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La Educación Emocional como régimen de normas emocionales: una lectura crítica de la normativa educativa argentina
No full textThe article analyses Argentinean educational regulations on emotional education (EE) enacted between 2016 and the post-pandemic period. The purpose is to understand the enactment of these laws as part of a broader historical record of affect regulation through psychological discourses, which seek to shape subjectivities by institutionalizing emotional rules. The findings reveal that these laws condense biologically based, individual-centered notions of emotions, thereby configuring what is referred to as a psycho-neuroscientific emotional regime.El artículo realiza un análisis documental de la normativa educativa argentina sobre educación emocional (EE) promulgada entre 2016 y con posterioridad a la pandemia. El objetivo es comprender la sanción de estas leyes como parte de un registro histórico más amplio de regulación de afectos mediante discursos psicológicos, que buscan modelar subjetividades a través de la institucionalización de reglas emocionales. Los hallazgos revelan que estas legislaciones condensan sentidos sobre las emociones con base en la biología y centrados en el individuo y configuran así lo que denominamos un régimen emocional psico-neurocientífico
Un conjurado que leía a Quevedo: Recepción de la Vida de Marco Bruto en el contexto de la Conspiración de Aragón de 1648
No full textA new reading of the last letter written by Carlos de Padilla, the main person responsible for the Aragon conspiracy of 1648, is presented with the purspose of focusing on the analysis of its textual sources. Some of the readings that Padilla used can be recognized, among which Quevedo’s Vida de Marco Bruto stands out, from which he took several passages quite literally. Its main interest lies in constituting a rare testimony of the reception of Vida de Marco Bruto, since it allows us to confirm that certain ideas developed by Quevedo came to give rise, in the context of the crisis of the1640s, to heterodox interpretations that supported rebellion or even tyrannicide.Se presenta una nueva lectura de la última carta escrita por Carlos de Padilla, principal responsable de la conocida como conspiración de Aragón de 1648 o conspiración del duque de Híjar, con el propósito de centrarnos en el análisis de sus fuentes literarias. Se pueden reconocer algunas de las lecturas que manejó Padilla, entre las que sobresale la Vida de Marco Bruto, de Quevedo, de la que tomó varios pasajes de manera bastante literal. Su principal interés radica en constituir un raro testimonio de la recepción del Marco Bruto, pues permite confirmar que ciertas ideas desarrolladas por Quevedo llegaron a suscitar, en el contexto de la crisis de la década de 1640, interpretaciones heterodoxas que amparaban la rebelión o incluso el tiranicidio
Body and Exemplarity in El Político by Baltasar Gracián
No full textThe purpose of this paper is to show how exemplarity is constructed as a model of the ruler in Gracián’s El Político. To this end, firstly, it shows how the image of Ferdinand the Catholic as an exemplary figure emerges paradigmatically following the classic study by Ángel Ferrari; secondly, it focuses on how Gracián represents this figure in the text from the concept of erudition; and, thirdly, it delves into the concept of exemplary validity from the hermeneutic that Arendt makes of Kant’s Critique of Judgment.El propósito de este trabajo es mostrar cómo se construye la ejemplaridad como modelo del gobernante en El Político de Gracián. Para ello, en primer lugar, muestra cómo emerge paradigmáticamente la imagen de la figura de Fernando el Católico como figura ejemplar siguiendo el clásico estudio de Ángel Ferrari; en segundo lugar, se centra en el modo como Gracián dibuja esta figura en el texto a partir del concepto de erudición; y, en tercer lugar, profundiza en el concepto de validez ejemplar a partir de la hermenéutica que Arendt hace de la Crítica del juicio de Kant
Damián Salucio del Poyo (2024). El premio de las letras, por el rey don Felipe el Segundo. Hélène Tropé (ed.)
No full textDamián Salucio del Poyo (2024).
El premio de las letras, por el rey don Felipe el Segundo.
Hélène Tropé (ed.).
Kassel: Edition Reichenberger, 192 pp.
