University of Idaho College of Law

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3-4-2021 
State v. Jones Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48349 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10999
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48349-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-18-50722
v. )
)
IAN SYLVESTER JONES, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ian Jones pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and
the district court sentenced him to seven years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
After he successfully completed his period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed
Mr. Jones on probation for five years. A few months later, the State filed a motion for a bench
warrant for a probation violation. In May 2020, the district court revoked his probation and
executed his underlying sentence. Mr. Jones filed a motion for reduction of his sentence pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. The district court denied it, and Mr. Jones filed a notice of appeal. On
appeal, Mr. Jones argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.
Electronically Filed
3/4/2021 8:52 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
According to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), Mr. Jones was the passenger of
a vehicle that was pulled over for swerving and failing to properly signal. (PSI, p.6.)1 Believing
that the driver was under the influence, the officer requested another officer come conduct a DUI
investigation. (PSI, p.6.) While one officer was administering field sobriety tests, the other
officer conducted a records check, and learned that Mr. Jones had prior drug arrests, and that the
driver was on parole. (PSI, p.6.) The officer requested a drug-detection K-9 come to the scene.
(PSI, p.6.) After the dog detected the smell of a narcotic, the officers began to search the vehicle,
and found a black case containing methamphetamine that belonged to Mr. Jones. (PSI, p.6.)
The State filed a complaint against Mr. Jones for possession of a controlled substance in
October 2018. (R., p.11.) A month later, the State filed an amended complaint for trafficking in
methamphetamine. (R., p.14.) After he waived his preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge
bound Mr. Jones over to district court, and he was charged by information with trafficking in
methamphetamine. (R., pp.17-23.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Jones pled guilty to
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (R., pp.25-36.)
A sentencing hearing was held in January 2019. (R., p.39.) At that hearing, the State
recommended that the district court sentence Mr. Jones to ten years, with three years fixed.
(R., p.39.) Defense counsel recommended that the district court sentence him to ten years, with
two years fixed, and retain jurisdiction (“a rider”). (R., p.39.) The district court sentenced
Mr. Jones to seven years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.39, 43-46.)
After successfully completing his rider program, the district court placed him on probation in
October 2019 for a period of five years. (R., pp.51, 53-58.)
1 Citations to “PSI” refer to the 298-page electronic document titled “Appeal Confidential
Exhibits Record.”
3
In February 2020, the State filed a motion for a bench warrant alleging nine probation
violations. (R., pp.63-69.) Mr. Jones admitted to absconding, and the State dismissed the
remaining allegations. (R., pp.64, 66-68, 92.) At the disposition hearing in May 2020, the State
recommended that the district court revoke his probation and execute the underlying sentence.
(R., p.94.) Defense counsel recommended that the district court reinstate probation. (R., p.94.)
The district court revoked probation and executed Mr. Jones’ underlying sentence of seven years,
with three years fixed. (R., pp.94-98.) When deciding to revoke his probation and execute his
underlying sentence, the district court considered an Idaho Department of Correction (“IDOC”)
internal investigation from another individual’s PSI, which mentioned Mr. Jones’ alleged
involvement in an IDOC drug smuggling operation. (Tr., p.5, L.18 – p.6, L.4; see PSI, pp.267-
98.) Later, the district court suggested that when it revoked Mr. Jones’ probation, it had accepted
that he was ‘involved in’ the drug smuggling operation described in the other individual’s PSI.
(Tr., p.5, L.17 – p.6, L.17, p.11, L.25 – p.12, L.8.)
In May 2020, Mr. Jones filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35. (R., pp.99, 103.) In support of this motion, he provided additional information
demonstrating that, although he was named in the IDOC investigation, there was never any proof
of wrongdoing on his part. (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-19; PSI, pp.266-98.) A hearing on that motion was
held in September 2020. (See Tr.) During that hearing, defense counsel requested that the district
court retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.10, Ls.11-19; R., p.138.) The district court orally denied
Mr. Jones’ motion. (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-5; R., p.138.) In November 2020, the district court entered its
written order on the Rule 35 motion. (R., p.145.)
4
In the meantime, Mr. Jones had filed a notice of appeal in September 2020. (R., pp.139-
41.)   The notice of appeal was timely, albeit premature, from the order revoking probation.2
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Jones’ Idaho Criminal Rule 35
Motion?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Jones’ Rule 35 Motion
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). “When
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire
record and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original
sentence.” Id. The Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.”
State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000.) “Where an appeal is taken from an order
refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all
information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on
2 Since Mr. Jones’ Notice of Appeal was filed after his Rule 35 motion was orally denied, but
before any written order was entered, it was initially premature; however, it ripened when the
district court entered its written order in November 2020. See I.A.R. 17(e)(2) (“A notice of
appeal filed from an appealable judgment or order before formal written entry of such document
shall become valid upon the filing and the placing the stamp of the clerk of the court on such
appealable judgment or order, without refiling the notice of appeal.”).
5
the motion to reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). The denial of a
motion for a sentence reduction under Rule 35 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Huffman,
144 Idaho at 203. “When reviewing a lower court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, this Court
must analyze ‘whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason.’” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018)).
Here, Mr. Jones submits the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused its
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. He provided the district court with new and additional
information to justify a reduction in his sentence to a rider.
In this case, when deciding whether to revoke Mr. Jones’ probation and execute his
underlying sentence, the district court considered information that was not available to defense
counsel or the State at the time of the disposition hearing. (Tr., p.5, L.15 – p.6, L.24.) The
information is from a 2017 IDOC internal investigation concerning the smuggling of drugs into
the prison, in which Mr. Jones’ name was mentioned. (Tr., p.5, L.18 – p.6, L.4; see PSI, pp.267-
98.) The district court stated, “when I considered the motion for probation violation, I had in
mind information that I had received from another presentence investigation report . . . . And
when I imposed [his underlying sentence], I do have to say, this information that I have that I
now provided to you did at least influence the Court in some regards . . . .” (Tr., p.5, Ls.17-20,
p.6, Ls.14-17.) Mr. Jones was never charged in connection with the IDOC investigation.
(Tr., p.7, Ls.8-16.) Despite the fact that Mr. Jones was never charged or convicted of any crime
6
relating to the IDOC investigation, the district court treated this information as aggravating when
it revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence. (Tr., p.6, Ls.11-21.)
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Jones provided additional evidence which
demonstrates that, although he was named in the investigation, there was never any proof of
wrongdoing. (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-19; PSI, pp.266-98.) At the Rule 35 motion hearing, defense
counsel stated that the parties were not able to get additional information regarding the
investigation, other than the fact that Mr. Jones was not charged in relation to the IDOC
investigation. (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-11.) This new and additional information from Mr. Jones
supported a reduction in his sentence to a rider. Therefore, Mr. Jones submits the district court
did not exercise reason and thus abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Jones respectfully requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and
the case remanded to the district court for an order retaining jurisdiction.
DATED this 4th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Kiley A. Heffner
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAH/eas


English

State v. Jones  Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48349

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
5-27-2021 
State v. Meyer Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48356 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JENNIFER JENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
KATIE JO MEYER, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48356-2020 
 
Ada County Case No. 
CR-FE-2016-349 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Katie Jo Meyer failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
revoked Meyer’s probation? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Meyer Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
On February 10, 2016, Meyer pled guilty to possession of heroin in  
 
