Nordic Wittgenstein Review (NWR)
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Some Thoughts on "Varieties of Skepticism" by James Conant and Andrea Kern (eds.)
Get PDFBook review of Conant, James and Kern, Andrea (eds.), Varieties of Skepticism: Essays after Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014, vi + 458 pp
Forms of Life, Forms of Reality
Get PDFThe article explores aspects of the notion of forms of life in the Wittgensteinian tradition especially following Iris Murdoch’s lead. On the one hand, the notion signals the hardness and inexhaustible character of reality, as the background needed in order to make sense of our lives in various ways. On the other, the hardness of reality is the object of a moral work of apprehension and deepening to the point at which its distinctive character dissolves into the family of connections we have gained for ourselves. The two movements of thought are connected and necessary
Naturalism, Conventionalism, and Forms of Life: Wittgenstein and the "Cratylus"
Get PDFI consider Plato’s argument, in the dialogue Cratylus, against both of two opposed views of the “correctness of names.” The first is a conventionalist view, according to which this relationship is arbitrary, the product of a free inaugural decision made at the moment of the first institution of names. The second is a naturalist view, according to which the correctness of names is initially fixed and subsequently maintained by some kind of natural assignment, rooted in the things themselves. I argue that: 1) Plato’s critical challenge to both views anticipates considerations introduced by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations’ consideration of rules and rule-following; 2) Understanding Plato’s appeal to the “form” [eidos] of a thing in resolving the problems of both views helps to explicate Wittgenstein’s own appeal to “forms of life” as the “given” ground of linguistic practice; and 3) We should not understand the grounding of language in form-of-life either as a (conventionalist) basis in the plural practices of different communities, or as a biological/anthropological basis in the specific nature of the human organism. Rather, it points to an autonomous dimension of form, which articulates the relationship between language and life as it relates to the possibility of truth
"Let us imagine...": Wittgenstein\u27s Invitation to Philosophy
No full textWendy Lee-Lampshire writes that Wittgenstein’s conception of language has something valuable to offer feminist attempts to construct epistemologies firmly rooted in the social, psychological and physical situations of language users (1999: 409). However, she also argues that his own use of language exemplifies a form of life whose constitutive relationships are enmeshed in forms of power and authority. For example, she interprets the language game of the builders as one of slavery, and questions how we read and respond to it. She asks: “Who are ‘we’ as Wittgenstein’s reader(s)?” This is an important question, and how we answer offers insight not only into our own philosophical practices, but also into Wittgenstein’s use of language games. With the words “Let us imagine...”, Wittgenstein invites readers to participate in creative, collaborative, and improvisational language games that alter not only the texts themselves, but our relationship with others
Mathematics and Forms of Life
Get PDFAccording to Wittgenstein, mathematics is embedded in, and partly constituting, a form of life. Hence, to imagine different, alternative forms of elementary mathematics, we should have to imagine different practices, different forms of life in which they could play a role. If we tried to imagine a radically different arithmetic we should think either of a strange world (in which objects unaccountably vanish or appear) or of people acting and responding in very peculiar ways. If such was their practice, a calculus expressing the norms of representation they applied could not be called false. Rather, our criticism could only be to dismiss such a practice as foolish and to dismiss their norms as too different from ours to be called ‘mathematics’
Note from the Editors
No full textThis special issue on Forms of Life was conceived on the top floor of a café overlooking one of Rome\u27s wonderful Piazzas, after a conference, hosted by Piergiorgio, on Forms of Life and Ways of Living. Piergiorgio, Sandra Laugier and I thought the subject cried out for a small collection of essays in which several voices would elucidate the genesis, use and potential of Wittgenstein\u27s concept of form of life - and we committed to producing it. This is the fruit of our Roman resolution.
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Piergiorgio Donatell
Aspect-Perception as a Philosophical Method
Get PDFInducing aspect-experiences – the sudden seeing of something anew, as when a face suddenly strikes us as familiar – can be used as a philosophical method. In seeing aspects, I argue, we let ourselves experience what it would be like to conceptualize something in a particular way, apart from any conceptual routine. We can use that experience to examine our ways of conceptualizing things, and re-evaluate the ways we make sense of them. I claim that we are not always passive with regard to these experiences, and explain how we can actively induce them. I distinguish this method from other standard Wittgensteinian philosophical methods
Does Wittgenstein have a Method? The Challenges of Conant and Schulte
Get PDFDoes Wittgenstein have a method? There are two challenges to an affirmative answer. One is put forth by Schulte, who claims that Wittgenstein’s method is little more than a skill, and thus not a method in any ambitious sense of that word. Another is Conant’s view that the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein entertains not one method, but a variety of methods. I tackle these challenges by questioning what I take to be their presupposed conceptions of ‘method’ and conclude that we can indeed speak of Wittgenstein’s method in an interesting sense. Thereby, the concept of method will be elucidated and the sense in which Wittgenstein’s philosophy has a method clarified