Análisis Filosófico
Not a member yet
785 research outputs found
Sort by
Notas sobre el paralelismo psicofísico y el emergentismo o de cómo salir de la "botella cazamoscas"
Get PDFIn this paper I claim that it is not possible to understand Wittgenstein's argument against psychophysical parallelism as proposing an emergentist position. In order to show this, first, I describe Wittgenstein's argument. Second, I reconstruct two versions of emergentism: a classical and a contemporary one. Finally, I argue that Wittgenstein does not subscribe any of the philosophical commitments that wouldenable an emergentist understanding ofhis argument against psychophysical parallelism, and that, in addition, this is consistent with sorne of his metaphilosophical hints.Mi objetivo en este trabajo será mostrar la implausibilidad de leer el argumento de Wittgenstein en contra del paralelismo psicofísico como proponiendo una salida emergentista. A tal efecto, en primer lugar, formularé el argumento en cuestión centrándome exclusivamente en los razonamientos por analogía a los que apela Wittgenstein en Zettel 608 y 612. Luego, reconstruiré el emergentismo desde dos formulaciones: una clásica y otra contemporánea. Finalmente, intentaré mostrar la inviabilidad de interpretar el argumento en contra del paralelismo psicofísico como proponiendo una salida emergentista -ya clásica, ya contemporánea- a la luz de los compromisos filosóficos que Wittgenstein parece no asumir y de dos de sus señalamientos metafilosóficos
Notas sobre el "Wahrheitsbegriff", II
Get PDFThis is the second part of a two-part paper devoted toa study of some historical, logical and philosophical issues arising from a reading of Tarski's celebrated "Wahrheitsbegriff' monograph. This second part concentrates on issues related to Tarski's "Wahrheitsbegriff' version of the theorem on the indefinability of truth. One of these issues is the correct exegesis of Tarski's claim that a truth definition cannot be constructed in a metalanguage if its order is not higher than that of the object language. Another issue is the correct contrast between Tarski's mathernatical achievement in offering his version of the indefinability result and Godel's achievement in his earlier discovery of another version of the result. The correct contrast must emphasize the fact that (contrary to frequent claims) Tarski's version does not use semantic notions (either defined or intuitive); no way towards a version of the indefinability theorem not employing intuitive semantic notions appears in Godel, despite thefact that he, like Tarski, sought to find non-semantic versions of his results
La concepción liberal de "persona razonable": Una propuesta de justificación
Get PDFFrom the point of view of politicalliberalism, one of the main features of "reasonable" people consists in accepting that the firm adhesion to a comprehensive conception of good, the certainty of dealing with a true conception (or, at least, the "best" or most plausible one compared to the available altematives), does not offer a sufficient justification to the intention of promoting it by means of the power of the State. Now, how is this liberal position founded? My aim in this paper is to offer an argument for it. Todo so, I will start analysing sorne aspects of Rawls' conception of "reasonable person" and the difficulties derived from this conception, particularly enlightened by the objections formulated to it by Leif Wenar and Eduardo Rivera López. I will propose an altemative argument to the presented ones, departing from two premises: 1) a political principie of equality and free consensus and 2) a practical interpretation (neither epistemological as conceived by Wenar, Rivera López and Barry, nor sociological as in Mulhall and Swift) of the burdens of judgement
Notas sobre el "Wahrheitsbegriff", I
Get PDFThis is the first part of a two-part devoted to a study of sorne historical, logical and philosophical issues arising from a reading of Tarski's celebrated "Wahrheitsbegriff' monograph. Thi first part starts with an exposition of Tarski's "Wahrheitsbegriff' theory of truth which is historically accurate but more easily intelligible to the modern reader than Tarski's "Wahrheitsbegriff' presentation. This exposition is then used in the refutation of sorne historical, logical and philosophical ideas appearing in the literature on Tarski, and in particular of the idea that he did not define or even considered in his work of this period the notion of "truth in a structure". The second part of the paper will concentrate on issues related to Tarski's "Wahrheitsbegriff' version ofthe theorem on the indefinability of truth
Conventions and Linguistic Communication
