University of Idaho College of Law

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
1-14-2021 
State v. Mihelich Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48348 
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Recommended Citation 
"State v. Mihelich Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48348" (2021). Not Reported. 7086. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7086 
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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6555 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #7353 
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 334-2712 
Fax: (208) 334-2985 
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id. us 
Electronically Filed 
1/14/2021 8:21 AM 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court 
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
V. 
ANNA MARIE MIHELICH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nature of the Case 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 48348-2020 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-19-41053 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Anna Marie Mihelich pied guilty to two counts of 
aggravated DUI. She received an aggregated unified sentence of thirty years, with seven years 
fixed. On appeal, Ms. Mihelich contends that this sentence represents an abuse of the district 
court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts. 
1 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On July 2, 2019, a car driven by Ms. Mihelich crossed into the oncoming lane of traffic 
and struck a van. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 pp.2-3.) The van was 
driven by a woman, and her three children were riding in the van as passengers, the youngest of 
whom later passed away due to her injuries.2 (PSI, pp.2, 145.) Ms. Mihelich admitted to using 
methamphetamine a few hours before the accident.3 (PSI, pp.2, 139.) She blacked out and woke 
up too late to swerve to avoid the van. (PSI, p.2.) 
Based on these facts, Ms. Mihelich was charged by Information with four counts of 
aggravated DUI. (R., pp.87-89.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Mihelich pled guilty to 
Counts I and III. (Tr., p.5, Ls.18-24; p.16, Ls.3-14; R., pp.117-28.) In exchange, the State 
agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and to recommend a sentence of at least five years fixed. 
(Tr., p.5, Ls.18-24.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence Ms. Mihelich 
consecutively. (Tr., p.52, Ls.11-14.) Ms. Mihelich's counsel asked the district court to consider 
retaining jurisdiction. (Tr., p.58, Ls.10-18.) However, Ms. Mihelich was sentenced to fifteen 
years, with five years fixed, on Count I, and fifteen years, with two years fixed, on Count III, to 
be served consecutively to the sentence in Count I. (Tr., p.65, Ls.10-22; R., pp.133-37.) 
1 Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the 
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of 
the electronic file. 
2 The driver and the front-seat passenger were seriously injured, in part due to the failure of the 
van's driver and passenger airbags to deploy during the crash. (PSI, p.95.) The van was 
purchased as a salvage vehicle, and the front airbags had been unplugged. (PSI, p.95.) 
3 An analysis of Ms. Mihelich's blood was positive for other substances, such as caffeine, 
amphetamine, Phenylpropanolamine (an over the counter decongestant), THC, Carboxy THC, 
Topiramate (prescription anticonvulsant), and Duloxetine (the prescription drug Cymbalta-used 
for the treatment of depression). (PSI, pp.139-42.) 
2 
Ms. Mihelich filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. 
(R., pp .141-4 3.) 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate unified sentence of thirty 
years, with seven years fixed, upon Ms. Mihelich following her plea of guilty to two counts of 
aggravated DUI? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Unified Sentence Of 
Thirty Years, With Seven Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Mihelich Following Her Plea Of Guilty To 
Two Counts Of Aggravated DUI 
Ms. Mihelich asserts that, given any view of the facts, her aggregate unified sentence of 
thirty years, with seven years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an 
independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character 
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 
(Ct. App. 1982). In reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant 
inquiry regards four factors: 
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and ( 4) reached 
its decision by the exercise of reason. 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). 
Ms. Mihelich does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its 
decision by the exercise of reason, Ms. Mihelich must show that in light of the governing 
criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing 
3 
criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or 
retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Ms. Mihelich's sentence is excessive 
considering any view of the facts. 
Ms. Mihelich contracted bacterial meningitis while incarcerated on these charges. (PSI, 
p.3; Tr., p.55, L.15 - p.56, L.22.) She nearly died, but recovered after being placed in a 
medically induced coma for eleven days, and continues to suffer from serious long-term 
disabilities. (PSI, p.3; Tr., p.18, L.17-p.19, L.15; p.55, L.16-p.56, L.22.) Ms. Mihelich uses a 
wheelchair, leg brace, and a back brace. (PSI, p.3; Tr., p.19, L.11; Tr., p.56, Ls.10-22.) She 
takes multiple medications for her physical health conditions, and has been diagnosed with 
MRSA, spinal meningitis, and Parkinson's Disease. (PSI, pp.3-4, 11, 14, 19; Tr., p.19, Ls.1-15; 
p.56, Ls.17-20.) 
Ms. Mihelich has been diagnosed with major depressive disorder and anxiety. (PSI, pp.4, 
7, 11-12, 19.) Since the accident, she thinks about suicide every day. (PSI, pp.4, 32.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that the trial court must consider a defendant's mental illness as a factor 
at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). 
Ms. Mihelich wants to stay clean from controlled substances. (PSI, pp.9, 16.) Her 
current goal is "to live a clean life and get back into doing what [she] was doing with the 
church." (PSI, p.9.) Ms. Mihelich has never attended substance abuse disorder treatment, but 
the GAIN evaluator recommended Level I Outpatient Treatment. (PSI, pp.11, 13.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a mitigating factor by the 
district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). 
4 
Ms. Mihelich has no prior felony criminal history. (Tr., p.19, Ls.18-19; PSI, pp.3, 8.) 
She was convicted of a misdemeanor disturbing the peace seventeen years ago, but otherwise has 
been a law-abiding citizen her entire life. (PSI, pp.3, 8.) The Idaho Supreme Court has 
"recognized that the first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual 
criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 
Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); 
see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). 
Ms. Mihelich has a supportive family to assist her in her rehabilitation. She has a good 
relationship with her sister, brother-in-law, children and grandchildren, and she received letters 
of support from her sister and brother-in-law. (PSI, pp.3-5; Tr., p.52, L.20 - p.53, L.14.) She 
also has support within the community. (PSI, pp.3, 26.) One community member who knows 
Ms. Mihelich from church, described her as "a very sweet, friendly woman." (PSI, pp.3, 26.) 
See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had 
the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). 
Further, Ms. Mihelich expressed considerable remorse and accepted responsibility for her 
actions. (Tr., p.14, L.15 - p.16, L.14; p.54, L.12 - p.55, L.13; PSI, pp.2, 4.) Ms. Mihelich said, 
during the presentence interview, "I tried to swerve and couldn't swerve fast enough. I'm not a 
bad person. I wish I could take it back." (PSI, p.2.) She wrote to the district court: 
I would like to say how sorry I am for this terrible crime. I am [a] 54 yr old 
woman that has never been in trouble before[.] I know I made a bad choice when 
I got high and drove that night[;] I wish I could take away all the pain that I 
caused not only the victims family b[ ut] my family as well. I know all I can do 
now is try to do my best so I'm asking the court to please look at my health and 
give me probation and credit for days I have been in custody[;] there is not much I 
can do but say I[']m sorry[.] I will go to classes and try to make my life better. 
Thank you. 
5 
(PSI, p.9.) When Ms. Mihelich entered her guilty plea, she told the court, "I tried to swerve but 
it was too late and we collided, and it was a horrible, horrible accident and people got hurt. And 
it's a heavy, heavy burden that I have to live with and the family has to live with, but I have to 
live with that, and I have terrible nightmares, that my family has to live with that pain, and I am 
so, so sorry. I wish I could go back and repeat that night." (Tr., p.15, Ls.1-8.) At her sentencing 
hearing, Ms. Mihelich expressed considerable remorse and told the court and the victims how 
sorry she was for her actions. (Tr., p.59, Ls.2-11.) She told the court: 
I would just like to tell [the] family that I'm so, so sorry. I never meant for any of 
this to happen, and every night I beg for their forgiveness, I pray to God that they 
forgive me, and if there's anything I can do to make it right, I know there's 
nothing that I can do, but I just pray to God every night that they would forgive 
me. And I am so truly sorry. I just -- I'm so sorry. I wish I could take their pain 
away. I'm so sorry. I just beg for them to forgive me. I truly do. 
(Tr., p.59, Ls.2-11.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses 
remorse for her conduct and accepts responsibility for her acts. Shideler, l 03 Idaho at 595; 
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Mihelich asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her. She asserts that had the 
district court properly considered her considerable remorse, mental and physical health 
conditions, and her family and community support, it would have imposed a less severe 
sentence. 
6 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Mihelich respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems 
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 14th day ofJanuary, 2021. 
/s/ Sally J. Cooley 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of January, 2021, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served as follows: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
SJC/eas 
/s/ Evan A. Smith 
EV AN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
7 


