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State v. Hunnicutt Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48038

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State v. Wheeler Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48043 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
REBECCA DAWN WHEELER, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
) 
 
No. 48043-2020 
 
Twin Falls County Case No.  
CR42-19-9172 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE ROGER B. HARRIS 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
KIMBERLY A. COSTER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570 
Boise, Idaho  83702 
(208) 334-2712 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Electronically Filed
2/2/2021 11:33 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................1 
 
 Nature Of The Case .............................................................................................................1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ..................................................1 
 
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................................................5 
 
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................6 
 
 Wheeler Has Failed To Show That The District Court 
 Erred When It Denied Her Motion To Suppress .................................................................6 
 
 A. Introduction ..............................................................................................................6 
 
 B. Standard Of Review .................................................................................................6 
 
 C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied 
  Wheeler’s Motion To Suppress ...............................................................................7 
 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................9 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................................9 
 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Andersen v. Prof’l Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 118 P.3d 75 (2005) ................................. 8 
Doe v. Doe, 159 Idaho 461, 362 P.3d 536 (2015) .......................................................................... 8 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) ................................................................................. 7, 8 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 981 P.2d 754 (Ct. App. 1999) ......................................................... 7 
State v. Dycus, 154 Idaho 456, 299 P.3d 263 (Ct. App. 2013) ....................................................... 7 
State v. Hayes, 166 Idaho 646, 462 P.3d 1110 (2020).................................................................... 8 
State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 148 P.3d 1240 (2006) ................................................................. 6 
State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 991 P.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1999) ................................................ 7 
State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho 732, 418 P.3d 1241 (Ct. App. 2018) ...................................................... 6 
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).............................................................................. 7 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) ....................................................................................... 7, 8 
 
 
 
 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Rebecca Dawn Wheeler appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress.   
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Law enforcement received a report that Wheeler was living at a residence and had an active 
warrant out for her arrest.  (See R., p.14.)  Law enforcement went to that address, entered the 
residence, saw and recognized Wheeler inside, and arrested her.  (R., p.14.)  Law enforcement 
seized a bag of marijuana that was in plain view in the bedroom, as well as methamphetamine and 
a glass pipe found in Wheeler’s purse, which she was wearing on her person at the time of the 
arrest.  (R., p.14.)  The state charged Wheeler with felony possession of methamphetamine, felony 
possession of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp.34-35.) 
 Wheeler filed a motion to suppress.  (R., pp.26-27; Ex. E.)  The district court held a hearing 
on the motion, prior to which it reviewed the 911 call and officers’ on-body videos.  (See 12/6/2019 
Tr., p.5, Ls.9-22; Ex. 1.1)  On the 911 call, a woman who identified herself as Joanie reported that 
her sister Wheeler was living with her and had a warrant out for her arrest.  (Ex.1 (911 Call).)  The 
caller provided dispatch with the address of a residence on Adams Street, as well as her phone 
number so officers could contact her when they arrived.  (Ex.1 (911 Call).)  
Officer Nate Egan was dispatched to the Adams Street residence.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.13, 
Ls.8-17.)  He confirmed that there was a valid warrant for Wheeler’s arrest, which authorized 
residential execution.  (See 12/6/2019 Tr., p.14, Ls.3-22; see also Ex. B.)  He also pulled up 
                                            
1 The state provided the district court with an electronic disk containing the 911 call audio, as well 
as both officers’ body camera videos.  (See 12/6/2019 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-17.)  That disk was admitted 
as Exhibit 1.  (See 12/6/2019 Tr., p.4; p.11, Ls.5-13.)  Citations to Exhibit 1 will indicate the 
specific file being referenced.   
 
 2 
Wheeler’s information, including her driver’s license photo.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.14, L.12 – p.15, 
L.15; Ex. C.)  The address associated with Wheeler matched the Adams Street address the caller 
provided.  (12/6/2019 Tr., 15, L.23 – p.16, L.1; Ex. C.)   
When the officers arrived at the Adams Street address, they saw a woman walking out to 
her car.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-15.)  Officer Egan asked the woman if she was the calling 
party; she said she was and gave a detailed description of Wheeler’s location in the residence.  
(12/6/2019 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-21.)  Officer Egan testified the woman appeared to be a resident and 
he had no reason not to believe that the address was her residence.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.18, Ls.12-
17.)  Although he did not identify her at that time, Officer Egan testified he recognized the woman 
at the preliminary hearing; he identified her thereafter as Joanie Wheeler2 based on her driver’s 
license information, which listed her address as the Adams Street residence.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.18, 
Ls.5-11; p.19, Ls.5-16; Ex. D.)   
Officer Egan followed Joanie’s instructions to locate Wheeler in the house; he entered the 
back of the residence into a common area, walked through a short hallway into another common 
area that was turned into a makeshift bedroom, and from there saw Wheeler sitting in a bedroom.  
(See 12/6/2019 Tr., p.17, L.22 – p.18, L.4; p.23, Ls.7-12.)  Officer Egan arrested Wheeler pursuant 
to the warrant.  (See Ex. 1 (Officer Egan Body Camera Video, 0:55-2:15).)    
Officer Martin Becerra was also dispatched to execute the arrest warrant.  (12/6/2019 Tr., 
p.27, Ls.12-15.)  Prior to arriving at the Adams Street residence, he ran Wheeler’s information.  
(12/6/2019 Tr., p.27, L.22 – p.28, L.4.)  He verified there was an active warrant for Wheeler’s 
                                            
2 For clarity, Joanie Wheeler will be referred to as Joanie and the defendant Rebecca Wheeler will 
be referred to as Wheeler.  
 
 3 
arrest, viewed her license photo, and confirmed the Adams Street address matched Wheeler’s listed 
address.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.28, Ls.5-20.) 
Joanie testified she had been living at the Adams Street address for about two years at that 
time.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.33, Ls.13-17.)  Her mother and husband also lived with her.  (12/6/2019 
Tr., p.33, Ls.18-20.)  Wheeler had been living at the residence for about a week and her daughter 
occasionally came and stayed the night.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.33, Ls.20-25.)  Joanie’s mother owned 
the residence.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-8.)  Joanie testified she called 911 to report Wheeler.  
(See 12/6/2019 Tr., p.35, Ls.1-5; p.37, Ls.4-5.)  She also testified she gave law enforcement 
permission to enter the residence.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.36, Ls.5-12.)   
The district court issued its decision on the record.  The district court found that, before 
entering the residence, Officer Egan confirmed Wheeler had an active warrant, viewed her license 
information and photo, and saw that her address on file matched the Adams Street address where 
Joanie reported Wheeler was located.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.50, L.19 – p.51, L.5.)  The district court 
also concluded the officers had a reasonable belief Wheeler was inside her residence at that time.  
(12/6/2019 Tr., p.51, Ls.14-18.)  Because an arrest warrant grants law enforcement limited 
authority to enter a suspect’s residence if the officers have reasonable belief that the suspect is 
within, the district court concluded the officers operated within the bounds of that limited authority 
when they entered the residence and arrested Wheeler.3  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.51, Ls.6-24.) 
The district court also noted that, although the officers did not need consent to enter the 
residence because of the limited authority granted by virtue of the arrest warrant, they nonetheless 
received such consent from Joanie.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.51, Ls.18-21.)  Even without actual authority 
                                            
3 The district court noted that if Wheeler did not live at that residence, she would have no standing 
to challenge her arrest.  (See 12/6/2019 Tr., p.55, L.4 – p.56, L.8.)   
 
