “acknowledged that, when he is not on his 
4 
 
medications, he turns to drugs to self-medicate and then turns to crime to support his drug abuse.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.5; see PSI, p.14.)  He asserts that the “medications provided by the jail were 
beginning to have a positive effect” on him, and notes that the district court said he “has the 
potential to successfully rehabilitate if he adheres to his mental health and medication regimen.”  
(Id.)  Zavala concludes that the court abused its discretion by not placing him on a rider “since the 
rider program would provide the sort of dual treatment [he] needs, but has not yet, apparently, had 
the opportunity to receive.”  (Id., p.6-7.)     
Zavala’s I.C. § 19-2524 mental health review determined that he has stimulant use disorder 
(cocaine type, severe), phencyclidine (PCP or angel dust) use disorder (severe), major depressive 
disorder (single episode, with psychotic features), and generalized anxiety disorder.2  (PSI, pp.20 
(cocaine and PCP are his drugs of choice), 39.)  The evaluation found that Zavala’s mental health 
needs “appear to be addressed through his current treatment at Canyon County Jail[,]” and 
recommended that he “continue to access mental health treatment while incarcerated and if 
released into the community to avoid deterioration of functioning and to monitor for any ongoing 
risk.”  (Id., p.41.)  Zavala’s GAIN-I evaluation recommended he be placed in a “Level II.I Intensive 
Outpatient Substance Abuse Treatment Program.”  (PSI, p.38.) 
Zavala’s mental health issues are mitigating factors in his case.  While substance abuse 
may be considered as a mitigating factor, State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982), it may 
also be considered as an aggravating factor, State v. King, 120 Idaho 955, 958, 821 P.2d 1010, 
1013 (Ct. App. 1991).  Here, Zavala’s repeated decisions to stop taking his mental health 
                                                          
2  Zavala self-reported to the Presentence Investigator that “he was diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia, PTSD, mood swings, anxiety, and depression when he was  while 
incarcerated at the Texas Youth Commission.”  (PSI, pp.18-19.)  No verification of those early 
diagnoses is found in the Presentence Report or attachments.  
5 
 
medications and instead “self-medicate” with illegal controlled substances, which, in turn, led to 
his decisions to commit crimes to acquire such substances, should not be deemed mitigating.   
 Contrary to Zavala’s argument, the district court exercised reasonable discretion by 
determining that, despite his mental health and substance abuse issues, Zavala should be sentenced 
to prison – not a rider.  The court read the pre-sentence report and was said it was “well aware of 
the four objectives of criminal sentencing” considerations, “[f]irst and foremost among them are 
protection of the community.  The others are rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment.”  (Tr., 
p.22, Ls.8-13.)  See State v. Toohill, 102 Idaho 565, 652 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982).  The court also 
cited the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521 “that are intended to guide courts in distinguishing cases in 
which a prison sentence is appropriate.”  (Tr., p.22, Ls.14-19.) 
 Zavala’s LSI-R (Level of Service Inventory-Revised) score was 38, “which places him in 
the high-risk category” to reoffend.  (PSI, p.21.)  That “high-risk” classification was based, in part, 
on his criminal history and alcohol/drug problems.  (Id.)  As the Presentence Investigator 
explained, “the defendant has one juvenile misdemeanor adjudication, 16 adult misdemeanor 
convictions, and eight adult felony convictions in Texas.  Since arriving in Idaho in May 2019, he 
has two misdemeanor convictions and three pending misdemeanors apart from the instant 
offense.”3  (PSI, p.13.)  The Presentence Investigator noted that Zavala “was also disruptive upon 
his arrival to the Canyon County Jail in November 2019” and reportedly “made threats to staff 
several times, covered safety cameras, and attempted to break a fire suspension sprinkler.  His 
actions required multiple members of the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office to place the defendant 
                                                          
3  In one of the Idaho cases, Zavala was charged with misdemeanor domestic battery for striking 
his then-girlfriend (and later wife) in the face in November 2019.  (PSI, pp.13, 15.)  
6 
 
in a restraining device for his own safety and the safety of the deputies and other staff involved.”  
(PSI, pp.13-14.) 
Although most of Zavala’s Texas convictions appear to be property crimes such as burglary 
or theft, he was placed on probation for 10 years for the felony of “aggravated assault causing 
serious bodily injury” in 1999, sentenced to 12 months jail for misdemeanor assault in 2001, and 
sentenced to three years imprisonment for robbery (second degree) in 2015.  (PSI, pp.7-8, 11.)  
The district court summarized Zavala’s Texas convictions, his three pending Idaho misdemeanor 
cases, and his jail misconduct, observing that many of Zavala’s theft/shoplifting misdemeanors in 
Texas would have been felonies (burglary) in Idaho.  (Tr., p.22, L.20 – p. 24, L.15.)   
Just before pronouncing Zavala’s sentence, the district court emphasized its determination 
that Zavala appeared to be a “community safety risk,” explaining: 
 So you’ve certainly had trouble keeping your nose clean, so to speak, and 
the criminal charges you are racking up are not crimes that don’t risk public safety 
in some way, so that’s a concern.  
 
