Análisis Filosófico
Not a member yet
785 research outputs found
Sort by
Jerry A. Fodor, Concepts. Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford Cognitive Science, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1998, 174 páginas.
No full textLa imposibilidad de un consecuencialismo moderado
No full textConsequentialism (with the exception of ethical egoism) is an ethical theory which accepts only agent-neutral reasons. A moderate consequentialist also accepts that -in certain circumstancesagent-relative reasons of autonomy can override an agent-neutral reason. Anda deontologist believes in the existence of agent-relative reasons in the form of deontological constraints. But the moderate consequentialist faces a dilemma: she must accept as a valid option an action that causes (unconsented) harm to others, or she must accept at least one deontological constraint, i.e., a constraint against harming others by means of an action. However, if she accepts a deontological constraint, she is not a moderate any more. So, if you begin accepting agent-relative reasons of autonomy, the end of the road is the acceptance of deontological constraints
Eduardo Rabossi (comp.), La filosofía de la mente y la ciencia cognitiva, Barcelona, Paidós, 1995, 450 pp.
No full textFranco Ratto (comp.), All'ombra di Vico. Testimonianze e saggi vichiani in ricordo di Giorgio Tagliacozzo, Ripatransone, Sestante, 1999, 363 pp.
No full textInconmensurabilidad y neutralidad teórica: algunas contribuciones actuales
No full textIn the early 80's the problem of incommensurability was reavived around of semantic holism versus causal realism discussion. In "Observation Reconsidered", Jerry Fodor argues -against Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend- the neutral character of perception judgments. Four years after Churchland writes "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: a Reply to Jerry Fodor". The objections are examined and answered again by Fodor in "A Reply To Churchland's 'Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality"'. In this paper I analyze the more relevan! aspects of this dispute and attempt to show the scarcity ofthe evidence available to solve the question. In a final section, however, I examine the conception holded by Michael Bishop that, in rny opinion, represents an interesting perspective in support for the Fodor's conclusions
Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World. An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1998, 146 pp.
No full text¿Procrear o no procrear? Sida y derechos reproductivos
No full textThis article presents sorne of the ethical and theoretical problems that reproductive decisions pose. I consider the difficult situation of HIV infected women who have to decide whether to begin or continue pregnancy, knowing about the possibility of transmitting the infection. Could reproductive freedom be limited? I discuss, among others, Parfit, Harris and Purdy's proposals. I try to show that a paternalistic solution is inadequate and argue on behalf of the importance of responsible and informed decisions on the part of the mother or the parents
Naturalismo y la autonomía del pensamiento filosófico: la epistemología naturalista de Quine en relación con la epistemología tradicional
No full text"Epistemology Naturalized" has been extremely influential among contemporary analytical epistemologists. Current discussions about Quine's thesis do not pay attention to a basic point: his main argument is a historical one. Quine tries to show that a naturalized epistemology is the best way out vis-a-vis the failures of traditional epistemology. In this paper, I argue that Quine's argument is based on a fictions historical account. lf that is the case, his reasons for a naturalizcd epistemology are non-sutficient
El carácter epistemológico del concepto de significado
No full textIn this paper I point out sorne essentially epistemological traits of the notion of meaning. They are related to analyticity. On the basis of Kripkean distinction between necessity and apriority, the traditional characterization of analytical statements, truths in virtue of meaning, is shown to be (on a literal reading) defective, and different epistemological interpretations of it are considered instead. After noting the epistemological nature of analyticity (already present in Frege's original definition) the putative link between that concept and that of unrevisability is examined. lf the link were not a real one, analyticity would be protected against those of Quine's criticisms based on the non-existence of unrevisable truths