 4 
to give consent (which the district court indicated Joanie “[p]robably” had), Joanie had the 
apparent authority to consent to the officers’ entry of the residence.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.52, Ls.18-
19.)  Joanie told dispatch she lived at the residence, waited for officers to arrive, gave the officers 
permission to enter, and provided a detailed and accurate description of the layout and Wheeler’s 
location in the residence.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.52, Ls.19-25; p.53, Ls.6-11.)  The district court 
concluded Joanie had actual or apparent authority to give, and did in fact give, officers permission 
to enter the residence.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.53, Ls.5-11.) 
Further, the district court found the officers saw Wheeler in her bedroom in plain sight 
from a common area of the residence.  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.54, Ls.8-14.)  “[T]he officer had the 
absolute legal right to be where he was when he then recognized her and she acknowledged that 
she was Rebecca Wheeler.”  (12/6/2019 Tr., p.54, Ls.14-16.)  Therefore, the district court denied 
Wheeler’s motion to suppress.  (See 12/6/2019 Tr., p.57, L.7; see also R., p.120.) 
 Thereafter, Wheeler entered a conditional guilty plea to all charges, specifically reserving 
her right to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress.  (R., pp.50-51, 61-81; 
2/18/2020 Tr., p.24, L.16 – p.27, L.5.)  The district court sentenced Wheeler to six years with three 
years fixed and suspended the sentence.  (R., pp.97-101.)  Wheeler filed a timely notice of appeal.  
(R., pp.106-08, 122-25.) 
-----
 
 5 
ISSUE 
 
Wheeler states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err in denying Ms. Wheeler’s motion to suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Wheeler failed to show that the district court erred when it denied her motion to 
suppress? 
 
 
 
 6 
ARGUMENT 
 
Wheeler Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied Her Motion To 
Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
 Wheeler argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained 
in conjunction with her arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant.4  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)  
“[M]indful” of the district court’s factual findings, she argues the officers’ entry into her home 
nonetheless violated her Fourth Amendment rights.  (Appellant’s brief, p.1.)  The district court 
properly concluded the officers acted within their limited authority to execute an arrest warrant at 
a suspect’s residence when they entered the home to arrest Wheeler.  Further, Wheeler does not 
challenge the district court’s alternative conclusion that the officers were given consent to enter 
the home by another resident.  Therefore, the district court did not err and this Court should affirm 
its denial of Wheeler’s motion to suppress. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision on a motion 
to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are 
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to those facts.  State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).  “At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.”  State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho 
732, 734, 418 P.3d 1241, 1243 (Ct. App. 2018). 
                                            
4 Wheeler does not challenge the validity of the arrest warrant.  (Appellant’s brief, p.2, n.2.) 
 
 7 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Wheeler’s Motion To Suppress 
 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “an arrest warrant alone will suffice 
to enter a suspect’s own residence to effect his arrest.”  Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 
221 (1981) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980)).  That is because “an arrest 
warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a 
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”  Wilson 
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 603).  Idaho courts have also 
recognized that arrest warrants grant officers this limited authority to enter a suspect’s residence 
to effectuate his or her arrest when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.  See State v. 
Dycus, 154 Idaho 456, 459, 299 P.3d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 
657, 991 P.2d 380, 382 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 32, 981 P.2d 754, 757 (Ct. 
App. 1999).   
The officers acted within the bounds of their authority when they entered Wheeler’s 
residence pursuant to a valid arrest warrant to effectuate her arrest, based on their reasonable belief 
she was inside.  As the district court found, the officers confirmed Wheeler’s warrant prior to entry.  
(12/6/2019 Tr., p.50, L.19 – p.51, L.5.)  Officers ran and reviewed Wheeler’s information, which 
showed the Adams Street residence to which they were dispatched as her listed address.  (See 
12/6/2019 Tr., p.14, Ls.3-22; p.15, L.23 – p.16, L.1; p.28, Ls.5-20.)  The officers were told by 
dispatch that the caller, a resident of the Adams Street address, reported Wheeler was inside the 
residence.  (See 12/6/2019 Tr., p.13, Ls.15-20.)  When the officers arrived, Joanie told Officer 
Egan she was the caller and told him exactly where in the residence Wheeler could be found.  
(12/6/2019 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-21.)  The district court properly concluded the officers reasonably 
believed Wheeler was inside the residence, listed as her own address, and therefore the arrest 
 
 8 
warrant gave them authority to enter the residence for the limited purpose of effectuating her arrest.  
See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611 (“[T]he officers had such a warrant, and they were undoubtedly 
entitled to enter the Wilson home in order to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson.”)  The 
district court did not err when it denied Wheeler’s motion to suppress. 
Wheeler “acknowledges that an arrest warrant ‘implicitly carries with it the limited 
authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect 
is within.’”  (Appellant’s brief, p.1 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 602-03).)  Further, Wheeler 
concedes the district court’s factual findings are supported by evidence in the record.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, p.7.)  Wheeler has failed to demonstrate error in the district court’s decision. 
Even if the arrest warrant alone did not authorize the officers’ entry into the residence, this 
Court must still affirm.  “When a decision is based upon alternative grounds, the fact that one of 
the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded if the judgment can be 
sustained upon one of the other grounds.”  Andersen v. Prof’l Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 
746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Doe v. Doe, 159 
Idaho 461, 464, 362 P.3d 536, 539 (2015).  The district court determined Joanie gave the officers 
permission to enter the residence and she had the actual or apparent authority to do so.  (See 
12/6/2019 Tr., p.51, L.18 - p.53, L.11.)  Wheeler acknowledges this alternative basis for the denial 
of her motion but does not challenge it on appeal.  (See Appellant’s brief, p.3, n.4.)  “The district 
court’s decision was based on alternative grounds, and as such, [Wheeler] bore the burden of 
demonstrating error in both grounds.”  State v. Hayes, 166 Idaho 646, 462 P.3d 1110, 1117 (2020).  
Wheeler has failed to do so.   
 
 
 
 
 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 2nd day of February, 2021. 
 
 
        
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
 KACEY L. JONES 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of February, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
 KIMBERLY A. COSTER 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
   /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
      KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
KLJ/dd 
 
 
 