[ISBN 978-3-967280-73-9]
From the hunts to the Palio “alla tonda”.Zooarchaeology of a Feast
No full textThe horse race held in the “tufo” ring of Piazza del Campo is only the most recent form of competition through which the Contradas of Siena have challenged each other over the centuries. In fact, the Palio has taken on different forms in various phases of its centuries-old history. The first written sources concerning the Feast, dated to the 14th century, speak of pugne, a sort of brawls, periodically organised by the city government. Only from the 16th century begins the use, never abandoned, of the animals. From that moment onwards, the Palio will be represented, in different periods, by hunts, races on donkey-back or on buffalo-back (called asinate and bufalate respectively), bullfights and, finally, horse races, disputed first alla lunga, run across the whole city, then alla tonda in the Campo. In this preliminary work, through the examination of iconographic and written sources, we intend to reconstruct the different methods of exploitation of the animals adopted by the Sieneses in the Palio.The horse race held in the “tufo” ring of Piazza del Campo is only the most recent form of competition through which the Contradas of Siena have challenged each other over the centuries. In fact, the Palio has taken on different forms in various phases of its centuries-old history. The first written sources concerning the Feast, dated to the 14th century, speak of pugne, a sort of brawls, periodically organised by the city government. Only from the 16th century begins the use, never abandoned, of the animals. From that moment onwards, the Palio will be represented, in different periods, by hunts, races on donkey-back or on buffalo-back (called asinate and bufalate respectively), bullfights and, finally, horse races, disputed first alla lunga, run across the whole city, then alla tonda in the Campo. In this preliminary work, through the examination of iconographic and written sources, we intend to reconstruct the different methods of exploitation of the animals adopted by the Sieneses in the Palio
I resti faunistici dell’edificio suburbano di Via Tommaso Gar a Trento: analisi archeozoologica e tafonomica
No full textLo scavo, svoltosi nel 2009 presso il sito di Via Tommaso Gar a Trento sotto la direzione della Soprintendenza per i Beni Culturali per la Provincia Autonoma di Trento, ha restituito una cospicua quantità di materiale faunistico, sulla quale è stata condotta un’analisi archeozoologica e tafonomica. Il materiale proviene da un edificio situato nell’area suburbana della Tridentum di epoca romana, la cui fase d’uso relativa all’insieme faunistico analizzato è databile al I-II secolo d.C. Lo scopo della ricerca è stato quello di indagare le abitudini alimentari e di sussistenza della popolazione locale, nonché verificare la presenza di attività produttive in situ per quanto riguarda l’industria su osso.Lo scavo, svoltosi nel 2009 presso il sito di Via Tommaso Gar a Trento sotto la direzione della Soprintendenza per i Beni Culturali per la Provincia Autonoma di Trento, ha restituito una cospicua quantità di materiale faunistico, sulla quale è stata condotta un’analisi archeozoologica e tafonomica. Il materiale proviene da un edificio situato nell’area suburbana della Tridentum di epoca romana, la cui fase d’uso relativa all’insieme faunistico analizzato è databile al I-II secolo d.C. Lo scopo della ricerca è stato quello di indagare le abitudini alimentari e di sussistenza della popolazione locale, nonché verificare la presenza di attività produttive in situ per quanto riguarda l’industria su osso
¿No dejar a nadie atrás? La Agenda 2030, la cooperación para el desarrollo y la construcción de la hegemonía en un mundo en crisis
No full textThis article aims to critically expose the changes in the political configuration and economic processes of the 2030 Agenda since its approval, based on the evolution of the historical bloc and the alliances that made the creation of this Agenda possible, as well as the analysis of the role of development cooperation as one of the international instruments that apparently promotes the fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals.
The article is structured around three main axes. The first argues that what is at stake with the 2030 Agenda is the social reproduction of capitalism and the alliances around development. It analyses the direct and proportionate relationship between the accumulation of capital and the accumulation of misery, and the way in which this relationship is managed, as well as the role of development cooperation in these processes. It also presents an alternative characterisation of the actors involved in development actions and cooperation, based on the so-called position in relation to capital, and then conceptualises the so-called false community of interests around development, analysing the construction of hegemony and the alliances that have historically taken place in the international institutional superstructure to ensure social reproduction under capitalism.
The second axis exposes the continuities and changes in the composition of the ruling class and its expression in the international institutional superstructure linked to development, characterising the two factions of the ruling class that are in dispute for leadership in the shaping of international alliances to manage social reproduction in general and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in particular: the liberal and the far-right. The third section presents the main contradictions of the 2030 Agenda and sets out a series of premises for overcoming the framework conceived by the 2030 Agenda, which is inseparable from the development of capitalism.
