The Bichler and Nitzan Archives
Not a member yet
    759 research outputs found

    Kapitał, by rządzić, musi sabotować postęp

    Full text link
    Od głodu i biedy po zwykłe marnotrawstwo i nawracające fale przeróżnych kryzysów – to nie niepożądane skutki uboczne kapitalizmu, ale przejawy sabotażu. Bo nic nie utrwala władzy kapitału skuteczniej niż istnienie szerokiej rzeszy ludzi, którzy ani na chwilę nie mogą przestać pracować, by przeżyć

    Inflation! The Battle Between Creditors and Workers

    Full text link
    I’ve been writing about inflation for the better part of three months. It’s been exhausting. Most of my time has been spent debunking misconceptions promoted by mainstream economists. Fortunately, I’m ready to move on. What’s interesting about inflation is not the fact that prices rise. What matters is that prices rise at different rates. In other words, inflation creates winners and losers — it redistributes income. In this post, I’ll dive into the redistribution dynamics between wage workers and creditors.1 When inflation rears its head, both groups try to bolster their income. But they rarely have equal success. Looking at over two centuries of US price history, I find (perhaps surprisingly) that inflation tended to benefit workers at the expense of creditors. Since the 1970s, however, the reverse has been true; inflation has systematically benefited creditors at the expense of workers. So what changed? Two things. First, the US labor movement was crushed. Second (and far less discussed), US policy makers adopted a new way to ‘fight’ rising prices. When inflation reared its head, central banks attempted to quell it by aggressively hiking interest rates. Today, it’s received wisdom that this policy ‘works’. Of course, the policy does work — but not for its stated goal. Never mind ‘fighting inflation’. When you raise interest rates, you give creditors a raise. Framed in this light, it’s unsurprising that inflation has recently become a boon for US creditors. Backed by monetarist ideology, the government is now dedicated to preserving the return on credit. When it comes to class struggle, there’s nothing like having the sledgehammer of the state to back you up. With credit returns in mind, here’s the road ahead. Before diving into the dynamics of class struggle, I’ll take a quick look at the language used to describe rising prices. Next, I’ll quantify the price struggle between creditors and workers. Finally, I’ll measure how this struggle has changed over time, and how it relates to the ideological currents of the period

    Mapping the Ownership Network of Canada’s Billionaire Families

    Full text link
    The planet has a billionaire problem. According to Oxfam, the world’s billionaires have more combined wealth than the bottom 60% of humanity — some 4.6 billion people. Given this obscene situation, calls are growing to rid the world of the billionaire class. But how do we make that happen? We think that part of the answer is to understand billionaire’s network of control. Many billionaires are happy to have their net worth tracked by Forbes — they treat it as an accumulation horse race.1 But what billionaires don’t like is for people to understand how they wield power. On that front, behind ever billionaire is a complicated network of corporate control — a network that is seldom made public. We’d like to change that. In this post, we’ll map the ownership network of ten billionaire families in Canada. Why Canada? Well, because we’re Canadian researchers. But more importantly, because the statistics arm of the Canadian government has done the heavy lifting for us. For the last decade, Statistics Canada has maintained a database on the inter-corporate ownership of Canadian corporations — a database that it bills as a “unique directory of ‘who owns what’ in Canada”. This corporate-ownership database contains a trove of information about how the rich wield power. In this post, we’ll begin to explore the data by mapping the ownership network of the following billionaire families: The McCain Family The Katz Family The Fidani Family The Richardson Family The Saputo Family The Rogers Family The Pattison Family The Irving Family The Weston Family The Thomson Famil