English

State v. Mihelich Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48348

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UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-26-2021 
State v. Watson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48350 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. Watson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48350" (2021). Not Reported. 7089. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7089 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NOS. 48350-2020 & 48351-2020
)
v. ) ADA COUNTY NOS.
) CR01-17-31677 & CR01-19-52078
CAMERON LEE WATSON, )
) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cameron L. Watson was on probation for burglary when she pled guilty to grand theft.
The district court revoked her probation and executed the underlying sentence of seven years,
with two years fixed, and sentenced her to eight years, with two and one-half years fixed, for
grand theft, to be served concurrently. Ms. Watson appeals. She argues the district court abused
its discretion by revoking her probation and imposing an excessive sentence.
Electronically Filed
3/26/2021 7:40 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2017, Ms. Watson pled guilty to burglary. (No. 48350 R.,1 p.29.) The
following month, the district court sentenced her to seven years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction (“a rider”). (No. 48350 R., pp.41, 42–44.) In June 2018, the district court
held a rider review hearing and placed Ms. Watson on probation for seven years. (No. 48350
R., pp.46, 47–50.)
In January 2020, the State charged Ms. Watson by information with two counts of grand
theft, two counts of burglary, and one count of petit theft, after she stole two debit/credit cards
and a backpack and then went into two stores to use the cards. (No. 48351 R., pp.24–26.) The
State also moved for a probation violation in the 2017 burglary case for committing the new
offenses, along with many other violations, including drug use, failure to pay fines and fees, and
absconding from supervision. (No. 48350 R., pp.90–94.)
In May 2020, Ms. Watson pled guilty to one count of grand theft. (No. 48351 R., pp.41–
42; Tr.,2 p.9, L.11–p.10, L.25 (pp.9–10).) The State agreed to dismiss the other charges. (Aug.
R., p.1.) The State also agreed to recommend a sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, to
be served concurrent to any other sentence. (Aug. R., p.1.) In June 2020, Ms. Watson admitted to
violating her probation in the 2017 burglary case by using heroin while pregnant, using
methamphetamine, failing to complete moral recognition therapy, failing to complete the
1 There are two clerk’s records on appeal. Citations to “No. 48350 R.” refer to the clerk’s record
in No. 48350-2020, Ada County No. CR01-17-31677. Citations to “No. 48351 R.” refer to the
clerk’s record in No. 48351-2020, Ada County No. CR01-19-52078.
2 A transcript was filed in both No. 48350-2020 and 48351-2020, but they are identical. The
transcript contains the entry of plea and sentencing hearing. Citations to the page number refer to
internal pagination of the individual transcript with a parenthetical cite to the overall page
number of the entire document.
3
cognitive self-change program, and committing grand theft in the new case. (No. 48350
R., p.100.)
In August 2020, the district court held a consolidated sentencing hearing. (No. 48350
R., pp.102, 104.) The State requested the district court sentence Ms. Watson to ten years, with
three years fixed, to be served concurrently, for the new grand theft charge. (Tr., p.9, Ls.5–8
(p.21).) Ms. Watson requested the district court sentence her to eight years, with two years fixed,
for grand theft. (Tr., p.11, Ls.20–21 (p.21).) Ms. Watson did not argue against revocation and
imposition of her sentence in the 2017 burglary case. (Tr., p.10, Ls.23–24 (p.21), p.12, Ls.12–14
(p.22).) The district court sentenced her to eight years, with two and one-half years fixed, to be
served concurrently. (Tr., p.14, Ls.18–24 (p.22); No. 48351 R., pp.45–46.) The district court also
revoked her probation on the 2017 burglary case. (Tr., p.14, Ls.21–22 (p.22); No. 48350
R., pp.105–06.)
Ms. Watson timely appealed in both cases. (No. 48350 R., pp.108–09; No. 48351
R., pp.52–53.)
ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Watson to eight years,
with two and one-half years fixed, for grand theft?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Watson’s probation for
burglary?
4
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Watson To Eight Years, With
Two And One-Half Years Fixed, For Grand Theft
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Watson’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 18-2408 (one-year minimum, fourteen-year maximum). Accordingly, to
show the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Watson “must show that the sentence, in light
of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand,
137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In this case, Ms. Watson asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive fixed sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends the
5
district court should have sentenced her to a lesser fixed term of two years, rather than two and
one-half years, in light of the mitigating factors in her case.
Ms. Watson’s young age, substance abuse issues, and acceptance of responsibility and
remorse supported a more lenient fixed term of two years. Ms. Watson had a normal childhood
with a stable, supportive family. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),3 pp.98–99.)
Unfortunately, as a young teenager, she experienced depression and anxiety and turned to drugs
to cope. (PSI, pp.98, 101.) Her drug use slowly increased and, by , she was using
heroin and methamphetamine every day. (PSI, p.98.) Ms. Watson was  when she
completed the rider for the 2017 burglary case. (PSI, p.109.) She was successful in the program,
but clearly struggled with maintaining her sobriety upon her release. (PSI, pp.110–12 (rider
review); PSI, pp.120, 123–24.) Looking back on her offenses and poor decisions while on
probation, she wrote:
I wish could find the words to show the remorse I feel for disrupting these
people’s lives that I did not consider enough to not have committed these crimes.
Secondly, I am sorry to my family for being absent with them and with my son. I
look forward to redeeming myself more and more everyday [sic], and I just ask
the Court to see into my heart and give me the opportunity to do that as soon as
possible. I’ve been manipulative and codependent for as long as I can remember,
and I desperately want to change who I am. I want to set myself up for success.
(PSI, p.125.) Ms. Watson stated that she was “so lost” in her addiction and was ashamed of her
actions. (PSI, p.120.) Once released after the instant case, Ms. Watson hoped to get stable
employment and spend time with her young child. (PSI, p.125.) These factors of Ms. Watson’s
age, substance abuse issues, and acceptance of responsibility and remorse stood in favor of
mitigation.
3 Citations to the PSI refer to the 573-page document with the confidential exhibits, including the
PSI and addendum to the PSI, in No. 48350.
6
In sum, Ms. Watson maintains the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. She contends proper consideration of the
mitigating factors in her case supported a more lenient fixed sentence of two years, followed by
six years indeterminate.
II.
The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Watson’s Probation For Burglary
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation under
certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to
review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the
Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of [her] probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f
it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of [her] probation,” the Court
examines “what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id. “[W]hen a probationer admits
to a direct violation of [her] probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is
required.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995).
Here, Ms. Watson does not challenge her admissions to the alleged probation violations.
(No. 48350 R., p.100.) Instead, she argues the district court did not exercise reason by revoking
her probation, although she is mindful that she requested that the district court revoke her
probation and execute her sentence. “It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not
7
successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced
in, or invited are not reversible.” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420-21 (2015). Mindful of the
invited error doctrine, Ms. Watson maintains the district court abused its discretion by revoking
her probation, based on the mitigating factors argued in Part I.
CONCLUSION
In No. 48351, Ms. Watson respectfully requests this Court reduce her sentence as it
deems appropriate. In the alternative, she respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of
conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. In No. 48350,
she respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s order revoking her probation and
remand her case to the district court for a new probation violation disposition hearing.
DATED this 26th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas


State v. Watson Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48350

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UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
4-26-2021 
State v. MacDonald Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48432 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported 
Recommended Citation 
"State v. MacDonald Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48432" (2021). Not Reported. 7143. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7143 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator 
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
COLLEEN D. ZAHN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
PEYTON CHARLES MACDONALD, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48432-2020 
 
 
 