More specifically, the analysis of the changes that have taken place in the ten years since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda begins by situating the implementation processes of this agenda and those specific to development cooperation as fundamental elements in the social reproduction of capitalism. To this end, first of all, the direct and proportionate relationship between the accumulation of capital and the accumulation of misery is presented. This relationship, fundamental to understanding the processes of development, implies that the accumulation of capital inseparably leads to a series of processes that harm the working class and nature. In order to avoid the problems that this direct and proportionate relationship can generate in social reproduction under capitalism, part of the accumulated capital is allocated to what in this article we call “misery management”, a set of processes that apparently seek to improve living standards, but which, being oriented towards capital accumulation, generate situations of poverty and ecological degradation somewhere along the way.
One of these processes of misery management is development cooperation, which is redefined in this article as a set of processes aimed at ensuring an expanded social reproduction for the central actors and an atrophied one for the poor countries, reproducing the logics of domination and economic polarisation linked to imperialism and coloniality. The article also introduces the concept of the “false community of interests around development”, referring to global interclass alliances between central and subordinate actors to manage social reproduction on an international scale. Its falsity is based on the use of hegemony and ideology to link actors with more or less antagonistic interests. To understand this community of interests, an alternative classification of the actors involved in the 2030 Agenda and in development cooperation processes is presented based on the so-called “position in relation to capital”, based on their dominant or subordinate position and the roles they play (funder, regulator, manager or implementer), all mediated by issues of class, sex, gender and race, as well as by the axes of imperialism and coloniality.
In this way, it is possible to undertake an analysis of the growing difficulties in the construction of hegemony and alliances by the ruling class, especially with regard to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The article specifies that the threats to the 2030 Agenda do not come from an exogenous, anti-capitalist actor, but from the dispute between the liberal faction and the emerging ultra-right faction for global hegemony. This section exposes the problems for the liberal faction of the ruling class to remain also the ruling faction, largely because of the dissonance between its ideological postulates and its economic and political praxis, marked by the violation of international law and human rights or the inability to stop the intensification of the climate crisis.
This has led to a tendentially greater inability of the liberal faction to maintain political control and to respond ideologically to the antagonisms of class, sex, gender and race and the contradictions that are generated within the framework of the development of capitalism. Because of this, and because they are part of the same dominant social class, the liberal faction is beginning to negotiate with the ultra-right faction in order to maintain its power.
For its part, the far-right faction is also described alternatively in the article. In addition to the rejection to a greater or lesser degree of liberal democracy, the defence of social hierarchy, populism, nativism and globalism, a tendency towards authoritarianism when it comes to (political) power and a defence of the heteronormative family, we link the far right to processes inherent to capitalism such as racism, imperialism and coloniality. The article demonstrates that the critique of the 2030 Agenda does not necessarily exhaust the elaboration of development partnerships but will seek to eliminate those elements that harm the most powerful actors.
In light of this, the repeated claim that it is the far right that is jeopardising the fulfilment of the 2030 Agenda is fallacious; not because its proposals are not dangerous or anti-human, but because the contradictions are not between this far-right faction and the 2030 Agenda or development cooperation, but between the economic and political praxis of the ruling class, which puts social reproduction at risk, and the ideological content of the 2030 Agenda, which is increasingly disconnected as the crisis of capitalism progresses and inequalities and antagonisms are accentuated.
Faced with the exhaustion of the dominant theories to explain the current scenario and of the instruments and actors involved in the international agenda to try to mitigate (at best) some of the effects of the development of capitalism on nature, here we consider why both the 2030 Agenda and development cooperation fail as processes of misery management, oriented towards the generation of processes of capital accumulation and therefore of misery. To this end, it has been essential to expose the forms of mystification and fetishism that affect development and cooperation, and it also sets out a series of counter-hegemonic premises to propose scenarios that go beyond the 2030 Agenda and development cooperation as ways of managing social reproduction under capitalism.
The article is constructed on the basis of an alternative epistemological framework to international relations studies. The theoretical framework is grounded in Marxism, decolonial studies and non-hegemonic feminisms and ecologies, while the methodology used is based on Marxist dialectics and relational thinking.Este artículo tiene como objetivo exponer de manera crítica los cambios en la configuración política y en los procesos económicos de la Agenda 2030 desde su aprobación, a partir de la evolución del bloque histórico y de las alianzas interclasistas que posibilitaron la creación de esta Agenda, así como del análisis del papel de la cooperación para el desarrollo como uno los instrumentos internacionales que aparentemente potencia el cumplimiento de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible.
