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State v. Ramos Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48440

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
8-9-2021 
State v. King Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48577 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
JOHN JAMES KING, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48577-2021 
 
 
 
Ada County Case No. CR01-17-42573 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Anthony John James King failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
by denying his request to commute the underlying sentence upon revoking his probation? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
King Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In September of 2017, John James King entered Walmart in Meridian, Idaho, and 
attempted to purchase items with Kevin Clark’s financial transaction card.  (PSI, p. 26.)  The state 
charged King with one count of burglary, one count of grand theft, and one count of misdemeanor 
Electronically Filed
8/9/2021 3:50 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
fraudulent use of a financial transaction card.  (R., pp. 28-29.)  King pleaded guilty to grand theft, 
and the district court sentenced him to ten years, with two years fixed, credit for 125 days served 
and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 47, 49-53, 56-59.)  Following King’s period of retained 
jurisdiction, the district court placed King on probation for a period of five years.  (R., pp. 69-73.)   
The state filed motions for probation violation, alleging that King used methamphetamine 
on April 23 and May 22, 2019, and February 13, 2020, amphetamine on November 1, 2019, and 
alcohol on January 27, 2020, possessing alcohol on December 10, 2019, and April 3, 2020, and 
associated with Ariel Thumm, a person he was not to associate with.  (R., pp. 76-77, 108-110.)  
The state also alleged that King failed to pay fines as ordered by the district court, failed to pay 
restitution, committed the crimes of aggravated assault, use of a firearm or deadly weapon during 
the commission of a crime, and battery.  (R., pp. 108-110.)  King admitted to violating his 
probation by committing the new crime of aggravated assault.   (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 9-21.)  At the 
disposition hearing, King’s counsel requested the district court to commute the sentence, which 
the district court denied.  (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 4-15, p. 19, 14-17.)  The district court revoked King’s 
probation and executed the underlying sentence of ten years, with two years determinate, granting 
credit for 658 days served.  (R., pp. 138-140.)  King then filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 142-144.) 
On appeal, King argues that “the district court abused its discretion by executing his 
sentence without commuting the sentence.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  King has failed to show that 
the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to commute the underlying sentence 
upon revoking his probation. 
 
B. Standard Of Review   
 A trial court generally has discretion to commute a sentence other than for treason, murder, 
or where the legislature has imposed a mandatory minimum sentence. I.C. § 19-2601(1); State v. 
 3 
Brooks, 131 Idaho 608, 609, 961 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Ct. App. 1998).  In evaluating whether a lower 
court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether 
the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. 
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
C. King Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
The record shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal 
standards to the issue before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.   
At the probation violation disposition hearing, the district court considered “the Toohill 
factors and the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, any mitigating or aggravating 
factors, fulfilling the objectives of protecting society, achieving deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
retribution.”  (Tr., p. 18, L. 24 – p. 19, L. 4.)  The district court noted that King was “provided with 
a Rider in 2018.  [He was] on probation when [he] committed this new serious felony,” and the 
district court found that King was not “amenable to supervision in the community at this time.”  
(Tr., p. 19, Ls. 6-10.)  The district court revoked probation, executed the underlying sentence, and 
denied the request to commute the sentence because “there needs to be a consequence to violating 
the terms and conditions of probation.”  (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 15-17.)  The district court stated that “the 
longer indeterminate sentence is appropriate to make sure that the defendant, who reverted back 
to criminal activity while he was on probation, does not revert to criminal activity while he’s on 
parole.”  (Tr., p. 19, L. 22 – p. 20, L. 1.)   
 4 
King argues that mitigating factors—his difficult childhood, mental and physical health 
issues, completion of his retained jurisdiction without disciplinary sanctions, and employment 
while on probation—show an abuse of discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)  At the time of the 
2018 PSI, King’s LSI score was twenty-seven, placing him in the moderate risk to reoffend 
category.  (PSI, p. 32.)  King’s extensive criminal history consists of numerous felonies and 
opportunities on probation.  (PSI, pp. 22-26.)  King’s previous probation for forgery, dangerous 
drug possession, and theft of credit card or obtaining a credit card by fraudulent means was 
revoked.  (PSI, p. 23.)  During King’s probation in this case, the state filed a criminal complaint, 
alleging that King pointed a handgun at Ariel Thumm and made threatening statements to her, and 
that he grabbed Ariel’s face and gouged her eye.  (R., pp. 115-116.)  King’s probation officer stated 
that King has “struggled on supervision.”  (R., p. 113.)  King brought a drill to work with a racial 
slur written on it, and the probation officer stated that in King’s “mind he truly could not 
comprehend that this is unacceptable.  His Aryan associations growing up have indoctrinated him 
to the point that it will take time and a lot of change on behalf of the defendant to adjust to societies 
[sic] expectations ….”  (R., pp. 113-114.)  The probation officer found that “drug use was a huge 
factor in his failing to succeed in the community.  He needs structured programming as well as 
drug treatment.”  (R., p. 114.)  The probation officer recommended that King’s “probation be 
violated and he serve his sentence incarcerated,” as he “is a danger to himself as well as others,” 
and “he has made several enemies recently and he may not be safe in any environment due to his 
choices and gang affiliation.”  (R., pp. 114.)   
King’s extensive criminal history and failures on probation show that he is not amenable 
to community supervision, and execution of the underlying sentence is necessary to protect society.  
King’s conduct while on probation shows that community supervision is failing to rehabilitate 
 5 
King, or deter his criminal thinking, and the underlying sentence provides proper punishment and 
deterrence to King.  A lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the instant offense, and 
King’s mitigating factors do not merit a reduction of the underlying sentence.  King has failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to commute the underlying 
sentence upon revoking his probation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 9th day of August, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                          /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. King Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48577

