The Oracle (E-Journal)
Not a member yet
103 research outputs found
Sort by
Meaning Use and Determination: The Underdetermination of Meaning by Use
No full textIn section 189 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s interlocutor asks: “But are the steps then not determined by the algebraic formula?” And Wittgenstein replies, “the question contains a mistake.” In the first part of this essay, I will argue that this question is a consequence of Wittgenstein’s attempt to elucidate the absurdity of the default idea of determination — Platonic determination — which suggests that an algebraic formula determines its infinite applications objectively for all time. Here I shall expose the problems with the Platonic conception of determination. Now if a question asked contains a mistake, then it should follow that at least one illicit assumption is necessary to asking it. In the second part of this essay I will try to make explicit this assumption. I will argue that Wittgenstein’s response to the question is a product of his attempt to articulate a conception of determination — naturalistic determination — independent of Platonic associations, and lying somewhere between the extremes of Platonism and conventionalism.' In the main, I hope to show that for Wittgenstein applications of a word might indeed be determined by its meaning. But I hope to illustrate that for Wittgenstein words can only be naturalistically determined. Though they may not be determined in virtue of their objective essence or inherent meaning, words can nonetheless determine future application in virtue of use, learning, norms and human nature. Wittgenstein’s position therefore hangs in the middle — between Platonism and conventionalism
Who Needs Value-Free Science? Defending Objectivity in Not-So-Value-Free Science
No full textThis essay is both a defense and a critique of value-free science. It is a defense in that I shall endeavor to demonstrate how science is often influenced by values that distort, misrepresent, or even completely falsify scientific data. I argue that there are many circumstances where values do not play a legitimate role in scientific inquiry, and thus are rightly barred. However, I shall also critique the notion of value-free science by demonstrating that values can (and do) play a legitimate and indeed vital role in the functioning of science. The worry, it seems, is that if science is not value-free, then it cannot be objective. Contrary to this assertion, I will argue that the conflation of value-freedom with objectivity is mistaken. First, I will begin by examining the arguments both for and against value-free science. Second, I will disentangle the notion of value-freedom from objectivity in order to reveal that the two are by no means the same. This will help to set up my defense of objectivity, where I shall reconcile value-motivated science with the possibility of objective knowledge. My thesis is that values are a necessary component of scientific inquiry, and that the lack of value-freedom in science does not compromise the pursuit of objectivity. 
Identity in Limbo
Get PDFTo answer the question of personal identity, philosophers generally examine two possible criteria: the criterion of continuity of memory and the criterion of continuity of body. Some argue that personal identity is independent of the body and that all that is needed to account for personal identity is the continuity of memory. Others, however, argue that continuity of memory alone is an insufficient criterion for personal identity; they maintain that humans intuitively value their physical make-up to such an extent that a criterion of continuity of body must also be taken into account. In this essay, I will examine and weigh important arguments from both camps and show how personal identity requires something much more than either criterion on its own. I will argue, then, that both memory and body are crucial elements of personal identity. Further, I will illustrate how, in some cases, human intuition gives emphasis to memory over body and, in other cases, body over memory
Do We Need Moral Facts?
