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China\u27s \u27New-Type\u27 Private Think Tanks: Is \u27New\u27 Better?
No full textChina’s public policy research community has long been dominated by large state-run research institutes, but in recent years financially and bureaucratically independent think tanks have played a more prominent role. While private think tanks have used a variety of strategies to secure funding and access to officials, a major constraint is the continuing influence of their state-run counterparts. What are the conditions under which private institutes can prosper in this environment, both in terms of providing meaningful advice and developing prestigious brands? This essay theorizes that these goals can be achieved under three conditions: when human capital is leveraged to provide new advice, when networks are deployed to build bridges between scholarly communities, and when effective use of information technology supports the dissemination of research outputs. An organization’s ability to meet those criteria depends both on resource endowments and on willingness to buck the conventional wisdom
Innovation and Its Discontents: National Models of Military Innovation and the Dual-Use Conundrum
No full textThis study explores variations in national models of innovation in the hope of beginning to shed light on the pathways or levers those models afford in controlling innovation’s end product. It considers the “lifecycle” of dual-use innovation and resulting technologies in the United States and Germany by evaluating how these countries are adapting (or not) their national approaches to investment, development, and integration of dual-use innovation. It uses case studies of both U.S. and German investment in artificial intelligence and additive manufacturing to highlight national approaches to innovation consistent with each country’s foreign policy and domestic goals. It also assesses each country’s approach to regulating sensitive and dual-use technologies once they have been developed. Finally, drawing on a companion report by Dr. Alexander Montgomery, it examines proliferation concerns and national capacities for countering the proliferation of next-generation warfighting technologies that result from innovation.
This approach allows us to consider how national goals, strategies, and values affect each country’s approach to technology development. While the study examines U.S. and German national capacity in the development of additive manufacturing and artificial intelligence, it takes a “macro” view rather than focusing on detailed accounts of these technologies, their trajectories, and the threats they present. As such, the study distills shared values and opportunities for policy alignment along the trajectory of innovation’s lifespan as a potential pathway or lever to generate increased cooperation and improved transatlantic coordination, as well as for increased security through improved technological capacity.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmdcenter-research/1003/thumbnail.jp
PRISM Vol. 8, No. 3
No full textEmerging disruptive technologies, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, and neuroscience will dramatically alter the global security environment. PRISM Vol. 8, No. 3 “Singularity” maps this evolving challenge and propose solutions.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/prism-full-issue/1031/thumbnail.jp
Modernizing biotechnology for the fight against COVID-19 and the future of pandemic response
No full textAs the world scrambles to combat the global pandemic of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), we’re witnessing a real-time demonstration of emerging biotechnology’s capabilities — computational tools, biological engineering, and advanced manufacturing are key factors in the fight against COVID-19. The United States should start to accelerate biotechnology in order to combat COVID-19. The anatomy of an outbreak requires specific response capabilities. First, as people get sick, we need the ability to rapidly and reliably test people and track the spread of the virus. Second, we need treatments and vaccines to remedy the sick and to prevent spread to the uninfected. Ultimately, the ability to rapidly produce and manufacture these technologies at-scale is critical to responding to the pandemic. In these arenas, biotechnology is working to speed up the response
China’s Inopportune Pandemic Assertiveness
No full textFor a state just beginning to recover from Covid-19, China has been remarkably active in pressing its sovereignty claims. Chinese forces have been involved in a spate of incidents around its borders, most recently a series of tense encounters with India. Foreign media have seized on this as another example of Chinese opportunism, in which Beijing shamelessly presses its territorial agenda against weaker rivals still in the throes of the disease. However, China’s actions also constitute a strategic blunder, sacrificing the propaganda value of its contributions to regional pandemic responses and weakening its long-running attempts to dilute US influence. This gives Washington a second chance at drawing a contrast with China and demonstrating concrete leadership for a region still reeling from Covid-19’s effects
Double Crisis Double Feature
No full textWith Kyrgyzstan and Nagorno Karabakh in crisis, Colleen Wood and Jeff Mankoff join to help us break down both
The European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation: Implications for Transatlantic Security
No full textIn November of 2017, the European Union (EU) officially launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project, its latest attempt to deepen defense cooperation among EU members. Earlier that same year, the EU approved two other important initiatives designed to strengthen defense cooperation: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Shortly after the launch of PESCO, many U.S. defense officials expressed skepticism about its value.1 This is not surprising; U.S. officials have reflexively opposed European defense initiatives such as PESCO since the end of the Cold War. U.S. opposition to these initiatives reflects its fear that they could lead the EU to become a competitor to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for European security issues and resources, and in so doing reduce U.S. influence in European security.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1007/thumbnail.jp
Infodemic
No full textOn March 11, the World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. Governments around the world have scrambled to attempt to limit the movement of people in order to prevent the spread of the disease. The unfolding crisis, however, has also highlighted the daunting challenge of attempting to halt the spread of misinformation (erroneous information) and disinformation (deliberately false information) about the virus. Five weeks prior to declaring the disease a pandemic, the WHO alerted governments and publics of the dangerous and increasingly prolific spread of “myths and rumors” about COVID-19. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on February 15, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom aptly described the challenge facing the international organization and governments around the world: “[W]e’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic. Fake news spreads faster and more easily than this virus, and is just as dangerous.”
The challenge is not just limited to countering COVID “cure” scams, profiteers attempting to corner the market on disinfectant wipes, and Facebook posts shared by well-meaning relatives about how you can use Tito’s vodka as a home remedy substitute for hand sanitizer (it’s not and please don’t: though Tito’s Handmade Vodka and other craft distilleries are working to fill the need). The Russian government, which has already sought to sow chaos and confusion on public health matters in an effort to divide and weaken America, is likely encouraging Russian media to fabricate news and rumors about COVID-19. And given past practices, moving forward Moscow may also seek to manipulate online information and social media discourse on the pandemic as part of its ongoing disinformation campaign against the United States
The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution
No full textBiology can be misused, and the risk of this causing widespread harm increases in step with the rapid march of technological progress. A key security challenge involves attribution: determining, in the wake of a human-caused biological event, who was responsible. Recent scientific developments have demonstrated a capability for detecting whether an organism involved in such an event has been genetically modified and, if modified, to infer from its genetic sequence its likely lab of origin. We believe this technique could be developed into powerful forensic tools to aid the attribution of outbreaks caused by genetically engineered pathogens, and thus protect against the potential misuse of synthetic biology
System Overload: Can China’s Military Be Distracted in a War over Taiwan?
No full textIn his 2019 New Year’s Day address, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping issued a stern warning to Taiwan: “We make no promise to abandon the use of force, and retain the option of taking all necessary measures.” At the same time, he warned that force could also be used to forestall “intervention by external forces,” referring to the United States. While designed to intimidate recalcitrant Taiwan and U.S. leaders—and appeal to domestic nationalists—rather than to signal an imminent confrontation, Xi’s comments underscored the very real military threats that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses to Taiwan. As the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency notes, Taiwan has been the “primary driver” of PLA modernization for decades, spurring the development of short- and long-range ballistic missiles, amphibious and airborne units, and other capabilities targeted at Taiwan and intervening U.S. forces. Those threats have become more worrisome as the PLA conducts large-scale exercises and provocative bomber flights around the island. The PLA’s improved warfighting capabilities have contributed to China’s near-term cross–Taiwan Strait objective—deterring Taiwan independence. Understanding the costs that a war would impose on the island, few but the most die-hard Taiwan independence activists have supported overt moves toward de jure independence.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/china-strategic-perspectives/1004/thumbnail.jp