De manera más concreta, el artículo se estructura en torno a tres grandes ejes. En el primero se expone que lo que está en juego con la Agenda 2030 es la reproducción social del capitalismo y las alianzas en torno al desarrollo y la cooperación. Para ello se analiza la relación directa y proporcionada entre la acumulación de capital y la acumulación de miseria, y la forma en que se gestiona esta relación. Se redefine críticamente a la cooperación para el desarrollo, como conjunto de procesos de gestión de la miseria que se orientan a asegurar una reproducción social ampliada para los actores centrales y atrofiada para los países pobres. También se presenta una caracterización alternativa de los actores que participan en las acciones del desarrollo y la cooperación, basada en la denominada posición frente al capital, para posteriormente conceptualizar la denominada falsa comunidad de intereses en torno al desarrollo, analizando la construcción de la hegemonía y de las alianzas que se han dado históricamente en la superestructura internacional institucional para asegurar la reproducción social en el capitalismo
En el segundo eje se exponen las continuidades y los cambios en la composición de la clase dominante y su expresión en la superestructura institucional internacional vinculada con el desarrollo. Para ello se caracterizarán alternativamente las dos fracciones de la clase dominante que están en disputa por la dirigencia en la conformación de las alianzas internacionales para gestionar la reproducción social en general y la implementación de la Agenda 2030 en particular: la liberal y la ultraderechista. El tercer eje presenta las principales contradicciones de la Agenda 2030 y la forma en que los procesos del desarrollo y la ayuda naturalizan e invierten las relaciones sociales y de producción capitalistas, presentando al desarrollo y la cooperación como los únicos caminos para garantizar el bienestar social y la mitigación de los impactos del cambio climático, pero que se basan y reproducen la polarización económica y los antagonismos de clase, sexo, género y raza. Por ello, se plantean una serie de premisas para superar el marco concebido por la Agenda 2030, inseparable del desarrollo del capitalismo. El artículo se construye a partir de un marco epistemológico alternativo a los estudios de Relaciones Internacionales. El marco teórico se asienta en el marxismo, los estudios decoloniales y los feminismos y ecologismos no hegemónicos, mientras que la metodología utilizada se basa en el pensamiento dialéctico y relacional.
La cooperación internacional en transición: UE y China ante la Agenda 2030 y la reconfiguración del orden de ayuda al desarrollo
No full textThis article examines the convergence of two major initiatives of international cooperation: the European Union’s Global Gateway (GGE) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At first glance, these projects appear to embody distinct paradigms. The GGE emerged within the framework of North-South Cooperation (NSC), traditionally associated with the Global North’s approach to development assistance, emphasizing aid conditionality, institutional reforms, and adherence to liberal democratic norms. In contrast, the BRI is rooted in South-South Cooperation (SSC), which stresses solidarity among developing countries, mutual respect, and non-interference. Despite these different origins, both frameworks have increasingly adopted convergent strategies, driven by shared geopolitical ambitions and the pressing need to frame global development within the narrative of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
The analysis proceeds from a critical theory perspective within International Relations, questioning whether these initiatives genuinely transform the global order or, rather, reproduce existing power asymmetries. Building on the insights of Robert Cox, the article emphasizes that international cooperation is not a neutral or purely humanitarian exercise. Instead, it constitutes a political mechanism that sustains hegemonic structures. Aid, investment, and connectivity projects often reinforce the interests of donor states, embedding them in development agendas that appear universal but remain shaped by particular geopolitical priorities. This theoretical framing provides the basis for interrogating the practices of both the GGE and BRI.
From this critical lens, the article argues that cooperation should not be understood simply in terms of poverty alleviation or technical assistance. Rather, it is part of a broader struggle over global governance, legitimacy, and influence. Discourses around sustainability, inclusion, and “win-win” partnerships often obscure the underlying reality: cooperation serves to project power, secure strategic resources, and expand spheres of influence. The EU and China, though employing different narratives, both use development as a foreign policy instrument, reinforcing their global standing at a time when multipolarity and competition over leadership in the Global South are intensifying.
Both the GGE and the BRI claim to tackle urgent global challenges. The EU highlights infrastructure deficits, climate change, and digital divides, framing its response in terms of values such as transparency, democracy, and rules-based governance. Conversely, China emphasizes its commitment to mutual benefit, shared prosperity, and non-interference, presenting the BRI as an inclusive framework that accommodates partner countries’ priorities without imposing political conditions. These discourses reveal important ideological differences but also converge on the goal of legitimacy: both seek to present themselves as reliable partners to the Global South and as leaders in shaping a post-Western order.