Get PDFIn this article I answer Gilbert Harman’s objection to the possibility of objectivity in the field of ethics, namely, that there is no such thing as a “moral fact.” I analyze the argument using terminology from G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica and try to apply it to utilitarian moral theory. After demonstrating that utilitarianism does not, in fact, make any appeal to moral facts, I then consider the implications of Harman’s theory for the field of ethics as a whole. I conclude that his argument is based on a misunderstanding of ethics and that values are not to be found in the world, but are to be found in us. I then give some closing remarks about one possibility for the construction of an objective system of ethics which finds its basis in the subject
Polishing a Crystal: Understanding Plato’s Allegory of the Cave
Get PDFBehold! He was born into chains and constrained to a chair. His head was held still, looking forwards. The world flickered as shadows on the wall in front of him. These shadows were life as he understood it; but he is being released. He is now being dragged out of this shadowy reality and into the light of actual objects. His eyes must adapt to the painful sunlight. And, once they have and he can see clearly the world as it is around him, he must return to the world of shadows. This is the philosopher. Plato’s allegory of the cave, summarized above, expresses Socrates’ understanding of the philosopher, his role in society, and the experience one needs to become a philosopher. Here, we will offer an interpretation of this famous allegory from Plato’s Republic to uncover the nature of the philosopher according to Socrates. To do so, we will examine the life experiences of the philosopher; his guiding principles and how he must come to arrive at them; and the practical use of philosophy within the polis. Moreover, we will examine these points with careful reference to the allegory of the cave and thereby reveal the allegory’s powerful ability to express Socrates’ notion of the philosopher
The Role of Free Speech in a Democracy: A Critique of Rawls’s Political Theory
Get PDFIn The Basic Liberties and Their Priority (1993), John Rawls attempts to supply a robust political theory that answers the criticisms leveled at his earlier work, A Theory of Justice (1971). Central to Rawls’s arguments is his conception of the person and the implications it has on the two principles of justice made famous in Theory. Yet answering these criticisms leads Rawls to make some questionable arguments regarding the priority of the basic liberties and how they may be made to cohere with one another. In particular, section 10 sees Rawls advocate a near absolute right of free speech by drawing on his theory of the person and attempting to illustrate how the basic liberties may be adjusted at later stages. Thus, this essay will be devoted to critically discussing Rawls’s views on his perceived right of free speech. Particularly, it will be argued that Rawls takes an approach to free speech that is far too narrow and seemingly tailored to his general theory and conclusions. Free speech is not a pure good as Rawls seems to suggest, but rather entails consequences with which any well-governed society must be concerned
What Defines Merit with Regards to Equality of Opportunity? Edited by Chris Moure
Get PDFIt is not uncommon to hear explanations such as “we hired this candidate because they were the most deserving of the job” or that “the particular student chosen for this scholarship was the most worthy candidate.” However, there is little consensus as to what defines merit or desert in this context. This essay defends Tom Scanlon’s view that for merit to be a valid basis of selection for positions of advantage, it must be defined in the institution-dependent sense. This means that merit or talent must be based on how well an individual fits the goals or aims which the institution plans to promote, provided that the institution’s aims are normatively justified. The first section of this essay successfully shows the theoretical validity of Scanlon’s argument for the institution-dependant sense of merit. This is done by first analyzing how institutions generate inequalities in a just fashion, relying on John Rawls’ concept of the original position. The essay then shows that for these inequalities to be justified, they must be distributed according to the institutional account of procedural fairness. The first section concludes by providing a definition of talent that fits with the institutional account of procedural fairness and the Rawlsian original position, this being the institutiondependent notion of merit. The second and third sections of the essay assess the logical strength of Scanlon’s argument against a rebuttal from Ronald Dworkin, and the real-world implications of the institution-dependent definition of merit on equality of opportunity, in the context of affirmative action programs. The final section of the essay highlights some potential problems and unanswered questions with regards to the institution-dependent definition of merit and provides some potential solutions while also provoking more exploration of the topic of merit and equality of opportunity. An appendix is also provided to show the logical validity of Scanlon’s argument with formal logic. All of this will cumulatively show that T. M. Scanlon is correct in asserting that for merit to be a valid basis of selection, it must be defined in the institution-dependent sense
The End of Art: A Hegelian Conception of the Postmodern Paradigm
Get PDFThis essay will use the Hegelian understanding of dialectical history as a model for the history of art. Through this model it will be shown that postmodern art is the actualization of artistic freedom whereby greater artistic autonomy has enabled artists to conceptualize, philosophize and theorize about the world around them to a much greater extent than at any other point in history. The result of this artistic autonomy is that art has now taken on a dual identity of both art and philosophy. Consequently, art, as it is historically known, is a thing of the past