State v. Wheeler Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48043

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7915/thumbnail.jp

Electronically Filed
1/14/2021 12:19 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) N0. 48049-2020
Plaintiff—Respondent, )
) Ada County Case N0.
v. ) CR—FE-2003-529
)
TYLER SHAWN CLAPP, )
)
Defendant—Appellant. )
)
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
HONORABLE MELISSA MOODY
District Judge
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN BRIAN R. DICKSON
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho 322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
COLLEEN D. ZAHN (208) 334-2712
Deputy Attorney General E-mail: d0cuments@sapd.state.id.us
Chief, Criminal Law Division
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@a2.idaho.2ov
ATTORNEYS FOR ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
w
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................ 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................................................... 1
ISSUE .............................................................................................................................................. 2
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................... 3
Clapp Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Denying His Motion T0 Dismiss His Conviction ......................................... 3
A. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 3
B. Standard OfReview .................................................................................................3
C. Clapp Is Not Eligible For The Dismissal Of His Conviction
Under LC. § 19-2604 ............................................................................................... 3
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................................ 6
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESM w
Lunneborg V. MV Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 421 P.3d 187 (2018) .................................................. 3
State V. Funk, 123 Idaho 967, 855 P.2d 52 (1993) ......................................................................... 5
State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 429 P.3d 149 (2018) .................................................................... 3
State V. Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751, 9 P.3d 1217 (2000) .................................................................... 3
STATUTES
LC. § 19-2604 ..................................................................................................................... 1, 3, 4, 5
ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tyler Shawn Clapp appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion t0 dismiss his
2003 felony driving under the influence conviction pursuant to LC. § 19-2604(1)(b)(i).
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2003, Clapp pled guilty to felony driving under the influence (DUI). (E Supp. R.,
pp.31-35, 44.1) The district court sentenced Clapp t0 five years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (Supp. R., p.45.)
In 2019, Clapp moved to dismiss his conviction pursuant to LC. § 19-2604(1)(b)(i),
asserting that he successfillly completed the terms 0f his probation Without any finding of
probation Violation. (R., pp.9-10, 14.) Along With his motion, Clapp submitted his Offender
History records from the Idaho Department 0f Corrections from February 21, 2006 through July
24, 2008. (R., pp.16-40.) The district court denied the motion, determining Clapp had not
shown good cause t0 grant relief based 0n the fact that Clapp received additional felony DUI
convictions in 2010 and 2020.2 (R., p.41 .) Clapp filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.43-44.)
1 This Court augmented the record on appeal t0 include the Clerk’s Record from Clapp’s direct
appeal from that conviction, Docket No. 29908-2003. (R., p.48.) For consistency with the
Appellant’s brief, citations to “R.” refer to the record prepared for this appeal, N0. 48049;
citations t0 “Supp. R.” refer to the record prepared for the 2003 appeal, No. 29908, and Will use
the electronic document’s pagination.
2 As Clapp notes, his 2010 and 2020 felony DUI convictions are not contained in the record;
therefore, the district court implicitly took judicial notice 0f the judgments of convictions in case
numbers CR-FE-2010-73 16 and CR01-18-32652. (E Appellant’s brief, p.2, n.3.)
ISSUE
Clapp states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Clapp’s motion t0 dismiss
his conviction under LC. § 19-2604.
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Clapp failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to dismiss his conviction?
ARGUMENT
Clapp Has Failed T0 Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Denying His
Motion T0 Dismiss His Conviction
A. Introduction
Clapp argues that the district court abused its discretion When it denied his motion t0
dismiss his conviction pursuant t0 LC. § 19-2604(1)(b)(i). (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) However,
as Clapp concedes 0n appeal, he is not entitled t0 relief under subsection (1)(b)(i). Further, the
relief he sought—dismissal of his conviction—is not available under subsection (2), the
provision applicable t0 Clapp’s sentence and conviction. Thus, the district court properly denied
Clapp’s motion.
B. Standard OfReview
A ruling 0n a motion pursuant t0 I.C. § 19-2604 “rests Within the discretion of the district
court.” State V. Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751, 753, 9 P.3d 1217, 1219 (2000). In evaluating Whether a
lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks
“Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries 0f its discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”m
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg V. MV Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C. Clapp Is Not Eligible For The Dismissal Of His Conviction Under LC. S 19-2604
Idaho Code § 19-2604 allows the court to dismiss a judgment of conviction in certain
circumstances if good cause t0 do so exists. Subsection (1) applies to an enumerated set of
circumstances: (1) Where a defendant’s sentence is suspended 0r the defendant receives a
withheld judgment; (2) where a felony sentence has been commuted; (3) in a felony case where
the district court did not impose sentence t0 the custody 0f the board 0f corrections; (4) Where a
defendant has not yet been sentenced but has successfully completed drug 0r mental health court;
0r (5) in a misdemeanor case where the defendant has not been sentenced to a term in jail 0r any
portion of the sentence is suspended. I.C. § 19-2604(1)(a). If a defendant falls into one of the
enumerated categories, he or she may make an application and a satisfactory showing that he or
she had n0 probation Violations found or admitted, either in general or after the successful
completion 0f drug or mental health court. I.C. § 19-2604(1)(b)(i)-(ii). If convinced by the
satisfactory showing made that there is good cause for granting the requested relief, the court
“may terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty 0r conviction of the defendant, and
finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant 0r may amend the judgment of conviction
from a term in the custody 0f the state board 0f correction t0 ‘confinement in a penal facility’ for
the number of days served prior to sentencing, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a
misdemeanor conviction.” LC. § 19-2604(1)(b).
Subsection (2) applies Where a defendant’s sentence is imposed but suspended and the
district court retains jurisdiction over the case at any period during the first 365 days of the
sentence. LC. § 19-2604(2). The defendant may make an application and the same satisfactory
showing as that in subsection (1)(b)—that n0 probation Violation was found or admitted. I.C.
§ 19-2604(2). However, under this provision, the available relief is much more limited: “the
court may amend the judgment 0f conviction from a term 0f custody 0f the state board of
correction to ‘confinement in a penal facility’ for the number 0f days served prior to suspension,
and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction.” LC. § 19-2604(2).
“Pursuant t0 this statute, the trial court ha[s] authority to amend the judgment t0 reflect
confinement in a penal facility for the time [the defendant] served and t0 deem the conviction a
misdemeanor. The trial court d[oes] not have the authority to dismiss the case.” State V. Funk,
123 Idaho 967, 969, 855 P.2d 52, 54 (1993).
The district court properly denied Clapp’s motion t0 dismiss his conviction. Clapp
sought relief only under LC. § 19-2604(1)(b)(i) and sought only the dismissal of his conviction.
(R., pp.9-10, 14.) However, Clapp was not eligible for relief under that subsection. Because the
district court retained jurisdiction, Clapp did not fall under the categories set forth in subsection
1(a) but instead fell under subsection (2). Under that subsection, the court could not grant
dismissal 0f a conviction as a form 0f relief. E Fu_nk, 123 Idaho at 969, 855 P.2d at 54.
Because Clapp requested relief under a statutory provision that was inapplicable to his sentence
and sought a form 0f relief unavailable t0 him under the proper provision, the district court did
not err When it denied his motion to dismiss his conviction.
“Mindful” of the fact that “he does not qualify for relief under subsection (1)” and that
subsection (2) “does not allow for dismissal of the conviction,” Clapp nonetheless argues that the
district court abused its discretion When it denied his motion to dismiss his conviction.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) However, Clapp is simply not entitled t0 relief for which he is not
eligible. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion When it denied Clapp’s motion t0
dismiss his conviction.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 14th day of January, 2021.
/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day 0f January, 202 1 , served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT t0 the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
KLJ/dd