Electronically Filed
5/27/2021 10:05 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c).  (Aug. R., pp. 25-26, 30.1)  In the sentencing proceedings, 
the court considered Meyer’s mental health and substance abuse issues. (4/13/2016 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 
2-4; p. 18, Ls. 9-22; p. 23, Ls. 1-24.)  On or about April 14, 2016, the court imposed a seven-year 
sentence, with one and a half years determinate, then suspended the sentence for a seven-year 
period of probation.  (Aug. R., pp. 42-47.)   
A few months later, Meyer was living with her parents and two younger siblings.  (Aug. 
R., p. 73.)  Her father contacted Meyer’s probation officer to report that she had stopped taking 
her medication and had threatened to kill her mother in her sleep and beat her sister with a baseball 
bat.  (Aug. R., p. 72.)  On September 20, 2016, the state filed a motion for probation violation on 
the basis that Meyer had failed to stay on her prescribed mental health medications and failed to 
check herself into Intermountain Hospital as instructed by her probation officer.  (Aug. R., pp. 70-
71, 75.)  The court ordered a mental health evaluation.  (Aug. R., pp. 78-79.)  Thereafter, the court 
committed Meyer to the custody of the Department of Health and Welfare for mental health 
treatment.  (Aug. R., pp. 81-83.)   
After Meyer’s term of treatment ended in early 2017, the district court held a probation 
violation hearing and revoked and reinstated probation.  (Aug. R., pp. 98-101.)  In its March 31, 
2017, order,2 the district court stated a condition of probation was “to take all medications 
recommended and prescribed to [Meyer] by her treating healthcare practitioners and at the rate and 
                                            
1 This Court granted augmentation of the record to include the clerk’s record and transcript from 
Meyer’s earlier appeal, No. 44982-2017.  (R., p. 178.)  The state refers to the clerk’s record from 
Meyer’s appeal No. 44982-2017 as “Aug. R.” and the clerk’s record from the instant appeal No. 
48356-2020 as “R.”   
2 Meyer appealed this order, but the appeal was dismissed as moot.  State v. Meyer, No. 44982, 
2018 WL 4061581, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App., Aug. 27, 2018). 
 3 
in the dosages as prescribed to her for any mental health or other medical condition[.]”  (Aug. R., 
p. 98.)   
Within a few months, Meyer again violated the terms of her probation.  On July 10, 2017, 
the state filed a motion for probation violation on the basis that Meyer had committed battery on a 
police/peace officer or sheriff, possessed drug paraphernalia, failed to report to substance abuse 
treatment on 26 different occasions, reported for treatment while under the influence on two 
occasions, failed to complete inpatient substance abuse treatment at the Walker Center, failed to 
maintain full-time employment, used methamphetamine on two occasions, used heroin on one 
occasion, used marijuana on two occasions, used “acid” on one occasion, and failed to submit to 
urinalysis testing on 14 different occasions.  (R., pp. 28-30.)  The district court revoked and 
reinstated probation.  (R., pp. 50-53.) 
About three months after the court’s order, on January 2, 2018, the state filed a motion for 
probation violation.  (R., pp. 58-60.)  The motion alleged failure to maintain full-time employment, 
failure to report to probation officer, use of heroin on five different occasions, use of 
methamphetamine on eight occasions, use of morphine on three occasions, use of dilaudid on two 
occasions, failure to complete substance abuse treatment, failure to submit to urinalysis testing on 
eleven different occasions, failure to pay fines, fees, funds, surcharges and/or costs, failure to pay 
restitution, and failure to reimburse Ada County for public defender services.  (R., pp. 74-77.3)  
The court revoked probation, imposed sentence, and retained jurisdiction while Meyer completed 
a one-year rider.  (R., pp. 97-100.)  During the rider program, Meyer completed the programs 
“Cognitive Behavioral Interventions for Substance Abuse” and “Thinking for a Change.”  (Conf. 
                                            
3 The allegations cited are from the amended motion, filed February 2, 2018. 
 4 
Docs., pp. 44-45.)  She also received a mental health evaluation and mental health treatment.  (R., 
pp. 106-07; Conf. Docs., pp. 33-40.) 
Upon completion of the one-year rider, at the end of March 2019, Meyer was reinstated to 
probation once more.  (R., pp. 124-30.)  The court conditioned probation on Meyer enrolling and 
meaningfully participating in mental health counseling and scheduling a mental health 
appointment within three days of her release from custody.  (R., p. 126.)  The court also 
recommended “that the Defendant pursue[] receiving injectable medications to insure that she 
stays on her medication.”  (R., p. 127 (bolding omitted).) 
Within less than a year, Meyer again had problems complying with the terms of her 
probation.  (See, e.g., Conf. Docs., pp. 61, 75.)  On February 11, 2020, the state filed a motion for 
bench warrant and probation violation.  (R., pp. 134-36.)  Meyer admitted to willfully violating 
the terms of her probation by using methamphetamine and by failing to pay fines, fees, funds, 
surcharges, and/or costs as ordered by the court.  (6/3/2020 Tr., p., 9, L. 25 – p. 11, L. 3.)  The 
court continued the probation revocation hearing and referred Meyer to mental health court.  (See 
9/23/2020 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 11-18; R., pp. 166-67.)  According to her counsel, Meyer did not meet 
the requirements for mental health court because at the screening Meyer had stated that “she is not 
on medication and wouldn’t take medication[.]”  (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 19-24.)  After hearing 
argument from counsel, the court revoked probation.  (R., pp. 169-72.) 
Meyer timely appealed.  (See R., pp. 169, 174.) 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Review of a probation revocation proceeding involves a two-step analysis.  First, it is 
determined whether the terms of probation have been violated.  If they have, it is then determined 
whether the violation justifies revocation of the probation.”  State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 
 5 
390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017) (citations omitted).  As to the first step, a “court’s finding that a violation 
has been proved will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the finding.”  State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations 
omitted).  “As to the second step, the decision whether to revoke a defendant’s probation for a 
violation is within the discretion of the district court.”  Id. (citations omitted).4     
In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a 
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. Meyer Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
“In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation 
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.”  State v. 
Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 733, 249 P.3d 1184, 1188 (Ct. App. 2011).  Courts act within their 
discretion to revoke a defendant’s probation when the defendant’s violations demonstrate that 
probation is not serving its rehabilitative purpose or when the defendant poses a threat to society.  
See, e.g., State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 798-99, 302 P.3d 1066, 1071-72 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(not serving the goal of rehabilitation); Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733, 249 P.3d at 1188 (not achieving 
rehabilitation and defendant was a risk to society).   
                                            
4 Meyer admits that she violated the terms of her probation.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  Accordingly, 
this Court need only consider the second step of the probation revocation review.   
 6 
For instance, in Fife, the Court of Appeals affirmed probation revocation, over the 
defendant’s argument that the district court should have revised the terms of his probation, rather 
than revoking probation, due to the defendant’s mental health issues.  State v. Fife, 115 Idaho 879, 
881, 771 P.2d 543, 545 (Ct. App. 1989).  The district court had found that the defendant’s mental 
issues contributed to him no longer responding to probation counseling.5  Id.  Because probation 
was not serving to rehabilitate him and the defendant posed a threat to society, the district court 
appropriately revoked probation.  Id.  Further, the district court had retained jurisdiction so that 
the defendant could obtain psychiatric evaluation and treatment.  Id. at 880, 771 P.2d at 544; see 
also Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733, 249 P.3d at 1188 (affirming probation revocation when one of the 
violations consisted of failing to obtain a prescription as required by the court).   
Indeed, untreated mental health conditions may be a factor in a court’s decision, but they 
are not, in and of themselves, controlling.  See State v. Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 666, 99 P.3d 616, 
619 (2004) (holding that district court had appropriately considered the information in the 
psychological report, which indicated that defendant who had committed forgery suffered from 
untreated, severe depression, but that defendant posed high risk to reoffend, so imposing 
concurrent sentence was within the court’s discretion).   
 Here the district court’s decision to revoke probation was reasonable.  As this was Meyer’s 
fourth probation violation, the court found that she was “not amenable for . . . having [her] 
probation reinstated.”  (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 21, L. 24 – p. 22, L. 5.)  The court reasoned that probation 
was not serving a rehabilitative purpose.  (See 9/23/2020 Tr., p. 21, L. 25 – p. 22, L. 5.)  Rather, 
                                            
