Czasopisma Naukowe ISP PAN
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Wrażliwa humanistyka
No full textRecent years have seen a noticeable increase in reflection on the ethical aspects of research. While this trend is generally considered positive, it is not without its dangers, including the potential for over-institutionalization or bureaucratization of ethics, where sensitivity towards others becomes entangled in regulations, codes, or recommendations. Acknowledging both the benefits and drawbacks of this shift in the approach to scientific research, the author turns to the humanities from the perspective of oral history, referring to concepts such as imagination, empathy, and vulnerability. These qualities, the author believes, are key to ethical scientific practice, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, which by their very nature are (or should be) closely connected to people. He draws on his research on children born of war.W ostatnich latach da się zaobserwować wzmożony namysł nad etycznymi aspektami badań naukowych. Trend ten, w założeniu pozytywny, niewolny jest od zagrożeń, między innymi zbytnią instytucjonalizacją czy biurokratyzacją etyki, gdzie wrażliwość na drugiego człowieka gubi się w gąszczach regulaminów, kodeksów czy rekomendacji. Rozpoznając wady i zalety tej zmiany podejścia do badań naukowych, autor tekstu z perspektywy historii mówionej spogląda na humanistykę, odwołując się do pojęć wyobraźni, empatii i ranliwości, z ufnością, że dają one klucz do etycznego uprawiania nauki, tu humanistyki i badań społecznych, które ze swej natury są (powinny być) blisko ludzi. Sięga przy tym do swoich badań poświęconych dzieciom urodzonym z powodu wojny
Europa, czyli idee zamiast bomb: (rec.: Z. Bauman, Europa. Niedokończona przygoda, tłum. Tomasz Kunz, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2005)
No full textDenuklearyzacja Ukrainy: Perspektywa prawa krajowego i międzynarodowego
No full textThe paper addresses the normative aspects of the denuclearisation process in Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR. It is based on the thesis of the existence of two main phases of this process: bilateral negotiations with Russia and the subsequent trilateral format with the participation of the United States, which enabled the effective negotiation of disarmament agreements. This periodisation determines the structure of the following article.
The paper focuses on the most significant acts of Ukrainian domestic law adopted during the denuclearisation process, between 1990 and 1994, as well as the acts of international law that brought Ukraine closer to becoming a party to the START I and NPT agreements.
Against the background of the main considerations, it was pointed out that Ukraine, with the third-largest nuclear arsenal inherited from the USSR, did not have full control over these weapons, but used their presence as a political instrument to obtain security guarantees and economic benefits.
The final section of the paper addresses the legal question of possible efforts to get Ukraine nuclear weapons again, an issue that has been raised repeatedly in the post-2022 Ukrainian media space. This issue may serve as a prelude to considering the sustainability of the international non-proliferation regime based on the NPT.Artykuł podejmuje problematykę normatywnych uwarunkowań procesu denuklearyzacji Ukrainy po rozpadzie ZSRR. Opiera się na założeniu, że istniały dwa zasadnicze etapy tego procesu – faza dwustronnych pertraktacji z Rosją oraz późniejszy format trójstronny z udziałem USA, który umożliwił skuteczne wynegocjowanie układów rozbrojeniowych. Periodyzacja ta determinuje strukturę artykułu.
Przedmiotem uwagi są wszystkie najważniejsze akty prawa krajowego Ukrainy przyjęte w procesie denuklearyzacji, tj. w latach 1990–1994, oraz akty prawa międzynarodowego, które przybliżały ją do stania się stroną porozumień rozbrojeniowych START I oraz Układu o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej (NPT).
Na tle głównych rozważań wskazano, że Ukraina, posiadająca po ZSRR trzeci pod względem wielkości arsenał jądrowy, od początku nie miała pełnej kontroli nad tą bronią, ale wykorzystywała ją jako instrument polityczny do uzyskania gwarancji bezpieczeństwa i korzyści gospodarczych.
W ostatniej części tekstu odniesiono się do prawnych kwestii ewentualnych starań o ponowne pozyskanie przez Ukrainę broni atomowej, co po 2022 r. podnoszone było w ukraińskiej przestrzeni medialnej wielokrotnie. Kwestia ta stanowić może preludium do rozważań na temat trwałości opartego na NPT międzynarodowego reżimu nierozprzestrzeniania broni atomowej
Mechanizm dostosowania granic emisji dwutlenku węgla – krok w stronę Europy à la française?
