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Comment devient-on associé d'audit ? Le fonctionnement des réseaux informels de promotion dans les cabinets Big 4 en France.
No full textInternational audienceSo far, literature has sought to describe and explain the advancement of auditors as a progression to the top of the pyramid, the climax in an auditor’s career: co-option as a partner. By adopting an interactionist perspective, the longitudinal and micro-sociological concept of career enables us to consider promotion-to-partnership as a process that began the very first working day, and continues throughout the individual’s career inside the firm. We demonstrate that invisible promotion networks, compared to “racing stables” informally organize the top-down structure of hierarchy inside Big 4 Firms, and play a critical but overlooked role before, during and after co-option as a partner.Jusqu’à présent, la littérature a cherché à décrire et expliquer la carrière des auditeurs comme un mouvement vers le haut de la pyramide, jusqu’à l’association, présentée comme un aboutissement de parcours. En inscrivant le processus de cooptation dans une perspective interactionniste, le concept longitudinal et microsociologique de carrière nous permet de considérer la promotion à l’association comme un processus entamé dès l’embauche et qui se poursuit tout au long du parcours de l’individu dans le cabinet. Nous montrons que l’accession à l’association s’organise autour de réseaux informels de promotion, comparées à des Écuries de formule 1, qui structurent de manière informelle la hiérarchie pyramidale des cabinets et jouent un rôle avant, pendant et après le passage à l’association
Credibility and Monetary Policy
No full textThis paper investigates the ability of monetary policy rules to coordinate private agents’ expectations when the enforcement of rules is limited. We show that limited enforcement precludes diverging inflation paths ensuring that nominal variables remain bounded in equilibrium. When applied to Taylor rules, this makes the Taylor principle necessary and sufficient for price determinacy when agents expect a Taylor rule. However, limited enforcement also allows agents to rationally anticipate multiple policies and we show that, in general, there is no policy rule able to recoordinate any private agents’ belief on that rule. We finally provide conditions under which such recoordination may take place
Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union
No full textBoth in the United States and in the Euro Area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central supervisors. I study a model in which local supervisors do not internalize as many externalities as a central supervisor. Local supervisors are more lenient, but banks also have weaker incentives to hide information from them. These two forces can make a joint supervisory architecture optimal, with more weight put on centralized supervision when cross-border externalities are larger. Conversely, more centralized supervision endogenously encourages banks to integrate more cross-border. Due to this complementarity, the economy can be trapped in an equilibrium with both too little central supervision and too little financial integration, when a superior equilibrium would be achievable
Input-Price Risk Management: Technology Improvement and Financial Hedging
No full textResearch has suggested that firms may benefit from price uncertainty - about input commodities - because it creates an "option value". We use a stylized mathematical model to explore and generalize this claim and to specify its implications for firms' investment decisions under various setups. In particular, we study firms' motivation for investing in such risk management measures as financial hedging (FH) and technology improvement (TI): technology changes that result in less consumption of an input commodity, fewer waste products and emissions, and lower production costs. We derive a simple expression that explicitly quantities firm's attitude toward input-price risk by considering the firm's (positive or negative) risk premium (i.e., what it would pay to "lock in" the unit input price at its mean) and linking that premium to various firm and industry-level characteristics. Also, we examine the comparative risk management advantages of TI and FH and characterize conditions under which these strategies are complements or substitutes. We find that although input-price uncertainty may be beneficial even for risk-averse firms, they can benefit from investing in risk reduction measures (e.g., TI, FH) because they could increase the option value of that uncertainty. A firm's ability to adjust its price in response to both market competition and input-price variation mediates the benefit of risk-reducing measures and also affects the two strategies' complementarity
Credibility and Monetary Policy
No full textThis paper revisits the ability of central banks to manage private sector's expectations depending on its credibility and how this affects the use of interest rate rules and pegs to achieve monetary policy objectives. When private agents can only provide limited incentives for the central bank to follow a policy, we show that resulting limited credibility allows a central bank to prevents the inflation from diverging by defaulting on past promises if necessary. As a result, the Taylor rule, when expected, anchors inflation expectations on a unique equilibrium path as long as the Taylor principle is satisfied. Finally, we also show that limited credibility restricts the impact of long-term interest rate pegs, so as to make current conditions less dependent on future policy changes
Aides d'Etat et financement public des infrastructures portuaires : que veut vraiment la Commission européenne ?
