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Miniaturization as Grail in the Third Nuclear Age
No full textInstability of the international system and order is arising from competition among great powers, who possess large, thermonuclear arsenals, and from greater multipolarity of both established and aspirational nuclear weapons states to exercise their own aims for possessing “tactical-size” yields. The capacity of the United States arsenal to deter a nuclear attack on its partners and/or allies—as affirmed in the combined 2022 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review—will be challenged in an emerging Third Nuclear Age by threats of nuclear weapons use with far lower yields (i.e., tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons) than those of the Cold War. The First Nuclear Age clearly began in 1945 and was characterized by the bipolarity of US-Soviet relations. The collapse of the USSR ended this era, but a Second Nuclear Age had already started, overlapping with the first. This intervening period proliferated the bomb to rising powers, regimes with starving populations, and those with revisionist agendas; it began sometime after China’s first test in 1964 and has matured through the present aspirations of North Korea and Iran. Still, the world has remained free of nuclear weapons use in conflict for nearly 78 years, driven by fears of global catastrophe from megaton exchanges.
The emerging Third Nuclear Age, however, will be dominated by more probable threats of low-yield nuclear use in regional conflicts rather than the classic dyadic promise of mutually assured destruction. We predict high-precision, low-yield nuclear weapons that are measurable by the hundreds or even tens of tons will become as strategically important to adversaries engaged in their own violence escalation with neighbors as the existing US nuclear arsenal is to deterrence of city-evaporating power. In the emerging Third Nuclear Age, the capacity for Washington to respond to threats of such limited nuclear use in conflicts that do not directly threaten the homeland will depend on the credibility of strategic messaging for assured US capabilities to respond in kind through retaliatory nuclear use—with conventional force or in other domains, such as cyber. We anticipate the proliferation of low-yield nuclear options during this new era to generate challenges to the credibility of at least in-kind US nuclear response options, given a perceived paradox of American ethics and jus in bello principles entwined in scenarios of strategic nuclear use. We also expect regional belligerents to reconsider limited first-use as viably below the US appetite for an assured, devastating response
AI’s impact on war’s enduring nature
No full textThis article reassesses the impact of Artificial Intelligence on war and revisits an article published in 2018 by one of the authors in Orbis. Despite the remarkable progress in generative AI, the authors contend that war’s essential nature will be impacted to a degree but will not be substantially altered
Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve
No full textManeuver warfare is a fraud, and maneuver as a warfighting function is dead. At least, that is what some scholars and military analysts claim. We disagree. However, there are ongoing changes in the character of war fueling perceptions that should be addressed. Warfare’s changing character often alters the balance between offense and defense, and the U.S. military faces one of these periodic shifts today.
These changes require professionals to think creatively about the implications. As warfare evolves, remaining ready in the face of technological change is key to the profession of arms. The challenges posed in today’s operating environment complicate maneuver and should stimulate updates to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1: Warfighting
Joint Force Quarterly 109 (2nd Quarter, April 2023)
No full texthttps://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/jfq-full-issue/1004/thumbnail.jp
China\u27s Indo-Pacific Folly
No full textIn December 2022, Japan released its first national security strategy in nearly ten years. The document committed Tokyo to strengthening the U.S.-Japanese alliance “in all areas.” And Japan is not alone. Over the last half decade, almost all U.S. allies across the Indo-Pacific have deepened their partnerships with Washington and formed new networks with one another.
At first blush, this might seem puzzling. Chinese President Xi Jinping has voiced his desire for the United States to withdraw from the Indo-Pacific, and his government has upheld China’s long tradition of expressing hostility toward Washington’s alliances, which form the foundation of the U.S. presence in the region. Many analysts, including Rush Doshi and Elizabeth Economy, have argued that Beijing has a disciplined and coherent strategy to drive a wedge between the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies. But far from a well-executed campaign, Beijing’s effort to erode U.S. alliances has been incoherent and undisciplined, strengthening, rather than weakening, U.S. alliances in the region and producing an energized U.S.-led coalition poised to constrain Beijing for years to come.