. . . You’ve certainly got a substantial history of using illegal drugs.  And so 
there are a lot of things that point to you presenting a risk to the community 
currently.  That’s not to say that, with proper medication management and sort of, 
I guess, a renewed commitment on your part to staying on your medications and to 
living your life in a way where you accept that your rights end when somebody 
else’s rights begin – 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT: – that you couldn’t turn the page –  
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT: – and live a different life.  But as I said, presently, you appear to 
present a risk to the community, and that risk justifies certainly a period of 
incarceration, and neither side says differently either, just arguing for different 
modes or lengths of incarceration . . . . 
 
I suppose I ought to mention the particular circumstances of this case as 
well, which involved the defendant being found to have possession of a firearm in 
7 
 
an incident that involved reckless and dangerous driving behavior, so the incident 
in and of itself is just one more, I guess, reason for concern about a community 
safety risk.   
 
(Tr., p.24, L.7 – p.25, L.15.)  The court concluded, telling Zavala “it seems to me, that you have 
got a substantial period of incarceration coming for what you’ve done and that efforts to 
rehabilitate you, it would seem to me, is a bit of a longer-term project than a rider.”  (Tr., p.26, 
Ls.6-12.)   
Based on Zavala’s extensive criminal history, the district court’s overriding concern that 
society be protected, and that he become a good citizen, it cannot have abused its sentencing 
discretion by sentencing Zavala to five years, with three years fixed instead of a rider.  Zavala has 
failed to show any abuse in the district court’s sentencing discretion.     
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Zavala’s conviction and sentence. 
 DATED this 17th day of March, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/  John C. McKinney 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
  
8 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of March, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
 BRIAN R. DICKSON 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
        /s/  John C. McKinney 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JCM/dd 
 


English

State v. Zavala Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48094

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7953/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
1-29-2021 
State v. Glandon Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48131 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Glandon Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48131" (2021). Not Reported. 6954. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6954 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JUSTIN R. PORTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
DUSTIN SCOTT GLANDON, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48131-2020 
 
Ada County Case No. 
CR01-20-10425 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Dustin Scott Glandon failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two and one half years fixed, upon 
his convictions for felony domestic violence? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Glandon Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
The state charged Glandon with attempted strangulation, felony domestic violence, and 
injury to a child.  (R., pp.58-59.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Glandon pled guilty to felony 
domestic violence.  (R., pp.60-72; Tr., p.8, L.15 – p.18, L.19.)  In exchange, the state agreed to 
Electronically Filed
1/29/2021 1:36 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend a suspended sentence of ten years, with three 
years fixed, and a period of probation.  (R., pp.71-72.)   
During the change of plea hearing, the district court asked Glandon whether he understood 
that the court could sentence him “up to the maximum allowed by statute, which is ten years in the 
state penitentiary” even though the state was bound by the terms of the plea agreement to 
recommend probation.  (Tr., p.13, L.21 – p.14, L.1.)  Glandon confirmed that he understood.  (Tr., 
p.14, L.2.)   
During sentencing, both parties requested a suspended ten-year sentence, with three years 
fixed, and probation.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.11-21, p.25, L.18 – p.27, L.12.)  The court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with two and one half years fixed.  (R., pp.79-82; Tr., p.34, L.17 – p.35, 
L.1.)  Glandon timely appealed.  (R., pp.84-86.)   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the 
defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) 
(citations omitted).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's 
probable term of confinement.  Id. (citation omitted).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, 
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 
136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citation omitted).  When a trial court’s discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine 
whether the lower court:  (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  State v. Herrera, 
164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). 
 3 
C. Glandon Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion 
 
 The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten 
years, with two and one half years fixed.  To carry the burden of demonstrating an abuse of 
discretion, the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence 
was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  In determining 
whether the appellant met this burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the 
decision to release the defendant on parole is exclusively the province of the executive branch, 
presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual incarceration.  State v. Bailey, 
161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391).  
To establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds 
could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting 
society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  A 
sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’”  
Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 
P.3d 621, 628 (2015)). 
As a preliminary matter, Glandon’s sentence fits within the statutory maximum.  Felony 
domestic violence is punishable by “imprisonment in the state prison for a term not to exceed ten 
(10) years.”  Idaho Code § 18-918(2).  The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, 
with two and one half years fixed.  (R., pp.79-82.)  Because his sentence fits within the statutory 
limit, Glandon “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under 
any reasonable view of the facts.”  State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002).  
He cannot do so.   
 4 
The district court imposed a reasonable sentence.  As the district court correctly observed, 
Glandon’s conduct in this case did not merit a sentence of probation.  (Tr., p.34, Ls.12-14.1)  
Glandon admitted that he punched his wife in her stomach and then put her in a stranglehold.  (PSI, 
p.4.)  As a result, his wife experienced difficulty breathing, stiffness in her neck, and a scratch and 
swelling on her jaw and cheek.  (PSI, p.3.)  Their  son was present at the time of this 
incident and attempted to stop Glandon by jumping on his back, but Glandon threw him onto a 
nearby couch.  (PSI, p.3.)  The court found that Glandon’s conduct “not only significantly 
negatively impacted his spouse … but also his  son who had to do what five year olds 
shouldn’t have to:  One, which is to see their mommy being struck and beaten by a daddy and, 
two, feel the need to intervene to try to stop daddy.”  (Tr., p.33, Ls.18-24.) 
Additionally, the district court considered the necessary sentencing objectives in 
fashioning Glandon’s sentence.  (Tr., p.31, L.16 – p.32, L.7.)  The district court properly 
considered “the protection of the community, including the victim … or any person who may be 
in a domestic relationship with [Glandon], as the foremost important factor.”  (Tr., p.31, L.22 – 
p.32, L.2.)  In determining how best to achieve the goals of sentencing, the court addressed 
Glandon’s troubling history of domestic violence.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.14-22; see PSI, pp.4-7.)  In 2012, 
Glandon received a withheld judgment for misdemeanor domestic battery.  (PSI, pp.4-6.)  In 2018, 
Glandon was convicted of misdemeanor domestic battery or assault in the presence of a child and 
disturbing the peace.  (PSI, pp.5-7.)  The dispositions of those cases provided Glandon “multiple 
opportunities for treatment for domestic violence, including the Domestic Violence Court 
program, as well as … domestic violence probation that included the domestic violence counseling 
                                            