Kootenai County Case No.  
CR28-20-6272 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Peyton Charles MacDonald failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
by imposing consecutive sentences of 365 days jail with 330 days suspended for possession of 
MDMA and 180 days with 118 days suspended for DUI, with probation on both convictions, and 
by denying a Rule 35 motion? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
MacDonald Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In April of 2020, Post Falls Police responded to a report of a male driver hitting a post and 
a curb in a parking lot.  (PSI, p. 5.)  The reporting party expressed concerns that the driver, Peyton 
Electronically Filed
4/26/2021 9:06 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
Charles MacDonald, may have been unfit to drive, and that MacDonald was attempting to drive 
away from the scene after hitting various items.  (PSI, p. 5.)  Authorities administered a field 
sobriety tests and determined that MacDonald’s driving ability was impaired.  (PSI, p. 5.)  Officers 
found a small plastic bag containing a white crystal substance believed to be methamphetamine on 
MacDonald’s person, and when questioned about the substance, MacDonald stated that a friend 
had given him MDMA, commonly referred to as molly.  (PSI, p. 5.)  MacDonald stated that the 
placed the MDMA in his vehicle, and upon search of his vehicle, authorities found a glass pipe 
with residue.  (PSI, p. 5.)  MacDonald admitted that he had previously smoked marijuana products 
from the pipe.  (PSI, p. 5.)   
The state charged MacDonald with possession of MDMA, driving under the influence 
drugs and/or an intoxicating substance, leaving scene of accident, and possession of paraphernalia.  
(R., pp. 50-52.)  MacDonald pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and DUI, and 
the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.  (R., pp. 53-54, 57-58.)  For the possession 
conviction, the district court sentenced MacDonald to one year in jail, with 330 days suspended, 
two days credit, thirty days of discretionary jail time, and two years on probation.  (Tr., p. 23, Ls. 
12-21; p. 24, Ls. 9-11; R., p. 67.)  For the DUI conviction, the district court sentenced MacDonald 
to 180 days in jail, with 118 days suspended, two days credit, thirty days of discretionary jail time, 
thirty days to serve, and two years on probation to run consecutive to the PCS sentence.  (Tr., p. 
23, L. 22 – p. 24, L. 16; R., p. 68.)  The district court granted MacDonald a five day early release 
from jail, and MacDonald filed a Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp. 73-77.)  The district court denied his 
Rule 35 motion, and MacDonald subsequently filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 81-89.)   
On appeal, MacDonald argues that “the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35 motion.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  MacDonald has 
 3 
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion.  Additionally, MacDonald has failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard.  Where a 
sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear 
abuse of discretion.”  State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time 
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution 
applicable to a given case.  Id. at 454, 447 P.3d at 902.  “A sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion.”  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted).  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (citation omitted).   
“If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 
35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.”  State 
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  In evaluating whether a lower court 
abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the 
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. 
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 4 
 
C. MacDonald Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
The sentences imposed are within the statutory limits of I.C. §§ 18-8005 and 37-2732.  The 
record shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal standards to the 
issue before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.   
At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it “could no more consider 
unsupervised probation than the man in the moon.”  (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 10-11.)  The district court noted 
that MacDonald “decided after using Molly, and apparently quite a bit, to go to Taco Bell,” which 
demonstrated “how selfish and self-centered” MacDonald is.  (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 11-14.)  He drove 
“stoned out of [his] gourd,” ran into mailboxes, “a citizen [had] to call law enforcement,” and he 
doesn’t “even remember any of this.”  (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 14-17.)  MacDonald stated that he “wasn’t 
on Molly when [he] was driving,” and that someone that lives in his apartment building told him 
that it was Xanax.  (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 20-24.)  The district court stated that it stood “corrected” and 
that MacDonald “took an unknown pill form a neighbor while [he] had point two grams of Molly 
with [him] and ran into things on the road, going to Taco Bell,” and that Macdonald is “a danger 
to the public.”  (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 2-5.)   
The district court further found that MacDonald “continued to drink” after being ordered 
not to, and “tested positive for alcohol on July 13th and positive again for alcohol on August 17th.”  
(Tr., p. 28, Ls. 16-21.)  The district court stated that “there is no indication” that MacDonald was 
“going to do well on probation.”  (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 22-24.)  The district court did “hope that 
[MacDonald] surprise[s] [the district court] and that [he] will abide by all the terms and conditions 
of probation.”  (Tr., p. 28, L. 25 – p. 29, L. 1.)   
In the district court’s order denying MacDonald’s Rule 35 motion, the district court stated 
that “[a]t the sentencing hearing, MacDonald was not contrite, he did not take accountability for 
 5 
his actions, and he was argumentative with the Court.”  (R., p. 84.)  The district court stated that 
there "is no evidence presented that the sentence imposed is too great given the offenses for which 
MacDonald was sentenced.  There is no evidence presented that somehow in the past 10 days 
MacDonald is now an acceptable risk to be placed only on two years of supervised probation.”  
(R., p. 84.)  The district court determined that the “sentences imposed on September 1, 2020, were 
and are an appropriate sentence given Macdonald’s social and criminal history and the crime for 
which sentence were imposed.  Any lesser sentences would depreciate the seriousness of 
Macdonald’s crimes.”  (R., p. 85.)   
On appeal, MacDonald argues that the mitigating factors–his age, lack of criminal history, 
mental health issues, loss of his mother, employment history, LSI score, remorse and acceptance 
of responsibility–show an abuse of discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)  MacDonald’s 
argument does not show an abuse of discretion.  His LSI score is sixteen, placing him in the 
moderate risk to reoffend category.  (PSI, p. 6.)  MacDonald struck numerous objects, including a 
parked GMC Envoy that then struck a Chevy truck parked next to the Envoy, while driving under 
the influence of an unknown pill.  (PSI, p. 16.)  MacDonald was so inebriated that he doesn’t 
remember the instant offenses, stating that he “was heading to Taco Bell and the next thing [he] 
remember[ed] was that [he] woke up in jail.”  (PSI, p. 6.)  While THC can take up to thirty days 
to become undetectable in a person’s system, MacDonald’s cannabinoid concentrate increased 
from May 5, 2020 to May 13, 2020, while he was on pretrial release.  (R., pp. 26, 46-47.)  
Additionally, MacDonald self-reported that he consumed alcohol on his twenty-first birthday 
while on pretrial release after being ordered not to consume alcohol.  (R., p. 26; PSI, p. 9.)   
MacDonald’s continued substance use while on pretrial release shows that he does not 
legitimately consider the seriousness of the instant offenses, nor the risk his criminal conduct 
 6 
presents to the community.  His decision to consume alcohol on his twenty-first birthday while on 
pretrial release shows that he does not regard the district court’s orders, or the law.  MacDonald 
places his own interests above the safety of society, and he’s failed to demonstrate remorse or 
acceptance of responsibility.  Four years of supervised probation with suspended sentences 
provides proper punishment and deterrence to MacDonald’s criminal behavior.  A lesser sentence 
would depreciate the seriousness of the instant offenses, and fail to provide appropriate structure 
and accountability for MacDonald’s rehabilitative efforts during his term of community 
supervision.  MacDonald has failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.  
MacDonald has also failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 
35 motion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 26th day of April, 2021. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
  
 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of April, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
JENNY C. SWINFORD  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____ 
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. MacDonald Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48432

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
9-7-2021 
State v. Shelton Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 48471 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7353
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NOS. 48471-2020, 48472-2020,
) & 48477-2020
v. )
) CANYON COUNTY NOS. CR14-18-3994,
WILLIAM RICHARD SHELTON, IV, ) CR14-18-3999 & CR14-18-16653
)
Defendant-Appellant. ) APPELLANT’S
____________________________________) REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, William Shelton, IV, pled guilty to three counts of grand
theft.  He received an aggregate unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed.  On
appeal, Mr. Shelton contends that his sentences represent an abuse of the district court’s
discretion, as they are excessive given any view of the facts.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contention that Mr. Shelton waived
his right to appeal his sentence in docket number 48472-2020 (the third theft case), therefore, his
entire appeal should be dismissed.  (Resp. Br., p.5.)
Electronically Filed
9/7/2021 12:59 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Supreme Court Docket No. 48471-2020 (Canyon County district court case number
CR14-18-3994 (hereinafter, the theft case)), Supreme Court Docket No. 48477-2020 (Canyon
County district court case number CR14-18-3999 (hereinafter, the second theft case)), and
Supreme Court Docket No. 48472-2020 (Canyon County district court case number CR14-18-
16653 (hereinafter, the third theft case)) were consolidated for sentencing and for appellate
purposes.  (R.48472, p.143.)
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Shelton’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed concurrent sentences of eight years,
with three years fixed, upon Mr. Shelton following his pleas of guilty to three counts of grand
theft?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Concurrent Sentences Of Eight
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Shelton Following His Pleas Of Guilty To Three
Counts Of Grand Theft
The State seeks dismissal of Mr. Shelton’s sentencing appeal from all three of his cases,
because Mr. Shelton marked a plea advisory form in 48472-2020 (the third theft case) which
indicated that he was waiving his right to appeal his sentence.  (Resp. Br., p.5.)
The guilty plea advisory form filed in the third theft case was signed by Mr. Shelton
which recorded his “X” on the line indicating he “waived [his] right to appeal [his] sentence as
part of [his] plea agreement.”  (R.48472, p.38.)  However, while all of the salient terms of the
3
plea agreement were discussed during the change of plea hearing for the third theft case, the
waiver of Mr. Shelton’s appellate rights was never put on the record.  (Tr., p.3, L.2 – p.16, L.10.)
Thus, it is unclear whether Mr. Shelton was aware of the provision in the written plea agreement
and knowingly and voluntarily waived his right. C.f., State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457
(1994) (holding defendant’s appellate waiver valid, where the district court specifically inquired
about the waiver and confirmed the defendant had no questions about the waiver); State v. Cope,
142 Idaho 492 (2006) (holding the record showed the plea was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary where defendant signed plea agreement in open court).
Further, although the plea agreement arranged between the parties was intended to be part
of a global resolution to resolve all of Mr. Shelton’s pending cases, Mr. Shelton had already pled
guilty in the first and second theft cases.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.13-23.)  The plea advisory form was only
filed in Mr. Shelton’s third theft case—Mr. Shelton’s other two cases did not contain any such
guilty plea advisory forms.  (See R.48471, pp.4-5; R.48477, pp.4-5.)  The cases were not
consolidated until after the guilty pleas were entered.  (R.48471, p.5.)  Thus, even if Mr. Shelton
waived his right to appeal the sentence in the third grand theft case, there is no indication that he
waived this right in all three cases.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Shelton respectfully requests that this Court reduce all three of his sentences.
DATED this 7th day of September, 2021.
/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of September, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas


