Nordic Wittgenstein Review (NWR)
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Moore’s Notes on Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933: Text, Context, and Content
Get PDFWittgenstein’s writings and lectures during the first half of the 1930s play a crucial role in any interpretation of the relationship between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations. G. E. Moore’s notes of Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures, 1930-1933, offer us a remarkably careful and conscientious record of what Wittgenstein said at the time, and are much more detailed and reliable than previously published notes from those lectures. The co-authors are currently editing these notes of Wittgenstein’s lectures for a book to be published by Cambridge University Press. We describe the materials that make up Moore’s notes, explain their unique value, review the principal editorial challenges that these materials present, and provide a brief outline of our editorial project
Wittgenstein\u27s True Thoughts
No full textThe central remarks of the Tractatus are without substantial content or consequence, remarks at the boundaries of sense that dissolve into truth. While they say nothing, they encapsulate logical features of the language and the world. Unasserted, they express thoughts, the truth of which Wittgenstein takes to be unassailable and definitive. Asserted, they are out-and-out nonsense. What is manifest in linguistic practice is no more sayable – and no less significant – than what is manifest in logical truths, mathematical equations and the principles of mechanics
Wittgenstein’s “Inner and Outer”: Overcoming Epistemic Asymmetry
Get PDFI offer a reading of those Wittgenstein’s late writings on psychology which, using his terminology, concern the theme of “inner and outer”. I identify three forms of epistemic asymmetry between a subject’s own mind and other minds, discussing Wittgenstein’s treatment of each of these in turn. I intend to show that Wittgenstein is not identifying or solving any single epistemic or conceptual problem of other minds, but criticizing the very general assumption that there is a unique first-personal access to one’s own mind that makes third-personal knowledge epistemically inferior. I conclude by a brief discussion of how my reading enables to understand better Wittgenstein’s relation to behaviorism
Wittgenstein and the Complexities of Semio-Translation – Wittgenstein in Translation (2012) by Dinda L. Gorlée
No full textReview of Dinda L. Gorlée: Wittgenstein in Translation (2012
Language and Logic in Wittgenstein\u27s Tractatus
No full textThis paper investigates Wittgenstein’s account of the relation between elementary and molecular propositions (and thus, also, the propositions of logic) in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I start by sketching a natural reading of that relation – which I call the ‘bipartite reading’ – holding that the Tractatus gives an account of elementary propositions, based on the so-called picture theory, and a different account of molecular ones, based on the principle of truth-functionality. I then show that such a reading cannot be attributed to Wittgenstein, because he holds the view that an explanation of logical complexity is already given by a correct account of the (pictorial) nature of elementary propositions; this is implied in his claim that ‘an elementary proposition contains all logical constants/operations in itself’. After clarifying Wittgenstein’s notion of an operation from the Notes on Logic to the Tractatus, I finally explain why Wittgenstein claims that an elementary proposition contains all logical operations in itself, and hence why he can be said to provide a unified (and thus not bipartite) account of language and logic
Chomsky and Wittgenstein on Linguistic Competence
Get PDFIn his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents his influential reading of Wittgenstein’s later writings on language. One of the largely unexplored features of that reading is that Kripke makes a small number of suggestive remarks concerning the possible threat that Wittgenstein’s arguments pose for Chomsky’s linguistic project. In this paper, we attempt to characterise the relevance of Wittgenstein’s later work on meaning and rule-following for transformational linguistics, and in particular to identify the potentially negative impact it has on that project. Although we use Kripke’s remarks to articulate some of the pertinent issues, we return to Wittgenstein’s later writings to address them. We argue that Wittgenstein’s main target in the relevant sections of the Philosophical Investigations is the notion of ‘logical compulsion’, which involves assuming that there is more to applying a word or rule than how we are naturally or “psychologically” compelled to apply. We characterise two of the main lines of argument in the Investigations in terms of the rejection of logical compulsion. We thus propose to address the relevance of Wittgenstein’s writings for Chomsky by considering whether Chomsky’s linguistics presupposes the targeted notion of logical compulsion. We argue that Chomsky’s conception of linguistic competence in terms of successive states of the “language faculty” (containing the principles of universal grammar) does presuppose this problematic notion. Chomsky responded to Kripke by devoting a chapter of his Knowledge of Language to defending this conception of linguistic competence against the Wittgensteinian arguments. We evaluate his response and argue that he has misidentified the threat to his linguistic project as consisting in the attack on its ‘individual psychology’ standpoint, rather than its commitment to logical compulsion. We conclude by arguing that Chomsky’s attempts at defending his individualist or non-communitarian standpoint are undermined by his inability to give a decisive response to Wittgenstein’s attack on logical compulsion.In his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents his influential reading of Wittgenstein’s later writings on language. One of the largely unexplored features of that reading is that Kripke makes a small number of suggestive remarks concerning the possible threat that Wittgenstein’s arguments pose for Chomsky’s linguistic project. In this paper, we attempt to characterise the relevance of Wittgenstein’s later work on meaning and rule-following for transformational linguistics, and in particular to identify the potentially negative impact it has on that project. Although we use Kripke’s remarks to articulate some of the pertinent issues, we return to Wittgenstein’s later writings to address them. We argue that Wittgenstein’s main target in the relevant sections of the Philosophical Investigations is the notion of ‘logical compulsion’, which involves assuming that there is more to applying a word or rule than how we are naturally or “psychologically” compelled to apply. We characterise two of the main lines of argument in the Investigations in terms of the rejection of logical compulsion. We thus propose to address the relevance of Wittgenstein’s writings for Chomsky by considering whether Chomsky’s linguistics presupposes the targeted notion of logical compulsion. We argue that Chomsky’s conception of linguistic competence in terms of successive states of the “language faculty” (containing the principles of universal grammar) does presuppose this problematic notion. Chomsky responded to Kripke by devoting a chapter of his Knowledge of Language to defending this conception of linguistic competence against the Wittgensteinian arguments. We evaluate his response and argue that he has misidentified the threat to his linguistic project as consisting in the attack on its ‘individual psychology’ standpoint, rather than its commitment to logical compulsion. We conclude by arguing that Chomsky’s attempts at defending his individualist or non-communitarian standpoint are undermined by his inability to give a decisive response to Wittgenstein’s attack on logical compulsion
Wittgenstein in Conversation with His Sources – H. Biesenbach: Anspielungen und Zitate im Werk Ludwig Wittgensteins (2011)
No full textReview of H. Biesenbach: Anspielungen und Zitate im Werk Ludwig Wittgensteins (2011
Studies Beyond Silence – A. Janik: Assembling Reminders (2009)
No full textReview of A. Janik: Assembling Reminders (2009
Analytical Philosophy and its Forgetfulness of the Continent. Gottfried Gabriel in conversation with Todor Polimenov
Get PDFGottfried Gabriel is interviewed by Todor Polimenov about the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy.Analytical Philosophy and its forgetfulness of the continent. Gottfried Gabriel in conversation with Todor Polimeno