Portail HAL Paris School of Economics (PSE)
Not a member yet
5677 research outputs found
Sort by
La fiscalité verte, une mise en œuvre inégale
No full textNational audienceLa fiscalité verte, une mise en œuvre inégale
Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention
No full textInternational audienceCommunication between individuals often involves two types of dual activities. On social media such as Facebook, for example, users produce content (posts) and pay attention to their friends' posts. These activities are dual as a user is more inclined to produce posts the more friends react to them and is more inclined to dedicate attention to a friend's posts the more numerous these posts are. This paper builds and analyzes a simple game with dual activities and dedicated attention when agents communicate through a follower-influencer network (say, X-Twitter). Equilibria can be multiple, each characterized by its attention network, which describes who pays attention to whom, resulting in a partition of cohesive subgroups who pay and receive attention from each other and do not communicate with agents in other subgroups. The stars-equilibria, where attention in each subgroup is focused on a single influencer, stand apart: activities and payoffs are high on average but unequal. Furthermore, they are the only equilibria stable to perturbations or to self-enforcing deviations from coalitions (coalition-proofness)
Equality: What It Means and Why It Matters
No full textInternational audienceIn this compelling dialogue, two of the world’s most influential thinkers reflect on the value of equality and debate what citizens and governments should do to narrow the gaps that separate us. Ranging across economics, philosophy, history, and current affairs, Thomas Piketty and Michael Sandel consider how far we have come in achieving greater equality. At the same time, they confront head-on the extreme divides that remain in wealth, income, power, and status nationally and globally.What can be done at a time of deep political instability and environmental crisis? Piketty and Sandel agree on much: more inclusive investment in health and education, higher progressive taxation, curbing the political power of the rich and the overreach of markets. But how far and how fast can we push? Should we prioritize material or social change? What are the prospects for any change at all with nationalist forces resurgent? How should the left relate to values like patriotism and local solidarity where they collide with the challenges of mass migration and global climate change?To see Piketty and Sandel grapple with these and other problems is to glimpse new possibilities for change and justice but also the stubborn truth that progress towards greater equality never comes quickly or without deep social conflict and political struggle
Reprint of: Inequality and optimal monetary policy in the open economy
No full textInternational audienceWe study optimal monetary policy in a tractable Small Open Economy Heterogeneous-Agent New Keynesian (SOE-HANK) model in which households face uninsured idiosyncratic risk and unequal bond-market access. We derive conditions under which optimal policy in our SOE-HANK economy entails domestic producer price stability, extending the ”open-economy divine coincidence” result of Galí and Monacelli (2005) beyond the Representative-Agent benchmark (SOE-RANK). Away from those conditions, inefficient fluctuations in consumption inequality generate monetary policy tradeoffs. Under plausible calibrations for the trade elasticities, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and the cyclicality of income risk, the central bank stabilizes output and the exchange rate more than in SOE-RANK
Préférence temporelle : évaluation, stabilité et malléabilité sur le cycle de vie
No full textInternational audienceLa préférence temporelle est un concept théorique important pour expliquer de nombreuses décisions individuelles impliquant un arbitrage intertemporel, notamment l’accumulation du patrimoine. Le modèle standard de l’épargnant (discounted utility) suppose que cette préférence pour le présent est rationnelle, rationalité qui correspond à des choix temporellement cohérents : l’individu ne se contredit pas dans ces choix intertemporels. La mesure quantitative de ce paramètre est le plus souvent assez simple : on fait choisir l’individu entre X euros maintenant et Y euros à une date ultérieure. Cependant, les valeurs obtenues à cette question dans les nombreuses études à notre disposition varient considérablement en fonction des montants envisagés, du type d’enquêtes choisi, des populations étudiées ou encore des biais pris en compte (préférence pour le court terme notamment). Une réflexion à la fois théorique et empirique est ici proposée pour dépasser ce « puzzle » empirique. Le concept théorique de la préférence pour le présent serait moins « paramétrique » et plus « existentiel » (rapport du moi « présent » au moi « futur » au sens philosophique). Empiriquement, cette approche renonce à toute mesure cardinale de la préférence temporelle, lui préférant une quantification ordinale à partir de diverses questions qualitatives concernant différents domaines de la vie tirées de l’enquête PAT€R. Deux applications sur lesquelles se focalise la littérature récente sont proposées à titre d’illustration : la stabilité des préférences (en période de Covid) et leur malléabilité en fonction des politiques publiques (programme d’éducation financière)
The Convention members' opinions on climate measures