    Capital as Death Denial

    Full text link
    Terror Management Theory (TMT) argues that subconscious fears about death shape our behaviour in often disturbing and destructive ways. Building on the work of Ernest Becker, the core theoretical claim of TMT is that human activity, including all forms of culture, is ‘…designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny of man.’ Capitalism is unlike anything that preceded it, and this novelty stems from a specific behaviour amongst capitalists that leads to sustained growth: the routine reinvestment of profits in the anticipation of future profitability. What might this novel feature of capitalism have to do with death denial? What kind of phenomenological specificity is bound up with this historical specificity? My aim in this chapter is to tackle these questions, primarily through a comparison between the role of death in capitalism and the archaic gift economy. My argument can be summarised as follows. First, I place the archaic gift economy, organised around the redistribution and destruction of surplus, on the low end of the death denial continuum. Archaic economic activity is collective and sacred, actively involving the dead and death in order to make payable the existential debts that haunt us from the moment of biological birth. Cyclical time and periodic redemptive ritual are purposefully designed to prevent accumulation of anything, whether it be wealth, power, time, anxiety, or guilt. Second, I place the capitalist economy, organised around the routine reinvestment of surplus for profit, on the high end of the death denial continuum. With capitalism, economic activity is individualised and de-sacralised and the dead and death are banished, resulting in unpayable debts. Capital accumulation is the primary psychological defence mechanism, a power intended to stave off mortal dread. But because accumulation rests on linear time and is shorn of redemptive and sacrificial ritual, guilt and anxiety also start to accumulate. The system is driven by an endless and increasing neurotic charge. Third, I claim that since the 1970s, capitalist death denial has intensified. Structural transformations in the so-called ‘advanced’ economies over the past few decades have dissolved the remaining vestiges of collectivism in economic life and shattered any shared vision of social progress. The result is a disintegration of the remaining collective outlets needed to share, expiate, and to some extent relieve, the cumulative guilt and anxiety of capitalist life. Intensified death denial in the contemporary era finds its most spectacular manifestation in Silicon Valley’s quest for literal immortality. This privatised immortality project is a morbid escapism intended to hive the ruling class off from the irredeemable masses

    When Stocks Go Up Who Benefits?

    Full text link
    Cui bono? For whose benefit? Think of this question as a sword — a sharp piece of steel that cuts through bullshit. In this post, we’ll use it to slice through business-press bullshit about the stock market. You know the stuff — the ubiquitous puff pieces that gush about rising stock prices, as though they benefit everyone. When we ask cui bono, we carve through this BS. We discover that for most people, rising stocks are a tool not for gain, but for administering pain. Looking at the United States, I find that when stocks go up, the vast majority of people see their share of income (and wealth) decline. So here’s the truth about the stock market: it’s a socially sanctioned way to take from the poor and give to the rich

    Does the US Tax Code Encourage Market Concentration? An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Corporate Tax Structure on Profit Shares and Shareholder Payouts

