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Would-Be Counterfactual Dependence, Binary Causation and the Causality of Absences
Get PDFMetaphysics has long taken for granted that causation is a binary relation. Recently, theories have arisen which challenge this claim. Such theories claim that some metaphysical problems regarding causation can be solved by taking causation to be ternary or quaternary. I respond to an argument that a quaternary formulation of causation can help resolve the causality of absences paradox (CAP). I reject this claim and propose an alternative solution to the CAP, which I argue is both consistent with a binary formulation of causal relations and preferable to the solution which a quaternary formulation allows for
A Case for Nihilistic Dualism
Get PDFBoth Roderick Chisholm and Dean Zimmerman consider mereological essentialism to accurately describe the relationship between parts and wholes. Chisholm supports mereological essentialism because he believes it solves the paradox of coincidence, while Zimmerman embraces it because he believes it helps him defend dualism and refute materialism. In the first part of this paper, I will prove that neither form of mereological essentialism solves the paradox of coincidence because constitution does not entail identity. I will also prove that only nihilism solves the paradox of coincidence because constitution is impossible. In the second half of my paper, I will prove that Zimmerman’s argument against materialism that assumes mereological essentialism works better if you assume nihilism. I will then prove that nihilism is incompatible with materialism, and a new form of nihilistic dualism is the best way to maintain the existence of each person as one persisting thinker
Agent Causal Libertarianism and Moral Responsibility
Get PDFIn his article “Defending Hard Incompatibilism,” Derk Pereboom presents an argument against the compatibility of libertarianism and moral responsibility. In my paper, I first symbolize his argument and present Pereboom’s support of his premises. In short, Pereboom claims that in order for libertarians to claim that moral responsibility is plausible, they must adhere libertarianism of the agent causal sort. He then presents a case, in which he contends that agent causation is shown to be no different than event causation, which leads to the denial of the plausibility of moral responsibility. Secondly, I present a case of my own which shows that the fourth premise of Pereboom’s argument is false, and thus allows a libertarian to avoid denying moral responsibility. Next, I present a response to a possible counter argument from Pereboom, or by a proponent of his theory. Finally, I present a practical reason why the compatibility of libertarianism and moral responsibility is a philosophical position worth upholding
Novel Predictions: From Empiricism to Unificationism
Get PDFFrom Fresnel’s wave theory of light to Einstein’s general theory of relativity, the use of novel predictions has a long history in the method of science. Since predictions concern empirical matters, associated models of the method are usually empiricist ones. However, much of the recent philosophy of science shows a lack of emphasis on novel predictions. The central reasons include the general thesis of underdetermination of theory by evidence and the marginalization of novelty to a narrower issue in theory assessment, the prediction-accommodation distinction. In particular, novelty has become nothing more than code for methods classified as unificationist criteria of theory assessment. In this paper, I will extend Harker’s criticisms to a broader history of novel predictions in philosophy of science. I will then suggest a philosophy of science rooted in empiricist ideas, new experimentalism, to recontextualize novel predictions and their epistemological role. I do so in hopes rehabilitating novel predictions as the core of empirical methods. The literature known as new experimentalism offers a particularly promising context for attempting this because it concerns itself with empirical progress as analyzed through the many epistemic values of experiments. The guiding theme of new experimentalism is the theory-independence of experimental phenomena. Thus, it bypasses all unificatory methods and extra-empirical tools of theoretical science. Through this, I aim to provide a basic characterization of novel prediction as experimental interventions, contrary to its current unificationist formulations
Idealism and Pragmatism: “Transcendent” Validity Claims in Habermas’s Democratic Theory
Get PDFIn her recent article “Realism and Idealism: Was Habermas’s Communicative Turn a Move in the Wrong Direction?” Maeve Cooke examines the evolution of Jürgen Habermas’s thought over the past five decades. According to Cooke, Habermas’s so-called “communicative turn” was a necessary step in his philosophy’s systematic attempt to derive a universal norm from the immanent context of human practices and institutions. In her opinion, however, Habermas is unable to uphold his pragmatically-based claim to “transcendence from within” without encountering problems of epistemic justification when it comes to his theory’s treatment of normative validity claims. Cooke believes that despite Habermas’ exhaustive efforts, any political theory that discredits the possibility of metaphysical truth inevitably relinquishes the “context-transcending moment” that his idea of validity is meant to capture. In this essay, I examine how Habermasian philosophy attempts to assimilate such criticisms by deriving its normative ideals from the Theory of Communicative Action. In conclusion, I seek to characterize the dilemma thusly: the epistemic criticism raised by Cooke places her in the unenviable position of defending metaphysically-justified validity claims—a pitfall that Habermas’ theory is designed to avoid
Defense of Rawls: Response to Brock
Get PDFCosmopolitans like Gillian Brock, Charles Beitz, and Thomas Pogge argue that the principles of justice selected and arranged in lexical priority in Rawls’ first original position would—and should for the same reasons as in the first—also be selected in the second original position. After all, the argument goes, what reasons other than morally arbitrary ones do we have for selecting a second set of principles? A different, though undoubtedly related, point of contention is the cosmopolitan charge (most famously, made by Pogge) that Rawls fails to consider the unfavorable conditions that owe themselves to global factors. Perhaps there was a time when interconnectedness and interdependency between states was not a factor; but in the current global order, this certainly is not the case. While this paper will address other related cosmopolitan concerns mentioned in Brock’s work, it is these two points that are perhaps the two biggest threats to the Rawlsian project and, as such, it is these two points that will be the primary focus of this paper
Towards a Humean Solution of Vagueness in Language and Ontology
Get PDFThis paper explores how a Humean may respond to issues of vagueness in philosophy of language—and in extension—ontology. It begins with an examination of the sorites paradox and two common responses: epistemicism, and eliminativism. I then turn to David Hume’s conception of abstract ideas as a way to determine how vague terms refer and then compare this view to both epistemicism and eliminativism. The paper ends with a defense of the Humean view as a synthesis of the two, which ultimately questions the formulation of the sorites paradox as a proper use of language
Currently Persisting Paradoxes: Getting Clear about Endurantism
Get PDFThis paper addresses a mereological paradox which faces proponents of endurantism, the theory of persistence according to which objects may be wholly located at several times. The paradox is intended to demonstrate that endurantism is false because it entails that enduring objects are both 3D and 4D. I offer three ways for the endurantist to avoid the paradoxical conclusion by demonstrating that the fusion principle required to generate the paradox is untenable