No full textInternational audienc
Second-Order Induction and Agreement
No full textAgents make predictions based on similar past cases. The notion of similarity is itself learnt from experience by "second-order induction": past cases inform agents also about the relative importance of various attributes in judging similarity. However, there may be multiple "optimal" similarity functions for explaining past data. Moreover, the computation of the optimal similarity function is NP-Hard. We offer conditions under which rational agents who have access to the same observations are likely to converge on the same predictions, and conditions under which they may entertain different probabilistic beliefs
Shining a Spotlight on EU Political Group Spending: Legal Guide on Access to Document Requests
No full textThe purpose of this legal memorandum is to provide advice to organisations and individuals interested in submitting a request for public access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/01 (“Regulation 1049/01”) to the European Parliament for documents related to the spending of political groups covered by Budget Item 400 appropriations under Chapter 7.Requests for those documents may face rejection on grounds related to exceptions provided for in Regulation 1049/01, specifically those found in Articles 4(1)b, 4(2), and 4(3) pertaining to privacy and integrity of the individual, commercial interests, and institution’s decision-making process respectively.This legal memorandum addresses the applicability of those exceptions to the documents requested for potential use in a confirmatory request to be submitted to the European Parliament subsequent to the initial rejection in line with Article 7 of Regulation 1049/01. The memo also provides arguments for overcoming these exceptions in light of: 1) recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) relating to the privacy exception; and 2) the strict legal requirements for triggering the commercial interests and institutional decision-making exceptions.The last section of the memo is structured to provide draft responses to the denial of requests for documents and should be tailored to the specific situation in question
De la dénonciation à l’alerte éthique : histoire et institutionnalisation du « whistleblowing » comme mode de contrôle social
No full textInternational audienc
Antécédents et Conséquences des Activités d'Exploration et d'Exploitation : Une Analyse Empirique dans le domaine du Corporate Venture Capital
No full textThis dissertation addresses unexplored issues on the antecedents, management, and outcomes of corporate venture capital (CVC). More specifically, I examine how negative performance feedback and corporate governance influence the direction of organizational change ˗ in terms of exploration and exploitation ˗ and how balancing such change over time influences firm performance in the CVC context. I first review the extant literature on CVC and lay out the unique contributions of my research. Then, in the first essay, I theorize on how poor firm performance influences the resource allocation decisions on exploration and exploitation and how such decisions are affected by the concentration of dedicated and transient shareholders and by the board of directors' monitoring and advising intensities. In the second essay, I empirically examine how the resource allocation decisions on exploration and exploitation are influenced by dedicated and transient shareholders in the context of CVC investing. In the third essay, I examine how balancing exploration and exploitation over time and the characteristics of oscillation impact firm performance. The empirical analysis in the latter two essays is based on CVC investments made by 286 U.S. companies during 1993-2013. This dissertation contributes to the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance research by introducing how shareholders and boards influence managerial decision-making in search and change, Ambidexterity research by studying how continuous change and organizational inertia impact temporal spillover between exploration and exploitation, and CVC research by examining the antecedents and consequences of explorative and exploitative initiatives in CVC investing.Cette thèse étudie la façon dont l’atteinte ou non des objectifs et la gouvernance influencent la direction du changement organisationnel – en termes d’exploration et d’exploitation - et analyse l’impact de ces effets sur la performance de l’entreprise au fil du temps. Dans un premier temps, je procède à une analyse détaillée de la littérature sur le Corporate Venture Capital afin de positionner mon propre travail de recherche dans le champs considéré et confirmer l’originalité de mes contributions. Ensuite, dans la première étude, j’examine comment la non-atteinte des objectifs fixés influe sur la direction du changement organisationnel mis en oeuvre dans l'entreprise, et étudie la façon dont ces changements sont influencés par la place qu’occupent les actionnaires stables ou passagers dans le capital de l’entreprise. Dans la seconde étude, je vérifie empiriquement la validité des propositions formulées en examinant les investissements de corporate venture capital (CVC) réalisés par un échantillon d’entreprises ayant une forte activité CVC. Enfin, l'équilibre entre exploration et exploitation au fil du temps, ainsi que les caractéristiques des oscillations entre ces deux types d’activités sont examinés dans la troisième étude constituant cette thèse. Les analyses empiriques portent sur les investissements de CVC effectués par 286 entreprises des États-Unis sur la période 1993-2013. Cette thèse contribue à la théorie comportementale de l’entreprise (Behavioral Theory of the Firm) en examinant la façon dont la structure du capital et l’actionnariat influe sur la prise de décisions en matière d’innovation et de changement. En étudiant la façon dont l'inertie organisationnelle et les phases de changement affectent les activités d'exploitation et d'exploration, cette thèse contribue aussi à la recherche sur l’ambidextrie organisationnelle. Pour finir, ce travail participe à la recherche sur le corporate venture capital au travers de l’étude des antécédents et des conséquences des activités d'exploration et d’exploitation dans le cadre de l’investissement CVC