State v. Shelton Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 48471

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
8-25-2021 
State v. Dobson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48528 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
           Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL RAY DOBSON, 
 
           Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48528-2020 
 
Ada County Case No. 
CR01-20-32991 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 Has Dobson failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion 
when it imposed a unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed upon Dobson’s guilty plea to 
felony DUI?  
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Dobson Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 In August 2020, in Boise, Dobson sideswiped a parked Amazon delivery vehicle as he 
was driving down the street, and then started to drive away.  (PSI, p.90.1)  The driver of the 
                                            
1 Citations to page numbers of the PSI refer to the page numbers of the electronic file containing 
the PSI and other documents.  
Electronically Filed
8/25/2021 4:10 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk
 2 
delivery vehicle followed Dobson and called the police.  (Id.)  Apparently because he saw that 
the delivery driver was following him, Dobson stopped his vehicle.  (Id.)  There, the delivery 
driver asked Dobson if he was drunk, to which Dobson responded in the affirmative.  (Id.)  
Dobson then tried to give the delivery driver containers of alcohol that he had in his vehicle, but 
the delivery driver refused.  (Id.)  Just before the police arrived, Dobson became angry, 
prompting the delivery driver to call the police again to express that he was concerned that 
Dobson would escalate his behavior.  (Id.) 
 Dobson admitted to a responding officer that he had been drinking that day.  (Id.)  The 
officer also noted that Dobson had glassy and bloodshot eyes, emitted the odor of alcohol, had 
impaired speech, and had some instability in his walking.   (PSI, pp.90-91.)  Dobson refused the 
standard field sobriety tests and indicated that he would also refuse a breath test.  (Id.)  Dobson 
was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence.  (PSI, p.91.)  A warrant for a blood 
draw was obtained, and subsequent testing revealed a .202 BAC.  (PSI, pp.91, 94.) 
 Because Dobson had a prior felony DUI conviction, the state charged him with felony 
DUI.  (R., pp.25-26.)  Because Dobson’s driver’s license was suspended, and because he left the 
scene after sideswiping the Amazon delivery vehicle, the state also charged him with driving 
without privileges and failing to provide info at the scene of an accident.  (Id.) 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Dobson pled guilty to felony DUI, and the 
state dismissed the other two charges.  (R., pp.27, 30-41.)  The state agreed to recommend a 
unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed, and Dobson was free to argue for a lesser 
sentence.  (R, pp.27, 40-41.)  At the sentencing hearing, Dobson recommended that the district 
court retain jurisdiction or impose an intensive probationary period.  (Tr., p.10, L.2 – p.11, L.14.)  
Noting that this was Dobson’s fifth DUI conviction, and expressing concern for the safety of the 
 3 
community, the district court instead followed the state’s sentencing recommendation and 
imposed a unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed.  (R., pp.45-49; Tr., p.12, L.9 – p.16, 
L.3.)  The district court subsequently denied Dobson’s I.C.R. 35 motion for reconsideration of 
sentence.  (R., pp.50, 55-57.)  Dobson timely appealed from the judgment of conviction. (R., 
pp.51-53.)  On appeal, Dobson challenges the district court’s sentencing determination.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-7.) 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering 
the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) 
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).    
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  The abuse of 
discretion test looks to whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by 
the exercise of reason.”  Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 
(2018). 
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
 4 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, the 
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was 
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and retribution.  Id. at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related 
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’”  State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895-96, 392 
P.3d 1228, 1236-37 (2017) (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 
(2015)).  It is well established that the primary sentencing consideration is protection of society, 
and that all other factors must be subservient to that end.  State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627, 
873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994).     
 Prior to imposing sentence in this case, the district court referenced the appropriate 
sentencing factors, and noted that it had reviewed and considered the PSI and Dobson’s 
sentencing argument and statement.  (Tr., p.12, L.18 – p.13, L.4.)  After acknowledging that 
Dobson was not an “irredeemable person,” and discussing the dangerousness of Dobson’s 
conduct in this case and his extensive criminal record of driving under the influence, the district 
court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed.  (Tr., p.13, L.5 – p.16, L.3.)  A 
review of the record supports the court’s sentencing determination.  
 This was Dobson’s second felony DUI conviction, and fifth DUI conviction overall.  
(PSI, pp.7-8.)  Dobson was still on probation for his prior DUI, and his license was still 
suspended, at the time he drove drunk again and sideswiped the Amazon delivery vehicle.  (PSI, 
pp.7-8, 30-37.)  Drinking alcohol and refusing the field sobriety and breathalyzer tests were all 
violations of his felony probation.  (PSI, pp.30-37.)  His prior felony DUI resulted in a 75-day 
jail sentence with 10 years probation (PSI, p.7) – it was not unreasonable for Dobson’s new 
 5 
felony DUI sentence to include significantly more incarceration, particularly considering that the 
prior supervised probation did not prevent Dobson from driving drunk again.   
 The district court was appropriately concerned with the severe danger to the community 
created by Dobson’s conduct in this case.  During the sentencing hearing, the delivery driver 
stated that if Dobson had sideswiped his vehicle three second later than he did, he would have 
been smashed against his vehicle while he was getting out of it.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.3-10.)  The district 
court properly recognized that these few seconds were the difference between the property 
damage that occurred and Dobson instead causing severe injury or death.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.5-8.)  
Further, both of Dobson’s felony DUI convictions involved an enhanced BAC (.202 and .268, 
respectively).  (PSI, pp.94, 97.)  In the prior felony DUI incident, Dobson was so intoxicated that 
he stumbled and fell onto the officer when he left his vehicle.  (PSI, p.97.)  
On appeal, Dobson does not take issue with any of the stated analyses as set forth by the 
district court, but instead simply asserts the existence of certain mitigating factors – including his 
substance abuse, remorse, amenability to treatment, a history of stable employment, and family 
support.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.)  However, nothing in the record indicates that the district 
court failed to consider any of these things, or chose to disregard the information about these 
factors presented in the presence investigation report and Dobson’s sentencing argument and 
statement.  Instead, the court noted several times that it did not believe that Dobson was a bad 
person, but that his poor judgment when drinking endangered the community, even while on 
supervised probation after a previous exercise of poor judgment, and even after periods of time 
of apparent sobriety.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.5-14; p.14, L.18 – p.15, L.12; p.16, L.24 – p.17, L.5.)  The 
court also noted that while it understood that relapsing is a part of addiction, the pressing 
question is whether an addict can use the tools they have been given to deal with the relapse in a 
 6 
way that does not endanger the community or themselves, or whether, as in Dobson’s case, they 
fail to do so.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.9-17.)       
 In light of all of the factors discussed above, the district court acted well within its 
discretion to impose a unified 10-year sentence with four years fixed upon Dobson’s conviction 
for felony DUI, his fifth DUI conviction.  Dobson has therefore failed to demonstrate that the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion.  This Court should affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentencing determination of the 
district court. 
 DATED this 25th day of August, 2021. 
 