Institutionally, the two models diverge significantly. The Global Gateway operates through a complex, multilayered governance structure involving the European Commission, EU Member States, development banks such as the EIB, private sector actors, and civil society organizations. This decentralized architecture is coordinated through the “Team Europe” approach, designed to promote coherence and visibility of European external action. By contrast, the BRI remains a highly centralized initiative. Strategic direction is set by Chinese ministries, while state-owned enterprises play a central role in implementation, supported primarily by financing from state-owned development banks such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. This centralized and state-led model reflects China’s preference for bilateralism and flexibility, allowing Beijing to negotiate directly with partner governments on a case-by-case basis.
Yet, despite these structural differences, both models demonstrate a growing convergence in financial logic. Traditional concessional aid has declined in importance, giving way to investment-driven cooperation that blends public and private capital. This shift emphasizes risk mitigation, return on investment, and the mobilization of large-scale funding for infrastructure and connectivity projects. The EU’s EFSD+ mechanism, for instance, offers €40 billion in guarantees and €13.5 billion in grants, designed to catalyze up to €135 billion in private investment across strategic sectors. China’s BRI, meanwhile, had mobilized over 11 billion allocated to renewable energy alone in that year. Such figures underscore how development cooperation has become increasingly financialized, subordinating aid to logics of profitability and visibility.
This financialization also reveals a deeper ideological shift. Earlier models of cooperation often invoked moral obligations or humanitarian imperatives. By contrast, the contemporary discourse stresses mutual benefit and partnership—rhetoric that often conceals underlying asymmetries. “Win-win” outcomes are frequently skewed toward donor states, whose strategic and economic priorities dominate project design. Moreover, the growing reliance on repayable instruments raises concerns about debt sustainability in recipient countries, particularly those with weak governance structures or limited fiscal capacity. The danger is that development cooperation, instead of fostering autonomy, may deepen dependency and vulnerability.
These trends highlight a broader transformation in the global aid architecture. While the vocabulary of the 2030 Agenda emphasizes inclusivity, equality, and sustainability, the actual practices of cooperation remain subordinated to geopolitical imperatives. Far from redistributing resources equitably or enabling independent development trajectories in the Global South, cooperation increasingly functions as a means of securing access to markets, strategic corridors, and political alignment. The EU and China thus represent two different pathways to the same end: the use of development as an instrument of geopolitical positioning.
The article further considers the role of recipient states and non-state actors in this dynamic. Officially, both the GGE and the BRI advocate for local ownership, context-sensitive implementation, and participatory governance. In practice, however, the influence of local actors remains limited. The GGE incorporates civil society organizations to a greater degree, particularly in monitoring and advocacy, but final decision-making is driven by institutional and financial imperatives at the EU level. In the BRI, local participation is even more constrained, with negotiations conducted primarily between Chinese officials and partner governments, often behind closed doors. This imbalance reflects the structural challenge of ensuring genuine agency for recipient states in a context where power asymmetries remain pronounced.
Ultimately, the article concludes that both the GGE and the BRI are not transformative frameworks but rather mechanisms that reconfigure existing hierarchies of global governance. While their instruments, discourses, and institutional arrangements differ, their substantive impact converges: reinforcing rather than challenging the dominant structures of international order. This convergence underscores the limitations of the 2030 Agenda, which, despite its universal aspirations, has become deeply entangled with the foreign policy agendas of major powers.
As international cooperation becomes increasingly subordinated to strategic competition in a multipolar world, the scope for building genuinely solidarity-based frameworks narrows. The article calls for renewed debate on the purpose, governance, and political economy of development cooperation. It argues for moving beyond the adaptation of existing frameworks toward the envisioning of new paradigms rooted in equity, pluralism, and democratic governance. Such paradigms would not treat the Global South merely as a beneficiary but as a co-architect of global development, capable of shaping agendas, institutions, and norms on equal footing. Only in this way can cooperation transcend its role as a vehicle of power projection and become a tool for genuine transformation.Este artículo compara dos iniciativas internacionales: la estrategia Global Gateway (GGE) de la Unión Europea y la Franja y la Ruta (BRI) de China, analizando cómo se relacionan con los objetivos de la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible. La hipótesis central es que, aunque estas iniciativas surgieron de modelos distintos de cooperación internacional —la Cooperación Norte-Sur (CNS) en el caso europeo y la Cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS) en el caso chino—, con el tiempo han evolucionado hacia formas de acción muy similares, sobre todo en lo que respecta a su impacto geopolítico. Desde una mirada crítica de las Relaciones Internacionales, se sostiene que la cooperación internacional no se usa principalmente como una herramienta para transformar el sistema mundial, sino como un mecanismo que ayuda a mantener y reproducir el orden existente.