    Full text link
    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Concerns about the market power of large corporations are growing. There are good reasons why monopoly now features so prominently on the political and economic agenda. Mounting evidence shows that corporate concentration stifles innovation and investment, resulting in lower-quality goods and services and less economic dynamism. Concentration is also a catalyst for rising wealth and income inequality, as monopolistic firms are able to suppress workers’ wages and charge consumers higher prices. Most of the public policy debate has been focused on the role of antitrust law in combating the monopolistic practices of large corporations. But recently, the focus has shifted somewhat, as more and more people come to recognize the role of federal and state-level taxation in understanding corporate concentration in the US. Yet, there are still many questions about the effect of taxation on market structure: Is there a tax advantage associated with bigness, as measured by revenues? If so, is this advantage confined to a few “bad apples” or is it widespread among large corporations? What role do the domestic and foreign tax systems play in encouraging monopoly power? What does an analysis of the relationship between tax and monopoly tell us about wider macroeconomic shifts in the US economy over the past few decades? The purpose of this brief is to address these questions by analyzing and comparing the overall effects of the US tax code on the profit share of large and smaller corporations. Our analysis reveals a striking tax advantage for big business in the US. Specifically, we find that the total post-tax profit share of the top 10 percent of listed corporations since the mid-1980s is consistently and significantly higher than their total pre-tax profit share, indicating that the overall tax structure (domestic and foreign) fuels profit concentration at the top of the corporate hierarchy. For example, in the most recent period covered in our analysis, 2019–2022, the overall tax structure has boosted the post-tax profit share of large corporations by 2.32 percentage points relative to their pre-tax share. We then assess the contribution of different tax jurisdictions to concentration by estimating the pre-tax and post-tax profit shares of large corporations, domestically and internationally. Here, our analysis reveals that the domestic tax structure is especially influential in driving concentration. Over the past four decades, the domestic post-tax profits of large corporations have been much larger than their pre-tax share, with the domestic tax structure augmenting the profit share of large corporations by 3.79 percentage points in 2019–2022. The effect of the foreign tax structure on profit concentration is more ambiguous. In most periods it is either slightly positive or slightly negative. For 2019–2022, the foreign post-tax profit share of large corporations was 0.87 percentage points higher than their pre-tax share. Based on these findings, we argue that the tax structure, especially the domestic tax structure, plays a crucial but still underappreciated role in exacerbating the monopoly problem. We go on to consider the wider consequences for the US economy of big business’s tax advantage. The political justification for corporate tax cuts—including those that were part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017—is that they would free up money for companies to invest in productive capacity, in turn generating higher employment and wages. But as our analysis shows, the capital expenditures of large corporations tend to decrease, not increase, when their tax advantage grows. Instead of fueling productive investment, the tax savings of large corporations are principally used to pay out dividends and buy back their own stock. This means that large corporations are less disposed to investments that may indirectly benefit ordinary workers and more disposed to shareholder value enhancement that directly benefits the asset-rich. Overall, we find that the tax system contributes in crucial ways to rising corporate concentration and to widening inequality among households. With the objective of leveling the playing field, our findings offer powerful justification for the restoration of graduated statutory corporate income tax rates in the US alongside a global minimum effective tax rate of 25 percent and a graduated excise tax on share buybacks. The monopoly problem has become endemic to US capitalism, and corporate tax reform on its own will not solve it. Yet one clear advantage of taxation is that it has a direct, and therefore much more easily discernible, effect on distributive outcomes compared to other policy measures. A more holistic approach, combining corporate tax reform with more robust antitrust regulation, the strengthening of workers’ rights, and increased public ownership in key sectors, is needed to build an economy based on equity, fairness, and prosperity for all

    Rethinking the Political Economy of Environmental Conflict: Lessons from the UK Fracking Controversy

    Full text link
    As governments and corporations have intensified their efforts to locate, extract, and capitalise oil, gas, and various other biophysical materials, the world has simultaneously witnessed a proliferation of social resistance to these efforts. While taking many forms, such resistance, and concomitant ecological distribution conflicts (EDCs), are invariably motivated by a diverse range of objections regarding the unequal distributions of power, harms, and benefits associated with these extractive endeavours. This thesis primarily addresses the EDC literature, an environmental justice activist orientated literature at the intersection of ecological economics and political ecology. Despite offering numerous insights regarding the socio-metabolic drivers of EDCs, this literature often tends towards problematic explanations regarding the role of capitalist power. Thus, while these explanations foreground questions of capitalist power, their core assumptions - especially the analytical distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘the economic’- serve to elide key aspects of capitalist power within this context. Moreover, they also tend to obscure an important counterpart to capitalist power of special relevance to the activists who mobilise for environmental justice within EDCs; namely, capitalist vulnerability. Consequently, this thesis enfolds existing EDC insights within a broader theoretical framework underpinned by the Capital as Power (CasP) approach to political economy. CasP’s overarching contribution is to enable researchers to map how intra-capitalist conflicts unfold through the reorganisation of social ecological relations. Mobilising this framework, and a unique combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in the context of the UK fracking conflict (2010-2020), this thesis aims to explore, understand, and explain capitalist power and vulnerability in fracking conflicts (specifically) and EDCs (generally). Alongside other key findings, the inherent uncertainty surrounding future earnings and the divergent interests of competing capitalist coalitions are identified as key sources of capitalist vulnerability that environmental justice activists can exploit within EDCs. These findings highlight the analytical benefits of a CasP-driven theoretical framework for elucidating capitalist power and vulnerability in fracking conflicts and EDCs, not only for activists and academics, but also for policy makers, businesses, and other advocates for just transformations towards sustainability

