Análisis Filosófico
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Autoengaño y responsabilidad moral: Un comentario sobre la suerte moral
Get PDFB. Williams and T. Nagel's notion of Moral Luck set foth the following paradox. On the one hand (i) moral judgements have a restrictive condition (C): No one is morally responsible for things beyond his control. On the other (ii) an exhaustive analysis of the facts reveals that we never control anything. It follows, then, that if we were to accept the second claim moral judgements (under C) would be annuled, while If we choose the first one we would have to show how it is possible for the agent to control anything. To solve the paradox it must be shown either that one of the claims is false or that the inconsistency of the hole is only apparent. While in order to solve it Nagel suggest the second way this paper explores the possibility of consider that claim (ii) is false. The line of the argument centres on the issue of self-deception
Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge y Londres, Harvard University Press, 1998, 420 páginas.
No full textModelos proposicionales de las funciones cognitivas superiores: ¿Qué ganamos y qué perdemos?
No full textThis article reviews the classical imagery-propositional debate, in which sorne theorists (notably Pylyshyn) have argued that images are not really a separate type of representation but can be reduced to propositional representations, and sorne imagery researchers have refused this thesis. The authors present then two areas in cognitive science in which sorne central aspects of the debate seem to reappear: text comprehension and analogical thinking. While sorne researchers in these fields have proposed propositional models, sorne others have postulated diverse analogical representations to complement or replace propositions. Considering these more recent controversies, it is concluded that, against Pylyshyn's reductionism, there is general agreement today that different representations are needed to characterise the richness of human cognition. However, propositions are still very useful: they seem necessary for representing structured knowledge, and they constitute a powerful instrument for the formulation of unified and mechanical theories of cognition. It is also indicated that, notwithstanding this usefulness, propositional models tend to underestimate the role of other forms of representations in human cognition. The authors suggest that the idea underlying the recurrent proposals of analogical constructs in cognitive science is that psychological meaning cannot arise solely from syntactic relations between amodal arbitrary symbols. Our minds (particularly, our consciousness) afford us the possibility of having internal representations (sensorial and motor ones) akin to the ones we construct when we interact with the external environment. From this perspective, the concreteness of the mediums we employ in cognition matters a great deal, and psychological meaning cannot be accounted for unless we seriously consider the corresponding non-abstract kinds of representations
Universales y sustratos
No full textThe general aim of this paper is to defend a theory of properties grounded on universals and the notion of substratum. We offer first a brief survey of sorne problerns concerning the attribution of properties to objects and the sirnilarity of objects. We next characterize the notion of universal by contrasting universals against other entities that have often been postulated in order to account for the mentioned problems. Besides, we distinguish two different theories of properties, both based on the notion of universal: the bundle theory and the substraturn theory, pointing to an unsurrnountable difficulty of the former. In the rest of the paper we try to answer to sorne of the most serious objections that have been posed against the substratum theory. Firstly, we argue that the theory of temporal stages can solve sorne problems deriving from the substantial change and the accidental change; moreover, we give a reply to sorne objections advanced against this theory. Secondly, we offer an elucidation of the notion of substratum as a bare partÍcular. Thirdly, we discuss some objections to the use that the substratum theory makes of these bare particulars as individuators. Our reply is based on a distinction between three different roles that can be ascribed to an entity: a particularizer role and two kinds of individuatory roles (respectively related to transworld and intraworld individuation). We argue that a substratum can perfectly play a rol as a particularizer and also as an intraworld individuator. Finally, we offer a solution to the well known Bradley's regressum
Psicólogos, filósofos e interfaces
No full textThe aim of this paper is to inquire about the possibility and conditions of an interface between the Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Psychology. After arguing that interfacing is a problem for Naturalistic- minded philosophers (not for Canonical ones), Goldman's tripartite classification of interface tasks, is analysed and exemplified. The final sections of the paper are devoted to the controversy concerning the role irnages and irnaginistic thinking play in a standard cognitive theory. The idea is to apply Goldman's tasks to some of the pertinent philosophical contributions. Finally, what is really at stake in the controversy is described, alternatively, as an intratheoretic discussion affecting the cognitivist program or a clash between different ways of practicing experimental psychology or an obvious sympton of a crises affecting the theoretical relevance of the notion of representation
Responsabilidad y suerte moral: Circunstancias y consecuencias de la acción
No full text"Moral luck" alludes to the fact of being responsible for things over which we have no control. Typically, we have neither (total) control over the consequences of our acts of will nor over the circumstances in which these acts are performed. The Kantian thesis on moral responsibility claims that every kind of moral luck should be eliminated from our moral language and practice. In the case of consequences, this aim does not seem impossible. But circumstances are more difficult to avoid beca use the act of will itself has to be performed within the framework of circumstances that the agent cannot control at all, and these circumstances will dramatically bear on his/her responsibility. Therefore, the following anti-Kantian (or pro-moral luck) argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck or we accept it. If we reject it, then every attribution of responsibility becomes impossible (because, as I have said, every action is performed in sorne uncontrollable circumstances). If we accept it, then we no longer have a good argument against consequential luck, the core of the Kantian rejection of moral luck. In this paper, I defend the Kantian position from this argument, claiming that both kinds of moral luck are relevantly different. This will, nevertheless, lead to a revision of the scope of our judgments of responsibility. They should be interpreted as comparative judgments: We compare how someone acted with how others (or we) would act in identical (or similar) circumstances
Como (no) elegir entre teorías cognitivas
No full textContemporary Cognitive Psychology has developed a research program that has two assumptions: 1) superior cognitive furictions are representations and 2) to know is to compute. Therefore representations are the main theorefical concept. Traditionally two theories argue about the status of imagery in cognitive process. Images are considered mere epiphenomena from the descriptionalistic point of view. By the contrary, the imaginistic theories support images as genuine phenomena to be explain. Different interpretations of empirical tests are claimed. In 1978 J. R. Anderson considered that it is impossible to settle the debate appealing to behavioural data. He proposed a general and formal argument to prove that given any pair <representation - process> is possible to build other pairs with different representations for the same behavioural data. Differences in representations are made amends for different processes. In this paper, consequences of Anderson's argumentare put into question and another strategy for considering imagery is suggested
Eleonora Orlando, Concepciones de la Referencia. Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1999, 216 páginas.
No full textReflexiones acerca de la necesidad lógica
No full textIt is known that logicians and philosophers have been interested on modal sentences since Aristotle and that it was Leibniz who gave the first definition of logical necessity: a necessary truth is the one that is true in every possible world. More than three centuries later, in the first half of the XX century, C. I. Lewis developed the first modal systems capable to formulate old Aristotelian definitions of modal operators in modern logic. However, it is only with Kripke's semantic of possible worlds that it was possible to get the first characterization of Leibnizian concept of necessary truth. Later on, David Lewis built a new semantics, also based on the notion of possible world, that allowed to give truth conditions of counterfactual conditionals and define necessary truth from them. The present paper intends to show: 1) that the modal systems built on Kripke classic semantic don't realize strictly the Leibnizian concept of necessary truth despite the fact that they were inspired by it ; 2) in addition, in the posterior developments of Kripkian semantic, the modal systems -and particularly the meaning of modal operators -have gradually lost their original philosophical content, and 3) despite David Lewis's semantics of counterfactual conditional was more fruitful for the philosophical logic than the modal systems based on the traditional semantics of possible worlds, however it was not successful to express appropriately the Leibnizian idea of necessary truth
