University of Idaho College of Law

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7854/thumbnail.jp

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State 0f Idaho
COLLEEN D. ZAHN
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
Electronically Filed
1/7/2021 3:15 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
BAILEE KAYE WILLIAMS-HARDING,
Defendant-Appellant.
vvvvvvvvvvvv
NOS. 47842-2020, 47843-2020 &
47844-2020
Ada County Case Nos. CR01-17—12224,
CR01-18-17065 & CR01-19-46925
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
Has Bailee Kaye Williams—Harding failed t0 show that the district court abused its
discretion by revoking her probations, sentencing her t0 five years, With two years determinate for
unlawful possession of a firearm, and by denying her Rule 35 motions?
ARGUMENT
Williams—Harding Has Failed T0 Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A. Introduction
In 2017, Bailee Kaye Williams—Harding possessed heroin and drug paraphernalia in her
purse. (47842 PSI, p. 41 (citations to electronic file named “47842-C0nf.Docs.pdf”).) Under case
number CR01-17-12224, the state charged Williams—Harding With one count 0f possession of a
controlled substance, and one count 0f possession 0f drug paraphernalia. (47842 R., pp. 20-21.)
Williams-Harding pleaded guilty t0 possession of a controlled substance, and the state agreed to
dismiss the paraphernalia charge. (47842 R., pp. 26, 34-35.) The district court sentenced
Williams—Harding to seven years, with two years determinate and placed her on probation. (47842
R., pp. 45-48.)
In 2018, authorities conducted a traffic stop after finding that Williams-Harding had two
outstanding warrants. (47843 PSI, p. 8 (citations t0 electronic file named “47843-
Conf.Docs.pdf’).) Williams—Harding possessed a hollowed out pen, a rolled up dollar and a purple
container that was attached t0 her key chain and contained an unknown white powder. (PSI, p. 8.)
The passenger in Williams-Harding’s vehicle, Derek A. D’attilio, possessed a plastic baggie
containing .88 grams ofheroin. (PSI, p. 8.) Williams-Harding admitted t0 recently abusing heroin
and knowing that D’attilio had heroin 0n him. (PSI, p. 8.) D’attilio admitted that Williams-
Harding fronted him the heroin, and that he would pay her back later. (PSI, p. 8.) D’attilio
provided text messages to authorities supporting his claim. (PSI, p. 8.)
Under case number CR01-18-17065, the state charged Williams-Harding With one count
of delivery 0f a controlled substance, one count 0f possession 0f a controlled substance, and one
count 0f possession 0f drug paraphernalia. (47843 R., pp. 22-23.) Williams—Harding pleaded
guilty t0 possession 0f a controlled substance, and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining
charges. (47843 R., pp. 28-29.) In CR01-17-12224, the district court revoked Williams—Harding’s
probation and retained jurisdiction. (47842 R., pp. 75-76.) In CR01-18-17065, the district court
sentenced Williams-Harding t0 seven years, With three years fixed and retained jurisdiction.
(47843 R., pp. 48-50.) Following her period 0f retained jurisdiction, the district court placed
Williams—Harding 0n probation in both CR01-17-12224 and CR01-18—17065. (47842 R., pp. 79-
81; 47843 R., pp. 53-56.)
In 2019, the state charged Williams—Harding with one count of unlawful possession 0f a
firearm under case number CR01-19-46925. (47844 R., pp. 13-14.) Williams—Harding pleaded
guilty, and the district court sentenced her t0 five years, With two years determinate. (47844 R.,
pp. 34-35.) In CR01-17-12224 and CR01-18—17065, the district court revoked probation and
executed the underlying sentences. (47842 R., pp. 123-124; 47843 R., pp. 91-92.) Williams-
Harding filed Rule 35 motions in all three cases, which the district court denied. (47842 R., p.
122; 47843 R., p. 90; 47844 R., p. 33; Aug, pp. 1-3.)
On appeal, Williams—Harding argues that “the district court erred in revoking her
probations,” that her sentence of five years, with two years fixed, for possession of a firearm is
excessive, and that the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 motions “in light
0f the additional information submitted.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.) Williams-Harding has failed
t0 show that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her probations, executing the
underlying sentences in CR01-17-12224 and CR01-18-17065, sentencing her t0 five years, with
two years determinate for possession of a firearm, and denying her Rule 35 motions.
B. Standard Of Review
“Appellate review 0f a sentence is based 0n an abuse 0f discretion standard. Where a
sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear
abuse 0f discretion.” State V. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). A sentence 0fconfinement is reasonable if it appears at the time
0f sentencing that confinement is necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and t0 achieve any or all 0f the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r retribution
applicable to a given case. I_d. at 454, 447 P.3d at 902. “A sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse 0f discretion.” I_d. (internal
quotations omitted). “In deference t0 the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its View 0f a
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” State V. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605,
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (citation omitted).
The decision whether t0 retain jurisdiction is a matter Within the sound discretion of the
district court and will not be overturned 0n appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State V. Lee,
117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). The primary purpose 0f a district
court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to obtain additional information regarding whether
the defendant has sufficient rehabilitative potential and is suitable for probation. State V. Jones,
141 Idaho 673, 677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005). Probation is the ultimate goal ofretained
jurisdiction. I_d. There can be Q abuse of discretion if the district court has sufficient evidence
before it t0 conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation. I_d.
“‘[T]he decision Whether t0 revoke a defendant's probation for a Violation is Within the
discretion of the district court.” State V. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017)
(quoting State V. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)). In
determining Whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving
the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State V. Cornelison, 154
Idaho 793, 797, 302 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted). A decision t0 revoke
probation Will be disturbed 0n appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.
I_d. at 798, 302 P.3d at 1071 (citing State V. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct.
App. 1992)).
The decision t0 place a defendant 0n probation is a matter Within the sound discretion 0f
the district court and Will not be overturned 0n appeal absent an abuse 0f that discretion.m
M1, 163 Idaho 681, 684, 417 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted). Rehabilitation
and public safety are dual goals of probation. State V. Le Vague, 164 Idaho 110, 114, 426 P.3d
461, 465 (2018). A decision to deny probation Will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is
consistent with the criteria articulated in LC. § 19-2521. State V. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61
P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State V. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct.