No full textCarbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) presented by the European Commission (EC) as a part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package was a turning point in almost twenty years of the French eff orts to implement this instrument. In this article I present the concept of CBAM. I also pose questions why France was so fervent proponent of introducing it into EU law and why it finally succeeded. In order to find the answer to these questions I recall the main assumptions of the French European policy. Then, I explain how policy of continuity was rewarded in times of important political changes. I also argue that multidimensional character of CBAM gives enough opportunity for France to shape not only EU climate pol-icy but other EU policies as well. I conclude that CBAM fits perfectly to the French interests. It allows all successive presidents of the Fifth Republic to adapt it to the current needs and include it in their narratives on EU affairs.Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) przedstawiony przez Komisję Europejską (KE) w ramach pakietu „Fit for 55” był punktem zwrotnym w prawie dwudziestoletnich staraniach Francji o wdrożenie tego instrumentu. W artykule przedstawiam koncepcję CBAM. Stawiam pytanie, dlaczego Francja była tak zagorzałym orędownikiem CBAM i dlaczego ostatecznie odniosła sukces na tym polu. Aby znaleźć odpowiedź na te pytania przywołuję główne założenia francuskiej polityki europejskiej. Następnie wyjaśniam, dlaczego polityka ciągłości odniosła sukces w czasach ważnych zmian politycznych. Twierdzę również, że wielowymiarowy charakter CBAM daje Francji wystarczające możliwości kształtowania nie tylko polityki klimatycznej UE, ale także innych polityk UE. Konkluduję, że CBAM doskonale odpowiada francuskim interesom. Koncepcja ta pozwala wszystkim kolejnym prezydentom V Republiki dostosowywać ją do aktualnych potrzeb i włączać do swoich narracji nt. UE
Fritz Bartel, The Triumph of Broken Promises. The End of the Cold War and the Rise of Neoliberalism, Harvard University Press 2022, 430 ss.
No full textPopulacja imigrantów, a zdolność Polski do budowania koalicji blokujących w Radzie Unii Europejskiej
No full textOne of the consequences of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is the increase in the number of foreigners living in Poland. This paper examines the potential impact of Poland’s population growth on its ability to build minimally blocking coalitions in the Council. For this purpose the article is developing a new voting model dedicated to qualified majority voting in this institution. Using the analysis of structure of blocking I find that an increase in Poland’s population of 2 million leads to an increase of about half in the number of minimal blocking coalitions of five or six countries it can form together with Germany or France. However, even an additional 4 million residents will not significantly increase Poland’s ability to form blocking coalitions in opposition to the German-French tandem.One of the consequences of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is the increase in the number of foreigners living in Poland. This paper examines the potential impact of Poland’s population growth on its ability to build minimally blocking coalitions in the Council. For this purpose the article is developing a new voting model dedicated to qualified majority voting in this institution. Using the analysis of structure of blocking I find that an increase in Poland’s population of 2 million leads to an increase of about half in the number of minimal blocking coalitions of five or six countries it can form together with Germany or France. However, even an additional 4 million residents will not significantly increase Poland’s ability to form blocking coalitions in opposition to the German-French tandem
Militarised, Destructive Element: The Image of Migrants and Migration in the Polish Government’s Statements around the 2021 Events at the Polish-Belarussian Border: Metaphor-Led Interpretive Analysis
No full textAbstract
This article examines the utterances made by selected representatives of the Polish government with regard to migrants and migration in the context of the events which took place at the Polish-Belarussian border in 2021. Its basic purpose is to reveal the link between the actions undertaken by the authorities and the way officials categorised these events and their participants. The analysis is performed from the interpretive perspective, using the conceptual metaphor theory as a hermeneutical key to reconstruct the actors’ points of view. It has revealed that migrations and migrants were categorised through the use of metaphors such as MIGRATION IS WAR and MIGRATION IS A FLOOD. The meanings generated by these metaphors, as well as their entailments, constituted cognitive premises for actions undertaken by Polish authorities in response to the events at the Polish-Belarussian border in 2021. They also determined the catalogue of adequate tools and methods to be applied with regards to the crisis situation at the border
Polish-Georgian Historians’ Commission. Collected Works, Vol. IV, ed. D. Kolbaia
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Западные Балканы – вызовы для безопасности перед лицом войны России в Украине
No full textThe Western Balkans is a region that has been aspiring to join the European Union for years. However, this process is prolonged due to the often insufficient involvement of individual governments in the actual implementation of reforms, but also of the EU itself, which did not express a real desire for enlargement. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to be an additional strong incentive to reactivate the region in order to prevent it from becoming an arena of foreign, including Russian, influence. Russia is particularly interested in deepening conflicts and destabilizing the situation in the region in order to prevent the Western Balkans from joining the EU. The aim of this article is to analyze the current situation in the countries of the region, after the outbreak of the Russian war in Ukraine, in the context of potential challenges for the security of the Western Balkan countries.The Western Balkans is a region that has been aspiring to join the European Union for years. However, this process is prolonged due to the often insufficient involvement of individual governments in the actual implementation of reforms, but also of the EU itself, which did not express a real desire for enlargement. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to be an additional strong incentive to reactivate the region in order to prevent it from becoming an arena of foreign, including Russian, influence. Russia is particularly interested in deepening conflicts and destabilizing the situation in the region in order to prevent the Western Balkans from joining the EU. The aim of this article is to analyze the current situation in the countries of the region, after the outbreak of the Russian war in Ukraine, in the context of potential challenges for the security of the Western Balkan countries