 
 
        /s/  Mark W. Olson 
      MARK W. OLSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
KILEY A. HEFFNER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Mark W. Olson 
      MARK W. OLSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
MWO/dd 


State v. Dobson Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48528

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
9-15-2021 
State v. Fukji Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48640 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
COLLIN SKIP H. FUKUJI, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Nos. 48640-2021 & 48641-2021 
 
Cassia County Case Nos. 
CR16-20-3935 & CR16-20-3977 
 
           
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Collin Skip H. Fukuji failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Fukuji Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
Cassia County Sheriff’s Deputies were surveilling Collin Fukuji in August of 2020.  (Conf. 
Ex., p.2.)  Over the course of several days they saw Fukuji associating with individuals under 
Electronically Filed
9/15/2021 1:31 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
investigation for drug crimes, and, and one point, in a car parked by a house under “active federal 
investigation” for drug trafficking.  (Id.) 
On August 13, 2020, an officer saw Fukuji, who himself “had been charged recently in 
Nevada” for trafficking, leave the home of an individual with an active drug delivery case.  (Conf. 
Ex., p.3.)  The officer observed Fukuji fail to signal on two occasions.  After the officer attempted 
to initiate a traffic stop, Fukuji “failed to pull over and a pursuit started.”  (Id.)  As the 17-minute 
chase went on, Fukuji threw what appeared to be clear baggies out of the driver’s side window, 
ran “numerous stop lights and stop signs,” and hit another vehicle after attempting to pass it.  (Id.)  
Fukuji did not stop after hitting the vehicle; instead “he powered through the accident and kept 
going.”  (Id.) 
Fukuji drove to the Kodiak America manufacturing building, where he was formerly 
employed, and ran inside.  (Conf. Ex., pp.3, 10.)  As Fukuji ran through the building he threw “a 
black case across the floor to another employee,” who hid the case on a shelf.  (Conf. Ex., p.4.)  
After officers arrested Fukuji they recovered the black case and searched it, and found “two glass 
pipes with white residue and a clear baggie containing a white crystal-like substance weighing 1.7 
gram,” which tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine.  (Id.)  Officers also searched 
Fukuji’s vehicle and recovered a loaded AR-15, a Sig Sauer 1911 handgun, multiple loaded 
magazines, a digital scale with residue, multiple plastic baggies, and “[s]everal other weapons 
including a baton, brass knuckles, a large bowie knife, a [balaclava], and tactical gloves.”  (Id.) 
The state charged Fukuji with one count of felony leaving the scene of an injury accident 
in case no. CR16-20-3977.  (48641 R., pp.25-27.)  In case no. CR16-20-3935, now consolidated 
on appeal (see 48640 R., p.106; 48641 R., p.92), the state charged Fukuji with felony fleeing or 
attempting to elude an officer, possession of methamphetamine, felony concealment or destruction 
 3 
of evidence, possession of paraphernalia, and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing an officer.  
(48640 R., pp.23-26.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Fukuji pleaded guilty to felony 
eluding in case no. CR16-20-3935, and every other charge in that case was dropped.  (48640 R., 
pp.40-56.)  Fukuji also pleaded guilty to felony leaving the scene of an accident.  (48641 R., pp.34-
50.)  The district court sentenced Fukuji to five years, with one year fixed, in the eluding case, and 
a consecutive five years, with one year fixed, in the leaving the scene case.  (48640 R., pp.64-67; 
48641 R., pp.54-59.)  The court retained jurisdiction in both cases.  (48640 R., p.67; 48641 R., 
p.57.)  Fukuji timely appealed.  (48640 R., pp.85-87, 101-05; 48641 R., pp.70-72, 87-90.) 
 Fukuji argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-9.)  Review of the record and application of the 
relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion. 
 
B. Legal Standard 
 
 Where “a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear 
abuse of discretion by the court imposing the sentence.”  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 
P.3d 621, 628 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant must 
show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is reasonable 
if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve 
any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  Id.  The district court 
has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon 
the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 
(1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, 
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “‘In deference to the 
trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
 4 
might differ.’”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 
139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).  “Furthermore, ‘[a] sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.’”  
Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)). 
 
C. Fukuji Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
Fukuji argues the lower court “did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards” 
when it sentenced him because it “did not adequately consider mitigating factors.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.7.)  Specifically, Fukuji claims the court “did not give adequate consideration” to his prior 
criminal history, his “remorse and acceptance of responsibility,” and his “support from his friends 
and family.”   (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) 
These arguments fail.  The district court understood the “goals of sentencing” and the 
criteria for placing defendants on probation, and it reviewed the PSI and the “attached letters from 
[Fukuji’s] parents, former employer,” and ex-wife.  (1/11/21 Tr., p.22, L.3 – p.23, L.4.)  And the 
court considered all of the mitigating evidence on offer, including Fukuji’s prior history, his 
“meaningful” remorseful comments made at sentencing, and his family and community support.  
(1/11/21 Tr., p.22, L.8 – p.28, L.15.)  Indeed, the court noted that it was “incredible how well 
respected” Fukuji was.  (1/11/21 Tr., p.24, Ls.19-20.) 
Nevertheless, the court also understood that Fukuji committed serious crimes.  Fukuji was 
fleeing from police, running red lights and stop signs, when he caused a car accident (from which 
he also fled).  (Conf. Ex., p.3.)  One of the passengers in the car Fukuji hit was a “young man being 
dropped off at football practice,” who ended up in the hospital.  (1/11/21 Tr., p.24, Ls.7-9; Conf. 
Ex., p.5.)  Fukuji had methamphetamine, loaded firearms, tactical gloves, a balaclava, drug 
paraphernalia, and a cache of other weapons in his car at the time of his arrest.  (Id.)  
 5 
And while true that Fukuji’s former employer spoke highly of him, that support letter also 
demonstrated a concerning downward spiral that preceded the arrest.  Kodiak America’s general 
manager reported that Fukuji “became associated with a local motorcycle gang” after his divorce.  
(Conf. Ex., p.20.)  “[H]e started using drugs,” started missing work, “became more angry and 
belligerent with his crew members,” and “seemed to be coming apart at the seams.”  (Id.)  Fukuji 
was given “chance after chance to recover and shape up” to no avail; “it became obvious that his 
drug dependency was destroying his [judgment], his commitment, his behavior and his character.”  
(Id.)  “Some concluding incidences of anger and violence toward another Kodiak employee” were 
the last straws that led to Fukuji’s termination.  (Id.) 
The same worsening trend can be seen in Fukuji’s criminal history.  Fukuji went from 
having only one decade-old misdemeanor on his record, to accruing the two felonies in the instant 
case, as well being charged with felony drug trafficking in Nevada.  (Conf. Ex., pp.12-13.)  The 
PSI also notes there “was a threat report from July 16, 2020, where [Fukuji] was the suspect in a 
possible threat,” and had commented that “he had purchased an AR-15 rifle.”  (Conf. Ex., p.3.)  
And in this case, Fukuji violated his conditions of release by having prohibited contact with his 
ex-wife.  (Conf. Ex., p.13.)  That is particularly troubling because, on August 5, 2020, Fukuji and 
his ex-wife “had been in a domestic” situation, “where he used or had a firearm resulting in a 
protection order being issued out of Cassia County.”  (Conf. Ex., p.3.)  According to his ex-wife’s 
request for that order, Fukuji had “threatened to kill her and himself.”  (Conf. Ex., p.8.)   
 Thus, the district court well considered the mitigating factors before it, but properly 
weighed those against the aggravating factors.  (1/11/21 Tr., p.22, L.3 – p.25, L.12.)  The court 
also correctly perceived that protection of society was the “number one,” “paramount concern,” 
and in light of all the facts, concluded that a lesser sentence “would depreciate the seriousness of 
 6 
the offense.”  (1/11/21 Tr., p.22, L.5 – p.25, L.12.)  And Idaho’s appellate courts do “not presume 
the district court did not consider the information before it, as the district court said it did,” nor 
will they “reweigh the evidence on appeal from a discretionary sentencing decision.”  State v. 
Deboer, 168 Idaho 520, 484 P.3d 204, 208 (Ct. App. 2021) (citing State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 
873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011)).  This Court should not do so here. 
Finally, the presentence investigator recommended, “based on the level of assessed need 
and risk, and other protective factors,” that Fukuji “be sentenced to a period of retained 
jurisdiction.”  (Conf. Ex., p.14.)  Given that recommendation, and the record that well supported 
it, the district court reasonably concluded that a retained jurisdiction—which offered classes, skills 
for Fukuji to learn, and “a forced period of sobriety”—was appropriate.  (1/11/21 Tr., p.27, L.21 
– p.28, L.2.)  In light of the facts of this case and the information in the record Fukuji fails to show 
the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Fukuji’s judgment of conviction and 
sentence.  
DATED this 15th day of September, 2021. 
 