State v. Clapp Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48049

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UIdaho Law 
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State v. Baca Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48083 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Baca Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48083" (2021). Not Reported. 6927. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NOS. 48083-2020 & 48084-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) TWIN FALLS COUNTY NOS.
v. ) CR-2015-131 & CR-2015-1942
)
TROY ALLEN BACA, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
________________________
HONORABLE ERIC J. WILDMAN
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
I.S.B. #6555 Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender (208) 334-4534
I.S.B. #9525
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
Electronically Filed
1/26/2021 10:43 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts and
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................................ 4
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 5
 The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked
 Mr. Baca’s Probation And Executed His Underlying Sentences ............................................. 5
A. Introduction  ................................................................................................................. 5
B. Standard Of Review......................................................................................................... 5
C. The District Court Should Have Continued Mr. Baca On Probation
  Because His Probation Was Achieving The Goal Of Rehabilitation
  And Was Consistent With The Protection Of Society ...................................................... 6
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................... 9
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856 (2018) ........................................................................5
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324 (Ct. App. 1992) ...................................................................... 5, 6
State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554 (Ct. App. 1998) ..............................................................................6
State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976 (Ct. App. 1989) ............................................................................6
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012) .........................................................................6
State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274 (Ct. App. 1995) ............................................................................6
Rules
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ........................................................................................................... 2, 6
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Troy Allen Baca appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking his probation and
executing his sentences in these two consolidated cases. He contends the district court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation—three-and-a-half years into his four-year term—when
his violations were very minor, and did not indicate he could not be successful on probation. The
district court should have continued Mr. Baca on probation.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In CR-2015-131 (“the drug case”), Mr. Baca was convicted in May 2015 of one count of
possession of a controlled substance, and was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with
three years fixed. (R., pp.62-69.) In CR-2015-1942 (“the car accident case”), Mr. Baca was
convicted in May 2015 of two counts of injury to child and one count of witness intimidation,
allegedly arising out of a car accident he caused when he grabbed the steering wheel of a vehicle.
(R., pp.168-71, 194-202.) On the injury to child counts, the district court sentenced Mr. Baca to
two unified terms of ten years, with five years fixed, to be served concurrently with each other
and with the sentence imposed in the drug case. (R., pp.198-99.) On the witness intimidation
count, the district court sentenced Mr. Baca to an indeterminate term of five years, to be served
consecutively to the other sentences. (R., p.199.) The district court retained jurisdiction in both
cases. (R., pp.66, 199.)
Mr. Baca successfully completed a rider program, and the district court suspended all of
his sentences and placed him on probation for a period of four years, commencing on
December 4, 2015. (R., pp.75-90, 210-23.) Mr. Baca transferred his probation from Idaho to
Oregon through an interstate compact in December 2015. (See R., p.95.)
2
Mr. Baca did well on probation, with no reported violations, from December 2015 to
August 2019. (See R., pp.98, 231.) On August 30, 2019, the State filed a motion to revoke
Mr. Baca’s probation in both cases, alleging he violated his probation by:  (1) committing battery
upon his wife (charged as misdemeanor battery in Oregon); (2) using controlled substances; and
(3) failing to make himself available for supervision or absconding. (R., pp.91-92, 224-25.)
Notably, with respect to Count II, the report of probation violation states that Mr. Mosqueda (not
Mr. Baca) continued to use illegal substances after transferring his supervision to Texas (not
Oregon). (R., pp.94, 227.)
Mr. Baca admitted to violating his probation as alleged in Counts 1 and 3, but not Count
2. (2/25/20 Tr., p.7, L.19 – p.8, L.24.) The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Count 2,
and concluded the State did not meet its burden of proving Mr. Baca violated his probation by
using controlled substances. (2/25/20 Tr., p.13, L.21 – p.14, L.6; R., p.110.)
At the disposition hearing, counsel for Mr. Baca asked the district court to reinstate him
on probation. (5/5/20 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-20.) He pointed out that Mr. Baca was close to completing
his four-year term, and that he was sentenced only to probation in the misdemeanor battery case.
(5/5/20 Tr., p.8, Ls.16-20.) Mr. Baca acknowledged he “made a lot of bad choices in [his] life.”
(5/5/20 Tr., p.12, Ls.10-11.) He explained, however, that he had “done a good job of trying to be
a productive member of society” while on probation. (5/5/20 Tr., p.12, L.24 – p.13, L.2.) He told
the district court he had not been using drugs, and had not “been doing any of the nonsense that
got me in this position in the first place.” (5/5/20 Tr., p.13, Ls.3-5.)
The district court revoked Mr. Baca’s probation and executed his sentences, without a
reduction. (5/5/20 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-2.) The judgment was entered on May 5, 2020. (R., pp.120-22,
247-49.) Mr. Baca filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 asking the district court to
3
reduce his sentences in both cases, but the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.123-28, 250-
55.) Mr. Baca filed a timely notice of appeal in both cases. (R., pp.129-33, 256-60.)
4
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Baca’s probation and executed his
underlying sentences?
5
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Baca’s Probation And Executed
His Underlying Sentences
A. Introduction
The district court revoked Mr. Baca’s probation and executed his underlying sentences,
without a reduction, even though he had completed three-and-a-half years of his four-year
probationary term, without any prior issues. Mr. Baca does not contest for purposes of this
appeal that he violated his probation, but contends his minor violations should not have resulted
in the revocation of his probation. Mr. Baca can be successful on probation, as demonstrated by
his history on probation, and does not present a risk to society. The district court should have
continued him on probation.
B. Standard Of Review
A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the
trial court abused its discretion. State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325 (Ct. App. 1992). When this
Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by the trial court, it considers “[w]hether the trial
court:  (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (citation omitted).
6
C. The District Court Should Have Continued Mr. Baca On Probation Because His
Probation Was Achieving The Goal Of Rehabilitation And Was Consistent With The
Protection Of Society
In determining whether to revoke a defendant’s probation, a court must consider whether
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.
State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325; State v. Hass, 114
Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 1998). After a probation violation has been established, the court may
order the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, reduce the sentence under Idaho
Criminal Rule 35. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977 (Ct. App.
1989). In reviewing the propriety of a district court’s decision to revoke probation, this Court
will consider the conduct underlying the trial court’s decision. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618,
621 (Ct. App. 2012).
The State filed a motion to revoke Mr. Baca’s probation, three-and-a-half years into his
four-year term, alleging he violated his probation by:  (1) committing battery upon his wife; (2)
using controlled substances; and (3) failing to make himself available for supervision or
absconding. (R., pp.91-92, 224-25.) The State attached to its motion a report of violation, which
contains more specific information regarding the allegations. (R., pp.93-106, 226-39.) With
respect to Count I, a police report reflects that Mr. Baca headbutted his estranged wife during the
course of an argument about his profiles on dating applications, after she tried to slap him, and
after she said, “What are you going to do, hit me?” (R., p.101.) When the police arrived,
Mr. Baca’s wife rated her pain “as a 10, on a scale of 1-10,” but declined medical attention.
(R., p.101.) With respect to Count II, the report of violation states that Mr. Mosqueda (not
Mr. Baca) continued to use illegal substances after transferring his supervision to Texas (not
Oregon), and was unsuccessfully discharged from outpatient treatment. (R., pp.94, 227.) It is
7
unclear why the allegations against Mr. Mosqueda were included in this case, and it also unclear
how they factored in to the State’s decision to move to revoke Mr. Baca’s probation. With
respect to Count III, the report of violation states Mr. Baca failed to return multiple calls from his
probation officer. (R., pp.94-95, 226-27.)
Mr. Baca admitted to violating his probation as alleged in Counts 1 and 3. With respect to
Count 1, he said, “I guess I did that.” (2/25/20 Tr., p.7, Ls.19-25.) With respect to Count 3, he
admitted he violated his probation, but explained “it was a misunderstanding between my
probation officer and I.” (2/25/20 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-5.) The district court asked, “You have an
explanation, but you admit to me right here that you failed to make yourself available for
supervision?” and Mr. Baca answered, “Yeah.” (2/25/20 Tr., p.8, Ls.21-24.)
At the disposition hearing, counsel for Mr. Baca asked the district court to reinstate
Mr. Baca on probation. (5/5/20 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-20.) He pointed out that Mr. Baca had almost
completed his four-year term, and had no prior violations. (See R., pp.98, 231.) Counsel told the
court that Mr. Baca was sentenced only to probation in the misdemeanor battery case, and
actually wanted to obtain a civil protection order against his wife. (5/5/20 Tr., p.8, Ls.16-20,
p.10, Ls.9-15.) As for the allegation that Mr. Baca did not make himself available for
supervision, counsel explained “it was kind of a mishap on [Mr. Baca’s] part.” (5/5/20 Tr., p.8,
L.25 – p.9, L.1.) He said, “There were attempts to get hold of him, and he was busy in another
part of the state, and he didn’t take those attempts by the probation officers as seriously as he
should have.” (5/5/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-5.)
Mr. Baca submitted multiple letters to the district court attesting to his good character.
(See 5/5/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-24.) Mr. Baca’s sister, Tonya Olson, told the court Mr. Baca “is
thoughtful and caring, and . . . genuinely has a good heart.” (R., p.115.) She told the court her
8
brother “has done the best I have seen him do these past several years.” (R., p.115.) She
explained, “He was motivated. He was working more consistently, He was able to finance a car
(for the first time).” (R., p.115.) Unfortunately, he “made the mistake of getting married to a
woman who was and is nothing short of unbalanced.” (R., p.115.) Mr. Baca’s father told the
court that he depended on his son a lot in their construction work. (R., p.116.) He said his son
“always comes to work” and is “always on time” and “goes the extra mile to make sure the job is
complete and done correctly.” (R., p.117.) Mr. Baca’s father explained that Mr. Baca’s wife
actually stalked Mr. Baca and “came to the job and tried to get him fired.” (R., p.118.)
Mr. Baca acknowledged he “made a lot of bad choices in [his] life.” (5/5/20 Tr., p.12,
Ls.10-11.) He explained, however, that he had “done a good job of trying to be a productive
member of society” during his four years on probation. (5/5/20 Tr., p.12, L.24 – p.13, L.2.) He
told the court he had not been using drugs, and had not “been doing any of the nonsense that got
me in this position in the first place.” (5/5/20 Tr., p.13, Ls.3-5.) He assured the court that he “will
not fail” if given “one more shot” on probation. (5/5/20 Tr., p.13, Ls.12-15.)
Considering Mr. Baca’s history on probation, and the nature of his violations, the district
court should have continued him on probation, and allowed him to complete the last few months
of his four-year term. Mr. Baca was involved in a disagreement with his wife, which resulted in a
misdemeanor battery charge against him. (R., p.101.) He also failed to return multiple calls from
his probation officer when he was busy with work in another part of the state. (R., pp.94-95, 226-
27.) But Mr. Baca did not abscond supervision; he did not use illegal substances; and he did not
do anything that put society at risk. Mr. Baca was doing well on probation and contributing
positively to the community. The district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation
and executing his underlying sentences without a reduction.
9
CONCLUSION
Mr. Baca respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order revoking
his probation and executing his underlying sentences, and remand these two cases to the district
court with instructions to place him back on probation. Alternatively, he requests that the Court
remand these cases to the district court for a new probation violation disposition hearing.
DATED this 26th day of January, 2021.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of January, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
AWR/eas


