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Resonating Ontologies: The Illusory Nature of the Confrontation Between Žižek\u27s Ontology and Speculative Realism
Get PDFThere are two main currents of thought in Continental philosophy emerging today – the speculative realists (via: Graham Harman and Meillassoux) and the post-continental Marxists (via: Žižek and Badiou). The two camps have propped themselves against each other, with the speculative realists giving especially acerbic critiques of post-continentalism as being stuck in correlationist thought (while the latter just tend to ignore the former, considering them a philosophy not worthy of exposition). This paper argues that this confrontation is an illusion: the fundamental ontologies of both groups essentially rely on a single concept – that of the non-All – that structures the rest of their thought. Further, it is only by overcoming the illusory nature of this confrontation that we can unleash the full potential of both these fields
Like Water in Water: The Nihilism of “Why,” the Immanence of “Because”
Get PDFThe work of Georges Bataille occupies an appropriately paradoxical place in the history of philosophy. Though he was decades ahead of his time, Bataille’s main focus was in a tradition that long been out of favor—mysticism. Though he claimed to be an atheist, he talked often of God. In this paper, I examine the ways in which Bataille’s system of though intertwines and diverges from Meister Eckhart, exploring the possibility of the Nietzschean mysticism Bataille constructed in his Summa Atheologica. With this more nuanced understanding of Bataille’s thought in place, his massive importance for post-structuralism and French philosophy more broadly becomes apparent
The Indubitable Nature of Temporality in Perception
Get PDFThe flow of time is vital for perception. While philosophers disagree as to the nature of how time is represented, i.e. that the passage of time is that of mere tense or belonging to the nature of the experience, it is generally accepted that the represented somehow tells us about the future, present and past. My contention is that this temporal character is indubitable for perception. I will begin by providing a temporal model of how percepts are represented. After giving a detailed presentation of the model, some problems will be considered, namely that the temporal model is doomed by the reversal of causal relata or no different than an unsuccessful perceptual experience. My contention will be that what is being represented in perception possesses fundamental temporal qualities that are indubitable for the experience, regardless of metaphysical worries or perceptual worries. If such temporal qualities belonging to the represented go without say, then a question remains as to the status of the temporal character of perception. After contrasting Kant’s position with Husserl’s position on the status of temporality in perception, I will argue that Kant’s position on perceptual temporality as manifesting from a cognitive faculty is more plausible
Academic Self-Efficacy, Coping, and Academic Performance in College
Get PDFThis study serves as a pilot study for a possible future study including the same variables. The purpose of the pilot study was to find a relationship in the college academic setting between academic self-efficacy, stress coping skills, and academic performance. Sixty-six undergraduate students, 17 male and 49 female, from a university in northwestern United States participated in the study. Stress was measured using the COPE Inventory (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). Self-efficacy was measured using the Academic Self-Efficacy Scale (Chemers, Hu, & Garcia, 2001). Academic performance was measured using the participants’ college GPA. Academic Self-Efficacy and the Planning subscale of the COPE Inventory were positively correlated with GPA (r = .49, p \u3c .01 and r = .32, p \u3c .05). Academic self-efficacy was positively correlated with the COPE Inventory subscales Positive Reinterpretation and Growth (r = .36, p r = .35, p \u3c .01), Acceptance (r = .46, p \u3c .01), and Planning (r = .25, p \u3c .05). Academic self-efficacy was negatively correlated with the COPE Inventory subscale Substance Use (r = -.32 at p \u3c 0.1).Faculty Sponsor: Heath Marrs, Ed.