 
  /s/  Kale D. Gans 
KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of September, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of 
iCourt File and Serve: 
 
BEN P. McGREEVY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
  /s/  Kale D. Gans 
KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
KDG/dd  
 


State v. Fukji Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48640

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
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Chambers v. Idaho Board of Pharmacy and Agency Appellant's 
Reply Brief Dckt. 48657 
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Electronically Filed
8/2/2021 9:24 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
CINDY A. CHAMBERS 
Appellant, 
vs. 
IDAHO BOARD OF PHARMACY 
AND AGENCY, 
Respondents. 
Supreme Court o. 48657-2021 
District Court No. CVO 1-20-8575 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County. 
The Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge, presiding. 
Bernadette C. Buentgen, ISB# 4674 
Attorney at Law 
4130 N. Sage Hill Lane, 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Telephone: (208) 724-2224 
Email: lawofficebb@gmail.com 
Attorney for Appellant 
ll Page 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
Andrew J. Snook, ISB #7761 
Chief, Contracts and Administrative Law 
Division 
Alexandra Anne Breshears, ISB #10038 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-4525 
Email: ali.breshears@ag.idaho.gov 
Attorney for Respondent 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Appellant stands by the arguments presented in her brief. Appellant and Respondent 
disagree on the legal standard of review required in this matter. Appellant responds below to 
issues of law and fact raised in Respondent's Reply Brief. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Idaho law mandates Respondent pay attorney fees and cost to Appellant as the 
prevailing party in the underlying action. Respondent argues Appellant's request for attorney 
fees and costs is untimely, therefore she is barred from recovering her attorney fees. 
However, Appellant, in her Verified Answer to Administrative Complaint, dated April 4, 
2019, requested attorney fees and costs. Thus, Respondent was notified as early as April 
2019, Appellant, as prevailing party, was entitled to attorney fees and cost. The Declaration 
of Bernadette Buentgen and Request for Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Costs was basically 
an invoice. R. Page 32-35. The Declaration was not the initial request for attorney fees, but a 
detailed statement of the time spent and the attorney's hourly rate. Respondent was aware 
Appellant was entitled to her attorney fees as early April 11, 2019. Idaho law mandates the 
payment of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party. A delay in receiving the invoice 
and payment causes no damage or prejudice to the Respondent. 
Respondent inaccurately contends after 2017 there are no supporting facts regarding 
Appellant's attorney's health concerns and extreme fatigue. The Declaration of Bernadette 
Buentgen states under penalty of perjury she is immune compromised and suffers from 
extreme fatigue. R. page 52-55. Given the extreme fatigue and compromised immune system 
Bernadette was required to prioritize her time and energy accordingly. Respondent presents 
21 Page 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
no evidence to contradict these statements. During the time in question, Bernadette was 
suffering from Bullous Pemphigoid a very rare autoimmune disease. Prior to the diagnosis 
there was a concern of graft versus host disease (GVHD). GVHD is a serious medical 
condition. Although leukemia cells haven't been detected since May 2014, the stem cell 
transplant in and of itself has continuing medical concerns and issues associated with it. 
These concerns will remain an issue for the remainder of Bernadette's life. She continues to 
have regular visits with her oncologist and received medical care during the period of time in 
question (May 2019 until present.) Her doctors monitor her for leukemia and GVHD. In 
2020, a biopsy was performed at the University of Utah. The biopsy confirmed the extreme 
fatigue, skin and gum problems were caused by an autoimmune disease. Discussions between 
the University of Utah, Long Term Care for Stem Cell Transplants in Seattle, her local 
dermatologist, and her local oncologist determined the diagnosis was not GVHD. She 
currently is receiving treatment for Bullous Pernphigoid. She will be receiving an infusion of 
Rituxan on August 6, 2021, and again on August 20, 2021. The August 6th treatment will be 
her fifth infusion. 
Appellant submits the medical issues and extreme fatigue alone justifies an extension 
of time to fi le the declaration for attorney fees. The fact there is no prejudice to Respondent 
caused by a delay is a necessary fact in determining "good cause" and abuse of discretion by 
the Board. Respondent benefits from the delay in paying Appellant's attorney fees and costs. 
Appellant respectfully request the Court reverse the district court ru ling and find good 
cause exists to justify any delay in payment of attorney fees. Additionally, the board applied 
the incorrect standard of review; prejudice to Respondent must be found. Appellant's 
attorney's medical condition requires reasonable accommodations, including but not limited 
3j Page 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
to, a delay in providing the board with an invoice for attorney fees. Pursuant to Idaho law 
Appellant is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Dated: August 2, 2021 
Bernadette C. Buentgen, Attorney for Appellant 
41 Page 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY on August 2, 2021 , a true and correct copy of Appellant's Reply 
Brief was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a 
Notice of Electronic Filing to the following: 
Alexandra Anne Breshears, ISB #10038 
Deputy Attorney General 
ali.breshears@ag.idaho.gov 
SI Page 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
Bernadette C. Buentgen, Attorney for Appellant 


Chambers v. Idaho Board of Pharmacy and Agency Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 48657

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State v. Peevy Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48752 
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1
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10999
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO.  48752-2021
)
v. ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2015-18366
)
KELLIE MARIE PEEVY, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kellie Peevy appeals from the district court’s order revoking her probation and executing
her underlying sentence. She argues the district court abused its discretion when it revoked her
probation.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
After Ms. Peevy pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, the district court imposed a sentence of seven
years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction (a “rider”). (R., pp.41-43.) After
Electronically Filed
9/8/2021 12:27 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
2
successfully completing a rider, Ms. Peevy was put on probation for seven years in January
2017. (R., pp.46-51.)
Ms. Peevy admitted to violating probation in August 2020, and the district court
reinstated probation for seven years, with the requirement that she fully comply with, and
successfully complete, Mental Health Court. (R., pp.94, 99-104.)
The State filed another motion for probation violation in February 2021. (R., pp.105-09.)
Ms. Peevy admitted to violating probation by failing to report for Mental Health Court. (Tr., p.5,
L.19 – p.6, L.20.)
At the disposition hearing in April 2021, the State recommended that the district court
revoke Ms. Peevy’s probation and execute her underlying sentence. (Tr., p.9, Ls.20-23.) Defense
counsel recommended the district court reinstate Ms. Peevy’s probation. (Tr., p.10, Ls.2-25.) The
district court revoked Ms. Peevy’s probation and executed her underlying sentence of seven
years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.13, Ls.24-25; R., pp.120-22.)
Ms. Peevy timely appealed from the order revoking probation. (R., pp.123-25.) She also
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion with no new information. (R., pp.127-29.) The district
court denied this motion in May 2021.1 (R., p.133.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Peevy’s probation and executed
her underlying sentence of seven years, with two years fixed?
1 Ms. Peevy is not challenging the order denying her Rule 35 motion in this appeal.
3
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Peevy’s Probation And Executed
Her Underlying Sentence Of Seven Years, With Two Years Fixed
Idaho’s appellate courts use a two-step analysis to review a district court’s decision to
revoke probation. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, this Court must determine
“whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f it is determined that
the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation,” the Court examines “what should
be the consequences of that violation.” Id. The determination of a probation violation and the
determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Ms. Peevy does not challenge her admissions to violating her probation. (Tr., p.5,
L.19 – p.6, L.20.) Rather, she argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her
probation.
After a probation violation has been proven, “[a] district court’s decision to revoke
probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.”
Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105. “When reviewing a lower court’s decision for an abuse of discretion,
this Court must analyze ‘whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.’” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019). Here, Ms. Peevy
contends the district court failed to exercise reason in revoking her probation and executing her
sentence.
 Ms. Peevy has battled substance abuse issues the majority of her life.
She reported that she first smoked marijuana when she was  and first drank
alcohol when she was  (PSI, pp.40, 192.) Ms. Peevy stated that her oldest
4
brother has “always used meth,” and he was the one who first gave her methamphetamine. (PSI,
pp.40, 188.) She explained that she started to use methamphetamine regularly after the stillbirth
of her son in 2014. (PSI, p.29.) She stated, “I felt as if I couldn’t go on in my life after the death
of my child and the drug numbed my pain.” (PSI, p.29.) In 2015, Ms. Peevy was diagnosed with
amphetamine dependence with physiological symptoms. (PSI, pp.20, 30, 47.)
 Ms. Peevy recognizes the detrimental effect that substance abuse has had on her life and
on her family. (See PSI, pp.29, 40, 193.) She acknowledged that using methamphetamine was the
biggest mistake she ever made, and admitted that it has destroyed everything in her life. (PSI,
p.29.) At the disposition hearing, Ms. Peevy apologized to the district court, and stated: “I want
to change my life for me and my kids. This is not something I want to continue going – coming
back and doing.” (Tr., p.11, L.17 – p.12, L.1.)
In addition to substance abuse, Ms. Peevy has also struggled with mental health issues
from a young age. Ms. Peevy described her childhood as “depressing,” and explained that she
was sexually and physically abused by her mother’s ex-boyfriend from 
 (PSI, p.188.) As a result of the abuse, Ms. Peevy suffers from tremors and post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (PSI, pp.191-92.) When she was  Ms. Peevy
was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and was prescribed
Ritalin and Concerta to help with the symptoms. (PSI, p.190.) At , she was diagnosed
with bipolar disorder, chronic depression, PTSD, and anxiety. (PSI, pp.36-38, 190.) Ms. Peevy
reported that she contemplated suicide when she was  as a result of the abuse
she suffered from her mother’s ex-boyfriend. (PSI, p.192.)
In this case, Ms. Peevy’s probation violation does not evidence any threat to the
community. Although she violated her probation by failing to attend Mental Health Court in
5
Canyon County, she did not do so intentionally. At the disposition hearing, Ms. Peevy explained
to the district court that she was not residing in Canyon County, and was not given any
information on where or when she needed to report for Mental Health Court. (Tr., p.11, Ls.8-15.)
Despite her serious substance abuse and mental health issues, Ms. Peevy has shown a willingness
to try to overcome her addiction and get treatment for her mental health issues. Prior to
disposition, Ms. Peevy applied for, and was accepted into, the Rising Sun Sober living facility,
and she obtained employment. (PSI, p.200; Tr., p.10, Ls.10-13.) She also has a doctor in the
community to assist her with psychiatric intervention as well as grief counseling. (Tr., p.10,
Ls.14-20.) Furthermore, through her defense counsel, Ms. Peevy submitted a detailed probation
plan to the district court that involves attending Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous meetings, a crisis intervention plan, her future goals and how she plans to achieve
them, and a list of sober individuals she can rely on for support. (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-10.)
In light of these facts, Ms. Peevy submits that the district court did not exercise reason,
and therefore abused its discretion, when it revoked her probation and executed her underlying
sentence. She submits the district court should have continued or reinstated her probation in
order to allow her an opportunity to meaningfully participate in Mental Health Court.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Peevy respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order revoking
her probation and remand her case to the district court for an order reinstating her probation.
DATED this 8th day of September, 2021.
/s/ Kiley A. Heffner
KILEY A. HEFFNER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of September, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
  /s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAH/eas