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
9-20-2021 
State v. Robinson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48837 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 48837-2021
)
v. ) TWIN FALLS COUNTY
) NO. CR42-19-10602
KENDRICK DEWAYNE ROBINSON, )
) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After a jury found Kendrick Robinson guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine, the
district court sentenced him to thirty years, with ten years fixed. Mr. Robinson appeals, and he
argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive indeterminate term.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State alleged by criminal complaint that Mr. Robinson committed the crime of
trafficking in methamphetamine (over 400 grams). (R., pp.13–14.) According to the affidavit in
support, this charge arose from a traffic stop and subsequent search of a rental car driven by
Mr. Robinson. (R., pp.15–19.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge found probable
Electronically Filed
9/20/2021 10:13 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2
cause for the offense and bound Mr. Robinson over to district court. (R., pp.50–51, 52.) The
State charged Mr. Robinson by information with trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.54–
55.)
Mr. Robinson pled not guilty and exercised his right to a jury trial. (R., pp.57, 180–88,
207–08.) At the end of a three-day trial, the jury found him guilty. (R., p.227.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of thirty years, with fifteen years fixed.
(Tr.,1 p.11, Ls.2–4.) Mr. Robinson requested the district court impose no more than the
mandatory minimum of ten years fixed. (Tr., p.16, Ls.7–10.) The district court sentenced
Mr. Robinson to thirty years, with ten years fixed. (Tr., p.21, L.21–p.22, L.1.) Mr. Robinson
timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.256–58, 264–66.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Robinson to thirty years, with ten
years fixed, for trafficking in methamphetamine?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Robinson To Thirty Years,
With Ten Years Fixed, For Trafficking In Methamphetamine
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Robinson’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732B(4)(c), (d) (ten-year mandatory minimum fixed term, maximum
of life). Accordingly, to show the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Robinson “must
1 There are six separate transcripts on appeal, but the only one cited here is the transcript of the
sentencing hearing, held on May 3, 2021. It will be cited as “Tr.”
3
show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view
of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In this case, Mr. Robinson asserts the district court did not exercise reason and therefore
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts.
Specifically, he contends the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser indeterminate
term or no indeterminate term at all light of the mitigating factors, including his employment
history, minor criminal record, lack of substance abuse or mental health issues, and many letters
of support.
First, Mr. Robinson’s positive employment history supports a more lenient indeterminate
term. See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful employment as a
mitigating factor); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982) (employment and
desire to advance within company were mitigating circumstances). From March 2005 until
March 2011, Mr. Robinson worked as a manager at McDonalds. (Presentence Investigation
4
Report (“PSI”),2 p.25.) Then, from June 2011 until July 2018, he worked as a manager at
Food4Less. (PSI, p.25.) He left that job to start his own beauty supply store, which he had yet to
open. (PSI, p.25.) Nonetheless, this positive employment history of two long-term managerial
roles justifies a shorter indeterminate term.
Second, the lack of a serious criminal record warrants a lesser indeterminate sentence for
Mr. Robinson. “The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts consider.”
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836 (2011). “It has long been recognized that ‘[t]he first offender
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v. Hoskins, 131
Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91
(1982)). About seventeen years ago, Mr. Robinson was convicted of robbery, a felony offense.
(PSI, pp.26–27.) He also received some misdemeanor and infraction convictions in 2008, 2011,
and 2012, but no other serious felony offenses. (PSI, pp.26–27.) After a 2012 case for driving
with a suspended license, Mr. Robinson had no issues with the law until the instant offense. (PSI,
p.27.) This minor criminal record supports a lesser indeterminate sentence.
Moreover, Mr. Robinson’s lack of substance abuse or mental health issues shows that he
can be a contributing member of society after he serves the mandatory minimum sentence.
Mr. Robinson reported no mental health issues. (PSI, p.23.) Although his parents both abused
drugs, and he described his childhood as difficult, (PSI, p.23), Mr. Robinson denied having any
alcohol-related problems, and he reported that he only tried marijuana once as a teenager. (PSI,
p.24.) He enjoyed spending time with his family and his children. (PSI, p.25.) These positive
characteristics, including the lack of substance abuse or mental health issues, should have been
given more weight at sentencing.
2 Citations to the PSI refer to the sixty-three-page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
5
Finally, the numerous support and good character letters from Mr. Robinson’s family,
friends, employers, co-workers, and jail staff stand in favor of mitigation. Shideler, 103 Idaho at
594–95 (family support and good character as mitigation); see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–
64 (Ct. App. 2010) (district court considered family and friend support as mitigating
circumstance). Mr. Robinson provided eighteen letters of support. (PSI, pp.43–51, 61–63, 245,
249–55.) Mr. Robinson’s girlfriend, who had known him for ten years, wrote about his good
character and the impact of this case on their family. (PSI, pp.43–44.) Mr. Robinson’s
ex-girlfriend, who had known him for twenty years, similarly wrote of his good character as “a
stand up guy” and an “amazing father, brother, and co parent.” (PSI, p.45.) Mr. Robinson’s
cousin wrote that Mr. Robinson was a hard-worker and believed that he had deep remorse for his
actions. (PSI, p.46.) Five other family members or friends wrote letters of support describing
Mr. Robinson’s admirable character and positive attributes. (PSI, pp.48–51, 61.) Further, a
long-term friend wrote that he considered Mr. Robinson to be a brother and discussed
Mr. Robinson’s generosity and family values. (PSI, pp.62–63.) Mr. Robinson’s sister also
submitted a letter asking for leniency. (R., p.245.) Likewise, the mother of Mr. Robinson’s
daughter asked for leniency and explained how difficult his incarceration was on her family.
(R., p.253.) Moreover, three former co-workers/managers wrote that Mr. Robinson was very
dedicated to his job, reliable and hardworking, and a good role model. (R., pp.249, 251, 252.) In
addition, Mr. Robinson provided a four letters of support from employees at the Jerome County
Sheriff’s Office, including two sergeants. (PSI, p.47; R., pp.250, 255, 254.) In fact, one sergeant
wrote that he had never written a letter of a support before, in nearly twenty years of working
with inmates. (R., p.255.) He described Mr. Robinson as a model inmate and a strong candidate
6
for rehabilitation. (R., p.255.) These many letters of support and good character warrant a shorter
indeterminate term.
In sum, Mr. Robinson maintains the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. He contends proper consideration of the
mitigating factors in his case supported a more lenient indeterminate term.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Robinson respectfully requests this Court reduce his indeterminate sentence as it
deems appropriate. In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 20th day of September, 2021.
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of September, 2021, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas


State v. Robinson Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48837

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UIdaho Law 
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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
9-29-2021 
State v. Toledo Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48866 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10999
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO.  48866-2021
)
v. ) BANNOCK COUNTY
) NO. CR03-18-12180
RUBIN TOLEDO, )
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Rubin Toledo pled guilty to two counts of felony criminal possession of a financial
transaction card, the district court withheld judgment and placed him on probation for three
years. After Mr. Toledo admitted to violating his probation for the second time, the district court
revoked his withheld judgment, imposed a sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. On appeal, Mr. Toledo asserts the district court abused its discretion when
it imposed an excessive sentence.
Electronically Filed
9/29/2021 10:09 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Toledo pled guilty to two counts of felony criminal possession of a financial
transaction card in November 2018 (R., pp.53-59, 61-64), and the district court withheld
judgment and placed him on probation for three years. (R., pp.75-80.)
In April 2019, the district court approved thirty days of discretionary jail time upon the
request of Mr. Toledo’s probation officer due to Mr. Toledo’s lack of his progress on probation.
(R., pp.89-94.)
The State filed a motion for a probation violation in October 2019. (R., pp.103-04.) Two
months later, Mr. Toledo admitted to violating his probation (see R., pp.101-04, 116), and the
district court continued his probation, with the condition that he successfully complete the
Sherriff’s Help And Recovery Environment (“SHARE”) program. (R., pp.118-23.)
In April 2021, the State filed another motion for a probation violation. (R., pp.130-34.)
Mr. Toledo admitted to violating his probation by consuming alcohol and committing the
following misdemeanor offenses: excessive DUI, driving without privileges, and/or driving
without an invalid driver’s license, and failing to provide insurance. (Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.12, L.2.)
At the disposition hearing in late May 2021, the State recommended that the district court revoke
Mr. Toledo’s withheld judgment and impose a sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and
retain jurisdiction (a “rider”). (Tr., p.17, Ls.16-25.) Defense counsel recommended that the
district court revoke Mr. Toledo’s withheld judgment, but return him to probation, and impose an
underlying sentence of three years, with one year fixed. (Tr., p.20, L.23 – p.21, L.10.) The
district court revoked Mr. Toledo’s withheld judgment and imposed the sentence requested by
the State: four years, with two years fixed, with a period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.27, L.4 –
p.28, L.19; R., pp.140-42.) Mr. Toledo timely appealed. (R., pp.140-42, 145-47.)
3
Mr. Toledo also filed a Criminal Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.143-44.) The district court has
not yet ruled on this motion.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an excessive sentence of four years,
with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction, upon revoking Mr. Toledo’s withheld judgment?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Excessive Sentence Of Four
Years, With Two Years Fixed, And Retained Jurisdiction, Upon Revoking Mr. Toledo’s
Withheld Judgment
Mr. Toledo asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate sentence of four
years, with two years fixed, with a period of retained jurisdiction, is excessive. Where a
defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Toledo does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, he must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria
or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
4
Appellate courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason.” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163, Idaho 856, 863 (2018)).
Here, Mr. Toledo asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district court
should have imposed a lesser sentence, in light of the mitigating factors, including his
tumultuous childhood, mental health issues, and his substance abuse and its longstanding impact
on his life.
 Mr. Toledo had an extremely difficult childhood. The Court of Appeals
has recognized that a defendant’s “extremely troubled childhood is a factor that bears
consideration at sentencing.” State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). Mr. Toledo
never knew his biological parents, and was raised in various foster homes until he was about
. (PSI, p.11.) He was exposed to drugs, pornography, and
violence at a young age.  (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Toledo stated that “[e]very imaginable thing you have
heard that happens (badly) to children in foster care I was exposed to and had done to.” (PSI,
p.11.) Mr. Toledo reported that being raped, beaten, cruelly punished for no reason, and forced to
perform sexual acts, were a “regular and common thing” for him. (PSI, p.11.) He said he does
not have one single happy or favorite childhood memory. (PSI, p.11.) He never went to a
birthday party or had his own birthday party, and never had sleepovers or “other such moments”
5