App. 1982)).
“If a sentence is Within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule
35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse 0f discretion.”m
V. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In evaluating whether a lower court
abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted Within the outer
boundaries 0f its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable t0 the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”m
m, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg V. MV Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C. Williams—Harding Has Shown N0 Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
The sentences imposed are within the statutory limits of LC. §§ 37-2732(c) and 18-3316.
The record shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal standards
t0 the issue before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope 0f its discretion.
At the consolidated sentencing hearing, the district court stated “it is particularly
concerning to see how [Williams-Harding] handled the opportunity for probation after [she was]
given probation.” (02/24/2020 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 6-8.) The district court noted that Williams—Harding
was “before the Court 0n April 1“, 2019, for [her] Rider review,” and that “the Court suspended
the balance 0f [her] sentence and placed [Williams—Harding] 0n probation with a number 0f terms
that are pretty standard.” (02/24/2020 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 9-13.) Williams—Harding’s “probation officer
made a home Visit 0n April 24, 2019, so less than a month after [she was] put back onto probation.
And at that time, the probation officer discovered that [she was] involved with Mr. Gonzalez, who
was a known gang member,” and “the probation officer at that point told [Williams-Harding] to
not have any contact at all, not to communicate with him, not t0 be in his presence.” (02/24/2020
Tr., p. 16, Ls. 14-22.) Williams—Harding then “quit [her] job at the end 0f August. Then 0n
November 6th, [she was] involved in a car accident, a crash Where [she] crashed into another
person and [was] aggressive and threw away a purse. And in the purse was a semiautomatic 44.”
(02/24/2020 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 3-8.) The district court stated that “[t]he probation officer recommends
imposition,” and “considering that the probation officer gave [Williams-Harding] direct
instructions not t0 be involved with a guy that the probation officer n0 doubt Wisely considered
would seriously endanger [her] successful performance 0f probation, it affected [her] directly.”
(02/24/2020 T12, p. 17, Ls. 9-15.) The district court stated that “months later the probation officer
c0nfirm[ed] that not only did [Williams-Harding] ignore the advice, [she was] in a relationship
with him.” (02/24/2020 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 18-21.)
The district court stated that “beyond the problems with drugs, the more serious problem
that [Williams—Harding has] is criminal thinking,” and those “were things that were specifically
addressed on [her] Rider program When [she] got Thinking For a Change, which is directly aimed
at helping a person deal with the thinking errors that lead them into conduct that breaks the law.”
(02/24/2020 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 22 — p. 18, L. 7.) The district court determined that “the circumstances
in this case it is particularly serious When a felon is in possession 0f a firearm,” and that
“consequences are essential.” (02/24/2020 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 8-12.) The district court also stated that
“the choice [Williams—Harding] made t0 not listen t0 [her] probation officer in spite 0f multiple
instructions was a choice that had very serious consequences.” (02/24/2020 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 15-18.)
In the district court’s order denying Williams-Harding’s Rule 35 motions, the district court
stated Williams-Harding “has repeatedly been given chances at probation, and has continued t0
commit crimes. The Court stated its reasons for the sentence it imposed 0n the record at the time
of sentencing. A11 0f those reasons remain valid. N0 information has been submitted Which
warrants changing the sentence.” (Aug, p. 2.)
Williams—Harding argues that the mitigating factors—her sobriety, family support, remorse
and acceptance 0f responsibility—show that “the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked her probations.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) Additionally, Williams—Harding argues that
her family support, remorse and acceptance of responsibility show that “the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her [in CR01-19-46925].” (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 8-9.) Finally, Williams—Harding contends that her “support, her parole plan, and her
intent to enroll in classes and programming t0 better herself” show “the district court abused its
discretion by failing t0 reduce [her] sentences in response t0 her Rule 35 motions.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 11.) A11 three of Williams—Harding’s arguments fail t0 show that the district court abused
its discretion.
Williams—Harding’s extensive criminal history consists 0f numerous felonies and
opportunities on probation. (47842 PSI, pp. 42-43.) Williams-Harding violated her probations in
CR01-17-12224 and CR01-18-17065 0n numerous occasions, and her supervising officer stated
the she “is either unable and/or unwilling t0 comply with the terms and conditions 0f probation,
and the Directives of the Court alike. Thus she is need of increased structure and treatment
services.” (47842 R., p. 125.) Williams-Harding’s supervising officer recommended that “the
Court respectfully consider imposition 0f sentence.” (47842 R., p. 125.) The felony conviction
for unlawful possession 0f a firearm derived from an incident in Which Williams—Harding had been
involved in a vehicular accident, and subsequently found in the possession of a Desert Eagle .44
magnum handgun inside her purse. (47843 R., p. 85.)
The numerous Violations on her probations and felony conviction for unlawful possession
0f a firearm justify the district court’s decision t0 revoke Williams-Harding’s probations. A felon
in possession of a firearm is a serious criminal offense and presents a risk to the community, and
the district court’s decision t0 sentence Williams-Harding to five years, With two years determinate
is merited. Her criminal history, risk to reoffend and failures 011 community supervision justify
imposition and execution 0f the sentences in these cases, and the district court’s decision t0 deny
Williams-Harding’s Rule 35 motions is reasonable. Williams-Harding’s criminal conduct while
0n probation shows that she is not amenable to community supervision, and the imposition and
duration ofthe sentences imposed provide proper punishment and deterrence to Williams—Harding.
Williams—Harding has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her
probations, sentencing her t0 five years, With two years determinate for unlawful possession 0f a
firearm, and by denying her Rule 35 motions.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court t0 affirm the judgment 0f the district court.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2021.
/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
ZACHARI S. HALLETT
Paralegal
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of January, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF t0 the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General


