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Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation
No full textNational audienceThis paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality
The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
No full textInternational audienceTo assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers’ applications in France, we estimate teachers preferences and perform a counterfactual analysis. The results show that these mechanisms perform much better than the modified version of deferred acceptance. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than triples under our mechanism
Évaluation d'impact de la bascule du Crédit d'impôt pour la compétitivité et l'emploi (CICE) en allègement de cotisations employeur
No full textLe Crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité et l’emploi (CICE), mis en place en 2013, avait pour objectif de stimuler l’emploi et la compétitivité des entreprises en baissant le coût du travail des salariés rémunérés moins de 2,5 fois le Smic. En 2018, cette réduction du coût du travail était égale à 6 % du salaire brut des salariés éligibles. Elle était opérée par un crédit d’impôt sur les sociétés effectif à partir de l’année suivante.Le CICE a eu des effets très modestes pour l’emploi. Une des explications avancées était que, par sa nature de crédit d’impôt, la réduction du coût du travail associée était décalée dans le temps par rapport au versement des salaires, et potentiellement mal prise en compte lors des décisions d’embauche et de salaires.En 2019, le CICE a été transformé en un allègement de cotisations employeur. Le mode de calcul et le montant de la réduction sont inchangés ; en revanche, la réduction apparaît désormais dans les calculs du coût du travail et devient effective immédiatement.Ce rapport présente des premiers résultats, pour les années 2019 et 2020, des effets de cette réforme tant sur les politiques salariales des entreprises que sur l’emploi et les performances de celles-ci
Mesurer le racisme, vaincre les discriminations
No full textInternational audienceDisons-le d'emblée : aucun pays n'a inventé de système parfait permettant de lutter contre le racisme et les discriminations. L’enjeu est d’imaginer un nouveau modèle, transnational et universaliste, qui replace la politique antidiscriminatoire dans le cadre plus général d’une politique sociale et économique à visée égalitaire et universelle, et qui assume la réalité du racisme et des discriminations – pour se donner les moyens de les mesurer et de les corriger, sans pour autant figer les identités, qui sont toujours plurielles et multiples
Investir dans l’éducation : oui, mais comment ?
No full textNational audienceRegards croisés d’une économiste et d’une sociologue sur l’investissement éducatif. Est-il toujours profitable, à la fois à chacun et à la société dans son ensemble ? L’enseignement supérieur est-il prioritaire ? Quelles compétences privilégier
Everyday econometricians: Selection neglect and overoptimism when learning from others
No full textThere are many important decision problems where learning through experimentation is costly or impossible. In these situations, individuals may try to learn from observing the outcomes of others who have made similar decisions. Often, however, information about others comprises a selected dataset, as outcomes are observed conditional on specific choices having been made. In this paper, we design an investment game which allows us to study the influence of selection when learning from others. Using the theoretical study of selection neglect in Jehiel (2018) as a guide, we test (i) for the presence of selection neglect in this investment context, and (ii) some comparative static predictions of the model. We find strong evidence for selection neglect-even though subjects are fully informed about the data generating process. As theoretically predicted, the degree of bias due to selection neglect increases when other decision makers become more informed, or become more rational. It decreases when signals are correlated
(Re)construire ensemble
No full textInternational audienceDébat sur les impacts économiques, sociaux, architecturaux et littéraires des migrations avec l’architecte Mohamed Adel Dessouki et l’écrivain Alaa Khale
Why and when coalitions split? An alternative analytical approach with an application to environmental agreements
No full textWe use a parsimonious two-stage differential game setting where the duration of the first stage, the coalition stage, depends on the will of a particular player to leave the coalition through an explicit timing variable. By specializing in a standard linear-quadratic environmental model augmented with a minimal constitutional setting for the coalition (payoff share parameter), we are able to analytically extract several nontrivial findings. Three key aspects drive the results: the technological gap as an indicator of heterogeneity across players, the constitution of the coalition and the intensity of the public bad (here, the pollution damage). We provide with a full analytical solution to the two-stage differential game. In particular, we characterize the intermediate parametric cases leading to optimal finite time splitting. A key characteristic of these finite-time-lived coalitions is the requirement of the payoff share accruing to the splitting country to be large enough. Incidentally, our two-stage differential game setting reaches the conclusion that splitting countries are precisely those which use to benefit the most from the coalition. Constraining the payoff share to be low by Constitution may lead to optimal everlasting coalitions only provided initial pollution is high enough, which may cover the emergency cases we are witnessing nowadays
Subjective Return Expectations, Perceptions, and Portfolio Choice
No full textInternational audienceExploiting a representative sample of the French population by age, wealth, and asset classes, we document novel facts about their expectations and perceptions of stock market returns. Both expectations and perceptions of returns are very dispersed, significantly lower than their data counterparts, and a substantial portion of the variation in the former is explained by dispersion in the latter. Consistent with portfolio choice models under incomplete information, a conditional risk-return trade-off explains the intensive margin, while at the extensive margin, only expected returns matter. Despite accounting for survey measurement error in subjective return expectations, ’muted sensitivities’ at both portfolio choice margins obtain, getting consistently (i) bigger when excluding informed non-participants, and (ii) smaller, for inertial and professionally delegated portfolios