with friends. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Toledo explained that he moved around to different homes, so
“having a real best friend was outta the question.” (PSI, p.11.)
Considering his troubled childhood, it is no surprise that Mr. Toledo eventually
developed mental health issues. “[T]he defendant’s mental condition is simply one of the factors
that must be considered and weighed by the court at sentencing.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122,
132 (2011). Mr. Toledo has struggled significantly with depression throughout his life, beginning
during childhood. (See PSI, pp.11, 16.) After the deaths of his two young daughters, Mr. Toledo
fell deeper into depression. (PSI, pp.13, 16.) He admitted that he drinks alcohol to deal with the
pain from losing his daughters, and stated that he struggles the most during the months his
daughters were born. (PSI, p.16.) Mr. Toledo reported that in the 18 months prior to his arrest for
the instant offense, his depression became significantly worse after he was attacked on two
different occasions while he was living in Washington, D.C. (PSI, pp.16, 33.) He reported that
after the second attack, he was in a coma for two months after he was thrown from a two-story
building and “left for dead.” (PSI, pp.11, 16.) After he recovered from the second attack, Mr.
Toledo returned to Idaho in hopes of getting in contact with his biological family. (PSI, p.16.) He
indicated that this was the worst decision he could have made because he discovered that his
biological father had recently drowned, and his biological mother had overdosed. (PSI,
pp.11,16.) Mr. Toledo has struggled with not being able to get any answers about his biological
family, and admitted this contributes to his depression. (PSI, p.16.) The Global Appraisal of
Individual Needs (“GAIN”) assessment noted that Mr. Toledo met the criteria for a major
depressive disorder diagnosis. (PSI, pp.33, 35.)
Like many addicts, Mr. Toledo uses alcohol to cope (PSI, p.16.), and the majority of his
criminal history stems from his substance abuse issues. (See PSI, pp.7-10.) The impact of
6
substance abuse on the defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of
punishment upon sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Mr. Toledo first
started drinking alcohol when he was  and recognizes that he will always be
an alcoholic. (PSI, p.16.). He explained that he drinks alcohol to deal with his loneliness and
depression. (PSI, p.16.) Mr. Toledo reported that he was sober for about four years, however,
after the death of his second daughter, he relapsed. (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Toledo admitted that he
struggles more around the time of his daughters’ birthdays, and acknowledged that different
things trigger memories of his daughters, such as seeing families together, and knowing he will
not be able to have that. (PSI, pp.16-17.) He reported that he drinks alone to deal with his pain.
(PSI, pp.16-17.) The GAIN evaluation noted that Mr. Toledo meets the criteria for severe alcohol
use disorder. (PSI, pp.23-25.)
Despite his tumultuous childhood, mental health issues, and severe substance abuse
problem, Mr. Toledo has shown a willingness to try to overcome his addiction and turn his life
around. Mr. Toledo does not blame his choices and actions on his upbringing or the other
negative life experiences he has endured. (PSI, pp.7, 11, 20.) He recognizes that alcohol is a very
significant problem for him, and admitted that he has a hard time dealing with grief, which led to
his recent relapse and probation violations. (PSI, p.7; Tr., p.24, Ls.16-19.) Mr. Toledo explained
that he has been through three different sponsors throughout his time on probation, as his first
two sponsors relapsed during the coronavirus pandemic. (Tr., p.22, Ls.19-20.) Mr. Toledo started
making progress with his most recent sponsor, but started to struggle when he could no longer
get in contact with him. (Tr., p.22, L.7 – p.23, L.19.) Mr. Toledo further explained that he lost
seven people in the last year, including his sister. (Tr., p.22, Ls.9-15.) When he found out about
his sister’s death, he tried to reach out to his sponsor for support, but due to the coronavirus
7
pandemic, many resources were unavailable, and Mr. Toledo was unable to reach him. (Tr., p.22,
Ls.9-19, p.23, Ls.9-19.) As a result, Mr. Toledo turned to alcohol to cope with his grief.
(Tr., p.19, Ls.1-7, p.24, Ls.14-19.) Although he participated in a twelve-month, court-ordered
alcoholics anonymous (“AA”) program in 2009, Mr. Toledo has never had the opportunity to
participate in any real long-term grief counseling, and he has expressed a desire to do so. (PSI,
p.17; Tr., p.24, Ls.10-23.) In addition, Mr. Toledo paid off all of his financial obligations in this
case, and paid ahead on his cost of supervision. (Tr., p.19, Ls.10-14.)
Proper consideration of these mitigating factors supported a more lenient sentence. In
light of these facts, Mr. Toledo submits that the district court did not exercise reason, and thus
abused its discretion, by sentencing him to four years, with two years fixed, and retaining
jurisdiction. He asserts the district court should have imposed a lesser sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Toledo respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2021.
/s/ Kiley A. Heffner
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of September, 2021, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
  /s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAH/eas


