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The Deep Roots of Fascist Thought
Full text linkFor decades, the word ‘fascist’ existed solely as a hyperbole — a term meant to insult rather than describe. But lately, politics have grown so hyperbolic that the label looks increasingly sincere. For example, when a powerful man advocates far-right politics and brazenly performs Nazi salutes in front of a cheering crowd, it seems like we have a word for that.
What was it again? Ah yes … fascist.
Of course, fascism is easy to see when it happens elsewhere. But when it grows under your nose within your own culture, even the most blatant signs can seem obscure. So what we need, then, is a hard-nosed way to measure the spread of fascist ideology — a method that is calmly quantitative, immune to both apologetics and hyperbole. In my mind, the best option is to study patterns in written language.
Backing up a bit, all ideologies have words that they emphasize, corresponding to concepts that they deem important. Now, we can get a qualitative sense for these words by reading a corpus of ideological text. But if we want to quantify an ideology, a better approach is to count words. When we do so, we can objectively identify the ‘jargon’ of an ideology — the words that it uses frequently and (crucially) overuses relative to mainstream writing. And once we’ve got this jargon, we can return to written language at large and track the changing frequency of our ideological jargon. The goal is to use word frequency to measure the spread (or collapse) of the ideology in question.
In this essay, I’ll use word frequency to track the spread of fascist ideology. The journey starts with a trip to 1930s Europe, where we’ll encounter the works of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler (translated into English). The rantings of these two villains will serve as our corpus of fascist text. From this text, we’ll extract the ‘jargon’ of fascism — the words that Mussolini and Hitler use frequently and overuse relative to mainstream English. With this jargon, we’ll then track the popularity of fascist thinking in written language.
Because I’m an anglophone, I’ll start with English writing. Running the numbers, I find that in English books, fascist jargon has been on the rise since the 1980s. Now this trend is admittedly alarming. But I’m going to resist the urge to focus myopically on the present. And that’s because the best way to understand today’s neo-fascism is by studying the deep past.
Here, then, is my key finding. Although ‘fascism’ was ostensibly born in the early 20th century, the linguistic data tells a different story about fascism’s origin. Looking at five European languages (English, German, Italian, Spanish, and French), I find that the high point of fascist jargon came several centuries before Hitler and Mussolini were born. In short, what we call ‘fascism’ may be best treated as a repackaging and rebranding of a set of dark ideas that have longed plagued humanity. So when fascists look into the future, they’re really peering into the long-dead past
Crises financeiras e a sabotagem do processo de produção: uma perspectiva Vebleniana (Financial Crises and the Sabotage of the Production process: A Veblenian Perspective)
Full text linkRESUMO. Este estudo explora as contribuições de Veblen sobre os fatores endógenos nas instituições e nos hábitos de gestão financeira que influenciam crises e limitam o crescimento econômico. Veblen destaca a prevalência de práticas de gerenciamento que priorizam a maximização financeira em detrimento da eficiência produtiva, promovendo a "sabotagem" industrial. As desigualdades econômicas e sociais, aliadas à ociosidade produtiva, são essenciais para sustentar o sistema capitalista. A mentalidade predatória que regula essa dinâmica também afeta as instituições políticas, intensificando a concentração de poder e a instabilidade. Como resultado, a tentativa de restauração da ordem financeira, após crises, aprofunda a sabotagem industrial e a concentração de poder. A análise de Veblen alinha-se aos pós-keynesianos, como Minsky e avança ao incorporar aspectos políticos na compreensão das crises financeiras.
ABSTRACT. This work explores Veblen's contributions regarding the endogenous factors within institutions and financial management practices that influence crises and constrain economic growth. Veblen emphasizes the prevalence of management practices that prioritize financial maximization over productive efficiency, promoting industrial "sabotage." Economic and social inequalities, along with productive idleness, are essential to sustaining the capitalist system. The predatory mindset governing this dynamic also affects political institutions, intensifying power concentration and instability. As a result, attempts to restore financial order after crises deepen industrial sabotage and power concentration. Veblen's analysis aligns with post-Keynesians, such as Minsky, and advances by incorporating political aspects into the understanding of financial crises
Monetary Expansionism, Global Commodity Prices, and Global Inequality
Full text linkAn early analysis of the imperialist implications of the surge of global commodity prices was conducted in 2014 by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler. However, their analysis did not consider how the US monetary and fiscal expansionist policies have contributed to the rise of global commodity prices. This article fills this gap. Arguably, under the current international fiat money system established in the early 1970s, the US has had the opportunity to use artificial money-creation mechanisms to enjoy the wealth produced by people outside the US without cost. This article argues that the US monetary and fiscal expansionist policies, including quantitative easing, are cases where the US takes advantage of such an opportunity and that the free transfer of wealth is a cause of the surge in global commodity prices
Capital as Power in the 21st Century. A Conversation
Full text linkOn December 3, 2024, Michael Hudson met with capital-as-power researchers Jonathan Nitzan, Tim Di Muzio and Blair Fix to discuss the intersections between their two lines of research.
YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBOU4xBg2p
‘National Champions’ in Global Meat Supply Chains: Implications for Governance and Corporate Power in Food Systems
Full text linkNational champion policies in BRICS countries pose challenges for governance in global meat processing markets as they increase concentration, reduce competition and enhance corporate power in food systems. We investigate the degree to which these shifts benefit sponsoring governments and citizens relative to intervention levels. By analysing mergers and acquisitions involving these firms, we unveil coordinated growth strategies benefiting primarily transnational capitalist investors. Our findings underscore the need for heightened scrutiny of national champion mergers and consideration of stronger international antitrust regulation. Understanding the evolving corporate power dynamics in meat supply chains is essential for improved ecological and social outcomes
El capital como poder en el siglo XXI: Una conversación
Full text linkEl 3 de diciembre de 2024, Michael Hudson se reunió con los investigadores del capital como poder Jonathan Nitzan, Tim Di Muzio y Blair Fix para discutir las intersecciones entre sus dos líneas de investigación. Lo que sigue es una transcripción de la conversación.
Vídeo de YouTube (inglés): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBOU4xBg2p
Partisan Politics and the Road to Plutocracy
Full text linkAs billionaires dance in the halls of the second Trump administration, it’s haunting how well Plutarch’s two-thousand-year-old words describe the state of American politics. It’s a barren landscape of plutocratic insatiability.
How did it get this way?
One way to tell the story is to look at the battle between the ruling class and everyone else — a battle which elites are obviously winning. But another way to understand the struggle is to look at the war between factions of the ruling class — a battle that plays out largely within partisan politics.
On this partisan front, the historical backdrop is that for forty years, Republicans have been playing a political shell game. As Jay Michaelson puts it, Republicans “appear populist … but act plutocrat”. What’s disorienting is that this shell game has worked. Although Republicans have historically governed for the benefit of the rich, they have recently rebranded themselves (successfully, it seems) as the party of the working class.
Is this new Republican messaging sincere? Or is it gaslighting? Well, Trump’s billionaire-stacked administration is quickly answering the question for us. However, this essay is not primarily about Trump, nor is it focused on the future. Instead, it’s a journey into how the partisan politics of the past have shaped the American plutocracy of today.
The essay consists of a deep dive into the realm of US state politics. The story will be simple and repetitive. Across states, I will measure the degree to which Republicans control each state’s legislature. Then I will observe, in a statistical sense, the policies and social outcomes that follow. That’s it. Of course, I’ll add commentary along the way. But the goal is to let the evidence speak for itself. And what leaps from the data is this: Republican control of state legislatures is systematically associated with the rich being (and becoming) richer. In short, American plutocracy seems to be a quintessentially Republican affair.
And that’s not all.
As we journey into the depths of US state politics, the plot will thicken. We’ll find striking partisan differences in the language used in state bills. We’ll see the many ways that Republicans help the rich and hurt workers. We’ll see the impact partisan politics have on the population as they work longer hours with less security. We’ll see the toll that Republican control takes on human welfare. And we’ll study the ways that Republicans gain power, despite enacting policies that are self-evidently bad for the majority. And we’ll reflect on the reasons that plutocracy can become self-reinforcing.
Think of the evidence that follows as a case study in how the machinery of democracy can be used to benefit the few and harm the many. It’s a warning from the past about tactics that will no doubt be intensified by Trump and his posse of plutocrats
The Half Life of Empire
Full text linkA good way to think about human history is that it has two distinct scales. On the small scale we have the churn of daily events — the stuff of endless individual exploits. And on the large scale, we have the long-term evolution of human societies — a scale so sweeping that the actions of individuals are as insignificant as the shifting grains of desert sand. The task of social science is to somehow connect these two scales — to show how the characters of history act on a stage that they do not fully control.
Looking at the present political spectacle, it’s clear that the world order is changing. In a matter of months, Donald Trump has taken a wrecking ball to the US-led regime that reigned since the end World War II. But here is an interesting question: if Trump had not been re-elected, to what extent would things be different?
The answer depends on our choice of scale. In a world without Trump, the eddies of small-scale history would surely be altered. There would be no ‘department of government efficiency’, for example. Nor would their likely be an unfolding US-led trade war. But on the scale of long-term history, many tides would remain the same. Chief among them would be the inexorable decline of US empire. To put things bluntly, the ‘American century’ is over and will never return
Capital as Coordination: A Synthesis Encompassing Marx and CasP
Full text linkThe global system we inhabit is often described in terms of markets, capital, and labor, but beneath these abstractions lies the deeper question of how coordination produces power and how power organizes coordination. Among the most influential traditions attempting to answer this question are Marxism and Capital as Power (CasP), two frameworks that, while sharing certain roots, diverge sharply in their interpretation of what capital is and how it operates. This divergence has led to ongoing tension. Marxists often argue that CasP misrepresents or abandons the core of Marx’s critique, while CasP theorists argue that Marxism remains tethered to outdated economic metaphysics. Both claim to reveal capitalism’s inner workings. But must we choose between them?
This essay argues that we do not. Through the lens of Coordination: the Fabric of Power (CfP), a broader theoretical framework that views coordination itself as the primary material of power, we can move beyond this impasse. Rather than asking whether capital is labor-time or capitalization, CfP reframes the question: How is coordination patterned, withheld, or manipulated in ways that produce asymmetries of power? In doing so, it offers a synthesis that integrates the structural insights of Marxism with the empirical clarity of CasP, not by erasing their differences, but by metabolizing their strongest claims
The Soviet Experiment with Empire
Full text linkIn my last post, ‘The Half Life of Empire’, I charted the rise and fall of the British and US empires, as measured by their share of world energy use. Afterwards, several readers requested that I apply the same methods to the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. Here’s my attempt to do so