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Disputing Frozen Embryos: Using International Perspectives to Formulate Uniform U.S. Policy
The fertility industry in the United States is, for the most part, unregulated. The growing demand of infertile couples has quickly accelerated the status of assisted reproductive technology procedures such as in vitro fertilization from experimental to everyday clinical use. Although minimum standards and guidelines for fertility clinics have been produced by professional societies, clinics are not obligated to follow them, and there are no standard substantive guidelines available for them to follow. As legislatures have been slow to respond to the dilemmas created by reproductive technology, the response to these dilemmas has come from the courts that are compelled to react on a case-by-case basis. Courts in all fifty states are able to decide these issues on a case-by-case basis because national uniform policy does not exist. In contrast, comprehensive national legislation in England and Australia has effectively curtailed courtroom battles over frozen embryos.This Comment focuses on the recent increase in litigation between divorcing couples in the United States over the disposition of frozen embryos and suggests that there is a need for uniform state regulation of the growing assisted reproduction technology market. A well-regulated regime would promote uniform contracts signed between IVF clinics and their clinics as per the disposition of any frozen embryos in the case of change of circumstance such as divorce or death. This Comment suggests that the U.S. would do well to follow the example set by countries such as England and Australia, and establish an independent commission to undertake a comprehensive review of the various issues raised by in vitro fertilization, and to draft legislation to be implemented by the states
Legal Procedure and the Law of Evidence in Ancient Egypt
The ancient Egyptians established fixed procedures for dispute resolution. As is the case with modern U.S. law, the ancient Egyptian courts tried to follow precedent, recognized the importance of due process, and kept records of their decisions so that, when similar problems arose, they were able to resolve those problems in a consistent fashion. There was no viable appeal procedure until the first millennium B.C.; or if there was a right of appeal earlier, it was extremely limited in scope. The ancient Egyptian had his day in court (so to speak) and that was it. Indeed, most trials lasted only one day. Although there were no professional lawyers, scribes seem to have specialized in preparing legal documents for pleading, and also wrote wills and other documents of a legal nature. Thus, the scribal class functioned somewhat like lawyers or quasi-lawyers. But scribes did not plead cases for others as advocates. Most of the evidence points to a relatively simple procedural structure. The plaintiff, or the state official acting in the capacity of a prosecutor, brought his case (often by means of a written complaint), argued it, and then the defendant answered, arguing his case, followed by a summation. It is clear that both oral evidence (i.e., bringing in witnesses to speak on your behalf) as well as documentary evidence (e.g., contracts, wills, deeds, and tax records) were both admissible. However, the Egyptians preferred to have the testimony of their witnesses written down. The judges took an active role at trial, asking questions and interviewing witnesses. Witnesses were threatened with severe penalties for perjury and sometimes were tortured. Officials had authority to search houses and to seize property as evidence. Although the special courts were not bound by formulaic court procedures, they too relied on traditional judicial mechanisms (e.g., investigation) and standard types of evidence (e.g., witnesses, documents, searches, and visits to the scene of the crime). We are not sure how much power the courts possessed to enforce their judgments
International Law Aspects of the European Union
The manifold manifestations of the regional economic integration organisation of the European states have produced a complex web of international relations without an always clear legal status. In contrast to the European Communities, the European Union is not supposed to have international personality at all. The relations between the member states are governed by international law precepts, and the Union acts towards third parties through the intermediary of its constituent organs, the member states, and the organs of the Community. It is submitted in this Article that this state of affairs inexorably leads towards an implicit recognition of the legal personality of the Union as well. Such recognition would not solve all problems, however. The Community enjoys legal personality by express reference in the founding treaties, but its competences are still less than those of a state. In many occasions, the Community and the member states have concurrent jurisdiction in the same subject-matter. The effective assumption of an international obligation necessitates then the conclusion of a mixed agreement, with all the problems of joint and several liability this might entail. The member states thus present to third parties a Janus face of both concerted and individual action. Balancing the inherent tensions within a continuously evolving institution remains the challenge of the future
Good Faith and Abuse of Procedural Rights in Japanese Civil Procedure
In Japan, the doctrine of abuse of right was first introduced into the substantive law early this century and gradually permeated into civil procedure in the post-War period as a part of the broader principle of good faith. Today, the principle of good faith incorporated in the New Code of Civil Procedure of 1996 enjoys a central position in Japanese civil procedure. Japanese courts have relied on the principle whenever a straight application of a statutory rule would contravene the sense of fairness and justice in situations ranging from the use of civil action to the scope of res judicata