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10-5-2021 
State v. Kugler Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48433 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov  
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JARED R. KUGLER 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48433-2020 & 48434-2020 
 
Bannock County 
Case Nos. CR-2017-3142 & CR03-19-13019 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 Has Jared R. Kugler failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his successive Rule 35 motion? 
 
ARGUMENT 
Kugler Has Failed to Show that the District Court Abused Its Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Police arrested Jared R. Kugler on a felony warrant after they were alerted of his suspicious 
behavior.  (48433 PSI, p. 4.)  Police found several small baggies containing marijuana and 
methamphetamine, a pipe, and a digital scale in his possession.  (48433 PSI, p. 4.)  The state 
charged Kugler with possession of methamphetamine.  (48433 R., pp. 38-39.)  Kugler pleaded 
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.  (48433 R. pp. 63-65.)  The district court imposed a sentence 
Electronically Filed
10/5/2021 8:53 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2 
 
of six years, three fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (48433 R. pp. 86-88.)  Kugler successfully 
completed Cognitive Behavioral Intervention for Substance Abuse counseling while serving a 
traditional rider and the district court suspended his sentence and placed him on probation for four 
years.  (48433, R., pp. 90-91; 48434 PSI, p. 19.) 
 Kugler subsequently violated the conditions of his probation by committing the new crime 
of possession of a controlled substance.  (48433 R., pp. 100-04; 48434 R., pp. 38-41.)  Kugler and 
his girlfriend absconded from probation and sheriff’s deputies were dispatched to assist probation 
officers in the couple’s apprehension.  (48434 PSI, p. 4.)  While taking Kugler into custody, 
deputies found methamphetamine and paraphernalia on his person.  (48434 PSI, p. 4.)   In his 
residence, deputies found more methamphetamine, pipes, and a scale.  (48434 PSI, p. 4.)  Pursuant 
to a plea agreement, Kugler pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine.  (48434 R., pp. 47-
56, 59-60.)  He also admitted violating his probation.  (48433 R., p. 109.)  The district court 
revoked his probation on the first conviction (48433 R., pp. 118-19) and sentenced him on the 
second conviction to six years, three fixed, to run concurrently (48434 R. pp. 76-77).   
Kugler timely filed Rule 35 motions in both cases for a reduction of sentence.  (48433 R., 
pp. 121-22; 48434 R., pp. 80-81.)  The district court denied the motions.  (48433 R., p. 125; 48434 
R., p. 85.)  Kugler did not file an appeal timely from the denial of his Rule 35 motions. 
Kugler filed, in both cases and pro se, a “Motion for Rule 33(d)” seeking a commutation 
of his sentence and a “Motion to Appeal Rule 35 Denial.”  (48433 R., pp. 127-29, 133-37; 48434 
R., pp. 87-89, 93-97.)  The district court denied both motions.  (48433 R., pp. 139-43; 48434 R., 
pp. 99-03.)  Treating the “Motion to Appeal Rule 35 Denial” as a notice of appeal, this Court found 
a timely appeal.  (48433 R., p. 152; 48434 R., p. 99.)   
3 
 
Kugler “asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions,” but is 
“[m]indful that Mr. Kugler’s ‘Motion to Appeal Rule 35 Denial’ is in effect a successive Rule 
35(b) motion, and because his Rule 33(d) motion … is more accurately characterized as a motion 
falling under Rule 35.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 3-4.)  Kugler’s claims fail because his Rule 35 
motions for a reduction of sentence were impermissible, successive Rule 35 motions, which the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider.   
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 provides that “[a] defendant may only file one motion seeking a 
reduction of sentence.”  I.C.R. 35(b).  Under this rule, “only a single motion for reduction of 
sentence, whether written or oral, is allowed.”  State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 439, 258 P.3d 950, 
959 (Ct. App. 2011).  Moreover, “the prohibition of successive motions under Rule 35 is a 
jurisdictional limit.”  State v. Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Because a defendant may only file one motion seeking a reduction of sentence, Kruger’s 
Rule 35 motions and Rule 33(d) motions for a reduction of sentence were impermissible successive 
Rule 35 motions, prohibited by the rule.  I.C.R. 35(b); Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875.  As 
such, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Kruger’s successive Rule 35 motions and 
the court’s order denying the motions must be affirmed.   
         
