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4784 research outputs found
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Du coworking au « co-learning » : impacts des tiers lieux ou Campus Connectés sur la formation et l’employabilité des apprenants en contexte insulaire
No full textInternational audienc
Cost stifling on peer-to-peer platforms: the making up of profitable investor subjects
No full textInternational audienc
Cost stifling on peer-to-peer platforms: the making up of profitable investor subjects
No full textInternational audienc
The Horizon of Investors' Information and Corporate Investment
No full textWe study how the quality of investors' information across horizons influences investment. In our theory, managers care about how investment is impounded in current stock prices. Because prices imperfectly reflect investment’s value, they under-invest. However, they under-invest less when investors have better information about the horizon matching that of their projects. Using a measure of projects' horizon obtained from the text of regulatory filings, we find that improvements in investors' long-term (short-term) information induce firms with long-term (short-term) projects to invest more, especially when managers focus on current stock prices. Therefore, the quality of investors' information across horizons has real effects
Single-actor scandal or multiple-actor scandal? A framework for studying scandal dynamics
No full textScandal is the disruptive publicity of alleged misconduct and it is important for organizations because of its severe consequences. Distinguishing between single-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct by a single actor, and multiple-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct of a similar type by multiple actors, we develop a framework for studying scandal dynamics that draws a distinction between how scandals start (single-actor or multiple-actor) and how they end (single-actor or multiple-actor). We focus specifically on spillover scandals (from single to multiple actors) and scapegoating scandals (from multiple to single actors) and identify several mechanisms that affect the likelihood of these two important types of scandals. We conclude by developing a research agenda that builds upon the central contribution of our framework: the distinction between single- and multiple-organization scandals and the transitions that result in spillovers and scapegoating
Circular Business Models: Product Design and Consumer Participation
No full textThis paper develops an analytical framework to study how firms should design a product by choosing its recyclability and price in a market where consumers adopt a life-cycle approach and decide whether to recycle an end-of-life product. We show that the firm offers a non-recyclable product in the absence of a reverse supply chain even if consumers care about recyclability – the linear take-make-dispose model. By operating a reverse supply chain, the firm generates revenue from both sales and recycling, and determines recyclability by balancing the marginal changes in the consumers' expected end-of-life utility and the unit production cost net of the expected value of the recovered resources. We identify conditions under which the firm offers a fully recyclable product and all consumers return the product for recycling – the fully circular model. In addition, we show that stronger concerns about recyclability and a higher market value of the recovered resources increase recyclability, but have an ambiguous impact on price, demand, profit, and the overall waste footprint of the firm. Further, we characterize the conditions under which transitioning from a linear to a circular business model is profitable and socially desirable. Finally, we show when a deposit-refund system, product buyback, and retaining product ownership are effective tools to boost circularity
Delegation of Decision Rights and Inertia in Capital Reallocation
No full textIn this paper, we investigate the antecedents of inertia in capital allocation decisions in organizations. Despite the importance of flexible capital reallocation, empirical evidence points to remarkably high levels of stability in these decisions. Adopting a behavioral perspective, we focus on information processing demands faced by boundedly rational decision makers as a driver of such inertia. In particular, we argue that centralization of decision rights, which increases the information processing demands on relevant decision makers, results in an increased inertia in capital reallocations. To empirically test our proposition and explore the causal effect of centralization on reallocation flexibility, we take advantage of an exogenous variation in decision rights among municipalities located in the state of Illinois in the US. Our findings indicate that the delegation of decision rights for capital allocation significantly decreases inertia in reallocation decisions. Additional analyses further provide evidence that a likely mechanism explaining our findings is that of decentralization reducing information processing load on relevant decision makers
Sharpen Your Sword: The Reaction of Branded Pharmaceutical Firms to the Threat of Generic Entry
No full textWhile patents have been shown to play a role as barriers to entry, there is heterogeneity inthe extent to which they actually deter entry. Whereas weaker patents may be relatively inefficientat deterring competitor entry ex-ante, we find they can delay it, ex-post, once competitorshave threatened to enter. Leveraging the unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical sector,where we observe the exact moment an entry threat materializes, we show that incumbentswait until such a threat occurs to disclose information about their weaker patents protectinga threatened drug and disproportionately use these patents in litigation. This strategy is positivelyassociated with entry delay, suggesting that there are second-mover advantages such thatby waiting until a competitor entry threat materializes incumbents not only avoid their weakerpatents being invalidated ex-ante but also learn about the competitor strategy ex-pos