Nordic Wittgenstein Review (NWR)
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At the Crossroads of the Wittgenstein and Autobiography Highways – N. Immler: Das Familiengedächtnis der Wittgensteins (2011)
No full textReview of N. Immler: Das Familiengedächtnis der Wittgensteins (2011
Sraffa\u27s Notes on Wittgenstein\u27s "Blue Book"
No full textThis article presents an edition of unpublished notes by Sraffa on Wittgenstein’s “Blue Book”, written about 1941 and housed at Trinity College Library, Cambridge. The article includes an introduction to the relationship between Sraffa and Wittgenstein and concludes with an interpretation of various philosophical issues addressed in the notes, namely that of solipsism. Various connections between the “Blue Book” and the Philosophical Investigations are traced.This article presents an edition of unpublished notes by Sraffa on Wittgenstein’s “Blue Book”, written about 1941 and housed at Trinity College Library, Cambridge. The article includes an introduction to the relationship between Sraffa and Wittgenstein and concludes with an interpretation of various philosophical issues addressed in the notes, namely that of solipsism. Various connections between the “Blue Book” and the Philosophical Investigations are traced
How to Use (Ordinary) Language Offensively
Full text linkOne can attack a philosophical claim by identifying a misuse of the language used to state it. I distinguish between two varieties of this strategy: one belonging to Norman Malcolm and the other to Ludwig Wittgenstein. The former is flawed and easily dismissible as misled linguistic conservatism. It muddies the name of ordinary language philosophy. I argue that the latter avoids this flaw. To make perspicuous the kind of criticism of philosophical claims that the second variety makes available, I draw a comparison between Wittgenstein’s recommendation that philosophers study ordinary language and Alfred Schütz’s recommendation that social scientists study the methods of the agents they study. Both do so in an attempt to sensitise philosophers and social scientists respectively to particular artefacts of method which can be easily mistaken for features of that which is studied
How to Be an Expressivist about Avowals Today
Full text linkAccording to expressivism about avowals, the meaning of typical self-ascriptions of mental states is a matter of expressing an attitude, rather than describing a state of affairs. Traditionally, expressivism has been glossed as the view that, qua expressions, avowals are not truth-evaluable. Contemporary neoexpressivists like Finkelstein and Bar-On have argued that avowals are expressions, and truth-evaluable besides. In contrast, this paper provides a defence of the view that avowals are, qua expressions, truth-evaluable. This defence is based on an argument from disagreement, to the effect that an adequate explanation of the existence of disagreement involving both cases of avowals and cases of nonlinguistic expression (like winces) supports a view according to which genuine (sincere, truthful) expression is what truth amounts to in avowals.According to expressivism about avowals, the meaning of typical self-ascriptions of mental states is a matter of expressing an attitude, rather than describing a state of affairs. Traditionally, expressivism has been glossed as the view that, qua expressions, avowals are not truth-evaluable. Contemporary neoexpressivists like Finkelstein and Bar-On have argued that avowals are expressions, and truth-evaluable besides. In contrast, this paper provides a defence of the view that avowals are, qua expressions, truth-evaluable. This defence is based on an argument from disagreement, to the effect that an adequate explanation of the existence of disagreement involving both cases of avowals and cases of nonlinguistic expression (like winces) supports a view according to which genuine (sincere, truthful) expression is what truth amounts to in avowals
Contemplating Evil
Full text linkVia a discussion of various ways in which putative descriptions or explanations can be deemed to be morally insensitive, this article investigates the role of “contemplation” in philosophy of religion and ethics, and especially in connection with the “problem of evil.” Focusing on the Wittgenstein-influenced methods of D. Z. Phillips, the question is considered whether a tension obtains between, on the one hand, a “contemplative conception of philosophy,” and on the other hand, the sort of critique of theodicy according to which the theodicist’s attempt to maintain a contemplative stance with respect to evil and suffering is morally corrupt.Via a discussion of various ways in which putative descriptions or explanations can be deemed to be morally insensitive, this article investigates the role of “contemplation” in philosophy of religion and ethics, and especially in connection with the “problem of evil.” Focusing on the Wittgenstein-influenced methods of D. Z. Phillips, the question is considered whether a tension obtains between, on the one hand, a “contemplative conception of philosophy,” and on the other hand, the sort of critique of theodicy according to which the theodicist’s attempt to maintain a contemplative stance with respect to evil and suffering is morally corrupt
Realism, Modernism and the Realistic Spirit: Diamond\u27s Inheritance of Wittgenstein, Early and Late
Full text linkThis paper argues that Cora Diamond\u27s interpretation of Wittgenstein\u27s early and later work, and her specific attempts to apply it in religious and ethical contexts, show a willingness to sacrifice elements of Wittgenstein\u27s signature concepts to the demands of what she calls his \u27realistic spirit\u27. The paper also argues that this willingness relates her project to a certain understanding of modernism in the arts.This paper argues that Cora Diamond\u27s interpretation of Wittgenstein\u27s early and later work, and her specific attempts to apply it in religious and ethical contexts, show a willingness to sacrifice elements of Wittgenstein\u27s signature concepts to the demands of what she calls his \u27realistic spirit\u27. The paper also argues that this willingness relates her project to a certain understanding of modernism in the arts
Note by the Editors
Full text linkThe note by the editors describes the profile of the journal as well as its background in the Nordic Wittgenstein Society (NWS), the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) and the EU-supported project “Agora – Scholarly Open Access Research” (2011-2013).The note by the editors describes the profile of the journal as well as its background in the Nordic Wittgenstein Society (NWS), the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB), the publisher ontos verlag, and the EU-supported project “Agora – Scholarly Open Access Research” (2011-2013)
Newly Discovered Wittgenstein Autograph in the Austrian National Library
Full text linkWithin the rather large Wittgenstein-collection at the Austrian National Library are 14 letters to Ludwig Wittgenstein from his uncle Paul (1848-1928), written between 1914 and 1923. The last of these letters, written on 1st March 1923, contains a little surprise. On the backside of this letter, the logical remarks and draft graphics which are recorded are obviously penned by the hand of Ludwig Wittgenstein.Within the rather large Wittgenstein-collection at the Austrian National Library are 14 letters to Ludwig Wittgenstein from his uncle Paul (1848-1928), written between 1914 and 1923. The last of these letters, written on 1st March 1923, contains a little surprise. On the backside of this letter, the logical remarks and draft graphics which are recorded are obviously penned by the hand of Ludwig Wittgenstein