1 The decision whether to place Glandon on probation or impose a term of imprisonment was “not 
even close, in the Court’s view.”  (Tr., p.34, Ls.12-14.)   
 5 
and weekly treatment.”  (Tr., p.32, Ls.14-22; PSI, pp.6-7.)  However, far from being rehabilitated 
by those treatment programs, the court found evidence that Glandon “used the information that he 
ha[d] received in treatment in part to manipulate the victim further.”  (Tr., p.32, L.23 – p.33, L.16.)  
Furthermore, despite receiving what the court characterized as “probably the best treatment 
available for domestic violence” (Tr., p.33, Ls.1-9), the domestic violence evaluation revealed that 
Glandon remained a “high risk” to reoffend (PSI, pp.19, 25; Tr., p.33, Ls.13-16).  Accordingly, 
the court correctly concluded that even “[t]he best treatment doesn’t seem to work,” rejected the 
recommendation to place him on probation, and imposed a term of incarceration consistent with 
the pre-sentence investigator’s recommendation.  (Tr., p.34, L.2 – p.35, L.1.)  In light of Glandon’s 
underlying conduct, his history of domestic violence and failed treatment, and his high risk of 
recidivism, the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable to achieve the objectives of 
sentencing.   
Glandon argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to place him on 
probation in light of certain mitigating factors.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-4.)  Specifically, Glandon 
points to such mitigating factors as his prior military service; substance abuse; expression of 
remorse; and support from family, friends, and a past employer.  (Id.)  However, he has failed to 
show how any of these mitigating factors, whether considered individually or collectively, entitle 
him to a term of probation.   
The court district considered each of these mitigating factors when it rejected the 
recommendation for a period of probation at the time of sentencing.  In determining an appropriate 
sentence, the district court expressly considered the PSI materials, which contained the relevant 
information regarding Glandon’s military service, substance abuse, and familial and community 
support. (Tr., p.32, Ls.8-13; PSI, pp.8-21.)  The court also considered the defendant’s expression 
--
 6 
of remorse.  (Tr., p.30, L.6 – p.31, L.14, p.32, Ls.8-13.)  Thus, even if this Court disagrees with 
the amount of weight the district court gave to this mitigating information, “[i]n deference to the 
trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 
148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).  Thus, Glandon has failed to show that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion.   
In sum, the district court imposed a reasonable sentence that fit within the statutory limit 
and was intended to achieve the goals of sentencing, particularly the protection of society.  
Glandon has failed to show otherwise. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 29th day of January, 2021. 
 
        /s/  Justin R. Porter  
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of January, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JASON C. PINTLER  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
  /s/  Justin R. Porter 
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
JRP/dd      Deputy Attorney General 


State v. Glandon Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48131

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UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
2-4-2021 
State v. Yardley Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48143 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Yardley Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48143" (2021). Not Reported. 6966. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6966 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
OLIVER RABIT YARDLEY, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
) 
 
No. 48143-2020 
 
Canyon County Case No.  
CR14-19-6178 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. NYE 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
JENNY C. SWINFORD 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570 
Boise, Idaho  83702 
(208) 334-2712 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
2/4/2021 1:59 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case .................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................................1 
 
ISSUE ..................................................................................................................................3 
 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................4 
 
 Yardley Has Failed To Show That The District Court 
 Misapplied The Relevant Legal Standard When It 
 Concluded, Based On Its Factual Findings, That Police 
 Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Yardley For A 
 Traffic Offense And Then Probable Cause To Arrest 
 Him For Carrying A Concealed Weapon.................................................................4 
 
 A. Introduction ..................................................................................................4 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .....................................................................................4 
 
 C. The District Court Correctly Applied Constitutional 
  Principles In Light Of The Facts Found When It 
  Rejected Yardley’s Claim His Stop Was Illegal ..........................................4 
 
 D. The District Court Correctly Applied Constitutional 
  Principles In Light Of The Facts Found When It 
  Rejected Yardley’s Claim His Arrest Was Illegal .......................................5 
 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................7 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................................7 
 