5 While the opinion does not identify what Fife’s mental health issues were, the Ninth Circuit 
opinion it cites regarding Fife’s Social Security disability appeal discusses Fife’s diagnoses, which 
included “paranoid personality disorder” and “high depression.”  Fife, 115 Idaho at 881, 771 P.2d 
at 545 (citing Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985)); Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d at 1429 
(discussing diagnoses). 
 7 
Meyer continued to exhibit the “same behavior of not remaining medication compliant.  
Continuing to use.  And absconding or making [her]self unavailable for supervision.”  (Id.)  
Meyer’s probation plan included medication compliance (Aug. R., p. 98; R., p. 126), but Meyer 
had refused to accept that she had mental health issues and refused the medication.  (Conf. Docs., 
p. 77; 9/23/2020 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 19-24; Aug. R., pp. 72-73, 75.)  This history apparently led to the 
district court noting, “So my hope is that you will make [the] mature decision to accept your 
medical condition, just like other people accept their medical conditions, and decide to manage 
your mental health issues so that you can be a full and active participant in all that life has to offer 
you.”  (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 10-15.)   
 Like the defendant in Fife, Meyer’s mental health issues contributed to her probation non-
compliance, and the district court properly revoked probation because Meyer’s conduct 
demonstrated that probation was not serving its rehabilitative purpose.  See 115 Idaho at 881, 771 
P.2d at 545.  The district court had considered the mental health information before it (6/3/2020 
Tr., p. 12, Ls. 2-18) as well as the number of Meyer’s violations and concluded that probation was 
not helping Meyer succeed (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 21, L. 24 – p. 22, L. 22.)   
 Not only was probation not serving its rehabilitative purpose, but the record demonstrates 
that Meyer posed a danger to society.  She had attacked a police officer, bitten her mother, tried to 
break into her parents’ house, assaulted another inmate while in jail, threatened to kill her mother, 
and threatened to beat her little sister with a baseball bat.  (R., pp. 28-30, 77; Conf. R., p. 101; 
Aug. R., p. 72.)  The court acted within its discretion when it revoked probation.  See Fife, 115 
Idaho at 881, 771 P.2d at 545; Calley, 140 Idaho at 666, 99 P.3d at 619. 
 Meyer argues that the district court did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason 
because it failed to appropriately consider Meyer’s severe mental health problems.  (See 
 8 
Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)  Meyer is mistaken.  The fact that Meyer has mental health issues does 
not alter the fact that the district court’s decision fell well within the controlling standard.  
Probation was not serving its rehabilitative purpose for Meyer, and the record reflected Meyer was 
a danger to society.   
The district court by no means ignored or misapprehended Meyer’s mental health issues, 
as Meyer contends.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  In fact, the district court had referred Meyer to 
mental health court (R., pp. 166-67), had ordered a mental health evaluation (R., pp. 106-07), and 
had set mental health-specific conditions for Meyer’s probation (Aug. R., p. 98; R., pp. 126-27.)  
While Meyer contends that the district court’s use of the words “mature decision” indicate the 
court wrongly concluded Meyer’s problem was immaturity (see Appellant’s brief, p. 6), as 
explained above, the court was rightly referring to Meyer’s history of denial of her mental health 
diagnoses, not focusing on some alleged immaturity.  Further, Meyer can hardly complain of such 
language when her own counsel had identified immaturity as a reason for leniency at the 
sentencing hearing.  (See 4/13/2016 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 23-24 (defense counsel arguing “I think maturity 
is also an issue as well”).)   
And while Meyer appears to argue on appeal that she is incapable of taking her medications 
(see Appellant’s brief, p. 6), she introduced no such evidence at the probation revocation hearing 
(or any evidence at all).  (9/23/2020 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 3-6.)  And the articles she cites (see Appellant’s 
brief, p. 6) should not be considered because they are new evidence not introduced in the court 
below.  See State v. Snapp, 163 Idaho 460, 463, 414 P.3d 1199, 1202 (Ct. App. 2018) (Appellate 
review “is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.”) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Skogen, No. 38701, 2012 WL 9495962, at *2 
(Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2012) (explaining that appellant’s argument relied heavily on criminal 
 9 
justice articles, which “in effect are new evidence that would be improper to consider for the first 
time on appeal”).   
The district court appropriately exercised its discretion to revoke Meyer’s probation.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 27th day of May, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Jennifer Jensen 
JENNIFER JENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
KIMBERLY A. COSTER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Jennifer Jensen 
JENNIFER JENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
JJ/dd 
 