English

State v. Williams-Harding  Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 47842

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7855/thumbnail.jp

State v. Garritson Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 47868

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7878/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
2-10-2021 
State v. Houser Appellant's Brief Dckt. 47956 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Houser Appellant's Brief Dckt. 47956" (2021). Not Reported. 6879. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6879 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6406
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 47956-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR28-19-8308
v. )
)
ERIC LAGRANDE HOUSER, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eric Lagrande Houser appeals from his judgment of conviction for eluding with a
persistent violator enhancement.  Mr. Houser was found guilty of eluding following a jury trial
and he subsequently admitted to being a persistent violator.  The district court imposed a unified
sentence of eight years, with four years determinate.  Mr. Houser appeals, and he asserts that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Electronically Filed
2/10/2021 12:14 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On May 23, 2019, a Kootenai County Sheriff’s Deputy observed Mr. Houser traveling on
his motorcycle on Highway 41 without headlamps, and he appeared to be following a vehicle
and riding with the front wheel in the air.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),
p.3.)  The deputy attempted to conduct a traffic stop by activating his lights but Mr. Houser
accelerated away from him through the residential neighborhood.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Houser
eventually stopped for the deputy.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Houser testified at trial that, because of the
noise of his bike and his helmet, he did not initially realize that the deputy was attempting to stop
him.  (Tr., pp.124-133.)  Further, the bike did not have any mirrors on it.  (Tr., p.98, Ls.2-5.)
Mr. Houser was charged with felony eluding and with a persistent violator enhancement.
(R., p.38.)  He was found guilty following a jury trial and he admitted to being a persistent
violator.  (R., pp.73-74.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with four
years determinate.  (R., p.160.)  Mr. Houser appealed.  (R., p.167.)  Mindful that he received the
sentence that he requested, Mr. Houser submits that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with
four years determinate, upon Mr. Houser following his conviction for eluding?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight Years,
With Four Years Determinate, Upon Mr. Houser Following His Conviction For Eluding
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
3
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)).  Here, Houser’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Houser “must show that
the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148.  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Mr. Houser asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
under any reasonable view of the facts.
At sentencing, counsel for Mr. Houser requested that the court impose a sentence of eight
years, with four years determinate, which is what he received.  (Tr., p.186, Ls.7-15.)  Mindful
that he received his requested sentence, Mr. Houser submits that his sentence is excessive.
Mr. Houser addressed the district court at sentencing.  He stated, “I do take responsibility
on both charges.1  I should never have been riding my dirt bike that night in the manner that I
did.  I put a lot of people in danger.  I made a lot of irresponsible choices this year leading to me
1 Mr. Houser pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance in a separate case at the
sentencing hearing.
4
being here right now, and I had been doing pretty good.”  (Tr., p.199, Ls.5-11.)  Mr. Houser
acknowledged that he had “back slid” in the past year, and “I need some help, and I’m asking the
court to consider giving me help, and I just thank you for your time.”  (Tr., p.199, Ls.12-15.)
Counsel also emphasized that Mr. Houser was taking responsibility for his actions in this case.
(Tr., p.197, Ls.20-25.)  Mr. Houser felt “dumb and ashamed” by what he had done in this case.
(PSI, p.4.)
Considering that Mr. Houser accepted responsibility for his actions in this case and
acknowledged that he had made some poor decisions and needed help, Mr. Houser respectfully
submits that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Houser respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2021.
/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of February, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JMC/eas


State v. Houser Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 47956

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7882/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
4-1-2021 
State v. Fellows Respondent's Brief Dckt. 47966 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Fellows Respondent's Brief Dckt. 47966" (2021). Not Reported. 6883. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6883 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
BRANDY KAY FELLOWS, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NOS. 47966-2020, 47967-2020 & 
48056-2020 
 