    The Key to Managing Inflation? Higher Wages

    Full text link
    For the last few months, I’ve been diving into the economics of inflation. In this post, I’m excited to review some forgotten history. Our journey starts with a basic question: what is the key policy tool for managing the rate of inflation? According to mainstream economics, the key tool is the rate of interest. Hike this rate, economists argue, and you will cool an overheated economy, solving the problem of inflation. As you probably know, I don’t think much of this idea. (Criticism here and here.) And so I’ve been looking for alternative theories of inflation management. After months spent in the library stacks, I’m happy to report that I’ve discovered some lost theory. During the mid-20th century, it seems that while most economists were jumping on the interest-rate bandwagon, a few researchers went in the opposite direction. They proposed that inflation could be treated with a dose of wage hikes. Needless to say, this alternative theory remains virtually unknown. And on its face, it seems absurd. But as I’ll show, the wage-hike approach is strongly supported by evidence. Using standard economic tools, I find that rapid wage growth tends to be followed by a drop in inflation. The message? Policy makers should reverse course. Instead of greeting inflation with a dose of interest-rate hikes, governments should reach for the wage-rate lever. Hike wages as fast as possible, and you will surely reduce inflation

    Technological Change and Strategic Sabotage: A Capital as Power Analysis of the US Semiconductor Business

    Full text link
    Rapid technological change is often touted as a fundamental reality of capitalist societies. It is also presented as concrete evidence for the supposed progressive improvement of material well-being that characterises the capitalist system of social order. Since its emergence in the mid-20th century, semiconductor technology in many ways exemplifies this view. Yet the rapid advancement of semiconductor technology has also been accompanied by social conflict. The history of the technology is as much a story of frequent global chip ‘shortages’ and geopolitical disputes as it is one of exponentially growing computational power. The purpose of this study is to examine how the two sides of this story—progress and conflict—are linked. Starting from the theoretical political economic framework of capital as power, I put organized social power at the centre of this inquiry. I examine the behaviour of large semiconductor manufacturing firms in an attempt to uncover empirical relationships between capital investment, chip ‘shortages’, prices, and profits. Using quantitative and qualitative analysis, I find evidence that dominant semiconductor firms have engaged in systematic underinvestment in order to control chip prices for differential gain

    Masochistic Fun with Plutocratic Murder

    Full text link
    There’s nothing like waking up to a boatload of Twitter scorn. It’s refreshing, in a masochistic sort of way. Some backstory. After most of my blog posts, I put the charts on Twitter, usually with a provocative caption. (It’s more fun that way.) So after last week’s review of Cory Doctorow’s book Red Team Blues, I tweeted the relation between income inequality and the rate of murder. The next morning my Twitter feed was … interesting. The tweet apparently went viral, helped along by a nice little insult from Nassim Nicholas Taleb: 'No. The statement by that fettuccinibrain is contradicted by his own graph. #fooledbyrandomness'. Apart from him calling me a fettuccini brain, I have a lot of respect for Taleb, who’s famous for (among other things) his excellent book Fooled By Randomness. It’s an engaging romp through the many ways that human’s get duped by random patterns. Back to the tweet. Taleb is implying that the relation between inequality and murder is essentially a random blob of data, and that I’m a fool to plot a trend line through it. I disagree

    467

    full texts

    759

    metadata records
    Updated in last 30 days.
    The Bichler and Nitzan Archives
    Access Repository Dashboard
    Do you manage Open Research Online? Become a CORE Member to access insider analytics, issue reports and manage access to outputs from your repository in the CORE Repository Dashboard! 👇