  
4 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order denying 
Kruger’s successive Rule 35 motions for a reduction of sentence. 
 DATED this 5th day of October, 2021 
 
 
        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen    
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
      MOLLY GARNER 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of October, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
 
EMILY M. JOYCE 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                        __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________ 
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                       Deputy Attorney General 
 


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12-14-2021 
State v. Peevy Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48753 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov  
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
KELLIE MARIE PEEVY, 
 
 Defendant-Appellant. 
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48753-2021 
 
Ada County 
Case No. CR-FE-2016-1312 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 Has Kellie Marie Peevy failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
revoked probation and executed her underlying sentence of seven years, with two fixed? 
 
ARGUMENT 
Peevy Has Failed to Show that the District Court Abused Its Discretion 
A. Introduction 
 Kellie Marie Peevy attempted to avoid arrest on an outstanding warrant by hiding under a 
blanket in the backseat of a car after the driver was pulled over for erratic driving.  (PSI, pp. 19-
20, 145.)  Police found syringes and methamphetamine in her purse.  (PSI, p. 19.)  The state 
charged Peevy with possession of a methamphetamine and paraphernalia.  (R., pp. 25-26)   
Electronically Filed
12/14/2021 10:57 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
2 
 
Peevy pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a plea agreement.  
(R., pp. 28-35.)  The district court imposed a sentence of seven years, with two fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 37-41.)  That sentence was to run concurrent with another possession 
conviction.  (R., p. 39.)  After successfully completing her rider, the district court suspended 
Peevy’s sentence and placed her on probation for seven years.  (R., pp. 47-51.) 
 The state alleged Peevy violated her probation by committing grand theft, petit theft, failing 
to report to her probation officer, using controlled substances and failing to pay fines, restitution 
and other costs.  (R., pp. 65-66.)  The grand theft probation violation allegation related to Peevy 
failing to return a vehicle she claimed she borrowed.  (R., pp. 68, 70-71, 92; Confidential Exhibits, 
pp. 31-36.)  In fact, the owner of a junkyard agreed to allow Peevy to borrow the vehicle “for a 
few hours” while he fixed the alternator in Peevy’s van and trusted her to leave her identification 
with the front office.   (Confidential Exhibits, p. 32-33.)  Peevy took the vehicle without providing 
her ID, abandoned the vehicle she had left for repair, and kept the “borrowed” vehicle for months.  
(Confidential Exhibits, pp. 31-33.)  The Canyon County district court sentenced Peevy to mental 
health court but Peevy failed to check in with the program coordinator, failed to check in with 
probation and parole, failed to check in with treatment at Health and Welfare, and failed to appear 
for weekly mental health court hearings.  (R., pp. 121-22.)  The district court issued a second bench 
warrant and suspended her from the mental health court program.  (R., p. 124.)   
 Ultimately, Peevy admitted to violating her probation by operating a vehicle without the 
owner’s consent and committing petit theft when she stole $75.00 from her employer.  (R., pp. 65-
68, 72-73, 131; Tr., p. 13, L. 11 – p. 14, L. 13.)  The district court revoked Peevy’s probation and 
executed the previously imposed sentence.  (R., pp. 133-35.)   
3 
 
Peevy filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 137-39.)  Peevy challenges the district 
court’s decision to revoke her probation and execute her underlying sentence of seven years, with 
two fixed.  Peevy has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
    
B. Standard of Review 
 “Review of a probation revocation proceeding involves a two-step analysis.  First, it is 
determined whether the terms of probation have been violated.  If they have, it is then determined 
whether the violation justifies revocation of the probation.”  State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 
390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017) (citations omitted).  “A court's finding that a violation has been proved 
will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding.”  State 
v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003).  However, “whether to 
revoke a defendant's probation for a violation is within the discretion of the district court.”  Id.  In 
evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part 
inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) 
(citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
    
C. Peevy Has Shown No Abuse of the Court’s Discretion 
 “In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation 
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.”  State v. 
Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 622, 288 P.3d 835, 839 (Ct. App. 2012).  “In reviewing the propriety of 
a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
4 
 