Bonner County Case Nos.  
CR09-19-4423 & CR09-19-5017, & 
Boundary County Case No.  
CR11-19-0093 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Brandy Kay Fellows failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
sentencing her to five years, with two years determinate in CR09-19-4423 & CR09-19-5017, and 
by denying her Rule 35 motions? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Fellows Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In February of 2019, the state charged Brandy Kay Fellows with one count of possession 
of a controlled substance, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia under case number 
Electronically Filed
4/1/2021 4:18 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
CR11-19-0093.  (48056 R., pp. 31-33.)  Fellows pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, and the district court sentenced her to four years, with two years determinate, and placed 
Fellows on probation for a period of three years.  (48056 R., pp. 53-64.)   
In November of 2019, Fellows, an employee at the La Quinta hotel in Sandpoint, acquired 
Ericka Rose’s ID and debit card from Ericka’s hotel room.  (47966 PSI, p. 10 (citations to 
electronic file named “Appeal Vol 1 – Confidential Exhibits”).)  Fellows later used Ericka’s debit 
card for a purchase with $17.67 at a gas station.  (47966 PSI, p. 10.)  Under case number CR09-
19-4423, the state charged Fellows with one count of burglary, and one count of grand theft.  
(47966 R., pp. 66-67.)  In case number CR11-19-0093, the state filed a report of probation violation 
for the new charges in CR09-19-4423, along with her verbal admission to using methamphetamine 
while on probation.  (48056 R., pp. 74-77.)   
While on pretrial release in December of 2019, Fellows broke into a Jeep Cherokee outside 
of a residence.  (47967 R., pp. 7-8.)  The vehicle’s owner exited their home and confronted 
Fellows, who then climbed underneath the Jeep and eventually fled from the vehicle into the 
residence.  (R., p. 7.)  Authorities later found Fellows in another house, in possession of a wallet 
she took from the first residence she entered.  (47967 R., pp. 7-8.)  Under case number CR09-19-
5017, the state charged Fellows with two counts of burglary.  (47967 R., pp. 53-54.)  In case 
number CR11-19-0093, the state filed an addendum to the report of probation violation for the 
December burglary incident, Fellows failing a saliva test for methamphetamine and amphetamine, 
and for Fellows failing a urinalysis for cocaine.  (48056 R., pp. 119-23.)   
In case number CR11-19-0093, the district court revoked probation and executed the 
underlying sentence of four years, with two years determinate.  (48056 R., pp. 132-33.)  In CR09-
19-4423, Fellows pleaded guilty to one count of burglary, and the district court sentenced her to 
 3 
five years, with two years determinate to run concurrent with CR09-19-5017 and CR11-19-0093.  
(47966 R., pp. 74-84, 92-94.)  In CR09-19-5017, Fellows pleaded guilty to one count of burglary, 
and the district court sentenced her to five years, with two years determinate.  (47976 R., pp. 68-
78, 98-100.)  Fellows filed Rule 35 motions in all three cases, which the district court denied, and 
filed timely appeals.  (48056 R., pp. 135, 142, 151-154; 47966 R., pp. 104, 113, 120-123; 47967 
R., pp. 95, 107, 114-118.) 
On appeal, Fellows argues that “the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence” in CR09-19-4423 and CR09-19-5017, and by “denying her Rule 35 motions.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-5.)  Fellows has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
by sentencing her to five years, with two years determinate for burglary in both CR09-19-4423 
and CR09-19-5017, and by denying her Rule 35 motions. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard.  Where a 
sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear 
abuse of discretion.”  State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time 
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution 
applicable to a given case.  Id. at 454, 447 P.3d at 902.  “A sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion.”  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted).  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (citation omitted).   
 4 
“If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 
35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.”  State 
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  In evaluating whether a lower court 
abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the 
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. 
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. Fellows Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
The sentences imposed are within the statutory limits of I.C. §§ 37-2732(c)(1) and 18-
1403.  The record shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal 
standards to the issue before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.   
At a consolidated sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it “understand[s] that 
[Fellows doesn’t] want to go back to prison.  However, [the district court] saw [Fellows] in 
Boundary County and sentenced [her].”  (02/24/2020 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 5-7.)  The district court noted 
that Fellows “came to Idaho after inter-stating when [she] got out of custody in Montana.  And 
[the district court] gave, on the Boundary County case, a very lenient sentence.”  (02/24/2020 Tr., 
p. 14, Ls. 7-9.)  The district court stated that Fellows has “12 prior felony convictions . . . just to 
go through this and the concern, theft, theft, theft, burglary . . . these are not victimless crimes.  
And we gave [Fellows] a chance on probation ….”  (02/24/2020 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 10-14.)  The district 
court noted that Fellows got a “job in Sandpoint and [she stole] from people’s credit cards, debit 
cards at [her] place of work.  [Fellows goes] back to jail.  We let [her] out with testing.  And then 
 5 
[she broke] into someone’s home and car, [she’s] out of [her] mind on drugs, [she stole] money 
from them.”  (02/24/2020 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 17-23 (paragraphs altered).)  The district court stated that 
it does not “send people to prison lightly.  But that’s the only sentence that makes sense in this 
case,” and “anything else depreciates the seriousness [of the crimes] and is unfair to our 
community.”  (02/24/2020 Tr., p. 14, L. 25 – p. 15, L. 2; p. 15, Ls. 21-22.)   
At the Rule 35 hearing, the district court stated that Fellows was “on felony probation, 
[she] inter-stated from Montana, [she] got three new felonies in Idaho.  But [she has] a significant 
criminal record.  [She has] done prison time before.”  (03/06/2020 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-15.)  The 
district court stated that “these were not victimless crimes.  [Fellows] pled to two more burglaries.  
[The district court] gave [Fellows] … a quite lenient sentence initially, gave [her] probation, and 
then [she] committed the two more burglaries,” and denied her Rule 35 motion.  (03/06/2020 Tr., 
p. 10, Ls. 16-21.)   
On appeal, Fellows argues that the mitigating factors–PSI recommendation, performance 
on probation, willingness to undergo treatment, family support and her young daughter–show an 
abuse of discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-5.)  Fellows’ argument does not show an abuse of 
discretion.  Fellows’ LSI score is thirty-one, placing her in the high risk to reoffend category.  
(47966 PSI, p. 31.)  Her extensive criminal history consists of twelve felony convictions and 
opportunities on probation.  (PSI, pp. 12-21.)  While on probation, Fellows continued to use 
narcotics and committed two new felony offenses.  (48056 R., pp. 75-76, 121-22.)  Fellows stopped 
attending her outpatient treatment program shortly before committing the first of the two instant 
burglary offenses, despite the treatment being required as part of her felony probation.  (47966 
PSI, pp. 28-29.)  Fellows’ probation officer requested that the district court revoke probation and 
execute the underlying sentence in CR11-19-0093.  (48056 R., p. 122.) 
 6 
Fellows’ extensive criminal history, numerous opportunities on probation, failure to 
comply with the terms of her probation in CR11-19-0093, and consecutive criminal cases for 
burglary show that the sentences in all three cases are reasonable.  Fellows is not a suitable 
candidate for community supervision or alternative treatment, and the sentences imposed provide 
proper deterrence to Fellows’ criminal behavior.  Fellows’ numerous burglary and theft charges 
show that she does not respect the laws that are in place to protect society, and the sentenced 
imposed provide protection to the community.  A reduction in sentence would depreciate the 
seriousness of the instant offenses, and the district court’s decision to deny her Rule 35 motions is 
justified.  Fellows has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion be sentencing her 
to five years, with two years determinate in both CR09-19-4423 and CR09-19-5017, and by 
denying all three of her Rule 35 motions.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 1st day of April, 2021. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
  
 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of April, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____ 
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. Fellows Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 47966

