Análisis Filosófico
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Realismo intencional, eliminativismo y psicología científica
Get PDFThe Hairy Intentional Realism (HIR or J. Fodor's Computational/Representational Theory of Mind) aims for two things that I shall try to show are difficult to jointly obtain: states (1) with an interpretable semantic content, and (2) with causal role in the production of behavior. There is no difficulty in obtaining (1), the problem is with (2). HIR's strategy consists in the postulation of causal intentional laws. The problem is that these laws have a doubtful status to the point that many consider them not possible and not even necessary. According to HIR, if (1) and (2) cannot be jointly obtained, two unwanted consequences emerge: if intentional states do not have a causal role qua intentional, that would mean ceasing to be realistic about them; and if intentional laws are not possible that would imply that we could not have a scientific psychology. In the first part of this paper I shall exhibit HIR's main theses and I shall show that it cannot accomplish the two demands. Second, I shall defend the idea that because of the fact that (1) and (2) cannot be reconciled, neither an eliminativism about intentional states, nor the impossibility that psychology is a science can follow.El realismo intencional acérrimo (RIA o teoría representacional/computacional de la mente de J. Fodor) quiere dos cosas que, según intentaré mostrar, son difíciles de lograr conjuntamente: estados (1) con contenido semánticamente interpretable y (2) que tengan rol causal en la producción de la conducta (y de otros estados intencionales). Si bien no hay dificultades para obtener(l), el problema es con (2). La estrategia del RIA consiste en postular la existencia de leyes intencionales causales. El problema es que esas leyes son de un estatus dudoso, al punto que muchos consideran que no son posibles y ni siquiera necesarias. Según el RIA, si no se puede obtener conjuntamente (1) y (2) se desprenderían dos consecuencias indeseables: si los estados intencionales no tienen rol causal qua intencionales significaría que no se es realista acerca de las creencias y deseos; y que no sean posibles las leyes intencionales implicaría que no se puede tener una psicología científica. En la primera parte del trabajo me ocuparé de exponer las tesis del RIA y mostraré que no puede cumplir conjuntamente con las exigencias (1) y (2). En la segunda parte me ocuparé de defender la idea de que del hecho de que no se pueda conciliar (1) y (2) no se sigue un eliminativismo acerca de los estados intencionales ni la imposibilidad de que la psicología sea una ciencia
Interacción y atribución mental: la perspectiva de la segunda persona
Get PDFIn this paper I intend to show that the debate between the first and the third person point of view of ordinary mental attribution needs to be redefined in order to make room to a more basic perspective, the second person point of view. The reason for this is that this point of view is able to account of a variety of phenomena that are left out of consideration from the other ones. Firstly, I defend a characterization of the different abilities that includes this kind of reciprocal understanding. Secondly, I identify some interactive phenomena that are better viewed as cases of intentional attribution made from the second personal point of view.En este trabajo describo los rasgos que identifican a la perspectiva de la segunda persona como una perspectiva genuina, específica y básica de la atribución mental y, sobre esa caracterización, me propongo defender su adecuación para dar cuenta de ciertos fenómenos básicos de atribución intencional que quedan fuera del alcance y del interés de la primera y la tercera persona. Defiendo la tesis de que ni la perspectiva de la primera ni la de la tercera persona son excluyentes ni básicas, y sugiero, en cambio, que se trata de perspectivas que se adquieren gradual y tardíamente en el desarrollo psicológico, y que son complementarias entre sí y con la de la segunda persona. En segundo lugar, identifico algunos fenómenos interactivos propios de esta perspectiva y, por último, extraigo algunas conclusiones generales que se siguen de la aceptación de esta perspectiva y de su importancia en la explicación de la atribución intencional ordinaria