State v. Peevy Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 48752

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Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
10-4-2021 
State v. Yehle Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48515 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
ERICA LEE YEHLE, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
NO. 48515-2020 
 
 
 
Canyon County Case No.  
CR14-19-12761 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Erica Lee Yehle failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by declining 
to place her on probation? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Yehle Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In June of 2019, authorities responded to a disturbance involving Erica Lee Yehle and 
Jaden Bautista.  (PSI, p. 1.)  Jaden advised that Yehle had left the residence.  (PSI, p. 1.)  Nampa 
police located Yehle, and noticed that she appeared to be under the influence of a stimulant.  (PSI, 
Electronically Filed
10/4/2021 4:43 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
p. 1.)  Yehle continuously tried to pull items out of her purse, despite officers telling her to stop 
reaching in her purse.  (PSI, p. 1.)  Officers took her purse, and learned that Yehle had multiple 
arrest warrants.  (PSI, p. 1.)  As authorities detained Yehle, she tried to pull her arms away and 
dropped to the ground.  (PSI, pp. 1-2.)  When Yehle rolled over, officers found a meth pipe where 
Yehle’s chest had been laying.  (PSI, p. 2.)  The white crystal substance in the pipe tested 
presumptive positive for methamphetamine.  (PSI, p. 2.)   
The state charged Yehle with one count of possession of a controlled substance, with a 
persistent violator enhancement as part two of the information, and one count of possession of 
drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp. 22-26.)  Yehle was given pre-trial release on bond, but failed to report 
for testing on seven occasions.  (R., pp. 19, 34-35, 38, 45.) When Yehle failed to appear for trial 
the district court issued a bench warrant and the state filed an affidavit of pretrial noncompliance.  
(R., pp. 41-3.)   
After her arrest on the warrant Yehle pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, 
the state agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia charge and the persistent violator enhancement, and 
the district court released Yehle on her own recognizance to pretrial services.  (R., pp. 47-48, 50-
51.)  Yehle failed to sign-up for the pretrial program, failed to attend three interviews for her 
presentence investigation, and failed to appear for her sentencing hearing.  (R., pp. 62-66.)  The 
district court issued another bench warrant and, after Yehle’s arrest, release Yehle to pretrial 
services.  (R., pp. 67, 71, 82.)  The district court reordered a presentence investigation, and Yehle 
failed to attend another three appointments for her PSI and her second sentencing hearing.  (R., 
pp. 87-88, 93.)   
 3 
The district court eventually sentenced Yehle to two years indeterminate for possession of 
a controlled substance, credited her for 147 days served, and Yehle filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 
111-113, 125-127, 135-139.)   
On appeal, Yehle argues that “the district court abused its discretion when it rejected the 
joint recommendations for probation and left that determination to the parole board instead.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)  Yehle has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
declining to place her on probation. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to place a defendant on probation is a matter within the sound discretion of 
the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  State v. 
Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 684, 417 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted).  Rehabilitation 
and public safety are dual goals of probation.  State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 114, 426 P.3d 
461, 465 (2018).  A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is 
consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 
P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. 
App. 1982)). In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts 
a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.”  State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 
 
 
 4 
C. Yehle Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
The record shows the district court perceived its discretion, acted within the boundaries of 
its discretion, employed the correct legal standards to the issue before it, and acted reasonably and 
within the scope of its discretion.   
At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted, “The presentence investigation report 
emphasizes Ms. Yehle has done two retained jurisdictions, she’s never successfully completed a 
probation, and has a significant and substantial record.”  (Tr., p. 17, L. 24 – p. 18, L. 3.)  The 
district court “considered the PSI, the other evaluations, the recommendation of the attorneys, and 
defendant’s statement,” and stated it has “great concerns about Ms. Yehle’s ability to complete 
probation.  She can’t even appear for presentence investigation interviews.  She never completed 
probation . . . .”  (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 4-10.)  The district court stated that it did not “think that placing 
her on probation at this time is an appropriate resolution to meet the sentencing goals of protection 
of society, deterrence to her and to others, rehabilitation, and punishment or retribution.”  (Tr., p. 
18, Ls. 11-15.)  The district court recognized “this is a possession case, simple possession case that 
she has plead guilty,” and “determined in order to try to reach those sentencing goals, generally in 
order to try to obtain rehabilitation rather than try the same things that have failed before,” it would 
“impose an indeterminate sentence of two years.”  (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 16-24.)  The district court stated 
that “this is the best way to try to achieve rehabilitation for the defendant.”  (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 2-3.)   
Yehle argues that the mitigating factors—that her conduct did not cause or threaten harm, 
obtaining two sober living program spots, acceptance of responsibility and willingness to pay 
restitution—show an abuse of discretion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)  Yehle’s argument does not 
show an abuse of discretion.  Her LSI score is thirty-eight, placing Yehle in the high risk to 
reoffend category.  (PSI, p. 3.)  Yehle’s extensive criminal history consists of probation violations 
 5 
in eight different criminal cases.  (PSI, pp. 3, 10-16.)  In March of 2020, Boise police found 
methamphetamine in Yehle’s bra, resulting in another felony charge.  (PSI, p. 19.)  In April of 
2020, Boise police arrested Yehle for felony driving under the influence.  (PSI, p. 19.)   
The presentence investigator stated that “Yehle has a long history of non-compliance while 
on probation/parole.  She has failed to show for Court appearances almost since the inception of 
her criminal record that now spans more than two decades.”  (PSI, p. 21.)  The presentence 
investigator stated that Yehle “rationalized her behaviors and often took a victim-stance.  Most 
concerning is the defendant’s inability to see the error in her ways.  She has demonstrated she is 
not willing to honestly examine her destructive behaviors and it is questionable if she truly feels 
she needs to change her behaviors.”  (PSI, p. 21.)  The presentence investigator determined Yehle 
“is not a candidate for community supervision at this juncture,” based upon “her continued 
thinking errors, substance abuse problems, continued reckless criminal lifestyle, her poor history 
on community supervision, and her complete non-compliance with the PSI process.”  (PSI, p. 21.)  
The presentences investigator stated “she has already completed two periods of retained 
jurisdictions and was denied Drug Court,” and recommended that Yehle “serve a period of 
incarceration under the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction.”  (PSI, p. 21.)   
Yehle’s failure to comply with pretrial release services, the presentence investigation, and 
failures to appear for court hearings show that she is not a suitable candidate for community 
supervision.  Her consecutive arrests for possession of methamphetamine and driving under the 
influence shows that she presents a risk to society, and that her conduct does in fact threaten harm.  
Yehle’s criminal history and LSI score show that there is undue risk that she would commit another 
crime during the period of a suspended sentence.  As the district court determined, attempts to 
 6 
rehabilitated Yehle outside custody simply have not worked. Yehle has failed to show that the 
district court abused its discretion by not placing her on probation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 4th day of October, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of October, 2021, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt 
File and Serve: 
 