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3-8-2021 
State v. Fife Appellant's Brief Dckt. 47996 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief of the Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 47996-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR28-19-20469
v. )
)
JARROD CHRISTOPHER FIFE, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jarrod Fife pled guilty to one count each of trafficking in
heroin, unlawful possession of a firearm, misdemeanor resisting and obstructing, and
misdemeanor driving under the influence (“DUI”), as well as a “persistent violator” sentencing
enhancement.  He received a sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed, for trafficking, a
concurrent sentence of five years, all fixed, for unlawful possession of a firearm, and sentences
of time served for the misdemeanors. Mr. Fife now appeals, asserting the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, and by declining to reduce that sentence in
response to Mr. Fife’s motion for a sentence reduction under Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
Electronically Filed
3/8/2021 10:07 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Just before Christmas 2019, Coeur d’Alene police were called to a parking lot “in
reference to possible drug activity in a truck.”  (R., p.15.)  The tipster “observed two subjects in a
vehicle with out of state plates possibly smoking drugs.”  (R., p.15.)  When first approached by
the police, Mr. Fife, the driver, gave the police a false name and refused to get out of the car.
(R., pp.14-15.)  Mr. Fife eventually exited the vehicle though, and the officer had him perform
field sobriety tests, which he failed.  (R., p.16.)  Mr. Fife was then arrested for DUI.  (R., p.16.)
The officers searched the truck.  (R., pp.15-16.)  In that search, the officers found
“multiple items of paraphernalia and illegal drugs.”  (R., p.16.)  After being transported to the
jail, a “drug recognition expert” performed an evaluation and opined that Mr. Fife was under the
influence of controlled substances.  (R., p.16.)  Upon further questioning, Mr. Fife admitted that
a red backpack found in the truck, which contained methamphetamine, belonged to him.
(R., p.16.)  However, he denied knowledge of a gun and a locked safe (containing heroin,
methamphetamine, fentanyl, oxycodone, other prescription drugs, and marijuana, as well as drug
paraphernalia), also found in the truck.  (R., pp.16-17, 19-20.)
Mr. Fife was cited for five misdemeanors: DUI (second offense), possession of drug
paraphernalia, resisting or obstructing officers, providing false information to law enforcement,
and possession of suboxone.  (R., pp.14, 24-26.)  In addition, a criminal complaint was filed
alleging four felonies: trafficking in heroin (by possessing 2 - 7 g), possession of
methamphetamine, possession of fentanyl, and unlawful possession of a firearm, as well as a
“persistent violator” sentencing enhancement.  (R., pp.10-12.)  All of the cases were
consolidated.  (R., p.70.)
After Mr. Fife waived his right to a preliminary hearing (see R., pp.80, 81), an
Information was filed charging him with trafficking in heroin (by possessing 7 - 28 g),
3
trafficking in methamphetamine (by possessing 28 - 200 g), possession of fentanyl, possession of
cocaine, unlawful possession of a firearm, misdemeanor DUI (second offense), misdemeanor
resisting or obstructing officers, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, providing false
information to law enforcement, and misdemeanor possession of buprenorphine, and a
“persistent violator” enhancement.1  (R., pp.82-86.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Fife agreed to plead guilty to trafficking in heroin (for
possessing 2 - 7 g), unlawful possession of a firearm, misdemeanor resisting or obstructing
officers, misdemeanor DUI (first offense), and the “persistent violator” enhancement.  (R., p.91.)
In exchange for his guilty pleas, the State agreed to: dismiss the remaining counts; reduce the
alleged trafficking amount; dismiss the second-DUI enhancement and proceed as if the DUI
were Mr. Fife’s first; and recommend concurrent sentences on all counts.  (R., p.91.)  Sentencing
recommendations were otherwise open for both parties.  (R., p.91.)
At sentencing, the State recommended that Mr. Fife be sentenced as follows:  for
trafficking heroin, fifteen years, with five years fixed; for unlawful possession of a firearm, five
years, all fixed, concurrent with the trafficking count; and, for the two misdemeanor counts, time
served, concurrent with the felonies.  (Tr., p.27, L.15 – p.28, L.1.)  Mr. Fife’s attorney asked that
the court impose concurrent sentences of five years, with three years fixed, on the felonies, and
time served on the misdemeanors.  (Tr., p.29, Ls.18-20, p.31, L.22 – p.32, L.1.)2  The court then
imposed a sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed, for trafficking in heroin, and a
1 Mr. Fife was bound over on more/greater offenses than those named in the complaint.
Apparently, the State moved to amend the complaint and, at the time set for the preliminary
hearing, the defense made no objection to the motion and the district court granted it.  (See
R., pp.4, 80.)  It does not appear that either a written motion to amend or an amended complaint
were ever filed.  (See R., p.4.)
2 The fixed portion of the sentence recommended by the defense would represent the mandatory
minimum for trafficking between two and seven grams of heroin.  I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(6)(A).
4
concurrent sentence of five years, all fixed, for unlawful possession of a firearm.  (Tr., p.34, L.15
– p.35, L.6; R., p.105.)  The court sentenced Mr. Fife to time served for each of the two
misdemeanor counts.  (Tr., p.34, Ls.1-10; R., pp.107, 108.)
Shortly after entry of the judgment of conviction, Mr. Fife filed a timely motion for a
sentence reduction under Idaho Criminal Rule 35.  (See R., pp.117-19.)  Mr. Fife asked that the
aggregate sentence be reduced to fifteen years, with five years fixed.  (R., p.118.)
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Fife’s motion.  At that hearing, Mr. Fife testified
he had not had any disciplinary issues since going to prison (Rule 35 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-4)3; he
testified to some of his rehabilitative efforts since going to prison (Rule 35 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-20,
p.6, Ls.2-3); and he expressed a desire to use his time in prison productively (Rule 35 Tr., p.6,
Ls.14-20).  Ultimately, he requested that the court at least reduce the indeterminate portion of his
sentence—by five years.4  He indicated that with a shorter “tail,” he would be eligible to go to a
work camp sooner.  (Rule 35 Tr., p.7, Ls.12-24, p.8, Ls.7-11.)
The district court denied Mr. Fife’s motion.  (R.35 Tr., p.10, L.18 – p.13, L13.; Aug. p.3.)
3 On July 10, 2020, the Supreme Court granted Mr. Fife’s motion to augment the record on
appeal with the court minutes from the June 24, 2020 hearing on Mr. Fife’s Rule 35 motion, the
transcript of that hearing, and the district court’s June 25, 2020 order denying that motion.
4 Mr. Fife vacillated repeatedly in terms of the specific sentence reduction he sought.  First, he
asked for a five-year reduction of the indeterminate portion of his sentence.  (Rule 35 Tr., p.7,