State v. Baca Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48083

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Roberts v. State  Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48085

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UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
1-11-2021 
State v. Scott Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48116 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
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https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6945 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
Electronically Filed 
1/11/2021 12:04 PM 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court 
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JOSIAH JOHN SCOTT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 48116-2020 
TETON COUNTY 
NO. CR41-19-0807 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPEALLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TETON 
HONORABLE STEVEN W. BOYCE 
KELLY D. MALLARD 
Mallard Law Office, P.C. 
I.S.B. 4802 
381 Shoup Avenue, Ste. 203 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Phone: (208) 542-0766 
Email: kmallard@co.bonncville.id.us 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Phone: (208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................. .ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................ 1 
Nature of the Case ...................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ................................................................. 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ......................................................... 3 
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................... 4 
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence For The Jury To Find 
Mr. Scott Guilty Of The Felony DUI Enhancement .............................. .4 
A. Introduction ........................................................................ 4 
B. Standard OfReview ............................................................... 4 
C. The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence For the Felony 
DUI Enhancement Because the State Did Not Prove .......................... 5 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................. 10 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) ........................................................ 5 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445 (2012) ........................................................ .4 
State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542 (2015) .......................................................... .4 
State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1 (2014) ........................................................... ~ .. 5 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009) ........................................................ .4 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267 (2003) ........................................................ .4 
State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782 (2017) ............................................................ .4 
State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48 ( 1969) ............................................................. .4 
Statutes 
I.C. Section 18-8004 ................................................................................ 6 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Josiah John Scott appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction for driving 
under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). The State charged this offense as a felony by alleging 
Mr. Scott pied guilty to one prior felony conviction for DUI within the last fifteen (15) years. Mr. 
Scott went to jury trial, and the jury found him guilty of the DUI and the felony enhancement for 
one (1) prior felony DUI. There is no testimony that Mr. Scott was driving upon a highway in the 
state ofldaho while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or while being under the influence 
of alcohol. Therefore, the State's evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's guilty verdict, and 
Mr. Scott respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case 
for a judgment of acquittal. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In July 2019, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging Mr. Scott committe~ a DUI, in 
I 
violation of Idaho Code Section 18-8004, 8005(9). (R., pp. 2, 8 - 10.) The State alleged this DUI 
I 
was a felony offense due to one prior felony DUI conviction within fifteen (15) years ("felony 
DUI enhancement"). After waiving his preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound Mr. Scott over 
to district court. The State filed an Information charging Mr. Scott with a DUI and the felony 
DUI enhancement. (R., pp. 4, 25 - 27, 38 -41.) Mr. Scott plead not guilty and exercised his right 
to a jury trial. (R., pp.4, 30- 31.) 
In February 2019, the district court held a jury trial. The district court separated the trial 
into two parts: one phase for the DUI and a second phase for the felony DUI enhancement. In the 
first phase, the jury found Mr. Scott guilty of a DUI. Along with the evidence pertaining to the 
1 
DUI, the State also presented evidence that dispatch had received a report of an abandoned 
pickup truck in an irrigation ditch with the water coming up on the driver's side door. (Tr., p.101, 
L.2-p.101, Ls.7-20.) The State offered one exhibit consisting of eleven (11) photographs 
depicting the pickup in the irrigation ditch: State's Exhibit 1 .. (Ex., p. 102-5.) The State and the 
Defense presented evidence that that Defendant did not start drinking until after he went off the 
road. (Tr. p.109, Ls. 11-13, Tr., p.114, Ls.6-11, Tr.p.127, Ls.20-22, Tr.p.170, Ls. 2-11, Tr. p.173, 
Ls. 5-8, and Tr.p.175, Ls. 11-25.) The State also presented evidence that a warrant was obtained 
for a blood draw eight (8) hours after the pickup went into the irrigation ditch. (Tr.p. 123, Ls. 20-
25, p.124, Ls. 1-9.) The State offered one exhibit to prove the influence of alcohol: State's 
Exhibit 3. (Ex. p. 125-6).) The Defense presented evidence that Defendant went off the road 
because he was looking at his phone and not the road. (Tr.p.165, Ls. 1-14.) The Defense also 
I 
presented evidence that the investigating officer asked the first person to speak with the 
Defendant after he went off the road if she thought the Defendant had been drinking and she told 
the investigating officer she couldn't tell ifhe had been drinking. (Tr. p.183, Ls. 3-19~) The jury 
found Mr. Scott guilty of the felony DUI enhancement. (Tr., p.241, L.14-25.) 
In May 2020, the district court placed Mr. Scott on probation for three years, with an 
underlying sentence of six years, with three years fixed. (R., pp. 5 - 6, 61 -63.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the State present sufficient evidence for the jury to find Mr. Scott guilty of the DUJI? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence For the Jury to Mr. Scott Guilty of The DUI 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Scott argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the DUI. 
Specifically, he asserts the State did not provide adequate evidence that he was driving a motor 
vehicle upon a highway while under the influence of alcohol or provide adequate evidence that 
he was driving a motor vehicle upon a highway while having a alcohol concentration of 0.08. 
i 
The State provided no contradictory evidence that Mr. Scott was driving a motor veh1cle upon a 
highway while under the influence of alcohol. The State also did not provide any contradictory 
evidence that Mr. Scott was driving a motor vehicle upon a highway while his blood alcohol 
content was above 0.08. Without such evidence, the State did not prove the elements ~fthe DUI 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Mr. Scott respectfully requests this Court vacate the 
district court's judgment of conviction and remand his case for a judgment of acquittal. 
B. Standard of Review 
"This court will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, where 
there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that 
the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. ''State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,285 (2003). "Evidence is substantial 
if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a 
disputed point of fact has been proven." State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015). A 
conviction can be based primarily upon circumstantial evidence, State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 
48, 50-51 (1969), and "even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted 
consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict 
when it also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt," State v. Severson, 14 7 Idaho 694, 
712 (2009). 
4 
C. 
State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 790 (2017). The Court does not substitute its '1udgment for 
the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence." Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 546 ( quoting State v. Adamcik, 152 
Idaho 445,460 (2012). The Court views "the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution. Id ( quoting Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460). 
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence For The DUI Because The State Did Not 
Prove Mr. Scott Was Driving a Motor Vehicle Upon a Highway While Under The 
Influence of Alcohol Or While He Had A Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 Or Higher 
Mr. Scott argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's guilty 
verdict for the DUI. The State has the burden to prove all elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to 
due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that due process, "no 
person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient 
proof-defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt 
of the existence of every element of the offense." 
Eliason, 158 Idaho at 545 (quoting State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 5 (2014)). "[E]ven when it can 
be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," "a properly 
instructed jury may occasionally convict." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979). 
Appellate review of sufficiency is limited in scope. Eliason, 15 8 Idaho at 545. The inquiry is not 
whether this Court would find the defendant guilty, but whether any rational jury could have 
found the State met its burden to prove each essential element with substantial evidence. Id at 
546. In this case, Mr. Scott asserts no rational jury could have found the State met its burden to 
5 
prove the elements of the DUI statute. 
Mr. Scott was charged with driving under the influence, in violation of Idaho Code 
Section 18-8004(l)(a). The statute reads in relevant part: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other 
intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in 
subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, 
to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon 
a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public. 
Idaho Code Section 18-8004(l)(a). The prosecuting attorney's information mirrored this statute: 
That the Defendant, JOSIAH JOHN SCOTT, on or about the 17th of July, 2019, in the 
County of Teton, State ofldaho, while being under the influence or alcohol, drugs or any 
other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other 
intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, did drive or was in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, upon a highway or street, ... 
(R., p.) Similarly, the jury instruction for the offense's elements required the state to prove, 
among others, that Mr. Scott " ... , drove or was in actual physical control of a motor ;vehicle 
upon a highway, ... , while under the influence of alcohol, while having an alcohol CQncentration 
of .08 or more as shown by analysis of the defendant's blood, ... " (Tr., p. 202, Lns.11 -18.) 
At trial, the State did not present sufficient evidence that Mr. Scott was under the 
influence of alcohol while driving or that while driving he had an alcohol concentration of .08 or 
more. Evidence was presented through verbal testimony that was not contradicted by other 
witnesses. First the prosecutor asked the investigating law enforcement officer, Deputy Sewell, if 
anyone was at the scene when he arrived, and he answered, "No, there was not. "(Tr., p.105, Lns. 
16- 18.) On cross-examination by Mr. Scott's counsel, Deputy Sewell testified that there were 
not any empty beer cans or any other items that would show Mr. Scott had been drinking: 
6 
Q. Were you at any time able to get into the pickup? 
A.No. 
Q. There was never a search incident to arrest then? 
A. No, there was not. 
Q. Okay. Could you see into the cab of the pickup through the window? 
A. I don't recall. I believe so. 
Q. Okay. Was there, by chance, you were looking inside the vehicle to see if there was 
any empty beer cans or other items that would show Mr. Scott had been drinking? 
A. I could not see any. 
(Tr., p.135, Lns. 7 -23.) Evidence was presented by Kayla Lund, who was the first person to talk 
to Mr. Scott after he went off the road, by direct examination and also by cross-examination 
I 
regarding his demeanor and sobriety: 
Q. What did-what did he look like? What was his demeanor? 
A. Super calm and relaxed, almost dazed and confused, because when he ask~d if I could 
pull him out, I thought that was pretty strange. 
(Tr., p. 141, Lns. 5 -9.) On cross-examination Deputy Sewell testified to his conversation with 
Kayla Lund about her contact with Mr. Scott: 
Q. Okay. She gave you any indication that she had seen him drinking there? , 
A. No. She didn't tell me that he had been drinking or that there was any alcohol. 
Q. Okay. And I think you even asked her if she thought he was drunk; is that correct? 
A. Yes, I did. 
7 
Q. And what did she tell you about that? 
A. I believe she stated she wouldn't know or wouldn't be able to tell. 
Q. Okay. So Ms. Lund, who is the first person to see Mr. Scott, had no idea ifhe had 
been drinking or not? 
A. The first person that I know of that saw him. 
(Tr., p.183, Lns. 6- 19.) Evidence was also elicited from an employee of Mr. Scott, Jeremy 
Lamb, by Idaho State Police Trooper Dustin L. Green regarding Mr. Scott's drinking: 
Q. Okay. Do you recall him asking specifically about Mr. Scott? 
A. Yes. I asked Mr. Lamb ifhe remembers whether Mr. Scott had been drinkiq.g or was 
drunk, intoxicated? 
Q. Okay. And what did Mr. Lamb say? 
A. He-I remember he said he didn't remember or he didn't know ifhe was drunk. I just 
remember he said he had a raspy voice. 
(Tr., p. 159, Lns. 5 - 12.) Mr. Scott waived his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination 
and testified that he had not been driving while impaired when he went off the road because he 
I 
was looking at his phone for directions: 
Q. And at some point, did something happen to you on your way to thatjobsite? 
A. I was staring at my phone. 
Q. And what were you looking at your phone for? 
A. For directions. 
Q. Okay. And did anything happen while you were looking at your phone? 
8 
A. Yeah. I slightly ran off the road into what I would consider a barrow pit. 
{Tr., p. 165, Lns. 6 - 14.) 
Q. Okay. Have you seen the videos of you doing the field sobriety tests? Correct? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Would you agree that watching those, you appear impaired? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So you would testify that you were impaired or too far over the legal limit to 
drive at 5:30 or quarter to six when you were talking to Deputy Sewell? 
A. I was impaired. 
Q. Okay. But is it your testimony today that you were impaired when you drove off the 
road at three o'clock? 
A. I was not driving impaired. 
(Tr., p. 172, Lns. 22 - 25, Tr., p. 173, Lns. 1 - 8). The jury must find proof beyond a r~asonable 
doubt for each element of the crime. Even viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
none of the evidence presented by the State provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
whether Mr. Scott was driving while under the influence of alcohol or if he was driving while 
I 
having a alcohol concentration of .08 or more. There is no evidence Mr. Scott was impaired 
while driving his pickup on July 17, 2019, in Teton County. There is evidence that he was not 
impaired while he was driving and it was not contradicted by any evidence presented by the State 
during the jury trial. With no evidence on this essential element of the offense, the State failed to 
I 
meet its burden to prove driving under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
9 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Scott respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court's judgment of 
conviction and remand his case for a judgment of acquittal. 
DA TED this 11 th day of January, 2021. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of January, 2021, I served a true ~d correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLATE'S BRIEF, to be served as follows: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 