State v. Meyer Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48356

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
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State v. Maritnez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48373 
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"State v. Maritnez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48373" (2021). Not Reported. 7102. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7102 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10999
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 48373-2020
)
v. ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2012-733
)
PETER MARTINEZ, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Peter Martinez appeals from the district court’s order revoking his probation and
executing his ten-year sentence for aggravated battery and violation of a no-contact order. He
argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his oral Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion
for modification of his sentence at the probation violation disposition hearing. He asserts that the
district court should have reduced his sentence to eight years, with three years fixed.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
According to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), in January 2012, police
officers were dispatched to Saint Alphonsus Hospital to investigate a woman’s report that she
Electronically Filed
3/9/2021 12:15 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
was beaten by her boyfriend. (PSI, p.123.)1 The woman reported that her boyfriend,
Mr. Martinez, showed up to her house and kept accusing her of being too friendly with her male
roommates. (PSI, p.123.) She claimed that he chest bumped her, causing her to fall on a futon.
(PSI, p.123.) She stated that she kicked Mr. Martinez in the chest or stomach to prevent him
from continuing to hurt her. (PSI, p.123.) He then started hitting her with his fists and threw her
across the room into a door. (PSI, p.123.)
The State filed a complaint against Mr. Martinez for aggravated battery and violation of a
no-contact order2 in January 2012. (R., p.15.) After he waived his preliminary hearing, he was
bound over to district court, and charged by information with aggravated battery and violation of
a no-contact order. (R., pp.36-37.) In March 2012, Mr. Martinez entered into a plea agreement
and pled guilty to aggravated battery and violating a no-contact order. (R., pp.42-50.)
A sentencing hearing was held in May 2012. (R., p.58.) At that hearing, the district court
sentenced him to ten years, with four years fixed, for aggravated battery, and one hundred and
eighty days in the Ada County Jail for violating the no contact order, to run concurrently.
(R., pp.60-63.) The district court also retained jurisdiction (“a rider”). (R., pp.60-63.) At his rider
review hearing in January 2013, Mr. Martinez was put on probation for ten years, effective in
May 2012. (R., pp.68-77.)
In February 2018, a motion for probation violation was filed alleging eleven probation
violations. (R., pp.85-91.) Mr. Martinez admitted to six violations, and the State dismissed the
remaining allegations. (R., p.98.) At the disposition hearing in March 2018, the district court
1 Citations to PSI reference the 454-page electronic document titled “Appeal Confidential
Exhibits.”
2 A no-contact order was previously issued in Case No. CR-MD-2011-0008168 against
Mr. Martinez, prohibiting him from having contact with the same woman involved in the instant
offense. (See PSI, p.123; R., p.37.)
3
revoked Mr. Martinez’s probation, executed his underlying sentence of ten years, with four years
fixed, and retained jurisdiction again. (R., pp.100-04.) At the rider review hearing in October
2018, the district court reinstated his probation for a period of five years. (R., pp.106, 108-19.)
About two years later, in April 2020, the State filed a motion for probation violation,
alleging five probation violations. (R., pp.126-32; PSI, pp.422-23.) Mr. Martinez admitted to two
probation violations, and the State dismissed the remaining allegations. (R., p.158; 7/20/20 Tr.3)
A disposition hearing was held in October 2020. (R., p.161; see generally 10/5/20 Tr.4) At that
hearing, the State recommended that the district court revoke his probation and execute his
underlying sentence of ten years. (10/5/20 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-13.) Defense counsel asked the district
court to consider reinstating his probation, or in the alternative, that it reduce his sentence to
eight years, with three years fixed. (10/5/20 Tr., p.10, Ls.18-21.) The district court followed the
State’s recommendation and revoked Mr. Martinez’s probation and executed his original
sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. (10/5/20 Tr., p.17, L.24 – p.18, L.7; R., pp.163-66.)
The district court also denied Mr. Martinez’s oral Rule 35 motion. (10/5/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.21-23,
p.18, L.3.) Mr. Martinez timely appealed. (R., pp.163-66 (judgment and commitment), 167-69
(notice of appeal).)
ISSUES
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Martinez’s oral Rule 35 motion?
3 Citations to “7/20/20 Tr.,” refer to the 11-page electronic document titled “Appeal
Supplemental Transcript,” and contains the admit/deny hearing held on July 20, 2020.
4 Citations to “10/5/20 Tr.,” refer to the 8-page electronic document titled “Appeal Transcript 1-
4-2021 10.35.43. . . . ” and contains the probation violation disposition hearing held on
October 5, 2020.
4
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Martinez’s Oral Rule 35 Motion
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). “When
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire
record and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original
sentence.” Id. The Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.”
State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000.) “Where an appeal is taken from an order
refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all
information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on
the motion to reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). The denial of a
motion for a sentence reduction under Rule 35 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Huffman,
144 Idaho at 203. “When reviewing a lower court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, this Court
must analyze ‘whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason.’” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018)).
5
Here, Mr. Martinez submits the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused its
discretion by denying his oral Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion.
First, Mr. Martinez stayed out of trouble and received no major disciplinary actions
during both periods of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.194, 205, 207, 209.) He received only four
warnings, all of which were for minor rule violations. (PSI, pp.194, 205, 207.) He received
positive recognition for volunteering and helping do things he was not required to do, such as
getting up early to help unload trucks, and having a positive attitude in his classes and groups.
(PSI, pp.205, 211.) During his period of retained jurisdiction in 2018, his case manager reported
seeing a lot of improvement regarding his thinking and actions. (PSI, p.206.) He stated, “I’ve
received nothing but positive comments from both security and programs staff regarding his
attitude, behavior, and work ethic.” (PSI, p.205.)
Second, Mr. Martinez successfully completed all programming during both periods of
retained jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.194-95, 205, 219, 436, 448.) His substance abuse facilitator noted
that despite this not being an easy program for him, and his struggles with reading and
comprehension, he never gave up. (PSI, p.205.) He stayed after groups to get extra help or seek
clarification on an assignment. (PSI, p.205.) He even made it on to the Honors Team, and later
advanced to the Honors Dorm. (PSI, p.205.) Mr. Martinez’s case manager noted that, “[t]he
offenders in the Honors Dorm are literally the best of the best offenders on the NICI compound.”
(PSI, p.207.) His case manager further noted that he successfully completed all his required
classes and groups, and his overall performance was good. (PSI, p.205.) Mr. Martinez’s
substance abuse facilitator reported that he made a significant amount of progress, and that he
appears to be honest and sincere regarding his desire to want to make positive changes in his life.
(PSI, pp.206-07.)
6
Lastly, Mr. Martinez made significant progress on probation until he relapsed. When he
was released on probation in 2013, Mr. Martinez did very well for the next five years, until his
probation violation in February 2018. (PSI, p.287.) His probation officer noted that he was
friendly, had a good attitude, and seemed motivated to get out of the shelter. (PSI, p.274.)
Mr. Martinez’s probation officer never had issues with him and reported that he was always in
compliance. (PSI, pp.263-91.)
After his period of retained jurisdiction in 2018, Mr. Martinez signed up for a sober
living facility, and lived there without any issues for about one and one-half years. (10/5/20
Tr., p.11, Ls.7-13; PSI, pp.219, 441.) While on probation, he attended all of his programming,
including completing a 26-week domestic violence course, and he did not have any positive drug
tests. (PSI, pp.219, 436, 439, 444-45, 448.) His probation officer reported that he did well in
group, always had a good attitude, and took ownership of his behaviors. (PSI, pp.436-37, 447-
48.) She also stated that although he failed the written portion of the driver’s license test, he
never gave up, and kept trying really hard to pass. (PSI, p.444.) Despite struggling to find
permanent work, Mr. Martinez still worked regularly, and really made an effort to find full-time
employment. (PSI, pp.436, 444.) Furthermore, Mr. Martinez’s probation officer recognized him
for the fact that he continued to remain positive despite his injured hand. (PSI, p.438.) In fact, his
probation officer stated that he was doing so well, that she did not need to see him for another
two months. (PSI, p.444.)
Mr. Martinez did well on probation for about one and one-half years until he
unfortunately relapsed. (PSI, p.220.) When explaining his recent probation violation and relapse,
Mr. Martinez stated that two of his nieces were involved in a shooting, and one of them passed
away. (See 10/5/20 Tr., p.13, Ls.4-18; PSI, pp.223, 442.) At the funeral, he ran into a former
7
girlfriend, and that is when he relapsed and began falling back into old behaviors. (See 10/5/20
Tr., p.13, Ls.4-18; PSI, pp.223, 442.) Despite some setbacks, Mr. Martinez demonstrated that he
is able to maintain his sobriety and stay out of trouble when he stays focused on his treatment
and is surrounded by positive individuals.
This new information on Mr. Martinez’s conduct and programming in prison and on
probation support a reduction in his sentence to eight years, with three years fixed. Therefore,
Mr. Martinez argues the district court abused its discretion by not granting his oral Rule 35
motion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order and
remand his case to the district court for entry of an order reducing his sentence.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Kiley A. Heffner
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
  /s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAH/eas


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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
7-2-2021 
State v. Hamilton Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48549 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Hamilton Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48549" (2021). Not Reported. 7188. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7188 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
MAYA P. WALDRON     
Waldron Legal, PLLC 
I.S.B. #9582 
P.O. Box 1316 
Boise, Idaho 83701  
(208) 244-0735 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 48549-2021 
     ) 
v.     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-19-38102 
     ) 
TODD A. HAMILTON,  ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
______________________________) 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Nature of the Case  
 
Todd A. Hamilton appeals from the district court’s order denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 motion for a reduction of sentence. In light of the new information Mr. Hamilton provided with 
that motion, the district court abused its discretion by denying it.  
Factual and Procedural Background 
When the State filed the charges in this case, Mr. Hamilton had just spent a year exploring 
the country by RV with his girlfriend, Ms. Moeri, and their young daughter, and was in the process 
of settling down in the Treasure Valley. PSI1 2. He had managed to create a life for himself despite 
his extremely difficult childhood and adolescence—including a felony conviction when he was a 
teenager and the murder/suicide of his parents when he was in college, both of which would 
 