Ls.17-20.)  Then he asked for that, as well as a two-year reduction of the fixed portion of the
sentence (down to the mandatory minimum).  (Rule 35 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-4.)  Then he indicated he
was not seeking “serious leniency,” just a reduction in the indeterminate portion of the sentence.
(Rule 35 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-9.)  Finally, returned to his request for the minimum fixed sentence.
(Rule 35 Tr., p.8, Ls.11-12.)  His counsel went on to clarify that the request—as in the written
Rule 35 motion—was simply for a five-year reduction in the indeterminate portion of the
sentence.  (Rule 35 Tr., p.9, Ls.22-24.)
5
In the meantime, Mr. Fife filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of
conviction.  (R., pp.113-15.)  On appeal, Mr. Fife contends the district court abused its discretion
by imposing an excessive sentence and by denying his Rule 35 motion.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Fife an aggregate
sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Fife’s motion for sentence
reduction?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Fife An Aggregate
Sentence Of Twenty Years, With Five Years Fixed
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573 (1979)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
In this case, Mr. Fife contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to
exercise reason in its ultimate sentencing decision.  “[R]easonableness is a fundamental
requirement.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982). “‘[R]easonableness’ implies that a term of
6
confinement should be tailored to the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” State v.
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).
The record in this case reflects a wealth of mitigating evidence that should have weighed
in favor of the district court imposing a lesser sentence.  That evidence includes Mr. Fife’s
abusive childhood, his amenability to drug rehabilitation, and the impact of substance abuse
throughout his life.
The impact of an abusive childhood is one mitigating factor. See, e.g., State v. Williams,
135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Gonzales, 123 Idaho 92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993).
Mr. Fife experienced a horrendous childhood.  He was sexually abused by one of his uncles
when he was around , which “caused him to have an ‘identity crisis.’”  (PSI, p.22.)
This experience was so traumatic that even now, over 40 years later, he struggles talking about it.
(See PSI, p.22 (“[W]hen I pressed him for details, he simply repeated, ‘no comment.’”).)
Another one of his uncles introduced him to drugs and alcohol between the ages of ten and
eleven.  (PSI, pp.26-27; Tr., p.21, L.18 – p.22, L.4.)  He never knew his birth father, and his
stepfather died when he was fourteen.  (PSI, p.21.)  He dropped out of school around the same
time and “did not return until later in his adult life.”  (PSI, p.22.)  During that time Mr. Fife said
he “lived on the streets, got addicted to meth – then coke – then found heroin.”  (PSI, p.21.)
Mr. Fife wants help coping with the horrendous trauma he experienced as a child; he asked the
court “if [it] had any solutions to, you know, [the] underlying issues that [he has] been having.”
(Tr., p.33, Ls.16-18; see generally Tr., p.32, L.5 – p.33, L.23.)
The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s criminal conduct is also “a proper
consideration in mitigation of punishment.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981).
Mr. Fife has been struggling with drugs for over thirty years.  (See PSI, pp.26-27.)  He admitted
7
that when he was arrested, “he was under the influence of ‘meth, heroin, oxycodone, benzo’s,
and crack.’”  (PSI, p.8.)  Everyone in Mr. Fife’s life recognizes he has a problem with drugs,
especially heroin.  His mother told the presentence investigator that her son “has trouble with
drugs and has a terrible heroin addiction.”  (PSI, p.22.)  She told the investigator that if Mr. Fife
were to address his drug addiction, “he would do much better.”  (PSI, p.22.)
Courts should also look at “a willingness to seek treatment for an alcohol [or drug]
problem” as a mitigating factor. State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008).  Mr. Fife
said that his crime was “[s]tupid [and] selfish,” but he is grateful he is now “getting help through
IDOC.”  (PSI, p.8.)  As previously discussed, he wants help so badly he was willing to ask the
court for any suggestions it might have for him to get that help while incarcerated.  (See
Tr., p.32, L.5 – p.33, L.23.)  Mr. Fife “seems to genuinely want to change his life at this point.”
(Tr., p.30, Ls.17-18.)  He wants to take the struggles he has experienced in his life and use them
to help keep children and young adults from making the same mistakes he has made by
becoming a “chemical dependency counselor.”  (PSI, p.24.)  Mr. Fife asserts he is ready to
change and make a positive impact on the community, but he cannot do that with a prison
sentence that could potentially keep him incarcerated until he is almost .
Accordingly, he asserts the district court did not exercise reason, and thus abused its discretion,
when it imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Fife’s Rule 35 Motion
“When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
8
support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  Such a motion “is
a plea for leniency,” the denial of which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Even if the indeterminate portion of Mr. Fife’s sentence was not excessive as originally
imposed, it became excessive in light of the new/additional mitigation evidence Mr. Fife
presented with his Rule 35 motion.  At the Rule 35 hearing, Mr. Fife testified that he had not had
any disciplinary issues whatsoever since going to prison.  (Rule 35 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-4.)  He also
testified about his rehabilitative efforts since he was sentenced.  (Rule 35 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-20, p.6,
Ls.2-3.)  Specifically, he testified that: he had been attending Narcotics Anonymous regularly
(Rule 35 Tr., p.5, Ls.19-20); he recently signed up for a computer class (Rule 35 Tr., p.6, Ls.2-
3); and he was on the waiting list to start working for Correctional Industries, where he hoped to
gain welding and/or graphic design skills and experience (Rule 35 Tr., p.5, Ls.15-19).  Finally,
consistent with the proactive steps he had already taken, Mr. Fife expressed a commitment to
using his time in prison productively, such as by also taking parenting classes.  (Rule 35 Tr., p.6,
Ls.14-20).
In light of the foregoing, as well as all of the mitigation evidence before the court at
sentencing, the district court failed to exercise reason, and therefore abused its discretion, when it
denied Mr. Fife’s motion for a sentence reduction.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Fife respectfully requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his
trafficking sentence to ten years.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Erik R. Lehtinen
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief of the Appellate Unit
9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
 /s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
ERL/eas