 
 
ii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Blythe, 166 Idaho 713, 462 P.3d 1177 (2020) ....................................................... 5 
State v. Byrum, 167 Idaho 735, 476 P.3d 402 (Ct. App. 2020) .......................................... 5 
State v. Conant, 143 Idaho 797, 153 P.3d 477 (2007) ........................................................ 6 
State v. Farrell, 165 Idaho 839, 453 P.3d 273 (Ct. App. 2019) .......................................... 5 
State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 450 P.3d 315 (2019) ..................................................... 4 
State v. Gosch, 157 Idaho 803, 339 P.3d 1207 (Ct. App. 2014) ......................................... 5 
State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 402 P.3d 1095 (2017)............................................................ 6 
State v. Williams, 162 Idaho 56, 394 P.3d 99 (Ct. App. 2016) .......................................... 6 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-3302 ..................................................................................................................... 6 
I.C. § 49-808 ....................................................................................................................... 5 
 
 
 
1 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Oliver Rabit Yardley appeals from his conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Yardley with possession of methamphetamine and a persistent 
violator enhancement.  (R., pp. 20-23.)  Yardley moved to suppress “all statements made 
by Defendant and all potential evidence seized from Defendant as a result of a search that 
was conducted of defendant’s person and clothing without Defendant’s consent and 
without a search warrant.”  (R., pp. 35-52, 63-67.)  The state contended the evidence arose 
from a lawful traffic stop, followed by a lawful search incident to arrest for carrying a 
concealed weapon, further justified by an alert from a drug detection dog.  (R., pp. 53-59, 
69-76.) 
 The district court found that a detective had received an anonymous tip that Yardley 
possessed methamphetamine and was at a local bar.  (Tr., p. 3, Ls. 3-8.1)  The detective 
went to the bar and saw the defendant leave the parking lot of the bar on his motorcycle 
without coming to a complete stop.  (Tr., p. 3, Ls. 8-13.)  The detective notified another 
officer who followed Yardley and saw him turn without signaling.  (Tr., p. 3, Ls. 13-19.)  
The officer then “initiated a traffic stop.”  (Tr., p. 3, Ls. 19-23.)  The officer saw something 
“tucked in the defendant’s waist or pocket” that created a bulge in his clothing that he 
                                            
1 Citations to the transcript are to the February 12, 2020, status conference in which the 
district court announced its findings of fact and ruling on the motion to suppress.  It begins 
on page 20 of the electronic transcripts file. 
 
2 
 
recognized as a “sap” or cudgel.  (Tr., p. 3, L. 23 – p. 4, L. 3.)  The police arrested Yardley 
and found the sap and methamphetamine.  (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 3-6.) 
 The district court found reasonable suspicion for Yardley’s stop because police 
“saw him turn without using a signal.”  (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 7-10.)  They also had probable cause 
to arrest him for carrying a concealed weapon because police saw “what looked like a sap 
sticking out” from under Yardley’s clothing, and a sap is a deadly weapon under the Idaho 
Code.  (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 10-18.)  The officers then searched Yardley incident to arrest and 
found the sap and methamphetamine.  (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 18-20.)  For these reasons the district 
court denied the motion to suppress.  (Tr., p. 4, L. 20.) 
 Yardley pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, and the enhancement was 
dismissed, as part of a plea agreement preserving his right to appeal the denial of his 
suppression motion.  (R., p. 83.)  He filed a notice of appeal timely from entry of judgment.  
(R., pp. 96-98, 104-06.) 
 
3 
 
ISSUE 
 
 Yardley states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Yardley’s motion to suppress 
evidence obtained during a traffic stop? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Yardley failed to show that the district court misapplied the relevant legal 
standard when it concluded, based on its factual findings, that police had reasonable 
suspicion to stop Yardley for a traffic offense and then probable cause to arrest him for 
carrying a concealed weapon? 
 
 
4 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Yardley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Misapplied The Relevant Legal 
Standard When It Concluded, Based On Its Factual Findings, That Police Had 
Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Yardley For A Traffic Offense And Then Probable Cause 
To Arrest Him For Carrying A Concealed Weapon 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court found that the initial detention of Yardley was justified by 
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, and the ultimate search of his person was 
justified by a probable cause arrest for carrying a concealed weapon.  (Tr., p. 3, L. 3 – p. 
4, L. 20.)  On appeal, “mindful of the district court’s findings,” Yardley argues the traffic 
stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and his arrest was not supported by 
probable cause.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8.)  Because the unchallenged factual findings of 
the district court demonstrate reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for the 
arrest, Yardley has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 This Court reviews a district court’s order denying a motion to suppress under a 
“bifurcated” standard in which it “accept[s] the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous” but “freely review[s] the trial court’s application of constitutional 
principles in light of the facts found.”  State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 671, 450 P.3d 
315, 319 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied Constitutional Principles In Light Of The 
Facts Found When It Rejected Yardley’s Claim His Stop Was Illegal 
 
 “A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and 
implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
 
5 
 
seizures.”  State v. Byrum, 167 Idaho 735, ___, 476 P.3d 402, 408 (Ct. App. 2020).  “Under 
the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven 
contrary to traffic laws.”  State v. Farrell, 165 Idaho 839, 842, 453 P.3d 273, 276 (Ct. App. 
2019).  Turning from a road without signaling is a traffic offense.  I.C. § 49-808.  Here the 
district court found that an officer observed Yardley make a turn without signaling.  (Tr., 
p. 3, Ls. 13-19; p. 4, Ls. 7-10.)  The district court correctly applied the constitutional 
principles to the facts found when it concluded the traffic stop did not violate Yardley’s 
constitutional rights. 
 On appeal, Yardley argues that it is possible that he did signal, but the officer simply 
did not see it.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  This is contrary to the district court’s factual 
findings, however, and Yardley does not claim that the finding is clearly erroneous.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7 (asserting Yardley is “mindful” of the district court’s factual 
findings).)  Because the district court correctly applied constitutional principles to the facts 
found, Yardley has failed to show error. 
 