to revoke probation.”  State v. Del Critchfield, 167 Idaho 650, 654, 474 P.3d 1247, 1251 (Ct. App. 
2020). 
 At the disposition hearing, the district court considered “Toohill[1] factors and the nature 
of the offense, the character of the offender, any mitigating or aggravating factors, fulfilling the 
objectives of protecting society, achieving deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution,” and the 
“criteria for sentencing under Idaho Code § 19-2521”  (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 6-15.)  The district court did 
not find Peevy to be “amenable for supervision … based on absconding and not complying with 
the Mental Health Court program” in Canyon County.  (Tr., p. 24, L. 23 – p. 25, L. 1.)  The district 
court noted that sentence had already been executed in the other case and it was not possible for 
Peevy to serve both her sentence and term of probation at the same time.  (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 1-7.)  
Further, the district court noted an imposed sentence is appropriate “based on how [Peevy had] 
performed when [she’s] in society.”  (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 7-9.)   
 Peevy argues that the district court did not give proper consideration to her substance abuse 
and mental health issues when it revoked her probation and executed her underlying sentence.  
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 4.)  Peevy’s claim is unpersuasive.  Rather, the record shows Peevy’s failed 
to take responsibility for her own rehabilitation. 
 Peevy’s psychosocial rehabilitation specialist wrote, Peevy “states she wants recovery,” 
but “her actions and attitude have shown her continued struggle with not following rules, 
acceptance from others, and defiance towards staff.  She has shown potential for growth (doing 
well in her classes) but unfortunately she has not put the skills she is learning or has learned in her 
classes into action while in her everyday routine.”  (PSI, p. 5.)  While participating in the rider 
program, Peevy had 19 disciplinary sanctions.  (PSI, p. 5.)  Unfortunately, Peevy continues to be 
                                            
1 State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).   
5 
 
unable or unwilling to put into practice the skills she was taught in the rider program.  She was 
given the opportunity to participate in mental health court, but absconded and demonstrated she is 
not a suitable candidate for community supervision.  Her LSI score is high and suggests a likeliness 
to reoffend.  (PSI, p. 2, 12.)  While on probation, Peevy continued to use methamphetamine, failed 
to appear before the court, and committed new thefts.  (PSI, pp. 21-23; R. pp. 65-68.)     
 The district court met its obligation of protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation and 
retribution when it revoked Peevy’s probation and executed her sentence of seven years, two fixed. 
    
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 14th day of December, 2021 
 
 
       /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen   
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
      MOLLY GARNER 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of December, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of 
iCourt File and Serve: 
 
 
KILEY A. HEFFNER  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                         /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen   
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                       Deputy Attorney General 


State v. Peevy Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48753

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12-28-2021 
State v. Lira Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48863 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
ALEXIS LIRA, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48863-2021 
 
 
 
Canyon County Case No. CR14-21-680 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Alexis Lira failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by declining to 
retain jurisdiction? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Lira Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In January of 2021, Alexis Lira displayed strange behavior at his parents’ house.  (PSI, pp. 
24-25.)  Lira became upset when his mother would not allow him to take her vehicle, took the car 
keys, and walked outside.  (PSI, pp. 24-25.)  Lira’s father, José, followed Lira outside, telling him 
Electronically Filed
12/29/2021 11:16 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
not to take the car.  (PSI, p. 25.)  Lira’s older sister, Nancy, called the police, and José followed 
Lira back inside the house and into the living room.  (PSI, p. 25.)  Lira pulled a gun out of his 
sweater and pointed it at José, and José grabbed Lira around his body.  (PSI, p. 25.)  As Lira and 
José struggled in the living room, Nancy was able to flee the residence.  (PSI, pp. 26-27.)  Lira 
fired the pistol twice next to José’s head as the two wrestled over the gun, and Lira punched José 
in the shoulder, causing José to lose his grip.  (PSI, p. 25.)  Lira pointed the pistol at José and 
pulled the trigger, but the weapon didn’t fire.  (PSI, p. 25.)  Lira then hit José over the head with 
the pistol three times, causing José to bleed heavily.  (PSI, p. 25.)  José ran outside and hid in a 
bush, and Lira went into a bedroom.  (PSI, p. 25.)  Lira’s mother, Patricia, hid in the corner of the 
bathroom, and heard Lira talking gibberish in the bedroom.  (PSI, p. 25.)  Patricia heard Lira’s 
voice turn angry, and then Lira fired four shots through the bathroom door.  (PSI, p. 25.)     
Police chased Lira as he drove approximately seventy-five miles per hour in a twenty-five 
mile per hour zone in a black Nissan Altima.  (PSI, p. 23.)  Authorities spiked Lira’s tires and 
stopped his vehicle.  (PSI, p. 23.)  A search of Lira’s vehicle revealed a Rock Island .380 semi-
automatic pistol with dry blood coating the barrel, ammunition, and a snort tube with trace amounts 
of methamphetamine.  (PSI, p. 27.)   
The state charged Lira with one count of aggravated battery, two counts of aggravated 
assault, one count of possession of a controlled substance, one count of eluding a peace officer, 
and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp. 26-29.)  Lira pleaded guilty to one 
count of aggravated battery, and once count of aggravated assault, and the state agreed to dismiss 
the remaining counts, as well as three other criminal cases in their entirety.  (R., p. 52.)  The district 
court sentenced Lira to fifteen years, with four years determinate for aggravated battery, five years, 
 3 
with two years determinate for aggravated assault, and ordered that the sentences run consecutive.  
(R., pp. 68-71.)  Lira then filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 80-82.)   
On appeal, Lira argues that “the district court abused its discretion by failing to retain 
jurisdiction.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  Lira has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion by declining to retain jurisdiction. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to retain jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the 
district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  State v. Lee, 
117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  The primary purpose of a district 
court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to obtain additional information regarding whether 
the defendant has sufficient rehabilitative potential and is suitable for probation.  State v. Jones, 
141 Idaho 673, 677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005).  Probation is the ultimate goal of retained 
jurisdiction.  Id.  There can be no abuse of discretion if the district court has sufficient evidence 
before it to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.  Id. 
In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a 
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
  