State v. Scott Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48116

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State v. Loveland Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48121

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6-1-2021 
State v. Holm Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48201 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JUSTIN R. PORTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL EVARETT HOLM, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48201-2020 
 
Bonneville County Case No.  
CR-2016-4399 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Michael Evarett Holm failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when 
it revoked his probation and executed the underlying sentence? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Holm Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 The state charged Holm with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.60-61.1)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Holm pled guilty to possession of 
                                            
1 The state adopts the Appellant’s citation designations.  (See Appellant’s brief, p.3 n.3; p.5 n.5.) 
 
Electronically Filed
6/1/2021 12:14 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
methamphetamine.  (R., pp.101-02, 105-08.)  In exchange for his guilty plea, the state moved to 
dismiss the paraphernalia charge.  (R., pp.105, 135-36, 139-40.)  The district court imposed a 
unified sentence six years, with two years fixed.  (R., pp.128-34.)  The court suspended Holm’s 
sentence and placed him on probation for a period of three years.  (R., p.129.)   
Just two and a half months after being placed on probation, Holm violated the terms and 
conditions of his probation by being suspended from drug court, using methamphetamine, refusing 
to submit to a polygraph examination, and tampering with a drug test.  (R., pp.150-51, 161-62.)  
The court revoked Holm’s probation, executed the underlying sentence, and retained jurisdiction.  
(R., pp.167-70.)  After Holm completed the term of retained jurisdiction, the court placed him back 
on probation for another three-year period.  (R., pp.186-90.)  Thereafter, Holm admitted that he 
violated the terms and conditions of his probation by consuming alcohol; consuming fentanyl pills; 
associating with someone probation had prohibited him from contacting; failing to maintain full-
time employment (he was fired for not showing up to work); changing residences without 
obtaining prior permission from his probation officer; and committing the new crime of possessing 
an open container.  (R., pp.236-42, 275-80, 300; Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.23 – p.13, L.17.2)  
Consequently, the district court revoked Holm’s probation and executed the underlying sentence.  
(R., pp.302-03; Tr., Vol. I, p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.24.)   
Holm timely appealed.  (R., pp.323-25.)  On appeal, Holm asserts the district court abused 
its discretion when it revoked his probation and imposed the underlying sentence.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.4-6.)  Review of the record and proper application of the relevant legal standards shows 
no abuse of discretion. 
                                            
2 Holm overdosed on fentanyl and became unresponsive in front of his teenage daughter.  (R., 
pp.239, 241.)  CPR and other life saving measures were used to keep Holm alive until he could be 
hospitalized.  (Id.)  Holm claimed it was an accidental overdose.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.5 – p.6, L.5.) 
 3 
B. Standard Of Review 
  
The Court “review[s] a district court’s decision to revoke probation under an abuse of 
discretion standard.”  State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(citation omitted).  The Court “reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by determining whether the 
trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. 
Smith, 168 Idaho 463, ___, 483 P.3d 149, 1006, 1019 (2021) (internal quotation omitted).   
 