No full textInternational audienceThis chapter discusses the Citizens' Convention for Climate members' opinions about climate measures, offering a fine-grained quantitative description of the link between personal characteristics and the degree of support for different policies. It exploits the individual data from questionnaires which the observing researchers passed round during various weekends. The chapter discusses the relationship between the citizens' responses regarding climate policies and these different types of information, in a bivariate approach. It verifies that the sociodemographic diversity guaranteed by the recruitment process goes hand in hand with a certain degree of heterogeneity of opinions on climate policies. France is characterized by lower levels of interpersonal trust and major distrust of the world of politics and governments, in comparison with other European countries
L’efficacité économique du secteur électrique indien
No full textIndia’s power sector has seen three waves of reform: 1991 liberalization, 2003 unbundling of state utilities, and, since 2011, large-scale renewable procurement via the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI). SECI’s flagship mechanism awards 25-year, flat-tariff PPAs through two-stage auctions: a sealed‐bid qualification round followed by an open descending‐clock, uniform-price final stage.The first chapter theoretically studies certain non-trivial elements of the auctions for large-scale procurement of capacity of renewable electricity production in India. The auctions, designed by SECI, award power purchase agreements (PPAs) to independent power producers (IPPs). These agreements mention the capacity (in Mega Watts) to be created by a particular IPP and the tariff paid to them per KiloWatt-Hour of power they produce, both determined through an auction. The chapter provides the details of the allocation mechanism. Thereafter, I characterise the semi-separating Bayes Nash equilibrium of an abstraction of this auction, to study the impact of a particular allocation rule, which has so far been studied only with symmetric firms. The rule results in a multi-winner open-bid uniform price auction of a large divisible good, with bidders having asymmetric demand for that good. The equilibrium in this asymmetric setting is such that this auction inadvertently provides larger contracts are awarded to higher cost firms. Therefore,the market designed by these auctions is cost-inefficient.The second chapter builds on theoretical results of the first chapter, empirically measuring the inefficiency of India’s renewable energy auctions, as well as proposing design improvements. To this end, I structurally estimate parametric cost distributions of firms, using bid data from the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) and firm information from various sources. For the estimation, I use tariff offers of the bidders who got an award of zero whose dominant strategy is to bid their cost. However, owing to some qualification rules, this set of bidders is self-selected over a threshold endogenous to their cost draws due to some qualification rules. I first show that we can identify the cost distribution despite the self-selection as long as there are at least 2 zero award bidders in any auction. Thereafter, I estimate the distribution using a partial information maximum likelihood estimator. Finally, I provide a counterfactual analysis, where we can see that that the current allocation method has a 40% probability of adverse selection and has 5% lower payoff to SECI compared to the VCG mechanism.The third chapter shifts focus to the fossil fuel-based "brown" electricity sector in India, which is dominated by coal and gas-powered thermal plants. As we saw earlier, these plants account for a significant portion of India’s power production and coal consumption and will continue to play a crucial role in grid stabilization as renewable power is integrated. Since the market evolution of this subsector is different from green power sector, and auctions have not been its primary shaper, I use a different measure for efficiency, the Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The firm level estimates of TFP have direct implication for cost-efficiency. A firm with higher TFP can produce more with the same level of inputs and thus has a lower average cost of production.Overall, the thesis shows that India's power sector has inefficiencies. While the cost inefficiency for the renewable sector is an inadvertent effect of market design policy, which can be rectified, the brown sector's inefficiency may be due to legacy issues. As both sectors continue to play a dominant role in India's economy, the thesis provides important policy implications for the future.Le secteur électrique indien a connu trois vagues de réformes : la libéralisation de 1991, la scission (« unbundling ») des services publics d’État en 2003 et, depuis 2011, l’approvisionnement à grande échelle en énergies renouvelables via la Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI). Le mécanisme phare de la SECI attribue des Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) de 25 ans à tarif fixe par le biais d’enchères en deux étapes : une phase de qualification par offres scellées, suivie d’une phase finale ouverte à horloge descendante et prix uniforme. Le premier chapitre étudie théoriquement certains éléments non triviaux de ces enchères destinées à l’acquisition de capacité de production d’électricité renouvelable à grande échelle en Inde. Conçues par la SECI, elles attribuent des PPA à des producteurs indépendants (IPP), précisant la capacité (en mégawatts) à installer et le tarif par kilowattheure qui leur sera versé, tous deux déterminés aux enchères. Le chapitre détaille le mécanisme d’allocation, puis caractérise l’équilibre de Bayes-Nash semi-séparateur d’une abstraction de ce dispositif, afin d’analyser l’impact d’une règle d’attribution étudiée jusqu’ici uniquement pour des entreprises symétriques. Cette règle donne lieu à une enchère ouverte, multi-gagnants et à prix uniforme, pour un bien divisible de grande ampleur, où les enchérisseurs ont des demandes asymétriques. L’équilibre montre qu’elle conduit involontairement à attribuer des contrats plus importants à des entreprises dont le coût est plus élevé : le mécanisme est donc inefficace en termes de coût. Le deuxième chapitre s’appuie sur ces résultats théoriques pour mesurer empiriquement l’inefficience des enchères de la SECI et proposer des améliorations de conception. Pour ce faire, j’estime structurellement des distributions de coûts paramétriques à partir des données d’enchères de la SECI (2016–2023) et d’informations sur les entreprises. J’utilise pour l’estimation les offres tarifaires des enchérisseurs ayant reçu une attribution nulle, dont la stratégie dominante est de proposer leur coût réel. Or, en raison de certaines règles de qualification, cet ensemble est auto-sélectionné selon un seuil endogène lié à leur tirage de coûts. Je montre d’abord que la distribution des coûts reste identifiable dès lors qu’au moins deux enchérisseurs zéro-attribution participent à chaque enchère. J’estime ensuite cette distribution par un estimateur du maximum de vraisemblance à information partielle. Enfin, une analyse contrefactuelle révèle que la méthode actuelle a une probabilité de 40 % de sélection adverse et procure à la SECI un rendement inférieur de 5 % par rapport à un mécanisme de type VCG. Le troisième chapitre se concentre sur le secteur de l’électricité « brun » à base de combustibles fossiles, dominé par les centrales thermiques au charbon et au gaz. Comme on l’a vu, ces centrales représentent une part importante de la production et de la consommation de charbon en Inde et demeurent essentielles à la stabilité du réseau lors de l’intégration des renouvelables. N’ayant pas été façonné par des enchères, ce sous-secteur requiert une mesure d’efficience différente : la productivité totale des facteurs (PTF). Les estimations de la PTF au niveau des entreprises—obtenues par MCO et la méthode de Levinsohn–Petrin—montrent que les grands acteurs, et même certaines sociétés détentrices de contrats renouvelables, présentent une PTF plus faible, traduisant des inefficiences de taille et de diversification. Dans l’ensemble, la thèse met en évidence les inefficiences du secteur électrique indien : celle des enchères renouvelables résulte d’un effet involontaire de la conception du marché et peut être corrigée, tandis que celle du secteur brun est probablement due à des problématiques historiques. Étant donné le rôle majeur de ces deux segments dans l’économie indienne, ces résultats offrent d’importantes pistes de politique publique pour l’avenir
Health literacy, socioeconomic disparities and health outcomes: the role of antenatal education in the use of caesarean sections: Health literacy, socioeconomic disparities and health outcomes
No full textInternational audienceThis literature review investigates the socioeconomic disparities affecting childbirth outcomes among women in high-income countries. Studies reveal that low-income women are more likely to deliver via caesarean section than their higher-income counterparts. While the underlying causes of this disparity are not fully understood, recent published studies emphasize the critical role of antenatal education on the probability of a caesarean section. Antenatal education participation is strongly correlated with a woman's socioeconomic status, with economically disadvantaged women being less likely to attend such programs. The result is a direct and indirect effect of patient socioeconomic status leading to caesarean section: poor attendance of antenatal education by the most disadvantaged women explains why they deliver more often by caesarean section than the majority of women. This review shows how increasing participation in antenatal education and targeting low-income women could improve maternal health outcomes while also reducing associated healthcare costs. Finally, we propose strategies to enhance the current system, focusing on promoting and expanding antenatal education, especially for economically disadvantaged pregnant women
Unpacking Household Engel Curves
No full textAcknowledging that decision making does not happen at the household but at the individual level, can household Engel curves be safely estimated based solely on household level data? Answering this question implies to consider the intrahousehold Engel curves (IECs) and to assess how estimates of such IECs relate to standard household Engel curves estimates. Aggregating the IECs to household level reveals confounding factors in standard household Engel curves, including intra-household inequality. A unique data set for Senegal is used to estimate IECs. Large discrepancies are found between the standard estimates of Engel curves and the consistently aggregated IECs. The main source of the discrepancy is a household fixed effect on intra-household spending behavior, which is only partially offset by differences in intra-household inequality. Results suggest that income elasticity of food consumption might be overestimated by as much as 43% by the standard household Engel curve estimation