D. The District Court Correctly Applied Constitutional Principles In Light Of The 
Facts Found When It Rejected Yardley’s Claim His Arrest Was Illegal 
 
 “Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable” unless they fall “within a 
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”  State v. Gosch, 157 Idaho 803, 
806, 339 P.3d 1207, 1210 (Ct. App. 2014).  “One such exception to the warrant requirement 
is for searches conducted incident to an arrest.”  State v. Blythe, 166 Idaho 713, ___, 462 
P.3d 1177, 1180 (2020).  “Pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception, law 
enforcement officers may search an arrestee incident to a lawful custodial arrest.”  State v. 
 
6 
 
Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 649, 402 P.3d 1095, 1102 (2017).  “A warrantless arrest is lawful if 
the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a public 
offense in his presence or has committed a felony not in his presence.”  State v. Williams, 
162 Idaho 56, 66, 394 P.3d 99, 109 (Ct. App. 2016).  “In conformity with the rule at 
common law, a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable and lawful under the Fourth 
Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is 
being committed.”  Lee, 162 Idaho at 649, 402 P.3d at 1102 (quotation marks and brackets 
omitted). 
 Carrying a concealed deadly weapon is a crime.  I.C. § 18-3302.  The district court 
found that officers saw part of a sap, a deadly weapon, concealed under Yardley’s clothes.  
(Tr., p. 3, L. 23 – p. 4, L. 3; p. 4, Ls. 10-18.)  Police found the methamphetamine and the 
sap in a search incident to Yardley’s arrest for carrying a concealed weapon.  (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 
3-6, 18-20.)  The district court correctly applied the constitutional principles to the facts 
found when it concluded the search was incident to Yardley’s lawful arrest and therefore 
did not violate Yardley’s constitutional rights. 
 On appeal Yardley argues that the district court erred because the officer’s 
testimony that he had seen a bulge in Yardley’s clothing and the handle of the sap “was not 
credible.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.)  “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court.”  State v. Conant, 143 Idaho 797, 799, 153 P.3d 477, 
479 (2007).  Because the credibility of the officer’s testimony is not a legitimate subject of 
review, Yardley has failed to show error. 
  
 
7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s judgment. 
 DATED this 4th day of February, 2021. 
 
 
 
        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of February, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by 
means of iCourt File and Serve: 
 
 JENNY C. SWINFORD 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
 


State v. Yardley  Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48143

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Lujan v. Hillbroom Appellant\u27s Reply Brief 2 Dckt. 48168

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State v. urias  Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48207

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State v. Torson Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 48209

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UIdaho Law 
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2-15-2021 
State v. Taylor Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48217 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL SCOTT TAYLOR, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48217-2020 
 