C. Holm Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
  
“The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under 
proper control and supervision” while also providing adequate protection for society.  State v. 
Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977); State v. Kerr, 115 Idaho 725, 726, 769 
P.2d 602, 603 (Ct. App. 1989).  “If the trial judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s 
conduct that probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose, probation may be revoked.”  
State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50-51, 844 P.2d 31, 32-33 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).   
Probation is not meeting the objective of rehabilitation and is not providing adequate 
protection for society where the defendant repeatedly violates the conditions of probation and 
commits new crimes.  See, e.g., State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 276-77, 899 P.2d 985, 986-87 (Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding the district court properly revoked probation because “society was at risk if 
[the probationer] remained at large” and “probation had not been successful in fostering 
rehabilitation” as shown by defendant’s “commission of a new theft”); State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 
324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding the district court properly revoked probation 
because “probation . . . was not working” and “continued probationary status would endanger the 
 4 
public” where the defendant violated conditions of probation and “committed the same type of 
offense” while on probation); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 
1988) (holding the district court properly revoked probation because “this was the third violation 
of probation” and the defendant “had continued to engage in counterproductive acts”).   
In determining whether the trial court properly revoked probation, the Court “examines all 
the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the 
sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and 
the revocation of probation.”  State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672, 962 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App. 
1998).  The “focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke 
probation.”  State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).  The record 
in this case shows no abuse of discretion because the goals of probation were not being met. 
The district court found that Holm had “proved” by his conduct “that [he was] not going 
to do probation,” be “compliant,” or “take advantage of the opportunities” provided by probation.  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.19.)  From the outset, Holm’s probation failed to meet its 
rehabilitative objectives.  Less than three months after being placed on probation, Holm violated 
the terms and conditions of his probation by using methamphetamine, refusing to submit to a 
polygraph examination, intentionally tampering with a drug test, and was suspended from drug 
court.  (R., pp.150-51, 161-62.)  Even after Holm completed a rider and was given a second 
opportunity to succeed on probation, he failed to conform his conduct to the rules of his probation.  
He consumed alcohol on several occasions, overdosed on fentanyl, continually associated with a 
woman probation officers had prohibited him from contacting, failed to maintain full-time 
employment, and changed residences without obtaining prior permission from his probation 
officer.  (R., pp.236-42, 275-80, 300; Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.23 – p.13, L.17.)  Furthermore, Holm 
 5 
committed a new crime while on probation.  (Id.)  The court noted that Holm had served a 
significant amount of his determinate time, giving him the opportunity to earn parole (and thus 
some additional treatment) in a reasonable time.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.14-19.)  Given Holm’s 
repeated violations and the fact that he committed a new crime, the district court sensibly 
concluded that a third chance at probation was not appropriate.   
Despite the district court’s well-reasoned analysis, Holm asserts the district court did not 
exercise reason in revoking his probation and executing the underlying sentence.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.4-6.)  Holm has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
Holm contends that he is not a threat to the community and had taken steps to prevent 
future relapse by securing safe and sober housing.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.)  While any attempt 
to address his “lifelong struggles with mental illness and substance abuse” is commendable, this 
last minute attempt to mitigate his various probation violations is simply too little too late.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  That Holm secured safe and sober housing prior to the disposition hearing 
does not negate the fact that while on probation he was suspended from drug court, intentionally 
tampered with a drug test, drank alcohol, used methamphetamine, and overdosed on fentanyl.  
These serious violations show that probation was not achieving its rehabilitative objective and 
justified revocation.  
Holm also argues “he could be successful in the community on probation.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.6.)  There is a dearth of evidence in the record to support this claim.  In fact, substantial 
evidence in the record directly contradicts it. (See R., pp.150-51, 161-62, 236-42, 275-80, 300; Tr. 
Vol. II, p.4, L.23 – p.13, L.17.)  Even if it were true that Holm could be successful on probation at 
some undetermined point in the future, that simply is not a relevant consideration for this Court on 
review of the district court’s decision to revoke Holm’s probation.  The fact remains that the district 
--
 6 
court exercised reason in revoking probation and executing the underlying sentence because Holm 
repeatedly violated the terms of his probation, failed to avail himself of any of the rehabilitative 
opportunities afforded to him, and committed a new crime while on probation.  Holm has failed to 
show otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 1st day of June, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/  Justin R. Porter  
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of June, 2021, served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt File 
and Serve: 
 
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Justin R. Porter  
      JUSTIN R. PORTER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JRP/dd 
 


State v. Holm Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48201

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
5-19-2021 
State v. Jacuinde Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48243 
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Recommended Citation 
"State v. Jacuinde Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48243" (2021). Not Reported. 7041. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7041 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
JENNIFER JENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MANUEL JACUINDE, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48243-2020 
 
Cassia County Case No. CR16-20-65 
 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Manuel Jacuinde failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion 
when it imposed a sentence of five years with two years determinate upon his conviction for grand 
theft? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Jacuinde Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 The state charged Jacuinde with grand theft in violation of I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-
2407(1)(b), and 18-2408(2) for stealing a maroon Chevy Cruise on or about January 3, 2020.  (R., 
Electronically Filed
5/19/2021 11:09 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
 2 
pp. 23-24.)  Jacuinde pled guilty.  (R., pp. 44-45.)  The court imposed a five-year sentence, with 
two years determinate, to run concurrently with a sentence then-recently imposed in Minidoka 
County for another criminal offense.1  (R., p. 59.)  The district court also retained jurisdiction.  
(Id.) 
Jacuinde timely appealed.  (See R., pp. 59-61, 64-65.) 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “[T]he doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or 
her own conduct induces the commission of the error.”  State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 915, 265 
P.3d 519, 528 (Ct. App. 2011).  “Idaho courts have long held that one may not successfully 
complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in.”  State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 
864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “In other words, invited 
errors are not reversible.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The invited error doctrine applies 
to sentencing decisions.  State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 
1986).   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the 
defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s 
probable term of confinement.  Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it 
                                            
1 The Minidoka County case against Jacuinde, No. CR34-20-66, is hereinafter referred to as the 
“Minidoka County Case.”  Jacuinde has another appeal pending for the Minidoka County Case, 
Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 48246-2020. 
 3 
is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  In evaluating whether a lower court abused 
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: 
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 
261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. The Doctrine Of Invited Error Precludes Reversal 
 
 Where a defendant receives the sentence he had requested from the trial court, the invited 
error doctrine requires the appellate court to affirm his sentence, unless the sentence violates the 
court’s statutory authority or defense counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing.  See 
Griffith, 110 Idaho at 614, 716 P.2d at 1386.  In Griffith, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
concurrent, indeterminate ten-year sentences for two counts of grand theft, which the defendant 
had requested from the trial court and then appealed, contending the sentences were excessive.  Id.  
The court reasoned that the invited error doctrine applied.  Id.  The sentence was under the statutory 
maximum for grand theft.  Id. (citing I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a) (maximum sentence for grand theft is 
fourteen years’ imprisonment per offense)).  And there was nothing in the record indicating that 
defense counsel “acted against his client’s interests or otherwise provided ineffective assistance.”  
Id.; see also Pentico, 151 Idaho at 915, 265 P.3d at 528 (holding invited error doctrine precluded 
reversal when defendant had prevented evidence at issue from being introduced); Atkinson, 124 
Idaho at 819-21, 864 P.2d at 657-59 (applying invited error doctrine to affirm denial of motion for 
mistrial when challenged testimony was responsive to defense counsel’s questioning at trial).   
-- --- --- -----
 4 
The invited error doctrine applies to this case, which poses identical circumstances to that 
in Griffith.  As Jacuinde admits on appeal, he received the sentence he had requested.  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 1 (“Mindful that the court imposed the sentence Mr. Jacuinde requested, he asserts that 
the court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.”).)  At the sentencing hearing, 
he requested a five-year sentence, with two years determinate, to run concurrently with the 
sentence imposed in the Minidoka County Case.  (07/13/20 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 4-15.2)  This was precisely 
the sentence the district court imposed.  (See 07/13/20 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 6-20; R., p. 59.)  The sentence 
was well under the statutory maximum of fourteen years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.  
(Compare R., p. 59, with I.C. § 18-2408(2).)  And there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
Jacuinde’s counsel acted against his interest or otherwise rendered ineffective assistance.  On the 
contrary, Jacuinde’s counsel secured him a lenient sentence.  (Id.)  This Court should affirm 
Jacuinde’s sentence on the basis of invited error.   
 
