31544 research outputs found
Sort by
Symposium on American Values
No full textA group of people listening to a talk in the library during the 2nd Symposium on American Values, April 24-27, 1963.https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/john_foster_photos/4201/thumbnail.jp
CEO marital status and capital allocation efficiency
No full textPurpose
The extant literature provides evidence that single CEOs are less risk-averse. Building on the theory of risk aversion, the authors argue that the risk aversion trait arising from CEO’s marital status partially explains capital allocation efficiency. The paper aims to examine the association between CEO marital status and capital allocation efficiency. Design/methodology/approach
The primary sample includes 9,671 observations from 1,264 US firms. The authors apply multivariate regression and a series of endogeneity tests to examine the association between CEO marital status and capital allocation efficiency. Findings
Single-CEO firms have higher capital allocation inefficiency than those with married CEOs. The findings continue to hold after a series of endogeneity tests such as propensity score matching, change analysis and instrumental variable regression analysis and are robust to alternative proxies for capital allocation inefficiency. The capital allocation inefficiency in single-CEO firms arises from overinvestment but not underinvestment, and corporate risk-taking channels the effect. Research limitations/implications
The study is limited to the effect of CEO marital status, not CEO marital quality. Practical implications
The findings imply that besides information asymmetry and agency conflicts, CEO marital status should receive special attention for capital allocation efficiency. Also, marital status influences the CEOs’ commitment to the general good of society, affecting the potential conflict of interest with different stakeholders from inefficient capital allocation. Originality/value
This study extends corporate finance literature on CEO marital status by providing novel evidence on the effect of single CEOs on capital allocation efficiency. The authors conclude that CEOs’ personality traits, such as marital status, matter in corporate policy choices
CWU Faculty Senate Minutes 10/04/23
Get PDFThese are the official Central Washington University Faculty Senate minutes for the October 4, 2023, regular meeting
Basketball 1962
No full textA CWSC Basketball player, 1962https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/john_foster_photos/4130/thumbnail.jp
Wrestling
No full textThree Wrestlers Posinghttps://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/john_foster_photos/4135/thumbnail.jp
Homecoming football vs Eastern
No full textAn action shot of a play during the homecoming football game vs. Eastern, 1962.https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/john_foster_photos/4093/thumbnail.jp
Restrictions on Warrant Properties
Get PDF[From the introduction]Not all true beliefs count as knowledge; warrant is the technical term for the (possibly logically complex) property that gives you knowledge when you add it to true belief. Warrant is not necessarily the same as justification, or any other epistemological property; all that this stipulative definition seems to entail about warrant is something akin to the following pair of biconditionals:(1) A true belief counts as a piece of knowledge iff it is warranted. A warranted belief counts as a piece of knowledge iff it is true.What exactly warrant turns out to be depends upon the substantive theory of knowledge we adopt. It may involve a belief’s being justified and having an absence of genuine defeaters for that belief, a belief’s being formed through a reliable process, a belief’s being formed through the virtuous traits of an agent’s cognitive character, or some such.Some epistemologists, however, have attempted to theorize about warrant by offering “nonpartisan” arguments, or in other words, arguments that do not depend upon any substantive theory of knowledge. For example, Merricks (1995, 1997) argues for warrant infallibilism, the claim that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false; Ryan (1996), Howard-Snyder et al. (2003), and Coffman (2008) challenge his arguments without endorsing warrant fallibilism. Pust (2000) argues that some of the claims made about warrant by the philosopher who first used the term as a technical concept in epistemology, Alvin Plantinga, are groundless, given the stipulative definition of the term. Lastly, Michael Huemer (2005) tries to demonstrate several claims about the nature of warrant: that there is no unique warrant property, that warrant fallibilism is true, that some but not all warrant properties are closed under known logical entailment if knowledge is, and that no warrant properties are closed under known logical entailment if knowledge isn’t.In this paper I will first summarize Huemer’s arguments and then critique his conclusions. Our stipulative definition of warrant needs to be modified somehow to eliminate some of the intuitively problematic candidates for warrant conditions that his analysis allows. What complicates our task is the fact that, as Huemer (p. 117) points out, given the way warrant is defined, it is not the kind of thing we can have clear intuitions about. Or in Pust’s words, “If we had the ability to make independent intuitive judgments about the term’s proper and improper application, there would be no justification, prior to analysis, for stipulating that warrant has a certain functional role. After all, we might find that such a characterization was mistaken,” (p. 51). All we can know about warrant at the outset is that it fills the functional role of making up the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. We may have intuitive ideas about what does that, but the thing that actually fills that functional role may turn out to be far different from what we originally thought
Consciousness Raising and Reality Construction Within Oppressed Groups: Bridging the Gap Between Feminist Theory and Critical Race Theory
Get PDFHuman beings’ understanding of the world around them, and how they interpret events that occur within that world, are expressions of their culture, their worldview (of reality). Many authors have written about reality as a social construction, some times through contracts (in a state, for example, the Racial Contract). I propose that reality can be (and often is) constructed through culture (within a group). The deconstruction of the officially (state sanctioned) accepted reality, by members of oppressed groups, is the first step in gathering the tools to empower themselves. This is a process of consciously recognizing the unconscious behavior of the privileged group/class. The reconstruction of a more accurate account of reality and the ability of individuals to identify themselves as a group is essential to affirming the reality of their experience as truth. Some cultures (for example indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere) have existed before the state that was constructed. In such cases, rather than reconstructing and creating, the task at hand is often remembering and affirming the validity of the (indigenous pre-conquest) culture. The psychological research into the social construction of stereotypes, and prejudice, confirms that much of these thoughts originate on an unconscious (and as a result unexamined) level of thinking. The consciousness raising techniques can begin to bring to the conscious level many of the quick (snap) decisions that rest beneath and behind prejudice and stereotypical thinking. Drawing on the work of MacKinnon, Mills, Foucault, and Banaji to bridge the gap between feminist theory and critical race theory by recognizing overlapping layers of oppression. In particular the oppression within oppressed groups, by those with limited degrees of ‘micro-power’ oppressing others within oppressed groups with no power at all. As a Native/Chicano/Irish person growing up in various different rural and urban areas throughout America, I integrate my personal experience into the philosophical theories
Excuses, Equivocation, and the New Evil Demon Problem
Get PDFEpistemology has experienced an explosion of diversification over the past hundred years regarding the concept of justification. Internalists claim that they hold the intuitive support, often in the context of the New Evil Demon Problem. In this paper I challenge the notion that externalism claims no support from intuitions. I further argue that internalists and externalists are talking about two completely distinct types of justification and show that internalists shift the focus onto the excusability of a believer for holding a belief rather than the justification of the belief itself and in fact frequently equivocate the two. I finally appeal to several arguments against the possibility of justified false beliefs to further bolster the general reliabilist position
Musical Platonism: A Challenge to Levinson
Get PDFMusical Platonism’s central thesis is that a musical work is a sound structure and nothing more. Given this, three consequences follow. First, musical works cannot be created. Second, if two musical works have the same sound structure, they are the same musical work. Third, a musical work’s instrumentation is not a necessary feature of its identity. Jerrold Levinson denies these three claims. He argues that musical works are created; that even if two musical works have the same sound structure, they are nevertheless two different musical works; and that a musical work’s instrumentation is a necessary feature of its identity. In this essay, I challenge Levinson’s views, and I make the case for a more feasible alternative