Ada County Case No. CR01-18-61164 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Taylor failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it 
revoked Taylor’s probation? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Taylor Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 The state charged Taylor with possession of methamphetamine and DUI, second offense.  
(R., pp. 23-24.)  Taylor pled guilty to both counts.  (R., pp. 46-47.)  The district court imposed 
concurrent sentences of six years with two years determinate on the methamphetamine conviction 
Electronically Filed
2/25/2021 4:46 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
and 180 days on the DUI conviction and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 70-73.)  At the conclusion 
of the retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Taylor on probation.  (R., pp. 96-99.) 
 A little more than two months after the court placed Taylor on probation, the state filed a 
motion for a warrant on a probation violation.  (R., pp. 105-06, 109-14.)  The state alleged Taylor 
violated his probation in several ways, including failing to notify his probation officer about 
multiple contacts with police, failing to move into a sober living establishment as instructed, 
leaving the district without permission, possessing or consuming alcohol and drugs on numerous 
occasions, failing to attend treatment, driving without a license, driving a car without an interlock 
device, failing to maintain employment, hiding from his probation officer, and failing to pay costs 
or probation and restitution.  (R., pp. 118-40.)  Taylor admitted violating his probation by 
possessing or consuming alcohol and drugs on multiple occasions.  (R., pp. 142-43.)  The district 
court revoked probation.  (R., pp. 149-50.)  Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 153-
54.) 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “‘Once a probation violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke probation 
is within the sound discretion of the court.’”  State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 
464 (2018) (quoting State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007)).  In evaluating 
whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which 
asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State 
v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 3 
C. Taylor Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation 
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society.”  State v. Del 
Critchfield, 167 Idaho 650, ___, 474 P.3d 1247, 1251 (Ct. App. 2020).  The record shows no abuse 
of discretion because the goals of probation were not being met. 
 The district court found that Taylor’s probation “didn’t go well at all.”  (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 5-
12.)  Taylor had a “lengthy criminal history” with multiple felonies.  (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 13-22.)  Taylor 
was not “conforming [his] conduct to the expectations of the law,” and was not “conforming [his] 
conduct to the rules of probation,” which were “imposing some negative consequences on society.”  
(Tr., p. 24, L. 23 – p. 25, L. 10.)  The district court concluded it was “not likely” that Taylor would 
follow the conditions of probation.  (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 11-19.)  Based on these findings, the district 
court revoked probation.  (Tr., p. 25, L. 20 – p. 26, L. 3.) The district court further noted that Taylor 
had served about half of his determinate time, giving him the opportunity to earn parole in a 
reasonable time.  (Tr., p. 26, Ls. 4-10.)  The district court’s determination that probation was not 
fulfilling its twin function of protecting society while rehabilitating Taylor shows that the district 
court properly exercised its discretion. 
 Taylor argues his lack of success on probation was a result of not having his medication 
when released from custody and not having access to resources such as Medicaid and support 
groups due to COVID, which caused him to self-medicate.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)  He 
contends he would be successful on probation but for those obstacles because he has support in 
the community, specifically his girlfriend, Kristen Johnson.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  The district 
court, despite expressing concern about Taylor not having a 30-day supply of his medications 
when being released, rejected this argument.  (Compare Tr., p. 19 L. 12 – p. 23, L. 12 (defense 
 4 
argument and allocution) with Tr., p. 23, L. 13 – p. 26, L 10 (district court’s ruling).)  The rejection 
of this argument is supported by the record. 
 The probation officer’s report shows that in the two and one-half months he was on 
probation, Taylor had four contacts with law enforcement, which resulted in an active 
misdemeanor warrant, that Taylor did not report.  (R., pp. 121-22.)  He used methamphetamine, 
marijuana, and alcohol on more than one occasion.  (R., pp. 122-23.)  He was living with his 
girlfriend, Kristen Johnson, instead of in transitional housing as required by his probation.  (R., pp. 
122, 124.)  He was driving his girlfriend’s car despite having a suspended license and the car not 
being equipped with an interlock device as required.  (R., p. 124.)  He left the district without 
permission when he fought with his girlfriend and went to stay with his wife.  (R., p. 122.)  The 
probation officer reported that Taylor’s relationship with Johnson was “unstable” and lacking in 
support for his sobriety.  (R., p. 124.)  Taylor’s claim that he lacked access to support groups is 
belied by the evidence that he failed to attend his ordered treatment.  (R., pp. 123-24.)  His claim 
that he had community support from his girlfriend is belied by the evidence that she was housing 
him when he was supposed to be in transitional housing, that he left the district more than once 
when he fought with her, that she provided him access to her car despite his lack of driving 
privileges and an interlock device, and that she was not providing a stable relationship conducive 
to sobriety.   
 The district court’s conclusions that probation was not protecting the community or 
rehabilitating Taylor are supported by the record.  Taylor has shown no error in those findings.  He 
has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
 
  
---
 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 25th day of February, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of February, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
 


