Nordic Wittgenstein Review (NWR)
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Review of Wittgenstein on Thought and Will by Roger Teichmann (2)
No full textReview of Teichmann, Roger, Wittgenstein on Thought and Will. New York/Oxford: Abingdon Books, Routledge 2015
Giving Hostages to Irrationality? Winch on the Philosopher as Judge of Human Thought
Get PDFPeter Winch, following Wittgenstein, was critical of the notion that philosophy could pass judgment on matters like the sense of words, the rationality of actions, or the validity of arguments. His critique had both what we might call a local strand – the insight that criteria of thought and action are not universal but vary between cultures and between practices – and a personal strand – the insight that those local criteria are ultimately given shape through the particular applications made of them by individuals. These strands are prominent, for instance, in Winch’s discussion of cross-cultural understanding as well as his treatment of the distinction between valid reasoning and illicit persuasion
Review of Wittgenstein on Thought and Will by Roger Teichmann (1)
No full textReview of Teichmann, Roger, Wittgenstein on Thought and Will. New York/Oxford: Routledge, 2015. 180 pages. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Report of Two Dreams from October 1942 (Ms-126, 21–26)
Get PDFThis paper presents two hitherto unknown dream reports by Ludwig Wittgenstein, written down by him in October 1942. The two reports are introduced by the title “Ein Traum” and found in his Nachlass item Ms-126, pages 21–26. They are edited here in parallel diplomatic and linear, gently normalized transcription. Facsimiles of the pages containing the reports can be viewed on Wittgenstein Source where they were published in the spring of 2016
Review of "Wittgenstein and Modernism" edited by Michael LeMahieu and Karen Zumhagen-Yekplé
No full textReview of Wittgenstein and Modernism edited by Michael LeMahieu and Karen Zumhagen-Yekplé
Review of "Becoming Who We Are: Politics and Practical Philosophy in the Work of Stanley Cavell" by Andrew Norris
No full textReview of Becoming Who We Are: Politics and Practical Philosophy in the Work of Stanley Cavell by Andrew Norris
Inheriting Wittgenstein: James Conant in Conversation with Niklas Forsberg, Part 2
Get PDFThis is part 2 of an interview with Prof. J. Conant, conducted by Niklas Forsberg
Wittgenstein\u27s Critique of Moore in On Certainty
No full textThis paper clarifies Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore in On Certainty, and argues that this critique is largely misunderstood, for two reasons. Firstly, Wittgenstein partly misrepresents Moore. Secondly, Wittgenstein is wrongly taken to be an (access-) internalist regarding justification for knowledge. Once we realize these two points, we can understand Wittgenstein’s critique properly as a grammatical argument in that Moore fails to see how the concepts of knowledge and certainty relate to those of justification and evidence. On this reading, we can also understand that Moore and Wittgenstein were in more agreement than many people have thought, even though Moore was not able to exploit and express his philosophical insights (which he shares with Wittgenstein) properly
"Give Me an Example": Peter Winch and Learning from the Particular
Get PDFThe text deals with the role of particular examples in our understanding, especially in the encounters with unfamiliar cases that may require us to expand our concepts. I try to show that Peter Winch’s reflections on the nature of understanding can provide the foundations for such an account. Understanding consists in a response informed by a background network of particular canonical examples. It is against this background that the distinction between appropriate differentiated reactions and misplaced ones makes sense. To accommodate applications of known concepts (such as love, or humour) to unfamiliar cases, particular examples are needed that invite the recipient in a certain direction of understanding, while providing a “closure” against arbitrary mis- or re-interpretations. This capacity has to do with a capacity or incapacity to convey the sense of seriousness of an example dealing with the lives of the persons (or characters) concerned