 4 
C. Lira Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
The record shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal 
analysis and standards to the issue before it, and exercised reason. The record shows no abuse of 
discretion.   
At the sentencing hearing, the district court found “there’s nothing in Mr. Lira’s criminal 
history that was predictive of this behavior.” (03/08/21 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 21-24.)  Even though the 
lack of a prior felony conviction was mitigating, it was also “concerning” given the severity of the 
crimes committed in this case.  (03/08/21 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 2-5.)  The district court agreed “with the 
assessment of the Department of Correction and also the State’s argument that it is a prison case,” 
but the “real difficult part for the Court to decide” was “whether or not the Court should retain 
jurisdiction.”  (03/08/21 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-13.)  The district court stated “the acts in this case posed 
a grave threat of harm, and did, in fact, harm others in this case.  The aggravated battery in 
particular posed . . . a grave threat of serious bodily injury or death, even.  And it did, in fact, 
seriously injure the victim.”  (03/08/21 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 19-23.)  The district court found that 
“nothing” Lira had said indicated he had “grasped [the] real harm that [he] caused,” and “there’s 
a lack of remorse.”  (03/08/21 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 2-4.)  The evidence showed Lira posed “a real risk” 
and a “real threat of harm to others in the community.”  (03/08/21 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 11-13.)  “The 
community must be protected from [Lira] so that, through criminal misconduct of the kind which 
occurred in this case, [he doesn’t] hurt or kill someone else in society.”  (03/08/21 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 
14-16.)   
Applying the goals of sentencing, the district court stated that “protection of society is the 
most important goal of sentencing.  And it does, in this case, analysis of that factor does push [the 
district court] towards the imposition of a prison sentence.  And a severe one at that.”  (03/08/21 
 5 
Tr., p. 17, Ls. 17-20.)  Regarding deterrence, he district court stated “it is important that the 
sentence be commensurate with the nature of the criminal misconduct to serve the sentencing goal 
of general deterrence,” and that because “this is not the kind of behavior which society will 
tolerate,” Lira “must be deterred from ever committing a crime of this type again.”  (03/08/21 Tr., 
p. 18, Ls. 3-12.)  The district court concluded that Lira would not “pursue rehabilitative treatment 
that is appropriate in this case unless [he is] confined, and unless [he has] the motivation of trying 
to obtain parole,” and that an executed sentence “will give [Lira] appropriate motivation to engage 
in treatment and to make [himself] ready to be released back into society.”  (03/08/21 Tr., p. 18, 
Ls. 19-24.)  Based on the “unusual nature of the violence in this case, and [Lira’s] lack of remorse, 
and the other factors contained within the presentence investigation report,” the district court 
determined “it is appropriate that [he] be under the control of the Department of Correction for 
that length of time.”  (03/08/21 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 21-25.)   
Lira argues that the mitigating factors—his young age, mental health issues, and that these 
are his first felonies—show an abuse of discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4.)  Lira’s argument 
does not show an abuse of discretion.  Lira’s LSI score is twenty-eight, placing him in the moderate 
risk to reoffend category.  (PSI, p. 32.)  During the presentence investigation, Lira denied ever 
being suspended or expelled from school, but he was suspended from school for three days after 
throwing a rock at a girl, causing the girl to blead from her head.  (PSI, p. 36.)  Lira’s self-reported 
employment history was largely fabricated.  (PSI, pp. 36-37.)  Lira’s criminal history began at  
 and consists of misdemeanors and opportunities on probation.  (PSI, pp. 38-40.)  The 
presentence investigator found that Lira “was not forthcoming nor appeared inclined to discuss the 
night of the instant offense.  His denial of accountability coupled with his flat demeanor reflected 
a man not dealing with reality.”  (PSI, p. 41.)  The presentence investigator stated Lira “clearly 
 6 
showed intent to murder or severely maim his father.  His strange behavior and violent acts caused 
great fear and trauma for his family.  He would be a poor candidate for an order of probation as he 
poses as a great risk to his family as well as the community at large,” and recommended that Lira 
“be sentenced to the Idaho Department of Correction.”  (PSI, p. 41.)   
The district court’s determination that Lira presents a danger to the community is supported 
by the record.  The violent nature of the instant offenses caused significant harm to Lira’s family.  
Lira’s lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility, coupled with his previous opportunities 
on probation, show that he is not amenable to alternative treatment, and he is not a suitable 
candidate for probation.  The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded a period 
of retained jurisdiction was not needed to determine Lira’s suitability for community supervision.  
Lira has failed to show error.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 28th day of December, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
  
 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of December, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of 
iCourt File and Serve: 
 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                          /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. Lira Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48863

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/9277/thumbnail.jp

State v. Damiani Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 47610

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/9318/thumbnail.jp

State v. Porter Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 47858

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/9333/thumbnail.jp

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