Beijing’s ambition to isolate Washington from its Asian allies has been derailed in large part by its desire to redress more immediate grievances—namely, to reclaim what it sees as lost territory and punish countries that offend its sensibilities. Instead of staying focused on its long-term strategic objectives, China has grown preoccupied with achieving near-term tactical gains in both its territorial disputes with its neighbors and its quest for deference from other countries. These impulses have resulted in major strategic errors and suggest that Beijing is not nearly as adept at planning and executing long-term strategy as many believe
Designating North Korean Nuclear Weapons as Proliferation Risks: A Proposal for Forestalling Major Power Conflicts in the Event of North Korea\u27s Internal Collapse
No full textToday, the United States struggles with identifying and prioritizing the plethora of potential vulnerabilities to national security posed by emerging technologies. Emerging technologies are often confused with emerging threats, but the two categorizations are not synonymous. Identifying which emerging technologies indeed constitute emerging threats can better prepare society to take the appropriate actions to mitigate hazards and possibly introduce governance measures that ensure better control over their development. The participants in the workshop described in this paper found that social, cultural, political, economic, and other factors are what make emerging technologies emerging threats. The confusion often has its roots in a “hype cycle” that stresses the dangers of an emerging technology while ignoring the various forms of expertise and resources (personnel and otherwise) needed to implement it. Denying bad actors important technical expertise or tacit knowledge plays an important role in denying them access to emerging technologies that may pose a threat to society.Today, the United States struggles with identifying and prioritizing the plethora of potential vulnerabilities to national security posed by emerging technologies. Emerging technologies are often confused with emerging threats, but the two categorizations are not synonymous. Identifying which emerging technologies indeed constitute emerging threats can better prepare society to take the appropriate actions to mitigate hazards and possibly introduce governance measures that ensure better control over their development. The participants in the workshop described in this paper found that social, cultural, political, economic, and other factors are what make emerging technologies emerging threats. The confusion often has its roots in a “hype cycle” that stresses the dangers of an emerging technology while ignoring the various forms of expertise and resources (personnel and otherwise) needed to implement it. Denying bad actors important technical expertise or tacit knowledge plays an important role in denying them access to emerging technologies that may pose a threat to society
Discerning the Drivers of China’s Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators, and Data
No full textFor decades following its first test in 1964, China maintained a small nuclear force and a doctrine emphasizing deterrence and no-first-use of nuclear weapons. China has recently embarked on an unprecedented campaign of expansion and modernization, which is changing the size, structure, and operational posture of its nuclear forces. The growing discrepancy between China’s restrained declaratory policy and advancing nuclear capabilities raises important questions about the status and future trajectory of China’s nuclear forces, with major implications for the United States.https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/china-strategic-perspectives/1000/thumbnail.jp
Imagining the Future of Landpower
No full textThere is an ongoing debate in the US military establishment about the changing character of war. Officially, we acknowledge the need for significant change over continuity, yet very few agree on the details. Ongoing conflicts raise questions. In particular, just how will the rapid diffusion of low-cost unmanned systems and an array of accurate, lethal top-attack munitions impact warfare and US defense priorities? How should tomorrow’s landpower adapt to the purported changing character of war. What is now a legacy capability and what are the new priorities shaping US military investments? A new book, The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century, gets to the heart of that debate, taking a forward-leaning look at these questions and urging adaptation. It races up to and past what a prior article in these pages called “the inflection point between evolutionary and revolutionary adaptation.
2023 Biodefense Posture Review
No full textIn his National Security Strategy, President Biden made clear that we are at an inflection point, with the United States entering a decisive decade amid a rapidly-changing security environment. In the National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan, the Biden-Harris Administration laid out a vision of a world free from catastrophic biological incidents, setting forth bold outcomes for countering biological threats, enhancing pandemic preparedness, and achieving global health security. In support of this strategic direction, the Department of Defense (DoD) must be prepared to operate in a biological threat environment and to support the national biodefense enterprise, at home and abroad