1 Citations to “PSI” refer to the .pdf document containing the confidential exhibits. 
Electronically Filed
7/2/2021 11:57 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
continue to haunt him throughout his life. PSI 5–6, 26–27. That past wasn’t obvious to those that 
knew Mr. Hamilton, however; he was a successful entrepreneur, considered a loyal friend to many, 
and had whole-heartedly taken on the role of father to Ms. Moeri’s daughter. PSI 11–12, 41–46. 
The past Mr. Hamilton worked so hard to overcome caught up with him in September 2019, 
when he and Ms. Moeri took wine from an Albertson’s without paying for it. PSI 2. The State later 
charged the couple with various counts of burglary, grand theft, and petit theft, alleging that they 
stole thousands of dollars’ worth of wine from multiple stores. R. 9–11, 43–45; PSI 1. Pursuant to 
a plea agreement, Mr. Hamilton pled guilty to one count of grand theft, while the State dismissed 
the remaining counts against him and agreed to recommend a sentence of one year fixed plus four 
years indeterminate. R. 55–66.  
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Hamilton called his mentor and former attorney to testify 
to his background and character. Tr., p.20, L.20–p.31, L.7. He gave context to Mr. Hamilton’s 
criminal history, spoke to the trauma Mr. Hamilton suffered as the result of his parents’ 
murder/suicide, described Mr. Hamilton as loyal and a hard worker, and told the court that 
Mr. Hamilton would not make the same mistake again. Id.  
Mr. Hamilton apologized for his actions, and told the court about the difficulties he faced 
as a young man after the death of his parents. Tr., p.48, L.9–p.49, L.9. He explained how, after 
struggling with his emotional health and getting into trouble with the law as a young man, he 
decided to turn things around and make the right choices every day. Tr., p.49, Ls.10–23. Twenty-
five years later, his decision to steal wine from Albertson’s took him full circle to where he had 
started. Tr., p.49, L.24–p.50, L.2. He described how that decision had caused him and his family 
to live in a prison of his own making, and forced him to finally face his problems head-on. 
Tr., p.50, Ls.2–23. In particular, Mr. Hamilton talked about Ms. Moeri’s daughter, who he was in 
 3 
the process of adopting, and the anguish he felt because of all of the pain he has caused her. 
Tr., p.53, L.22–p.58, L.1.  
Consistent with the plea agreement, State recommended one year fixed plus four years 
indeterminate, and argued that sentence was appropriate because Mr. Hamilton’s actions were 
planned rather than a drunken mistake. Tr., p.37, L.5–p.39, L.23. Defense counsel asked for 
probation and a withheld judgment. Tr., p.40, Ls.2–4. She explained the devastating consequences 
that Mr. Hamilton’s actions had already had on his life: His daughter’s sense of safety and stability 
was upended when she was placed into foster care after Mr. Hamilton and Ms. Moeri were arrested, 
he lost his business and financial security, and he had to stay in Idaho where he has no family or 
support. Tr., p.41, L.22–p.43, L.5. Given the nature of the crime and the deterrent effect of a prison 
sentence hanging over his head, plus Mr. Hamilton’s efforts at rehabilitation while on pretrial 
release, defense counsel argued that probation and a withheld judgment were appropriate. 
Tr., p.45, L.8–p.47, L8.  
 The district court sentenced Mr. Hamilton to six months fixed and two-and-a-half years 
indeterminate.2 R. 82–84. It explained that it believed Mr. Hamilton’s actions were part of a well-
devised plan, and that Mr. Hamilton’s criminal history suggested probation was not appropriate. 
Tr., p.81, L.20-p.83, L.23. 
 Mr. Hamilton filed a timely Rule 35 motion. R. 86–89. He requested that the court reduce 
his sentence to one year fixed and two years indeterminate, suspend that sentence and place him 
on probation, impose 180 days of local jail, and require him to complete the ABC and SAP jail 
programs. R. 87. He explained that his sentence, especially when considered alongside that of 
 
2 The court sentenced Ms. Moeri to serve an underlying sentence of six months fixed and two-and-
a-half years indeterminate, placed her on probation, and required her to spend at least ninety days 
in local jail. Tr., p.76, L.3–p.80, L.7. 
 4 
Ms. Moeri, unnecessarily impacted his personal, family, financial, and professional life, and did 
not allow him to seek the treatment he needed. R. 87–88. His requested sentence of 180 days of 
local jail and probation would provide him with the certainty needed to make arrangements with 
for his daughter and his business. R. 88. In support of that motion, Mr. Hamilton provided the 
court with letters from himself, Ms. Moeri, and several of his friends and employees. R. 90–106.  
 The district court denied the motion without a hearing. R. 106–09. It concluded that 
Mr. Hamilton’s original sentence was not excessive, Mr. Hamilton did not present any new 
evidence for the court to consider, and nothing in the letters Mr. Hamilton provided with his Rule 
35 motion showed that his sentence was excessive. Id.  
 Mr. Hamilton filed a notice of appeal timely only from the order denying his Rule 35 
motion. R. 113–14. 
Issue 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hamilton’s Rule 35 motion? 
 
Argument 
 
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Hamilton’s Rule 35 motion. 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) allows the district court to grant a request for leniency and 
reduce the defendant’s sentence. “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show 
that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to 
the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
It follows that “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to 
review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.” Id.  
 “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those 
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. This Court will conduct 
 5 
an independent review of the record, taking into account “the nature of the offense, the character 
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 
(2011). The Court reviews the district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion, which 
considers whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). The district court 
abuses its discretion if it imposes a sentence that is unreasonable “under any reasonable view of 
the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002). “A sentence is reasonable if it appears 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” Miller, 151 Idaho at 834; see also 
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Hamilton’s Rule 35 motion because 
it did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. See Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863. 
Mr. Hamilton’s sentence of six months fixed and two-and-a-half years indeterminate is excessive 
in light of the new information he provided in the letters attached to his Rule 35 motion.3 In 
particular, Mr. Hamilton’s own letter to the court addressed what the court viewed as 
Mr. Hamilton’s lack of accountability for his actions. PSI 91. He explained that he was told that 
the remarks he had originally planned to make at his sentencing hearing were too long, and so he 
 
3 In one breath, the district court said both that Mr. Hamilton provided no new information and 
that the letters he provided did not change the court’s mind. R. 108. Mr. Hamilton included seven 
letters from various people with his Rule 35 motion, some of which had not previously voiced 
their support for Mr. Hamilton. PSI 91–106. At the very least, Mr. Hamilton’s letter, which 
addressed the court’s concern at sentencing that he was not taking accountability for his actions, 
plainly contained new information for the court to consider. PSI 91. 
 
 6 
omitted much of what he wanted to tell the court: “It was neither my intent to upset you or to in 
any way minimize the impact my actions have had. It is in fact those actions that have placed all 
of us in this position. In no way was I trying to portray [Ms. Moeri] or I as victims, but simply 
highlight the fact that alongside the others, [my daughter] is among them.” Id.  
Thus, Mr. Hamilton clearly took responsibility of his actions. That accountability, together 
with the other mitigating factors in his case—including Mr. Hamilton’s ability to overcome the 
trauma of his youth, his success as an entrepreneur, his support from friends, and the important 
role he plays in the life of Ms. Moeri’s daughter—shows that the district court’s sentence of six 
months fixed and two-and-a-half years indeterminate is excessive. Mr. Hamilton’s requested 
suspended sentence of one year fixed and two years indeterminate, with 180 days of local jail and 
obligatory treatment, will adequately serve the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and retribution.  
Conclusion 
Mr. Hamilton respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  
DATED July 2, 2021. 
/s/ Maya P. Waldron 
       MAYA P. WALDRON 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
 
  
 7 
Certificate of Service 
 
A true and correct copy of this Appellant’s Brief has been served via the File and Serve 
system on July 2, 2021, to the following:  
 
 KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
 DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
 E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
  
