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Baltics Left of Bang: Comprehensive Defense in the Baltic States
No full textSponsored by the National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish National Defense University, this paper is the third in a series of Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 National Security Strategy described Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in a series of wargames conducted in late 2017 through the winter of 2019 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea region. This third installment in the series highlights research and gaming insights indicating the value of a comprehensive defense for building resilience and resistance capabilities among the Baltic states.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1005/thumbnail.jp
The Tripolar Strategic Balance in 2030
No full textAssessing the tripolar balance in 2030 is particularly difficult because of the uncertainty of the future U.S. strategic approach, which could depend heavily on the results of the November 2020 election. It is also difficult because it is important to consider the entire strategic posture and not look at the tripolar balance in purely nuclear terms. Even this may not be the most important factor. Whether our strategic deterrent will be adequate in 2030 may depend on the nature of Russian and Chinese leadership and on China’s overall strategic approach.
In what follows I argue that the greatest threat to the United States in 2030 and beyond does not come from disparities in force structure. Rather, the risk arises from a possible failure to deal with policy innovations in both Russia and China. The Russian case is immediate and reasonably well understood. China poses different and longer-term challenges. But both require thinking that does not now appear to be going on within the United States. I also argue that the trilateral situation between now and 2030 is best thought of and managed as a set of bilateral relationships and that the convergence between Russia and China in politically opposing the United States is unlikely to lead to significant military cooperation.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmdcenter-books/1017/thumbnail.jp
Toward an Integrated Strategic Deterrent
No full textThis chapter explores the need for greater integration across the strategic forces toolkit as a means to strengthen deterrence and defense, the opportunities that exist to advance this goal, and obstacles that must be overcome to ensure progress. The chapter begins by framing the integration challenge broadly and as an aspiration over time that must nonetheless inform current thinking and planning. It then examines two current initiatives that address more discrete, near-term integration challenges: offense-defense integration for missile defeat, and conventional-nuclear integration to support regional deterrence strategies. It closes with a brief discussion of organizational approaches that could accelerate the integration process.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmdcenter-books/1016/thumbnail.jp
An Affordable Defense of Asia
No full textUS military advantages over China are steadily eroding…
For the last two decades, China has studied the US military, identified its key weaknesses, and developed the tactics and forces best suited to exploit those vulnerabilities. These challenges are compounded by significant deficiencies in today’s US joint force across all domains of conflict—sea, air, land, space, electronic warfare, and cyber. Proposed budgets cannot overcome those deficits using legacy systems.
Therefore, the current US military strategy for the defense of Asia—a conventional defense of the first island chain from Japan to the Philippines, built on current air and sea platforms supported by major air and sea bases—needs to be adapted.
What to do…
The United States and its allies have two major advantages they can exploit—geography and emerging technologies. In Forward Defense’s inaugural report, An Affordable Defense of Asia, T.X. Hammes crafts a strategy for leveraging these advantages. Hammes makes the case that by developing novel operational concepts that take advantage of emerging technologies, while integrating these concepts into a broader Offshore Control Strategy which seeks to hold geostrategic chokepoints, the United States can improve its warfighting posture and bolster conventional deterrence. This paper advances the following arguments and recommendations.
The geography of the Pacific provides significant strategic, operational, and tactical advantages to a defender.
New operational concepts that employ emerging, relatively inexpensive technologies—including multimodal missiles, long-range air drones, smart sea mines, and unmanned naval vessels—can support an affordable defense of Asia.
These new technologies can and should be manufactured and fielded by US allies in the region in order to strengthen alliance relationships and improve their ability to defend themselves.
Autonomous weapons will be essential to an affordable defense of Asia
Joint Force Quarterly 97 (2nd Quarter, April 2020)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1016/thumbnail.jp
Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic Total Defense and Implications for the Baltic Sea Region
No full textSponsored by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish National Defense University, this paper is the second in a series of Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy described Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). This second report highlights early research and gaming insights indicating the importance of total defense and comprehensive security, whole-of-society approaches to deterrence and defense of the Baltic Sea Region from Russian aggression. It also provides recommendations for how the Nordic and Baltic states can leverage aspects of total defense and comprehensive security to generate a credible asymmetric defense and build societal resilience.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/strategic-forums/1009/thumbnail.jp
Joint Force Quarterly 96 (1st Quarter, January 2020)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1017/thumbnail.jp
Joint Force Quarterly 99 (4th Quarter, October 2020)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1014/thumbnail.jp
Aligning the nuclear and conventional elements of NATO’s deterrence
No full textThe European security environment is increasingly competitive and dangerous. In particular, Russia has reemerged as a strategic rival seeking to overturn the current European political order. To that end, nuclear weapons are central to Russia’s foreign policy and planning which explicitly intend to intimidate, coerce and potentially defeat, militarily, its neighbours and the NATO Alliance. Russia has integrated nuclear weapons with non-military and non-nuclear concepts, capabilities and operations to expand its range of coercive options and signaled a willingness to rapidly and deliberately escalate early a “conventional” crisis or conflict to, and potentially past, the nuclear threshold to secure a favorable outcome.
To foreclose the coercive options this creates for Russia, NATO could seriously consider better aligning the conventional and nuclear elements of its own deterrence posture. Rather than imitating Russia, however, a key aspect for NATO is to avoid Moscow identifying exploitable advantages from its aggressive nuclear posture. A more cohesive and comprehensive deterrence posture can help influence Russian leaders against the use of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening deterrence.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmdcenter-research/1004/thumbnail.jp
Inevitable bedfellows? Cooperation on military technology for the development of UAVs and cruise missiles in the Asia-Pacific
No full textToday, the ‘small, smart and many’ revolution is providing state and non-state actors with capabilities that previously belonged only to great powers. Advances in specific technologies and manufacturing are broadening access to long-range precision-strike capabilities, and an increasing number of states have an incentive to take advantage of this – particularly those that share a border with China. This paper examines how the evolution of enabling technologies and changes in strategic objectives are increasing the likelihood that uninhabited-aerial-vehicle (UAV) and cruise-missile technologies will proliferate throughout the Asia-Pacific. Through arms sales, new technology-sharing relationships are likely to be created and existing ones reinforced. The current rapid pace of technological evolution means that non-aligned states, non-state actors and even second-tier defence companies are pursuing and contributing to UAV and cruise-missile capabilities. We conclude that although the proliferation of advanced weapons is normally a cause for concern regarding escalation, modern cruise missiles and UAVs may today serve as weapons that smaller states can use to deter aggression from larger states.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/wmdcenter-research/1002/thumbnail.jp