State v. Taylor Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48217

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
2-9-2021 
State v. Taylor Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48217 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7353
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO.  48217-2020
)
v. ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-18-61164
)
DANIEL SCOTT TAYLOR, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Daniel Scott Taylor pled guilty to possession of
methamphetamine and misdemeanor DUI.  He received a unified sentence of six years, with two
years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction, then placed him on probation for five years.
After a probation violation, the district court revoked Mr. Taylor’s probation.  On appeal,
Mr. Taylor contends that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation.
Electronically Filed
2/9/2021 12:55 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In the evening on December 29, 2018, a reporting party notified law enforcement of a
driver in a white Lincoln Town car who was swerving and had crossed into oncoming traffic.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 pp.7, 119.) Officers were unable to make
contact with the calling party; however, after an area search, Daniel Taylor was located sleeping
in the front seat of his vehicle, which matched the description provided by the reporting party.
(PSI, p.7.)  Upon making contact with Mr. Taylor, the officer observed him hiding something
between the seats which was believed to be a baggie containing suspected methamphetamine.
(PSI, p.7.)  Mr. Taylor was unsteady on his feet and field sobriety tests were conducted, which
Mr. Taylor did not pass.  (PSI, pp.7-8.)  When a breathalyzer examination was administered,
Mr. Taylor’s results were 0.00.  (PSI, p.8.)  Mr. Taylor consented to a blood draw, and the results
indicated that Mr. Taylor had methamphetamine, amphetamine, and Lorazepam in his blood.
(PSI, pp.8, 104, 109; R., p.31.)  Mr. Taylor admitted to using methamphetamine and Suboxone2
earlier in the day.  (PSI, p.8.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Taylor was charged with possession of methamphetamine and
misdemeanor DUI.  (R., pp.23-24.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Taylor pled guilty as
charged.  (R., pp.35-47.)  In exchange for the guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend a
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but that the district court suspend the sentence and
place Mr. Taylor on probation.  (R., pp.37, 43.)  The district court sentenced Mr. Taylor to a
unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed, for the drug charge, and 180 days,
concurrent, for the misdemeanor DUI.  (R., pp.70-74.) The court retained jurisdiction over
1 Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
2 Suboxone was a medication prescribed to Mr. Taylor.  (R., p.37; PSI, pp.135-36.)
3
Mr. Taylor.  (R., p.71.)  After a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the
prison sentence and placed Mr. Taylor on probation for five years.  (R., pp. 96-102.)
In 2020, the State filed a motion for probation violation.  (R., pp.118-140.)  Mr. Taylor
was alleged to have violated his probation by failing to notify his supervising officer of multiple
law enforcement contacts, failing to move into a sober living residence as instructed, failing to
obtain permission from his supervising officer before leaving the district, consuming alcohol,
using methamphetamine and marijuana, failing to successfully complete substance abuse
treatment, operating a motor vehicle without a license, driving without an interlock device,
failing to maintain full-time employment, failing to make himself available for supervision, and
failing to pay fines, fees, and restitution.  (R., pp.118-140.)  Mr. Taylor was screened for
admittance into Drug Court.  (R., pp.141, 144-48.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Taylor
admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his probation.  (6/19/20 Tr., p.7, L.17 -
p.8, L.6; p.11, L.5 – p.13, L.25; R., pp.142-43.)  At the disposition hearing, the district court
revoked Mr. Taylor’s probation and gave him credit for 372 days he had served.3  (7/24/20
Tr., p.25, L.25 – p.13, L.3; R., pp.149-51.)
Mr. Taylor filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Order Revoking Probation,
Imposition of Sentence and Commitment.  (R., pp.153-55.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Taylor’s probation?
3 Mr. Taylor was found not appropriate for admittance to Drug Court, according to the district
court.  (7/24/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.16-17.)
4
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Taylor’s Probation
Mr. Taylor asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation and executed his original sentence of six years, with two years fixed.  He asserts that
his probation violations did not justify revoking probation, especially in light of the goals of
rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society could be best served by his continued
supervision under the probation department.
There are generally two questions that must be determined by the district court in
addressing allegations of probation violations: first, the court must determine whether the
defendant actually violated the terms and conditions of his probation; and second, if a violation
of probation has been found, the trial court must then decide the appropriate remedy for the
violation.  State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009).  “The determination of whether a
probation violation has been established is separate from the decision of what consequence, if
any, to impose for the violation.” Id. (quoting State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 799 (2004)).
Once a probation violation has been found, the district court must determine whether it is of such
seriousness as to warrant revoking probation. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App.
2000).  However, probation may not be revoked arbitrarily. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053,
1055 (Ct. App. 1989).  The district court must decide whether probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and whether probation is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Leach,
135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001).  If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been
proved, a district court’s decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.    I.C. § 20-222; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529.
5
In reviewing a trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry
regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a
particular situation to meet the state’s legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, or the
protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient, genuine
efforts to obey the terms of the probation order. State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App.
1994). Mr. Taylor asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision to revoke his probation by the exercise of reason.
Here, Mr. Taylor performed very well in custody, but when he was released from the
rider programming, he did not have a 30-day supply of his mental health medication, Lithium.4
(7/24/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.6-18; PSI, p.135.)  His release coincided with the rise of Covid-19 in the
community, which resulted in businesses being shut down, including the business that processes
Medicaid.  (7/24/20 Tr., p.19, L.16 – p.20, L.1.)  This led to Mr. Taylor’s inability to obtain his
prescribed mental health medication, which, when combined with personal challenges such
marital difficulties, overwhelmed Mr. Taylor.  (7/24/20 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-15.)  Further, due to the
Covid-19 pandemic, Mr. Taylor’s support system, Narcotics Anonymous (NA), could not meet
in person.5  (7/24/20 Tr., p.22, Ls.17-21; PSI, pp.141-42.)  As a result of his loss of this source of
4 Mr. Taylor has been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder.  (PSI, pp.134, 136; R., p.37.)
5 Mr. Taylor also has Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), thus he is at risk of
serious complications should he contract Covid-19 while incarcerated.  (7/24/20 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-
9; PSI, pp.134, 136.)
6
support and his unmedicated condition, he became manic and self-medicated using illegal
substances.  (7/24/20 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-15.)  However, Mr. Taylor can be rehabilitated and be a
productive member of society.  Mr. Taylor asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
finding that his probation violations justified revocation in light of his past successes on
probation and his rehabilitative potential.   (7/24/20 Tr., p.22, Ls.12-16.)
One factor supporting Mr. Taylor’s rehabilitative potential is the fact that he has strong
support in the community.  (7/24/20 Tr., p.21, Ls.2-12.)  Ms. Kristen Johnson, who was present
for Mr. Taylor’s disposition hearing, wants to do whatever she can to help Mr. Taylor succeed.
(7/24/20 Tr., p.21, Ls.2-7.)  She sees Mr. Taylor’s potential and has hope for his future.  (7/24/20
Tr., p.21, Ls.7-12.)  Further, Mr. Taylor now knows what it takes to succeed on probation.  He
has plans to reconnect with his treatment provider to continue his classes.  (7/24/20 Tr., p.21,
Ls.18-22.)  While on probation, Mr. Taylor was participating in treatment classes over Zoom, but
his telephone stopped working and he did not have any way to resume the classes.  (7/24/20
Tr., p.20, Ls.3-9.)  Mr. Taylor has Medicaid now, and so he can obtain the correct mental health
medications upon his release.  (7/24/20 Tr., p.21, Ls.22-25.)
In light of all of the mitigating evidence presented to the district court that demonstrates
Mr. Taylor’s significant rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its discretion when
revoked Mr. Taylor’s probation.
7
CONCLUSION
Mr. Taylor respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
disposition hearing.
DATED this 9th day of February, 2021.
/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of February, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
  /s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas


State v. Taylor Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48217

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3-10-2021 
State v. Jacuinde Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48246 
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Recommended Citation 
"State v. Jacuinde Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48246" (2021). Not Reported. 7044. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7044 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6661
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48246-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) MINIDOKA COUNTY NO. CR34-20-66
v. )
)
MANUEL JACUINDE, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Manuel Jacuinde pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced to
a suspended unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and was placed on probation.
Mr. Jacuinde later admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the district court revoked
probation, and retained jurisdiction.  Mr. Jacuinde asserts the district court abused its discretion
by retaining jurisdiction, rather than continuing Mr. Jacuinde’s probation with the added
condition that he complete an inpatient treatment program.
Electronically Filed
3/10/2021 7:49 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Manuel Jacuinde was caught attempting to steal items from Walmart.  (R., pp.8-9.)  He
refused to cooperate with the investigating officer and was arrested, and he was found to be in
possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.8-9.)  The State
filed a criminal complaint charging Mr. Jacuinde with felony possession of methamphetamine,
and misdemeanor possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, petit theft, and
resisting or obstructing an officer.  (R., pp.10-13.)  Mr. Jacuinde waived his right to a
preliminary hearing and was bound over into the district court, and an information was filed
charging him with the above crimes.  (R., pp.23-30.)  Mr. Jacuinde pleaded guilty to possession
of methamphetamine, the State dismissed the remaining charges, and the court sentenced
Mr. Jacuinde to a suspended unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and he was placed
on probation.  (R., pp.33-35, 37-46, 55-58.)
After initially checking in with his probation officer, Mr. Jacuinde failed to report, and
when contacted by his probation officer by telephone, Mr. Jacuinde admitted that he had been
using methamphetamine and wanted to get into an inpatient treatment program.  (R., pp.59-65.)
The State filed a motion to revoke probation alleging that Mr. Jacuinde violated the terms of his
probation in a variety of ways.  (R., pp.59-68.)  Mr. Jacuinde admitted that he violated the terms
of his probation by failing to report to his probation officer, failing to reside where he was
directed, by drinking alcohol, and by using marijuana and methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.10, L.5 –
p.15, L.2.)  The State asked the court to revoke Mr. Jacuinde’s probation and to retain
jurisdiction (Tr., p.15, Ls.19-22), while Mr. Jacuinde asked the court to continue him on
probation with the requirement that he complete and inpatient treatment program (Tr., p.18, L.3
– p.20, L.17.)  The district court revoked Mr. Jacuinde’s probation and retained jurisdiction.
3
(R., pp.80-82; Tr., p.24, Ls.22-24.)  Mr. Jacuinde filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (R., pp.83-
85.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Jacuinde’s probation, in light of the
mitigating factors that exist in this case?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Jacuinde’s Probation, In Light Of
The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
Mr. Jacuinde asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its
discretion by revoking his probation.  When a defendant admits to willfully violating the terms of
probation, the district court has broad discretion to determine the appropriate disposition,
including whether to continue the defendant on probation, to retain jurisdiction, or to execute the
sentence without retaining jurisdiction.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record considering the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest.  The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.
Mr. Jacuinde recognizes that he is a drug addict, and he wants to get treatment.
Mr. Jacuinde started drinking alcohol at age , but as he got older, he eventually started using
methamphetamine and other illicit drugs.  (PSI, pp.12-13.)  His addiction got so bad that
Mr. Jacuinde became an intravenous methamphetamine and heroin user for a two-year period.
(PSI, p.13.)  Mr. Jacuinde recognizes that his drug use cost him his wife and his children, and
4
admitted that he used to spend all of his money on his drug habit.  (PSI, p.13.)  He told the PSI
writer that “he feels like his drug use has taken what he loves the most away from him and he
resents his drug use.”  (PSI, p.13.)  But all is no lost for Mr. Jacuinde, because he understands the
importance of getting treatment for his disease, and he expressed a willingness and a desire to do
so.  (PSI, pp.4, 13.)  Mr. Jacuinde also expressed that he was, “‘Remorseful for the pain I may
have caused anyone affected by my drug use/crime.’”  (PSI, p.4.)  During the disposition portion
of his admit/deny hearing, Mr. Jacuinde told the district court the following:
I’m just optimistic, Your Honor.  I’m optimistic about the chance at getting better
because I do know that I have a problem.  And however that be, whether it’s the
Walker Center or whatever you decide, I just want you to know that I’m looking
forward for the outcome for myself, you know. I’m looking forward, whether it be
a year from now or two years from now.  I have the rest of my life.  I’m just tired
of being an addict.  I’m tired of being an addict.
(Tr., p.21, Ls.2-10.)
Idaho courts recognize that drug addiction, coupled with the willingness to seek
treatment, and remorse, are mitigating factors that should counsel a court to impose a less-severe
sentence. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App.
1991).  In light of the mitigating factors present in his case, Mr. Jacuinde asserts the district court
abused its discretion by revoking his probation and retaining jurisdiction.
5
CONCLUSION
Mr. Jacuinde respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district court
with instructions that it place Mr. Jacuinde on probation, with the requirement that he complete
an inpatient treatment program.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Jason C. Pintler
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCP/eas


State v. Jacuinde Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48246

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5-2-2021 
Roles v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 48337 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
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