     
 /s/ Maya P. Waldron 
       MAYA P. WALDRON 
 


State v. Hamilton Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48549

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
5-5-2021 
State v. Nolen Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48559 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Nolen Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48559" (2021). Not Reported. 7191. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7191 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9841
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48559-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-19-46930
v. )
)
JAMES DELL NOLEN, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After James Nolen pled guilty to robbery, the district court sentenced him to thirty years,
with ten years fixed.  Mr. Nolen appeals, and he argues that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On November 6, 2019, Mr. Nolen entered a bank and passed a note to one of the bank
tellers stating “this is a robbery” as well as requesting certain amounts of different monetary
Electronically Filed
5/5/2021 12:05 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
bills.  (PSI,1 pp.147-48.)  Mr. Nolen was arrested shortly thereafter a few blocks away from the
bank.  (PSI, pp.12, 148-49.)  Mr. Nolen admitted to the police that he was the person who passed
the note and took the money from the bank.  (PSI, pp.149-50.)  Mr. Nolen explained that he was
unarmed and did not threaten anyone at the bank.2  (PSI, p.149.)  Mr. Nolen had consumed beer
and wine immediately before entering the bank.  (PSI, pp.12, 26, 45.)  Mr. Nolen had not been
taking his prescribed psychotropic medication, Invega, for about two months prior to when he
entered the bank.  (PSI, p.95.)
On November 7, 2019, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Nolen had
committed the crime of robbery.3  (R., pp.9-10.)  The proceedings in the case were suspended
after Mr. Nolen was found not competent to proceed.  (R., pp.22-23.)  After Mr. Nolen was
deemed fit to proceed, the case was eventually bound over to the district court on the charges of
robbery and burglary following a preliminary hearing.  (R., pp.24-25, 29-33.)  Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Mr. Nolen pled guilty to robbery and the burglary charge was dismissed.4  (Tr. Vol.
I,5 p.7, Ls.2-11, p.16, L.11—p.17, L.3; R., pp.55-65.)  The State also agreed to recommend no
1 Citations to the “PSI” refer to the 165-page electronic document titled “Appeal Confidential
Exhibits 03-01-2021 13.10.6 44871144 0BA0A3D6-5A09-4061-88D3-44D256234D65”
included with the confidential sentencing materials.
2 The bank teller testified at the preliminary hearing in this case that Mr. Nolen did not say that
he was going to hurt the teller at any point during the encounter and that Mr. Nolen never told
the teller that he was armed.  (Exhibit 1, p.11, L.20—p.12, L.19.)  A certified copy of the
transcript from the preliminary hearing is contained the electronic document titled “Appeal
Exhibits 03-01-2021 13.10.6 44871208 C69BDB96-02A1-4A67-8F17-9AFA0682B154”, and is
cited herein as “Exhibit 1”.
3 In particular, the criminal complaint alleged that Mr. Nolen passed a note to an employee at a
bank stating that “this is a robbery” and “demanded cash and/or money.”  (R., p.9.)
4 As part of that plea agreement, the State also agreed not to file a persistent violator
enhancement.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.7, Ls.2-6.)
5 There are two transcripts on appeal, both of which are in the electronic document titled “Appeal
Transcripts 03-01-2021 13.10.6 44870764 FFDA12BB-6A3B-4C1F-A736-7653271C49F8”.
Since the pagination for the second transcript starts over at page one, the transcripts are cited
separately herein.  Citations to the first transcript, cited herein as “Tr. Vol. I”, refer to the
3
more than ten years fixed and twenty years indeterminate at sentencing.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.7, Ls.7-11;
R., pp.64-65.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of thirty years, with ten years fixed,
and asked that the sentence be executed.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, L.24—p.12, L.3.)  Mr. Nolen
requested that the district court sentence him to five fixed years at most, and he also requested
that the district court retain jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.5-13, p.17, Ls.2-6, p.19, Ls.6-23.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Nolen to serve a term of thirty years, with ten years fixed.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.22, Ls.9-15; R., pp.68-71.)  Mr. Nolen timely appealed from the judgment of
conviction.  (R., pp.72-74.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Nolen to serve thirty years, with
ten years fixed?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Nolen To Thirty Years, With
Ten Years Fixed
“Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, ‘the appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.’” State v. Windom, 150
Idaho 873, 875 (2011) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the sequence of
inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial court: (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
transcript for the entry of plea hearing held on October 16, 2020.  Citations to the second
transcript, cited herein as “Tr. Vol. II”, refer to the transcript for the sentencing hearing held on
December 18, 2020.
4
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).  In this matter, Mr. Nolen’s sentence does
not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-6503 (“Robbery is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison not less than five (5) years, and the imprisonment may be
extended to life”).  Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion,
Mr. Nolen “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘[R]easonableness’” implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to the
purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App.
1982).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In this case, Mr. Nolen asserts the district court did not exercise reason and therefore
abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts.  Specifically, Mr. Nolen contends the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser
term of imprisonment or retained jurisdiction in light of the mitigating factors, including his
substance abuse issues and mental condition.
First, Mr. Nolen’s substance abuse issues, the impact of his substance abuse on his
behavior, and his need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation.  A sentencing court should
give “proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing
5
[the] defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).  The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s
criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.”
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981).  Prior to sentencing, Mr. Nolen completed a
Global Appraisal of Individual Needs (“GAIN”) assessment.  (PSI, pp.26-37.)  In that
assessment, Mr. Nolen self-reported symptoms sufficient to meet the criteria for alcohol use
disorder severe, stimulant use disorder severe, and opioid use disorder mild.  (PSI, pp.27-29.)
Mr. Nolen reported that he started drinking alcohol at the age of   (PSI, p.28.)
Mr. Nolen informed the evaluator that he had “drank alcohol every day during the 90 days prior”
to committing the offense in this case.  (PSI, p.26.)  On the day that he committed the crime
charged, Mr. Nolen consumed beer and wine immediately before entering the bank.  (PSI, pp.12,
26, 45.)
Mr. Nolen disclosed that he also began using amphetamines and opioids when he was
 years old.  (PSI, pp.28-29.)  Like with alcohol, Mr. Nolen reported that “he used
methamphetamine every day during the six months prior to his last use”, which occurred a few
days before his conduct in this case.  (PSI, p.26.)  Mr. Nolen also stated that he injected heroin
intravenously “on 45 days during the 90 days prior to his last use.”6  (PSI, p.26.)  Based on these
disclosures, the GAIN assessor found that Mr. Nolen “meets lifetime criteria for substance use
disorder severe.”  (PSI, p.29.)
At sentencing, Mr. Nolen’s defense counsel explained that Mr. Nolen “experimented and
became addicted to alcohol and controlled substances at a very young age and has battled with
his addiction for basically his entire adult life.”  (Tr. Vol. II, p.18, L.21—p.19, L.5.)  Mr. Nolen’s
6 It is unclear from the GAIN assessment as to the exact day that Mr. Nolen disclosed last using
heroin, but Mr. Nolen “recalled using heroin IV during October 2019.”  (PSI, p.26.)
6
defense counsel recommended a retained jurisdiction or shorter period of fixed time so that
Mr. Nolen could address his substance abuse needs through programming and treatment.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.19, Ls.6-23.)  Mr. Nolen’s substance use issues, the impact of his substance abuse
on his behavior, and his need for treatment are strong mitigating factors that support leniency in
this case.
Second, Mr. Nolen’s mental condition is a mitigating factor that supports leniency in
sentencing.  The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 not only
suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing
factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).  If a defendant’s mental condition is a
significant factor, then Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the court to consider factors such as:  (a)
the extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; (b) the degree of illness or defect and level of
functional impairment; (c) the prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; (d) the availability of
treatment and level of care required; (e) any risk of danger which the defendant may create for
the public if not incarcerated, or the lack of such risk; and (f) the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged.  “The factors listed in Idaho
Code § 19–2523 provide a manner in which to evaluate the mental health information presented
to the sentencing court.” Strand, 137 Idaho at 461.
Mr. Nolen’s mental health was evaluated in a mental health examination report prior to
sentencing.  (PSI, pp.38-48.)  In addition to the stimulant use disorders described above,
Mr. Nolen was also given provisional diagnoses for:  (1) major depressive disorder, recurrent,
with psychotic feature; (2) unspecified anxiety disorder; and (3) attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder – combined presentation.  (PSI, p.38.)  In the Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment
7
prepared prior to sentencing, the assessor noted that Mr. Nolen “demonstrates a history of major
depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizoaffective disorder.  James has a significant
history of mental health related hospitalizations and treatment episodes.”  (PSI, p.46.)  Even
though he was receiving treatment at the Ada County jail prior to sentencing, Mr. Nolen reported
that he “is continuing to experience depressive and suicidal symptoms as well as daily auditory
hallucinations, delusions, and paranoia.”  (PSI, p.47.)  The assessor found that Mr. Nolen
“experiences severe and persistent symptoms related to his diagnoses with and without a
medication/treatment regimen although his symptoms appears to be somewhat manageable when
receiving appropriate treatment.”  (PSI, p.47.)  The assessor determined that Mr. Nolen “has a
history of psychiatric hospitalizations and is currently incarcerated on a charged related to both
substance use and mental health symptomatology.  He has experienced a number of negative
impacts stemming from difficulties with severe and persistent mental health issues and ongoing
substance use.”  (PSI, p.48.)
At sentencing, Mr. Nolen’s defense counsel explained that Mr. Nolen had been dealing
with severe mental health issues throughout his life.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.18, L.21—p.19, L.5.)
Mr. Nolen’s defense counsel also indicated that Mr. Nolen would need to obtain treatment for
both his mental health and substance abuse issues since future substance abuse could exacerbate
Mr. Nolen’s mental health issues.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.20, Ls.7-21.)  Defense counsel further stressed
the importance for a treatment focused sentence for Mr. Nolen because Mr. Nolen was still
demonstrating symptoms related to his mental health issues even though Mr. Nolen had been
sober and in custody for over a year since his arrest in November of 2019.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.20,
Ls.7-21.)
8
Mr. Nolen asserts that the district court did not adequately consider his mental health as a
factor at sentencing as required under Idaho Code § 19-2523.  Mr. Nolen mental health was a
significant factor, and there were substantial concerns if Mr. Nolen does not receive adequate
treatment for his mental health needs.  “The sentencing court is not required to recite each of the
factors listed.” Strand, 137 Idaho at 461.  However, the prison sentence imposed suggests that
the district court did not give adequate consideration to the factors listed under Idaho
Code § 19-2523.  Mr. Nolen’s mental condition stands in favor of mitigation and leniency in this
case.
In sum, Mr. Nolen maintains the district court did not exercise reason at sentencing
because it failed to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors in his case. Proper
consideration of these factors supports a lesser prison sentence or a retained jurisdiction.
Mr. Nolen submits that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Nolen respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2021.
/s/ Jacob L. Westerfield
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of May, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
 /s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JLW/eas