Get PDFEn el siglo XX, se ha intentado articular el convencionalismo lingüístico de maneras distintas. Uno de los enfoques más prometedores fue el que propuso David Lewis a finales de los años 60 e inicio de los 70. Lewis subsume las regularidades convencionales que subyacen a la actividad de hablar un lenguaje bajo los estados de equilibrio más generales que resultan de cualquier tipo de compot1-amiento cooperativo racional. En este artículo propongo que, pese a su atractivo, las convenciones lewisianas deberían ser abandonadas en favor del convencionalismo lingüístico del segundo Wittgenstein. Mi motivación para recomendar tal giro es que la propuesta de Lewis no es capaz de ofrecer una respuesta satisfactoria a la objeción de Donald Davidson, de acuerdo con la cual la teoría convencionalista de Lewis no puede explicar la ocurrencia sistemática de malapropismos (malapropisms) en nuestro uso ordinario del lenguaje. En las últimas secciones del artículo, me dedico a mostrar cómo las convenciones wittgensteinianas sí pueden explicar el fenómeno de los malapropismos.En el siglo XX, se ha intentado articular el convencionalismo lingüístico de maneras distintas. Uno de los enfoques más prometedores fue el que propuso David Lewis a finales de los años 60 e inicio de los 70. Lewis subsume las regularidades convencionales que subyacen a la actividad de hablar un lenguaje bajo los estados de equilibrio más generales que resultan de cualquier tipo de compot1-amiento cooperativo racional. En este artículo propongo que, pese a su atractivo, las convenciones lewisianas deberían ser abandonadas en favor del convencionalismo lingüístico del segundo Wittgenstein. Mi motivación para recomendar tal giro es que la propuesta de Lewis no es capaz de ofrecer una respuesta satisfactoria a la objeción de Donald Davidson, de acuerdo con la cual la teoría convencionalista de Lewis no puede explicar la ocurrencia sistemática de malapropismos (malapropisms) en nuestro uso ordinario del lenguaje. En las últimas secciones del artículo, me dedico a mostrar cómo las convenciones wittgensteinianas sí pueden explicar el fenómeno de los malapropismos
El problema del método de la teoría jurídica contemporánea y la disputa Hart vs. Dworkin
Get PDFDworkin's central argument against positivism casts doubt on its main tenet, viz, that the theory must give an account of Law from an externa! point of view.Dworkin claims that Law is a social practice in which participants develop an interpretive attitude, i.e., they assign a purpose to it without considering other participant's opinions on that issue. An account of this practice demands interpretation, by adopting the participants' attitude.The argument is inconsistent with Dworkin's distinction between levels of interpretation. Participants interpret certain data, and the observer must interpret that social practice. He must therefore consider the participant's opinions. If he adopted the internal attitude, the task would be unpursuable.Dworkin's second argument attacks what positivism's tenet presupposes: propositions about law are different from propositions of law. Dworkin maintains that the distinction is insustainable, as with the distinction between ethics and meta-ethics. Meta-ethical theories that claim externality are inconsistent, since every proposition about morality (externa!) is supported by moral propositions (internal).However, ifmeta-ethics is interna! to morality, there is at least one external theory about morality: Dworkin's own analysis. Dworkin's criticism is of a logical type, since he claims that meta-ethical theories are inconsistent. lt must then be meta-linguistic and, hence, external (non-moral)
Notas acerca de Fodor y el carácter innato de nuestros conceptos
Get PDFIn his Concepts. Where cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998). Fodor argues for his own conceptual atomism within the framework of the Representational Theory of the Mind. It is usually said that this point of view implies a strong involvement with nativism and this nativism is considered as a serious problem for atomism. Here 1 propose to analyze the nativist implications of his atomism.
Firstly I refer to sorne aspects of Fodor's views on concepts and I anticípate my central thesis: in spite of the usual interpretations according to which he is a supporter of an extreme form of nativism, I argue that in Concepts Fodor modifies his account, abandoning his previous involvement with such a strong form of nativism. lnstead he now argues for a kind of a more modera te and more plausible form of nativism. Secondly, I present what Fodor calls the "the standard argument" and also his strategy deployed in Concepts to block this argument. Finally, I criticize Fodor's nativism as it is argued for in Concepts
