The Oracle (E-Journal)
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T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism, Reasonableness, and Moral Intuition
Get PDFIn his article “Contractualism and Utilitarianism”, T. M. Scanlon formulates a contractualist account of moral wrongness. For Scanlon, a morally permissible principle is one that cannot be reasonably rejected within the context of an “informed, unforced general agreement.”1 Scanlon posits a hypothetical situation between agents who share a mutual recognition of each other’s value as persons. These persons are assumed to be rational individuals who are capable of formulating their own particular visions of the good; this situation is the figurative space in which a principle can be held up to the standard of reasonable rejection. Scanlon’s formulation of moral wrongness hinges on this notion of reasonableness. If we are to use it as a standard of rejection, it must be clear what Scanlon considers reasonableness to be. The goal of this paper is to clarify the meaning of reasonableness in Scanlon’s contractualism, consider how it functions within the hypothetical space of mutual recognition, and challenge its sufficiency as a standard of moral wrongness in relation to our moral intuition
Why is there growing authoritarianism in 21th century? : Edited by Niki Hoveida
Get PDFIn the neoliberal world of us, we are experiencing the rise of authoritarian regimes all over the world. The USA elected Donald trump, Turkey elected Erdogan, and the list goes on. According to the mainstream approach, this is caused by the growing inequality and eradication of the middle class due to neoliberal policies. This approach treats neoliberalism in a very reductionist way and asses it solely as a new economic relationship in the world. However, these accounts cannot provide any answers to questions of how neoliberalism transforms ordinary people into a supporter of authoritarian leaders and is the new authoritarianism an anomaly of the era or a phenomenon that is a reality of our society. In this paper, firstly, I summarize the argument of Lowenthal and Guterman which analyze the tactics of fascists and psychology of their listeners. In the second part, I will show that same tactics described by Lowenthal and Guterman are used by the new authoritarian leaders. In this paper I argue that neoliberalism recreated and, fueled the relying reasons behind the authoritarian tendencies that Lowenthal and Guterman argued. Unlike the mainstream approach, I will argue that neoliberalism cannot be analyzed solely in terms of the economic relationship, it is a specific governing rationale that includes phenomenon such as discipline through debt, depoliticization of social problems, individualization of economic security. In my paper, I show that neoliberal rationality helps the new authoritarian leaders to facilitate those tactics and exploit the same emotions. This is because, firstly, the neoliberal rationale that tried to form induvial who is securing its future in the financial market and who is in debtor creditor relation creates anxiety and devastation. Financial markets are uncertain no action can secure future return for 100 percent, and it creates expansion of creditor debtor relationship in the neoliberal era create citizens who are born and die in debt. Therefore, people are more paranoid and failed in the neoliberal world. As a result, agitators effectively exploit those feelings. Also, in the neoliberal era, it is easier to distort and exploit values for the agitator because in the neoliberal era the values are deviated already by the creation of social and political sphere which is predominantly occupied by market rationality. Therefore, agitators could easily replace their distorted ideas as the inside of value is already emptied. This work helps us to understand which emotions produce authoritarian tendencies and in what ways neoliberalism reproduce them
There Is More than One Way to Do It: Fostering an Interdisciplinary Approach to the Politics of Sexuality
Get PDFIn this paper, I engage with Michel Foucault’s philosophy of sexuality, specifically the discursive method articulated in The History of Sexuality, Vol.1. Drawing primarily from the work of Sigmund Freud (1905), Antonio Gramsci (1931), Ian Craib (1997), as well as prominent York University scholars John O’Neill (1995) and Loree Erikson (2000), the paper uncovers some of the politically debilitating philosophical assumptions on which Foucault’s work is predicated, and which prevent his text (as well as other postmodern theories of sexuality) from producing a radical, inclusive and liberating politics of sexuality. The paper does not seek to discredit the validity, utility or profundity of Foucault’s constructionist theories — rather, the main objective of the essay is to encourage psychoanalytic, social constructionist, historical and scientific approaches to sexual theory. I suggest that to understand the complex phenomenon of sexuality and promote an inclusive, radical politics of sexuality, theorists need to approach the study of sexuality from multiple perspectives
Why Explaining Religion Is Not Sufficient to Explain Away Religion: Edited by Ko-Lun Liu
Get PDFWhile science continues to make significant progressive strides, religion has yet to add to its historically established doctrines. Not only has the rapid expansion of science brought into question the validity and necessity of religion, part of scientific inquiry now focuses on how ‘counterintuitive’ notions of religion came to be. ‘Counterintuitive’ ideas of religion posit religious beliefs to go against or violate empirically verified facts or knowledge. Some argue that we can utilize the knowledge attained from advancements in science to explain away religion. One particular aspect of science that is used to explain away religion are evolutionary theories. In this paper, I will argue that while evolutionary accounts can explain our affinity towards religion, it has yet to explain away religion. I will explicate and refute the three different argument for evolutionary accounts of religion, including the socio-evolutionary, bio-evolutionary and cultural-evolutionary, to demonstrate how science has not succeeded in explaining away religion
Commensurability of Science During Paradigm Shifts And Standards Of Progress: Edited by Doğa Özden
Get PDFIn this essay, I will talk about the development of scientific theories in the philosophy of science. I will explain the way in which science is thought to be created by Thomas Kuhn in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”. As a result of the Kuhn’s description of science as a framework consisting of paradigms, Kuhn contends that scientific advancement is noncumulative. For Kuhn, an old paradigm must be supplanted irrationally in entire by a new and incommensurable alternative paradigm through the process of a scientific revolution (Kuhn, 12). However, I will argue that Kuhn’s position on this matter is entirely not correct. Instead, I argue that, within the paradigmatic structure of science that Kuhn advances, progress within the paradigms of science can be shown to be cumulative and rational. Examples of this can be found in the various ways in which scientists continually reference and operate with the work of the old paradigm despite their adherence to the new. After my argument, a reaction from Kuhn is imagined on the alleged correspondence between paradigms. I show that Kuhn would find that although paradigms may communicate among one another the standards by which they communicate and ultimately compare among one another is inherently irrational and cannot be justified. At last, I attempt to explain away Kuhn’s imagined reaction by arguing that rational discussion and judgement among paradigms is possible using experience in our epistemological pursuits