State v. Nolen Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48559

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State v. West Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48700 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7259
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48700-2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-19-36502
v. )
)
JONIER LATIMORE WEST, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joiner Latimore West appeals from the district court’s Order Denying Rule 35 Motion for
Reconsideration of Sentence.  Mr. West was sentenced to a unified sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed, for his felony operating a motor vehicle while under the influence conviction.
He asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On October 24, 2019, an Information was filed charging Mr. West with felony operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.  (R., pp.27-28.)  Later, an Information, Part
Electronically Filed
7/8/2021 11:35 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
II, was filed adding a persistent violator enhancement to the charge.  (R., pp.35-36.)  Mr. West
entered a guilty plea to the charge and the enhancement was dismissed.  (R., p.69.)  He was
sentenced to a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.69, 87-89.)
Mr. West filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence timely from the Judgment of
Conviction and Order of Commitment.  (R., p.94.)  The district court denied the motion.
(R., pp.100-01.)  Mr. West filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order
Denying Rule 35 Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence.  (R., pp.103-04.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. West‘s Idaho Criminal Rule 35
Motion for a Reduction of Sentence ?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. West Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447
(Ct. App. 1984)).  “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the
same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. (citing
Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
3
573, 577 (1979)).  In order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. West must show that in light of
the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)).  “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: Whether the trial court:  (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).  Mr. West asserts that in light of
the new or additional information supplied in support of his Rule 35 motion, the district court’s
ruling on the Rule 35 motion was unreasonable and, as a result, the district court did not reach its
decision by an exercise of reason.
Mr. West provided new or additional information in support of his Rule 35 motion.
Specifically, he argued the following in his motion:
Due to restrictions at the CAPP facility where Mr. West is housed, he has
been unable to program.  He informed counsel that the coronavirus has limited the
number of offenders permitted to program.  He learned that because he is serving
a term, and not a Rider, the facility deems him a lower priority for programming
than the rider inmates due to the time constraints of the retained jurisdiction.  If
the Court were to grant Mr. West’s requested modification, he is hopeful that he
would become eligible to start his programming much sooner or moved to a
facility where he could participate in programming.
(R., p.94.)  He also supplied the court with a letter in which he noted that he was not considered
to be a priority inmate for programming purposes, that coronavirus protocols were not being
followed, and that he wanted to pursue treatment.  (R., p.96.)
4
Additionally, there are mitigating factors that support a reduction in sentence including
Mr. West’s difficult childhood, substance abuse and a desire for treatment, mental health issues,
and remorse.  Idaho courts have previously recognized that a difficult childhood is a mitigating
factor that should be consider in determining the appropriate sentence. See State v. Gonzales,
123 Idaho 92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993) (highlighting the facts that the defendant, who was eighteen
at the time of the offense, had dropped out of high school, had been “subjected to an abusive
childhood, living in numerous broken homes,” and “was introduced to drugs and alcohol at a
very young age and admit[ted] to being chemically dependent,” but finding no abuse of
discretion in sentencing).  Mr. West was sexually abused as a young child, witnessed substance
abuse and domestic violence in his home, was physically abused by his father’s girlfriends, and
was introduced to illegal substances at an early age; experimentation with alcohol and marijuana
began at  and cocaine at   (PSI, pp.270-71.)1
His early exposure to illegal substances began a lifelong battle with addiction.  Over the
years he has abused alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, Oxycodone, spice,
mushrooms, and PCP.  (PSI, pp.5, 271.)  Mr. West was diagnosed with Alcohol Use Disorder,
Severe – Sustained Remission in a Controlled Environment; Stimulant Use Disorder –
Amphetamine Type, Moderate – Sustained Remission in a Controlled Environment; Cannabis
Use Disorder, Moderate - Sustained Remission in a Controlled Environment; and Opioid Use
Disorder, Severe - Sustained Remission in a Controlled Environment.  (PSI, p.6.)  It was recently
recommended that he participate in Level 1 Outpatient Treatment. (PSI, p.4.)  Mr. West
desperately wants to engage in treatment and change his life for the better.  (Letter from
1 For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as “PSI” and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
5
Defendant, file-stamped 7/27/2020.)  Substance abuse and a desire for treatment should be
considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).
Further, Mr. West suffers from mental health issues.  Idaho courts have previously
recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental
illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).  Mr. West has been
previously diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder, Moderate, Recurrent and Generalized
Anxiety Disorder.  (PSI, p.273.)  He was admitted to Emanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon for
mental health issues in 2011.  (PSI, p.11.)  It was recommended that he participate in individual
or group therapy and take any mental health medications as prescribed.  (PSI, p.21.)  Mr. West
feels like mental health treatment would benefit him, help him cope, and make him a better
father.  (PSI, p.209.)
Finally, Mr. West has repeatedly expressed his remorse for his criminal behavior.
(PSI, p.2; Tr., p.19, L.14 – p.21, L.8.)  In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the
Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, “In light of Alberts’ expression of
remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and
other positive attributes of his character.” Id. 121 Idaho at 209.
Based upon the new or additional information presented with his Rule 35 motion and the
mitigating factors present in his case, Mr. West asserts that the district court abused its discretion
in denying his Rule 35 motion.
6
CONCLUSION
Mr. West respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and
the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 8th day of July, 2021.
/s/ Elizabeth A. Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of July, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
CHERI C. COPSEY
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
E-Service: dccopscc@sadaweb.net
THOMAS M. CALLERY
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-Service: tcallery@adaweb.net
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Kylie M. Fourtner
KYLIE M. FOURTNER
Administrative Assistant
EAA/kmf


State v. West  Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48700

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State v. West Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48700 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JONIER LATIMORE WEST, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48700-2021 
 
Ada County Case No.  
CR01-19-36502 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
ISSUE 
 