Verdad, pragmatismo y progreso
Get PDFThis paper examines Rorty's theory of truth in reference to concepts such as "falibilism" and "progress". First, it claims that Rorty mixes inconsistently the pragmatist conception of truth, the Davidsonian thesis that "true" is a primitive and the deflacionist conception of truth. Secondly, it analyses the Rortyan attempt to "reduce" "true" to "warranted assertibility" in order to show that this move is imcompatible with falibilism. It is argued that the distinction between truth and justification is essential to conceiving falibilism. Finally, it is held that Rorty's pragmatism is unable to explain scientific and philosophical progress. Three points in the Rortyan philosophy can be pointed out for that thesis: 1) incommensurability of vocabularies, 2) the idea that there is no reason to think that the beliefs best justified are those which are most likely to be true, 3) the "reduction" of "true" to "warranted assertibility".This paper examines Rorty's theory of truth in reference to concepts such as "falibilism" and "progress". First, it claims that Rorty mixes inconsistently the pragmatist conception of truth, the Davidsonian thesis that "true" is a primitive and the deflacionist conception of truth. Secondly, it analyses the Rortyan attempt to "reduce" "true" to "warranted assertibility" in order to show that this move is imcompatible with falibilism. It is argued that the distinction between truth and justification is essential to conceiving falibilism. Finally, it is held that Rorty's pragmatism is unable to explain scientific and philosophical progress. Three points in the Rortyan philosophy can be pointed out for that thesis: 1) incommensurability of vocabularies, 2) the idea that there is no reason to think that the beliefs best justified are those which are most likely to be true, 3) the "reduction" of "true" to "warranted assertibility"
La verdad y el éxito de la ciencia: A propósito de un artículo de P. Kyle Stanford
Get PDFP. Kyle Stanford proposes "An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science" according to which the success of a wholy false scientific theory (as for example an enhanced version of the Ptolemaic system) can be explained by its "predictive similitude" (= empírica! equivalence) to the true theory in the relevant domain (the Copernical theory), and he holds that this explanation: (a) is antirealist, for it doesn't require that the successful theory be true-not even partially or approximately; (b) it ends the chain of legitimate requests for explanation: there is no general answer to the question how a false theory can generate the same predictions as a true one, which can only be answered by appealing to the specific mechanisms posited by each particular theory; (c) is as good as a realist explanation, even regarding the success of the theories in generating "novel" predictions.
In this work I wish to suggest that: (a) to explain the success of a theory in this way is analogous to explaining the blackness of a swan by saying that it is chromatically similar to a crow; (b) there is a plausible explanation of how a totally false theory can have the mentioned capacity, viz., that it contains ad-hoc hypothesis; and (c) that, thus, a false theory having also the same capacity as a (partially) true one to generate predictions that are "novel" in sorne reasonably strong sense would be a miracleP. Kyle Stanford proposes "An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science" according to which the success of a wholy false scientific theory (as for example an enhanced version of the Ptolemaic system) can be explained by its "predictive similitude" (= empírica! equivalence) to the true theory in the relevant domain (the Copernical theory), and he holds that this explanation: (a) is antirealist, for it doesn't require that the successful theory be true-not even partially or approximately; (b) it ends the chain of legitimate requests for explanation: there is no general answer to the question how a false theory can generate the same predictions as a true one, which can only be answered by appealing to the specific mechanisms posited by each particular theory; (c) is as good as a realist explanation, even regarding the success of the theories in generating "novel" predictions.