Tanto la GGE como la BRI articulan sus discursos en torno a la sostenibilidad, la conectividad y el desarrollo inclusivo. Sin embargo, estas narrativas encubren intereses estratégicos, comerciales y de posicionamiento internacional. La UE promueve una gobernanza descentralizada y multiactor, con fuerte participación del sector privado y de la sociedad civil; China, en cambio, se apoya en una arquitectura estatal centralizada, con predominio de las empresas públicas y del financiamiento bilateral. A pesar de estas diferencias, ambas iniciativas comparten una tendencia a la financiarización de la cooperación, mediante los instrumentos reembolsables y los esquemas de movilización de inversión privada.
El análisis revela que las formas actuales de cooperación internacional están más alineadas con las lógicas de competencia entre las potencias que con los objetivos de la Agenda 2030. Lejos de empoderar a los países receptores, refuerzan las dinámicas de dependencia y de subordinación, limitando el margen de autonomía y priorizando la lógica de los intereses mutuos sobre los principios de justicia global. En este contexto, el artículo llama a repensar la cooperación desde modelos poshegemónicos, orientados a la equidad, la pluralidad y la corresponsabilidad global
Entrevista conjunta a Pablo Bustinduy Amador, Ministro de Derechos Sociales, Consumo y Agenda 2030, y a Belén Sánchez-Rubio, Miembro del Grupo Motor de la alianza Futuro en Común
No full textEntrevista conjunta a Pablo Bustinduy Amador, Ministro de Derechos Sociales, Consumo y Agenda 2030, y a Belén Sánchez-Rubio, Miembro del Grupo Motor de la alianza Futuro en ComúnEntrevista conjunta a Pablo Bustinduy Amador, Ministro de Derechos Sociales, Consumo y Agenda 2030, y a Belén Sánchez-Rubio, Miembro del Grupo Motor de la alianza Futuro en Comú
Rituales del Fuego en el III Milenio a.C.: Las Deposiciones Funerarias en el Foso/Atrio deCarrascal 2 (Porto Torrão, Ferreira do Alentejo)
No full textThis paper presents the context of secondary depositions of cremated and non-cremated human remains in the ditch/atrium of the Carrascal 2 site, which is an integral part of the extensive archaeological complex of Porto Torrão in Ferreira do Alentejo (Beja). The discussion will include its placement within the surrounding funerary contexts, absolute chronology, bioanthropological data regarding a minimum number of 25 individuals, part of which cremated as complete bodies, and the associated votive component. This context reveals the importance of cremation and of the use of fire articulated with other forms of body treatment in funerary practices during the 3rd millennium BC in South Portugal.O presente texto apresenta o contexto de deposições secundárias de restos humanos cremados e não cremados no fosso-átrio do sítio do Carrascal 2, o qual é parte integrante o grande complexo arqueológico do Porto Torrão em Ferreira do Alentejo (Beja). É feita a sua contextualização nos ambientes funerários envolventes, apresentada a sua cronologia absoluta e informação bioantropológica relativa a um número mínimo de 25 indivíduos, parte dos quais cremados com corpos completos, assim como os materiais votivos associados. Este contexto revela a importância da cremação e do uso do fogo articulado com outras formas de tratamento do corpo nas práticas funerárias, reforçando a complexidade e variabilidade de que estas se revestiram durante o 3º milénio a.C. no Sul de Portugal.Este artículo presenta el contexto de los depósitos secundarios de restos humanos incinerados y no incinerados en la fosa/atrio del yacimiento de Carrascal 2, parte integral del extenso complejo arqueológico de Porto Torrão en Ferreira do Alentejo (Beja). Se analizará su ubicación dentro de los contextos funerarios circundantes, la cronología absoluta, los datos bioantropológicos relativos a un número mínimo de 25 individuos, algunos de los cuales fueron incinerados como cuerpos completos, y el componente votivo asociado. Este contexto revela la importancia de la cremación y del uso del fuego, junto con otras formas de tratamiento corporal, en las prácticas funerarias durante el tercer milenio a. C. en el sur de Portugal