Has West failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 motion?  
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
 In August of 2019, an Idaho State Police officer on a routine patrol saw “a vehicle make 
an illegal U-Turn across a double yellow line.”  (Conf. Ex., p.1.)    The officer stopped the vehicle 
and observed the driver, West, had “glassy and bloodshot eyes” and slurred speech.  (Id.)  
Additionally, “there was an odor of alcoholic beverage emitting from” West’s breath.  (Id.)  West 
Electronically Filed
9/27/2021 4:38 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
attempted “a series of field sobriety tests” and failed them.  (Id.)  After securing a warrant, the 
officer drew West’s blood, and testing later showed he had a .256 blood-alcohol content.  (Id.; Tr., 
p.11, Ls.1-13.) 
The state charged West with felony driving under the influence, alleging he had a prior 
conviction for felony DUI within the last 15 years.  (R., pp.27-28.)  The state subsequently filed 
an Information Part II, alleging West was a persistent violator.  (R., pp.35-36.)  West filed a motion 
to suppress evidence (R., pp.37-40), which was denied (R., p.58).  Pursuant to a plea agreement 
between the parties, West pleaded guilty to felony DUI, the state withdrew the persistent violator 
enhancement, and the state dismissed charges in a separate criminal case.  (R., pp.69-81.)  The 
district court sentenced West to ten years with three years fixed.  (R., pp.87-89.) 
West timely filed a motion for leniency pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.  (R., pp.94-
96.)  The district court denied the motion.  (R., pp.100-02.)  West timely appealed.  (R., pp.103-
05.) 
 
  
 3 
ARGUMENT 
 
West Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 West contends that, “[b]ased upon the new or additional information presented with his 
Rule 35 motion and the mitigating factors present in his case,” the lower court “abused its 
discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.)  Review of the record and 
application of the relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “‘If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 
35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.’”  State 
v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 288, 297 P.3d 244, 251 (2013) (quoting State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)); see also State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d 381, 
385 (Ct. App. 2015) (“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for 
leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”).  In conducting a review “of the grant or 
denial of a Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for 
determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.”  Anderson, 163 Idaho at 517, 415 P.3d 
at 385. 
 
C. West Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied West’s Rule 35 Motion.  
“When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 
Rule 35 motion.”  State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013) (emphasis added, 
internal quotations omitted).  The information in West’s motion was as follows: 
-- --- ------------
 4 
Due to restrictions at the [Correctional Alternative Placement Program] facility 
where Mr. West is housed, he has been unable to program.  He informed counsel 
that the coronavirus had limited the number of offenders permitted to program.  He 
learned that because he is serving a term, and not a Rider, the facility deems him a 
lower priority for programming than the rider inmates due to the time constraints 
of the retained jurisdiction.  If the Court were to grant Mr. West’s requested 
modification, he is hopeful that he would become eligible to start his programming 
much sooner or moved to a facility where he could participate in programming. 
 
(R., p.94.)  West additionally submitted a letter to the court, purporting that “[m]y breathing is not 
normal, and I have asthma which places me at a high risk with Covid-19,” and requesting a 
sentence reduction “in accordance with other state’s attorneys general[’s] directives to release non-
violent offenders like myself and [to] allow me to pursue treatment and be safe from the 
coronavirus in the community.”  (R., p.96.)  The district court denied West’s motion to reduce his 
sentence, concluding the original sentence was not “unduly harsh or excessive,” and finding West 
had “not presented any new evidence or authority for the Court to consider.”  (R., p.101.) 
On appeal, West fails to show that the district court abused its discretion.  The court 
correctly found that West failed to support his motion with new evidence (R., p.101), as West’s 
drug and mental health issues, and his desire for programming in custody, were not “new” issues 
before the court.  (See Tr., p. p.16, L.2 – p.17, L.17; p.22, L.15 – p.27, L.17); see also State v. 
Quintana, 155 Idaho 124, 133, 306 P.3d 209, 218 (Ct. App. 2013) (“The letters from family and 
friends Quintana submitted in support of her Rule 35 motion cannot be truly considered ‘new’ as 
they simply purport to provide additional information as to her mental health, a factor we have 
already determined was adequately considered by the district court at sentencing.”).  Nor was it 
news to anyone in September of 2020, when West was sentenced, that COVID-19 was disrupting 
the usual workings of the judicial and prison systems.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.8, Ls.6-7; see also R., 
pp.65, 67-69, 85 (showing that after March of 2020, hearings in this case were conducted remotely 
via WebEx).)  And the district court judge, who read the PSI (see Tr., p.33, L.11), would have 
-- --- ------
 5 
already known that West claimed he was at risk of coronavirus complications (Conf. Ex., p.22).  
Thus, the district court properly found that West’s statements about needing programming, and 
having difficulties finding it in the post-COVID world, was not “new” information, much less 
information that would justify a reduction in sentence.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 
P.3d 838, 840 (2007) (noting that “Huffman has presented no new information that the court could 
properly consider,” and “holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a Rule 
35 motion based on factors that “were considered by the district judge at the original sentencing”).  
West fails to show the court abused its discretion. 
On appeal, West additionally raises several other mitigating factors that he claims justify a 
reduced sentence.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)  Specifically, West cites his “difficult 
childhood, substance abuse and a desire for treatment, mental health issues, and remorse” as 
“mitigating factors that support a reduction in sentence.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)    
But this evidence is likewise irrelevant for a Rule 35 analysis because none of it is new.  
The district court was well aware of all the mitigating evidence at sentencing.  (See e.g., Tr., p.16, 
Ls.2-14; p.23, L.20 – p.24, L.6 (discussing West’s difficult childhood); p.16, L.2 – p.17, L.17; 
p.22, L.15 – p.27, L.17 (discussing West’s substance abuse, mental health issues, need for 
programming and prior attempts at treatment); p.19, L.14 – p.21, L.5 (where West made 
remorseful statements).)  As such, West cannot show the court erroneously denied his Rule 35 
motion based on these factors.  Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840. 
In any event, even considering the known mitigating information, West’s sentence is 
justified.  West’s focus on mitigation leaves out all of the aggravating factors in the record.  He 
has a lengthy criminal history in multiple states, with 16 misdemeanor convictions, including 
convictions for harassment, petit theft, disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct, and DUI.  (Conf. 
 6 
Ex., pp.195-204.)  The instant conviction is West’s fifth felony conviction.  (Conf. Ex., pp.2-4, 
195-204.)  Along the way, West accrued no less than four probation violations.  (Conf. Ex., pp.234-
35.)  And West’s record of prison misconduct is just as aggravating, with “12 negative log entries” 
(Conf. Ex., p.31), and multiple fights, including one where West “back-handed another inmate” 
(Conf. Ex., p.23).   
It is also particularly troubling that, despite previous attempts at treatment (Conf. Ex., pp.3-
4, 209-11), probation (Conf. Ex., p.217), drug court (Conf. Ex., p.5), a CAPP rider (id.) and 
aftercare (id.), West was pulled over in this case with a .257 BAC, something West himself 
considered a “reckless” act that put the community and his “friends … in the vehicle” at risk.  (Tr., 
p.19, Ls.16-19.)  Despite all the attempted interventions, nothing seems to have changed since 
2016, when West’s probation officer recommended an imposed sentence because he “can’t seem 
to stay out of trouble and continually puts the public at risk with his behavior.”  (Conf. Ex., p.205.) 
Thus, in light of all of the aggravating and mitigating factors, even West had to admit below 
that ten years imprisonment, with three years fixed, was within the appropriate range.  His attorney 
told the court that West knew “he’s got to do some time, and in the grand scheme of things” West 
was “very content” with the state’s sentencing recommendation.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.8-11.)  In light of 
all the information in the record, West fails to show his sentence was excessive or that the court 
abused its discretion by denying his motion for leniency. 
 
  
 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order denying West’s 
Rule 35 motion. 
 DATED this 27th day of September, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/  Kale D. Gans  
      KALE D. GANS 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of September, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of 
iCourt File and Serve: 
 
ELIZABETH A. ALLRED 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kale D. Gans  
      KALE D. GANS 
      Deputy Attorney General 
KDG/dd 
 
 


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