BRIAN R. DICKSON  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                          /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


State v. Yehle Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 48515

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State v. Beck Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48780 
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 1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
MARK A. KUBINSKI 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
Email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
 
ROBERT SHAWN BECK, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
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NO. 48780-2021 
 
 
 
Kootenai County Case No.  
CR28-18-10612 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF 
 
 
 Has Robert Shawn Beck failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion? 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Beck Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
In July of 2018, an Idaho State Police trooper conducted a traffic stop on Robert Shawn 
Beck.  (R., p. 15.)  The trooper noticed Beck appeared to be intoxicated, and Beck admitted to 
drinking a shot of Rumplemintz and a Keystone Ice beer.  (R., p. 15.)  Beck failed a field sobriety 
Electronically Filed
11/19/2021 11:44 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
 2 
test and submitted to a breath test, yielding results of .262 and .255 BrAC.  (R., p. 15.)  The state 
charged Beck with one count of felony operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, and a 
persistent violator enhancement as part three of the information.  (R., pp. 35-37.)  Beck pleaded 
guilty to felony DUI, and the state agreed to dismiss the persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp. 
40-44.)  The district court sentenced Beck to ten years, with six years determinate, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 45-47.)  Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed 
Beck on probation for a period of ten years.  (R., pp. 50-51.)   
In August of 2020, the state filed an interstate compact report of violations, alleging that 
Beck had been found in possession of a meth pipe, with methamphetamine in the pipe.  (R., p. 57.)  
Beck also received numerous citations for a trailer he pulled with his vehicle, possessed a 
marijuana pipe and marijuana, and absconded supervision.  (R., pp. 58-59.)  Beck admitted to 
violating his probation by absconding supervision, and the district court retained jurisdiction again.  
(R., pp. 82-85.)  Beck then filed an untimely Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied.  (R., 
pp. 90-96.)   
During his second rider, Beck’s conduct raised significant concern from IDOC staff.  
Beck’s case manager stated that Beck “received a surging number of corrective actions,” which 
“is an indicator that his level of willingness is not conducive to abiding by his terms of 
supervision.”  (APSI, p. 8 (citations to electronic file named “Appeal Confidential Volume 1 06-
25-2021 . . .”).)  The case manager stated “Beck demonstrated a considerable level of good person 
addictive thinking patterns.  This is where Mr. Beck uses his good deeds as justification for rule-
violating behavior.  When confronted, he reported that he was only conveying the facts. 
Additionally he also minimized his negative behavior to an alarming point.”  (APSI, p. 8.)  The 
case manager stated that “Beck sees himself as a role model in his living unit; however, the staff 
 3 
who work on the unit do not agree with Mr. Beck’s self-assessment.  Mr. Beck’s level of 
overconfidence is also likely to present problems on probation ….”  (APSI, p. 8.)  After completing 
the APSI, the case manager submitted an update letter to notify the district court of new 
information regarding Beck’s conduct.  (APSI, p. 1.)  Beck took items from the school he had been 
tutoring at, and lied about receiving permission to take the items.  (APSI, p. 1.)  The case manager 
stated that Beck “is more interested in creating a façade of following the rules and communicating 
honestly with staff rather than upholding the level of integrity that is necessary to be successful 
both at NICI and in the community.”  (APSI, p. 1.)   
Following Beck’s second period of retained jurisdiction in this case, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction, executed the underlying sentence, and credited Beck with 478 days 
served.  (R., pp. 99-100.)  Beck filed another Rule 35 motion, asking the district court to allow him 
to return to a retained jurisdiction, or to reduce the fixed portion of his sentence.  (R., pp. 102-
103.)  The district court denied Beck’s Rule 35 motion, and Beck filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 
111-119.)   
On appeal, Beck argues that “the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 2.1)  Beck has failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 
motion.   
 
  
                                            
1 The state does not dispute Beck’s assertion that the district court had jurisdiction to rule on the 
Rule 35 motion filed after relinquishment of jurisdiction where the prior motion, filed after 
revocation of probation, was untimely.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 4.) 
 4 
B. Standard Of Review   
The decision to place a defendant on probation is a matter within the sound discretion of 
the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  State v. 
Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 684, 417 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted).  Rehabilitation 
and public safety are dual goals of probation.  State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 114, 426 P.3d 
461, 465 (2018).  A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is 
consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 
P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. 
App. 1982)). 
“If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 
35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.”  State 
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  In evaluating whether a lower court 
abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the 
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”  State v. 
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). The record shows the district court perceived its 
discretion, acted within that discretion, applied the correct legal standards, and reached its decision 
by the exercise of reason. 
 
C. Beck Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
“In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 
 5 
motion.”  State v. Yang, 167 Idaho 944, 949, 477 P.3d 998, 1003 (Ct. App. 2020).  “In conducting 
our review of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the 
same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.”  State v. Del 
Critchfield, 167 Idaho 650, 654, 474 P.3d 1247, 1251 (Ct. App. 2020).   
In the district court’s memorandum decision and order denying Beck’s second Rule 35 
motion, the district court stated that “Beck has not set forth any new evidence that could be adduced 
at hearing on an I.C.R. 35 motion.  Beck’s attached letter provides no evidence.  It simply explains 
that he was mad while on his retained jurisdiction, which explains nothing about why Beck cannot 
be honest.”  (R., p. 114.)  Beck provided no evidence that he “is any more likely to perform 
appropriately on an additional period of retained jurisdiction at this time, as compared to when he 
started his second period of retained jurisdiction.  In fact, the evidence is just the opposite.”  (R., 
p. 114.)  The district court noted the APSI report of actions taken to correct becks behavior and 
stated “Beck’s disciplinary problems increased toward the end of his period of retained 
jurisdiction.  In a prison-based program where Beck in a controlled environment can focus on his 
myriad problems, Beck chooses to behave worse as time goes on.”  (R., p. 114.)  The district court 
noted that after its initial “tepid” recommendation of probation, IDOC issued a follow-up report 
changing its recommendation in light of Beck’s ongoing bad behavior.  (R., p. 114; compare PSI 
p. 6 (March 19, 2021 APSI recommending probation) with PSI, p. 1 (April 7, 2021, reversing 
recommendation after Beck stole school supplies and lied about it).)   
The district court stated it had ordered the first retained jurisdiction rather than probation 
“due to the severity of his crime and his lengthy criminal record” and the “risk to the public of 
placing Beck on probation.”  (R., pp. 114-115.)  Beck “performed well enough to convince [the 
district court] he was an acceptable risk to be placed on probation.  However, that was proven 
 6 
wrong when Beck then absconded probation.”  (R., p. 115.)  The district court determined “Beck 
made many choices that prove that he is not a good candidate for probation and that he is not an 
acceptable risk to the public to be placed on probation.”  (R., p. 115.)  Ultimately, the sentence 
was appropriate “given Beck’s social and criminal history and the crime for which the sentence 
was imposed.”  (PSI, p. 115.)  “Any lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of Beck’s 
crime.”  (R., pp. 115.)   
Beck argues that the mitigating factors—completion of programs and positive notes while 
on his rider, and the original recommendation from the NICI—show an abuse of discretion, and 
merit Beck being placed back on probation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)  Beck also argues that his 
change in perspective towards his programming shows the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his Rule 35 motion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.)  Beck’s arguments do not show an abuse 
of discretion.   
Beck’s continued criminal conduct while on probation, in conjunction with his negative 
performance during his second rider, show that he is not amenable to alternative treatment, and he 
is not a suitable candidate for community supervision.  Beck’s failure to abide by the terms of his 
probation and rider shows that there is an undue risk he will reoffend without a significant term of 
incarceration.  A reduction of sentence in this case would depreciate the seriousness of Beck’s 
felony DUI conviction.  The instant offense threatened significant harm, and the sentence imposed 
provides appropriate deterrent and punishment to Beck.  Beck has exhausted the district court’s 
options for alternative treatment, and the district court’s disposition in this case provides 
appropriate protection to society.  Beck has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion.   
 
  
 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 DATED this 19th day of November, 2021. 
 
 
        /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ZACHARI S. HALLETT 
      Paralegal 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of November, 2021, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of 
iCourt File and Serve: 
 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN  
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
documents@sapd.state.id.us 
 
 
 
                                                                          /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen  
                                                                        KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
                                                                        Deputy Attorney General 
 


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