In this work I wish to suggest that: (a) to explain the success of a theory in this way is analogous to explaining the blackness of a swan by saying that it is chromatically similar to a crow; (b) there is a plausible explanation of how a totally false theory can have the mentioned capacity, viz., that it contains ad-hoc hypothesis; and (c) that, thus, a false theory having also the same capacity as a (partially) true one to generate predictions that are "novel" in sorne reasonably strong sense would be a miracl
Normatividad epistémica y capacidad metarrepresentacional
Get PDFSorne recent forms of reliabilism, and mainly the epistemic virtues theory, postulate a compromise between reflectivity and informational reliability. In this paper we present a model of epistemic normativity that makes compatible the reflective instance with the physical process of information gathering. The hard core of this proposal is a concept of metarepresentation that allows to represent both the content and the process of belief formation. This new concept is provided by the Recanati's Principie of Iconicity. We propose this principie as a basis for a more robust knowledge relationship than the considered ones in the clasical forms of reliabilism.Sorne recent forms of reliabilism, and mainly the epistemic virtues theory, postulate a compromise between reflectivity and informational reliability. In this paper we present a model of epistemic normativity that makes compatible the reflective instance with the physical process of information gathering. The hard core of this proposal is a concept of metarepresentation that allows to represent both the content and the process of belief formation. This new concept is provided by the Recanati's Principie of Iconicity. We propose this principie as a basis for a more robust knowledge relationship than the considered ones in the clasical forms of reliabilism
Overlapping Causal Interactions in Phil Dowe's Theory
Get PDFLa teoría de Phil Dowe (2000) intenta dar cuenta de la causalidad en el marco de las teorías físicas actuales con un análisis centrado en procesos e interacciones causales. En este artículo se presentan algunos contraejemplos a dicha teoría en casos de superposición de interacciones causales y se muestra de qué manera puede obtenerse toda una serie de ellos. Se analiza también qué tipo de entidades, procesos o interacciones son candidatos a desempeñar el papel de causas y efectos en el marco de la mencionada teoría y se muestra finalmente cómo la teoría de Dowe podría hacerse inmune a esta familia de contraejemplos y cuál sería el costo de esta posible solución
El silencio del derecho
Get PDFAccording to Raz there are no legal gaps originating in the silence of law. Such gaps require that there should be no reason to perform an action and no conclusive permission to omit that action. Raz claims that such a situation leads to a contradiction and hence is impossible. This means that aIl legal systems are necessarily complete. In this paper I argue that (1) the Razian argument against gaps begs the question, (2) the concept of conclusive pennission is inadequate for characterizing completeness and gaps and must be replaced by a stronger notion, and (3) legal gaps due to the absence of legal regulations are possible and hence the problem of completeness of legal systems is an empirical question that cannot be sol ved by logical means alone.De acuerdo a Raz no hay lagunas jurídicas originadas en el silencio del derecho. Tales lagunas presuponen una situación en la que no hay razones para realizar una acción y tampoco hay un permiso concluyente para omitirla. Raz pretende que una situación tal lleva a contradicción y, por lo tanto, es imposible. Esto significa que todos los sistemas jurídicos son necesariamente completos. En este artículo sostengo: (1) que el argumento de Raz en contra de las lagunas presupone lo que pretende probar; (2) que el concepto de permiso concluyente es inadecuado para caracterizar la completitud y, por ende, las lagunas, y debe ser sustituido por una concepto más fuerte; y (3) que las lagunas del derecho debidas a la ausencia de regulaciones jurídicas son posibles y, por lo tanto, el problema de la completitud de sistemas jurídicos es una cuestión empírica que no puede ser resuelta por la lógica
Glosas del discurso legal acerca de derechos subjetivos
No full textThe present work starts off with sorne general considerations about the traditional view on rights, dissected into eight theses. Next, the theory of the Scandinavian realists, who represent the most radical opposition to such traditional view, is discusaed, althourh it is worthwhile pointing out that those authors do not reject all the theses that make up tbe traditional view as a whole. Subsequently, the author expresses his opinion about the above-mentioned theses, sometimes supporting the criteria of one side, sometimes those of the other side. However, there are also occasions in which the author backs up a thesis shared by both views, and even others when he expresses discrepancies with theses supported by both views. The latter is precisely what happens with the most important thesisa of all, namely the one according to which the expressions of rights are names or terms. Contrary to this claim, the author suggests contemplating the expressions of rights not in isolation, but as part of the legal sentences in which they appear. The issue at hand is precisely to gloss over the legal sentences that contain expressions of rights. This procedure allows for the deletion or solution of the manifold problems that emerge when analysing those expressions.El trabajo comienza con ocho tesis sobre el punto de vista tradicional acerca de los derechos. Luego discute a los realistas escandinavos, que presentan la oposición más radical a ese punto de vista. Cabe señalar que ellos rechazan todas las tesis que componen el enfoque tradicional. El autor formula una evaluación de las tesis de ambas posiciones. En particular, discrepa con la tesis común más importante, a saber, que las expresiones que corresponden a derecho. Son nombres o términos. El autor sostiene que las expresiones de derechos no deben considerarse aisladamente, sino como parte de las oraciones legales en las que aparecen. La cuestión es glosar esas oraciones. El procedimiento permite eliminar o solucionar el problema que surge cuando tales oraciones se analizan