State v. Fife Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 47996

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7889/thumbnail.jp

UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-24-2021 
State v. Cortez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48010 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Cortez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48010" (2021). Not Reported. 6890. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6890 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7259
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 48010-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO.
v. ) CR01-19-28324
)
CHARLES ROBERT CORTEZ AKA APPELL, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
__________________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Charles Robert Cortez appeals from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction and
Commitment.  Mr. Cortez was sentenced to unified sentences of five years, with one year fixed,
following his guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm and a persistent violator
enhancement.  He asserts that the district court abused its discretion because in light of the
evidence, including the mitigating factors present in his case, the ultimate sentencing conclusion
was unreasonable.
Electronically Filed
3/24/2021 10:53 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On August 1, 2019 an Information was filed charging Mr. Cortez with unlawful
possession of a firearm.  (R., pp.23-24.)  Later, and Information, Part II, was filed adding a
persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp.30-31.)  Following a trial, Mr. Cortez was found guilty
of the firearm change and entered a guilty plea the sentencing enhancement.  (R., p.92,
Tr. 1/10/2020, p.94, L.25 – p.97, L.25.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified sentence of ten years, with three years
fixed.  (Tr. 5/1/2020, p.102, Ls.18-22.)  Defense counsel requested that Mr. Cortez be placed on
probation or, alternatively, a period of retained jurisdiction, with an underlying sentence of five
years, with one year fixed.  (Tr. 5/1/2020, p.115, L.18 – p.116, L.11.)  The district court imposed
a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed.   (R., pp.157-59.)  Mr. Cortez filed a Notice
of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction and Commitment.
(R., pp.162-64.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Cortez, a unified sentence
of five years, with one year fixed, following his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm
and a persistent violator enhancement?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Cortez, A Unified
Sentence Of Five Years, With One Year Fixed, Following His Conviction For Unlawful
Possession Of A Firearm And A Persistent Violator Enhancement
Mr. Cortez asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of five years,
with one year fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
3
record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Cortez does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Cortez must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)).  The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138
(2001)).
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: Whether the trial court:  (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).  Mr. Cortez asserts in light of the
evidence, including the mitigating factors present in his case, the ultimate sentencing conclusion
was unreasonable and, as a result, the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of
reason.
4
In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that
family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the Court’s decision as to
what is an appropriate sentence.  Mr. Cortez supplied the district court with numerous letters of
support.  (PSI, pp.418-425, 595-605.)1  His neighbors took the time to write letters discussing
what a kind, polite, and helpful person is.  (PSI, pp.418-425, 598-605.)  He also has the support
of his parents, who think highly of him, despite the mistakes he has made in his life.   (PSI,
pp.212, 595-597.)
Additionally, Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523
requires the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v.
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).  Mr. Cortez has been previously diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, depression, and attention hyperactivity disorder.  (PSI, p.216.)  At the time of his
sentencing, he was taking Laduta daily.  (PSI, p.216.)  Despite receiving Social Security
Disability Benefits as a result of his mental health diagnoses (PSI, p.220), the DHW Mental
Health Examination Report failed to identify any serious mental illness and made “no further
mental health treatment recommendations” (PSI, p.233).  Regardless, Mr. Cortez attributes his
recent criminal behavior, in large part, to a misjudgment about no longer needing to take his
mental health medication; a mistake he is prepared to address to insure he never goes off his
medications again.  (Tr. 5/1/2020, p.117, L.1 – p.119, L.1.)
Idaho courts have held that substance abuse and a desire for treatment should be
considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).  Additionally, in State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the
1 For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as “PSI” and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
5
Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, “In light of Alberts’ expression of
remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and
other positive attributes of his character.” Id. 121 Idaho at 209.  Although Mr. Cortez initially
believed that he did not have an issue with alcohol (PSI, p.216), he has since recognized that he
needs to abstain from alcohol use (Tr. 5/1/2020, p.117, Ls.12-16).  He has expressed remorse for
his criminal behavior, committed to staying sober and continuing his mental health medications
in the future, and a desire to become a productive member of society:
. . . I’ve been making mistakes all my life.  Seems the harder I try, the
more I mess things up.  I have good morals and sometimes my anger and lack of
impulse control get in the way of me always doing what is right.  I am sorry for
who I’ve been the last eight months of so.  I feel like a complete failure as a
husband and a father and as a son.
14 years ago I told myself I would stop doing meth, and still to this day
I’m clean off meth.  Haven’t touched it; haven’t been around anybody who uses
it.  I’ve kept my word to myself about that, and I will continue to do so.
Now I’m saying the same thing about drinking.  I am done for good.  I’m
sorry that it took me this long to open my eyes to the fact that I should no longer
be drinking alcohol.
I could benefit from anger management and NA/AA meetings. I’m not a
bad person.  Life just gets the best of me sometimes, and it’s hard for me to deal
with at times.
I could use some new coping skills also.  It would help if I stayed on my
meds.  On or about May of last year I stopped taking my meds because I didn’t
think they were working or I needed them anymore.  That was a huge mistake.
I don’t know why I need to learn from my mistakes the hard way, but
since I was released off of portable Breathalyzer, I felt like I was doing so good
that once again, I felt I didn’t need my meds anymore.  So after I missed taking
them for a few times in one week, I stopped taking them altogether cold turkey,
which was a horrible lack of judgment on my part.  In quitting cold turkey, I may
have contributed to those last two arrests.
I don’t know why I am so hardheaded and insist on learning the hard way.
I know if I had never stopped taking my meds, I would not be in front of you in
jail right now.
6
If given a chance on probation, I promise to stick to my meds or anything
else, say clean and sober for the rest of my life.  Freedom means more to me than
I have shown myself, my family, and the courts.  I’m asking your Honor to grant
me one more opportunity at probation and at a prosocial lifestyle.  I’m never
again going to take that for granted.
(Tr. 5/1/2020, p.117, L.1 – p.119, L.1.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Cortez asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Cortez respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 24th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
EAA/eas


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Wilson v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48030 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
RICHARD ALLEN WILSON, 
 
 Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Respondent. 
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
No. 48030-2020 
 
Canyon County Case No.  
CV14-19-3335 
 
 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE GENE A. PETTY 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
RESPONDENT 
RICHARD ALLEN WILSON 
IDOC #63233 
I.S.C.C. – D-2, 10-B 
P. O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho  83707 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRO SE 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
5/12/2021 12:11 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Melanie Gagnepain, Deputy Clerk
 
 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case .................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................................1 
 
ISSUES ................................................................................................................................3 
 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................4 
 
 Wilson Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel ....................................4 
 
 A. Introduction ..................................................................................................4 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .....................................................................................4 
 
 C. The District Court Properly Concluded There Was 
  No Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Because The 
  Suppression Motion Would Not Have Been Granted ..................................5 
 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................7 
 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING............................................................................................7 
 
 
 
 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Chernobieff v. State, 168 Idaho 98, 480 P.3d 136 (2021) .................................................. 5 
Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898, 277 P.3d 1050 (Ct. App. 2012) .................................... 5 
Marsalis v. State, 166 Idaho 334, 458 P.3d 203 (2020) ...................................................... 5 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999) .................................................. 4 
Savage v. State, 166 Idaho 169, 457 P.3d 150 (2020) ........................................................ 5 
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1 (2015) ......................................................... 4 
State v. Wilson, 165 Idaho 64, 438 P.3d 302 (2019) ...................................................... 1, 7 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................................. 5 
 
 
1 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Richard Allen Wilson appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Wilson filed a petition, and after appointment of counsel an amended petition, 
seeking post-conviction relief by challenging his convictions for aiding and abetting 
trafficking in methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 6-36, 209-15.)  Wilson alleged he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not file a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained by law enforcement in the course of a traffic stop.  (R., pp. 211-13.)  The 
case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing.  (R., pp. 403-04.)  The district court denied relief.  
(R., pp. 784-95.) 
 The district court found that Wilson was convicted of two counts of aiding and 
abetting trafficking in methamphetamine after a jury trial, based on evidence that he and 
Regina Jones twice sold methamphetamine to an undercover detective.  (R., pp. 784-87.1)  
After making the second purchase (one ounce of methamphetamine for $600), the detective 
asked if Jones would sell him an additional ounce of methamphetamine.  (R., p. 787.)  Jones 
agreed, stating that she would have to go back to her residence for the requested ounce.  
(R., p. 787.)  Wilson drove Jones back to the residence, and then toward the buy site.  (R., 
p. 787.)  Officers conducting surveillance of the transactions requested a patrol officer to 
stop Wilson’s car before they arrived, however, and officers detained him for about two 
                                            
1 The facts of the case are also set forth in the appeal in the criminal case.  State v. Wilson, 
165 Idaho 64, 66, 438 P.3d 302, 304 (2019). 
 