D. In Any Event, Jacuinde Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  In determining whether the appellant met this burden, 
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole 
                                            
2 The state and Jacuinde had originally contemplated probation, but probation became a moot 
consideration after Minidoka County court retained jurisdiction.  The plea agreement included the 
recommendation of a five-year sentence, with two years determinate, to run concurrent with the 
sentence imposed in “any other case.”  (R., pp. 31-32.)  The plea agreement also recommended 
that the sentence in the instant case be suspended for a period of probation.  (See id.; 07/13/20 Tr., 
p. 6, Ls. 16-19; p. 8, Ls. 6-9.)  Before the sentencing hearing in the instant case, the Minidoka 
County court retained jurisdiction.  (07/13/20 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 16-20.)  Accordingly, an immediate 
term of probation in the instant case was no longer possible because Jacuinde would be engaged 
in the rider program for the next year.  (See 07/13/20 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 16-20; p. 8, Ls. 6-9, 19-23.)   
 5 
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be 
the period of actual incarceration.  State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) 
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, 
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was 
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and retribution.  Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears 
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of 
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’”  Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)). 
 There “is no requirement that sentencing courts articulate the reasons for imposition of a 
particular sentence.”  State v. Magsamen, 167 Idaho 655, ___, 474 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Ct. App. 
2020) (citing State v. Martinsen, 128 Idaho 472, 475, 915 P.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1996)).  “Where 
the sentencing court has set forth no reasons for imposition of a sentence, the appellate court draws 
its own impressions from the record and will affirm what it infers to be a reasonable exercise of 
sentencing discretion.”  Id. at ___, 474 P.3d at 1256-57. 
 Even assuming the invited error doctrine somehow does not bar Jacuinde’s challenge to 
his sentence, the sentence imposed is reasonable.  The district court properly considered the goals 
of sentencing, the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 19-2521, the arguments of counsel, and 
Jacuinde’s statement.  (07/13/20 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 9-20.)  Although the maximum penalty for grand 
theft is fourteen years’ imprisonment, a fine up to $5,000, or both (07/13/20 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 4-6), the 
court imposed the much more lenient sentence Jacuinde had requested (07/13/20 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 4-
 6 
15; R., p. 59).  And Jacuinde was not a first-time offender, having a prior felony and two 
misdemeanors.  (PSI, p. 2 (felony), pp. 4-5 (misdemeanors).3)   
 Jacuinde argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to 
appropriately consider (1) Jacuinde’s drug addiction and willingness to seek treatment, and (2) his 
remorse.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  Jacuinde is incorrect.  As a threshold matter, the trial court is 
not obligated to impose a lighter sentence based on potential mitigating factors.  See State v. 
Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171-72, 191 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Ct. App. 2008) (affirming sentence when 
trial court had stated that it had considered mitigating circumstances); State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 
663-64, 239 P.3d 456, 461-62 (Ct. App. 2010) (affirming sentence when the trial court had 
considered mitigating circumstances and decided they did not warrant a lesser sentence). 
 Contrary to Jacuinde’s contention, the trial court appropriately considered the potential 
mitigating factors.  First, Jacuinde has not met his burden to show that the trial court erred by 
insufficiently considering his addiction and amenability to treatment.  See State v. Quintana, 155 
Idaho 124, 134, 306 P.3d 209, 219 (Ct. App. 2013) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial 
court not discussing each mitigating factor meant that the court had insufficiently considered such 
factors).  The trial court heard Jacuinde’s statement at the sentencing hearing, in which he said, “I 
have an addiction, I am an addict, and I’m looking forward to the person I am a year from now, 
once I get this retained jurisdiction out of the way.”  (07/13/20 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 19-23.)   
 Second, the district court adequately considered any remorse that Jacuinde expressed.  
Jacuinde did not say anything indicating regret at the sentencing hearing.  (See 07/13/20 Tr., p. 8, 
Ls. 19-23.)  And in the PSI, Jacuinde stated that he felt “[r]emorseful for the pain I may have 
                                            
3 The district court in the instant case reviewed and proceeded on the PSI from the Minidoka 
County Case.  (07/13/20 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 14-16.) 
 7 
caused anyone affected by my drug use/crime” in response to questioning about the crime at issue 
in the Minidoka County Case, possession of methamphetamine.  (07/13/20 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 14-16; 
PSI, pp. 4, 6.)  This non-existent record of remorse does not support Jacuinde’s argument.  Further, 
even if Jacuinde had expressed remorse, the court need not discuss every potential mitigating factor 
at sentencing.  Quintana, 155 Idaho at 134, 306 P.3d at 219.   
And this case is distinguishable from Nice and Alberts, the cases on which Jacuinde relies.  
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (citing State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982) and State v. 
Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 824 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991).)  In those cases, there was no contention 
that the court had imposed the sentence requested by the defendant.  See Nice, 103 Idaho at 90-
91, 645 P.2d at 324-25; Alberts, 121 Idaho at 204-11, 824 P.2d at 135-42.  And the court in Nice 
reasoned that the defendant was a first-time felony offender supporting his children at the time of 
the offense, 103 Idaho at 90-91, 645 P.2d at 324-25, unlike this case, where Jacuinde has a prior 
record and has three children but was unemployed for the one and a half years immediately 
preceding his offense (PSI, pp. 4-6, 9-10).     
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 19th day of May, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Jennifer Jensen 
JENNIFER JENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
  
 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Jennifer Jensen 
JENNIFER JENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
JJ/dd 
 


State v. Jacuinde Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48243

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State v. Beck Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48261 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
KALI DEONE BECK, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
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NO. 48261-2020 
 
Ada County Case No. 
CR01-17-46637 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Is Beck’s appeal moot because she received her requested relief when the district court 
granted her Rule 35 motion? 
 
 
Beck’s Appeal Is Moot And Should Be Dismissed 
 
The state charged Beck with operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent.  (R., 
pp.32-33.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Beck pleaded guilty.  (R., pp.37-40.)  The district court 
sentenced Beck to five years with two years fixed, and suspended the sentence.  (R., pp.49-53.)  
Later, the state filed a motion, alleging that Beck violated the terms of her probation.  (R., pp.70-
Electronically Filed
7/13/2021 2:08 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
72.)  After finding that Beck violated her probation, the district court imposed the underlying 
sentence.  (R., pp.93-95, 114-16.)   
Thereafter, Beck filed a Rule 35 motion requesting the district court “commute her 
previously imposed sentence in the amount of 172 days, consistent with the time she was in 
custody” on another case.  (R., pp.120-21.)  Although the state initially objected on timeliness 
grounds, in its amended response the state “d[id] not object to the Court reducing Beck’s fixed 
portion of her sentence in this case by 172 days to achieve the Court’s goal at the time of the 
probation violation disposition.”  (R., pp.123-27 (footnote omitted).)  The district court granted 
Beck’s motion and “commute[d] 172 days from her sentence in this case.”  (R., pp.131-33.)  Beck 
filed a timely notice of appeal.  (Aug., pp.1-4.) 
On appeal, Beck is “[m]indful that she was granted the sentence reduction that she 
requested,” but nonetheless argues that “the district court did not exercise reason, and therefore 
abused its discretion, by not further reducing her sentence.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  Because the 
district court granted Beck’s motion and she received the relief she sought, her claim is moot. 
“To raise an issue on appeal, the record must contain an adverse ruling to form the basis 
for assignment of error.”  State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 687, 99 P.3d 1069, 1077 (2004) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, appellate review of an issue will be precluded where 
that issue is deemed moot.  State v. Vasquez, 163 Idaho 557, 560, 416 P.3d 108, 111 (2018) (citing 
State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 344, 127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005)).  An issue is moot “if it does not 
present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded through judicial decree 
of specific relief.”  Id.  “This Court may dismiss an appeal when it appears that the case involves 
only a moot question.”  State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 419, 272 P.3d 382, 391 (2012) 
 3 
(quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614, 
616 (2000)).   
  Here, Beck received the sentence reduction she requested when the district court granted 
her Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.120-21, 131-33.)  Therefore, her appeal is moot and should be 
dismissed.  See State v. Gallipeau, 128 Idaho 1, 5, 909 P.2d 619, 623 (Ct. App. 1994) (claim of 
error on appeal was moot where defendant obtained requested relief from the district court pursuant 
to a Rule 35 motion).   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to dismiss Beck’s appeal.   
 DATED this 13th day of July, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of July, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kacey L. Jones 
KACEY L. JONES 
Deputy Attorney General 
KLJ/zh 


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