2 
 
hours, finding the $600 in pre-recorded drug-buy money on his person as a result of a 
probation search.  (R., pp. 787-88.)   
 Defense counsel did not file a motion to suppress evidence found as a result of the 
traffic stop because “Petitioner was present at the April 7 and April 27, 2016 drug 
transactions with an undercover police officer; surveillance observed him driving Ms. 
Jones to and from the April 27, 2016 transaction; he had an invalid license; he was on 
probation or parole; and there was a discrepancy between his driver’s license address and 
the address listed on the sex offender registry.”  (R., p. 789.) 
 The district court found that Wilson’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, 
and therefore any motion to suppress would have been denied.  (R., pp. 789-795.)  Wilson 
timely appealed from the entry of judgment.  (R., pp. 797-801.) 
 
3 
 
ISSUES 
 
 Wilson states the issues on appeal as: 
1). Did the District Court err when it denied the Post Conviction Relief 
Petition? 
 
2). Did the District Court consider items that were false when it denied 
the Petition for Post Conviction Relief? 
 
3). Was the Petitioner denied his right to the Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, when Counsel failed to file a Motion to Suppress Illegally 
Obtained Evidence? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
 Has Wilson failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion he failed to prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
 
 
4 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Wilson Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court concluded that, because Wilson would not have prevailed on a 
motion to suppress evidence as a result of the investigative stop following his participation 
in the second drug buy with an undercover officer, Wilson had failed to show ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (R., pp. 789-95.)  Wilson contends that the investigative stop was 
too long for a traffic investigation, and was therefore illegal.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-14.)  
Wilson’s argument lacks merit. As found by the district court, there were a myriad of 
suspected crimes justifying the investigative detention, including traffic offenses, 
probation violations, sex offender registry violations, and trafficking in methamphetamine. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Reviewing the district court’s denial of a petition for post-conviction relief after an 
evidentiary hearing, “this Court defers to the district court’s factual findings supported by 
substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of the relevant law to those facts.”  
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999).  “When appellate review 
of a district court’s denial of post-conviction relief follows an evidentiary hearing, rather 
than a summary dismissal, the evidence must be viewed most favorably to the trial court’s 
findings.”  State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 417, 348 P.3d 1, 32 (2015) (internal brackets 
and quotations omitted). 
 
  
5 
 
C. The District Court Properly Concluded There Was No Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel Because The Suppression Motion Would Not Have Been Granted 
 
 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the two-prong test 
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Marsalis v. State, 166 
Idaho 334, ___, 458 P.3d 203, 209 (2020).  “Under the Strickland test, a petitioner must 
demonstrate (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.”  Chernobieff v. State, 168 Idaho 98, ___, 480 P.3d 
136, 141 (2021) (quotation marks omitted).  “The deficient performance prong requires 
showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective level of reasonableness” while 
the prejudice prong “requires showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different.”  Savage v. State, 166 Idaho 169, 
___, 457 P.3d 150, 154 (2020). 
 “In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney’s failure to pursue a 
motion in the underlying criminal action, the district court may consider the probability of 
success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney’s inactivity 
constituted incompetent performance.”  Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898, 904, 277 P.3d 
1050, 1056 (Ct. App. 2012).  Where, as here, the claim is counsel was ineffective for failing 
to file a motion, the conclusion that the motion would have been denied “is generally 
determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test.”  Id. 
 Here the district court concluded a motion to suppress would have been denied, and 
therefore counsel was neither deficient nor Wilson prejudiced for lack of such a motion.  
(R., pp. 789-95.)  The district court concluded that officers properly conducted a traffic 
stop based on reasonable suspicion of trafficking in methamphetamine and speeding in a 
school zone.  (R., pp. 789-91.)  Law enforcement officers thereafter reasonably investigated 
6 
 
both suspected crimes, and found additional evidence that Wilson did not have a valid 
driver’s license, was in violation of his sex offender registration requirements, and was in 
violation of his probation, and may have been in violation of a no-contact order.  (R., pp. 
791-93.)  During the course of the investigation of these matters a drug dog alerted on the 
car and Wilson was searched on the authority of the probation officer and the drug-buy 
money was found on his person.  (R., p. 793.)  “Based on a totality of the circumstances, 
this Court concludes that the stop was reasonable and that the officers did not improperly 
prolong the stop.”  (Id.2)  Because the district court properly applied the relevant law to the 
facts before it, it did not err in finding no ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 Wilson argues that his stop was unreasonably long to conduct an investigation of 
his traffic offenses of speeding and having an invalid driver’s license.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 9-11.)  As shown, the district court found the stop and the investigation justified by a 
myriad of potential crimes.  Most significantly, the detention was justified by reasonable 
suspicion Wilson and Jones were involved in methamphetamine trafficking, had recently 
sold methamphetamine to an undercover detective, and were on their way to deliver more 
methamphetamine to the undercover officer. 
 Wilson also contends the facts are different than found by the district court (and in 
some instances contrary to his conviction), but fails to argue or demonstrate clear error.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-15.)  The district court’s factual findings about the course of 
events is supported by the evidence.  (See, e.g., R., pp. 617-18, 624-25, 689-90, 693-94, 
                                            
2 The district court also found the prolonged stop and search justified by probable cause.  
(R., pp. 793-95.) 
7 
 
741-43, 750-51, 754-55; see also pp. 763-67 (Wilson’s closing argument); Wilson, 165 
Idaho at 66, 438 P.3d at 304.)  Wilson has failed to show error. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 12th day of May, 2021. 
 
 
 
        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of May, 2021, served a true and 
correct paper copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing the copy in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
 
RICHARD ALLEN WILSON 
IDOC #63233 
I.S.C.C. – D-2, 10-B 
P. O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, ID  83707 
  
 
 
  /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
 


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