Evolutionary Ethics and the Moral Skeptic
Get PDFIn this paper, I examine the relation between moral skepticism and evolutionary ethics. I focus on Robert Richards’ ‘Revised Theory’ of evolutionary ethics (in his “A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics), and Robert Joyce’s introduction of the moral skeptic as an objection to Richards’ view (in his The Evolution of Morality). I argue that Joyce’s application of the moral skeptic (an individual who denies common-sense moral judgments) is misaimed—for Richards can utilize a traditional response in moral theory and simply consider the skeptic beyond the pale of moral discourse. I then proceed to argue that the skeptic can be reintroduced at a further point in Richards’ argument, where he attempts to tease out the imperative force of ‘ought’ in moral contexts by appealing to the ‘structured context’ in which those ‘ought’-propositions occur, and that, if we frame our application of the skeptic here carefully, a serious problem for Richards’ view (and by extension, naturalistic ethical programs generally). I conclude with an evaluation of a series of possible responses to the skeptic by a proponent of Richards’ view (most of which can be generalized to naturalistic ethical projects beyond his)
Kant’s Implicit Suggestion of the Negative Formulation of Duty
Get PDFIn this paper I argue that in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Kant suggests that while I can never know when I am acting from duty, I can know when I am not acting from duty. In this paper I neither reconcile Kant’s imperatives with his statement that we will never know if we are definitely acting on his maxims, nor do I mount an argument against his perfectionist ideal theory. Instead I propose a negative formulation of his perfectionist ideal theory that argues Kant implicitly suggests I can only know when I am not acting from duty. First, I describe how the conditions of moral worth which Kant outlines make it so that I can never definitely know if I am acting from duty. I then take these conditions and show that Kant indirectly suggests that I can, however, know when I am not acting from duty. Specifically I examine the conditions Kant places on moral actions viz. the relationship inclinations and duty have with the moral worth of an action. Next, I provide a non-exhaustive refutation of potential arguments against my negative formulation proposition. Finally I discuss the implications of my negative formulation proposition on Kant’s perfectionist ideal theory as a whole
The Epistemic Value of Live Fiction: A Dramatic Response to the Question of Knowledge
Get PDFThis essay occupies a niche wedged between Philosophy and Art, exciting both the creative and inquiring mind. Drawing on both foundational and recent work in the philosophical study of knowledge and aesthetic theory, this paper synthesizes two fields within the humanities: epistemology and live theatre. This presentation challenges the academic barriers that keep philosophy and the performing arts from fully participating in interdisciplinary communication, and challenges the conceptual definition of knowledge itself. The aim is to promote recognition of the value in using that which is live, liminal, and personal in understanding the nature of knowledge. This can be achieved through exploring the ways in which the experiences of engaging with the fiction of live drama are a key to finding the missing element in the definition of knowledge. In exploring the collective views of specific, highly developed fields such as philosophy’s epistemology and art’s live theatre, an underutilized tool emerges: truth through fiction. This tool spurs the emergence of new societal and learning expectations and changes the face of academia in the process
Dennett’s Intentional Strategy Applied to Animals
Get PDFDaniel Dennett lays out what he calls the intentional strategy (or stance) and the intentional system, which proposes that we could predict the behavior of humans, non-human animals, plants or in other words, what he calls an intentional system. Roughly speaking, the intentional strategy involves attributing beliefs and desires, that a reason using object ought to have given the circumstances, to an object; with those beliefs and desires, one should be able to predict the object’s behavior. Though my goal is not to criticize Dennett’s view, I will argue that the intentional strategy works better on non-human animals than humans; a mere observation of an application of the intentional strategy. Once I have shown that the intentional strategy seems to work better on non-human animals than humans, I will argue that it is because it is in the nature of animals to make survival their highest desire and then form beliefs to secure this desire. Humans, on the other hand, form beliefs about the world, and these beliefs form their desires; they are not simply seeking survival
On Perception and Autonomy Considered through the Phenomenological Understanding of Emotion Described by Kym Maclaren
Get PDFFemale philosopher Kym Maclaren, in her article, “Emotional Metamorphoses: The Role of Others in Becoming a Subject,” explores a phenomenological view on emotion as being-in-the-world as well as the ethical implications of understanding emotion in opposition to the moralistic view. In the first part of this paper, I provide an exegetical assessment of Maclaren’s thesis; in the second I introduce a critique of Maclaren’s argument and argue a claim of my own which explores perception and autonomy in the human body along with its implications in the context of Maclaren’s phenomenological account of emotion. I discuss the necessity of both emotion and reason in morality and argue that the traditional definition of autonomy is not plausible when considered through Maclaren’s phenomenological view of emotion. Finally, I work to creatively explore a new definition of autonomy that does cohere with this view
Perspectivalism and Blaming
Get PDFUsing the combination of two views of blame (T. M. Scanlon and J. J. C Smart), I will argue in favor of a thesis I refer to as perspectivalism; that blame from the perspective of a third party is fundamentally a different sort of thing than blame from the perspective of an injured party. Using both examples that focus on hypocrites and moral luck cases, I will attempt to give reasons to why perspectivalism has strong explanatory value. Focusing on cases that involve hypocrites, I will attempt to show that two statements about hypocrites are true if we accept perspectivalism. First, that as many philosophers have noted, hypocrites lose their standing to blame from a third party perspective. Second, utilizing my new understanding of blaming as the injured party, I will conclude that hypocrites retain their standing to blame in virtue of their relationship to the wrong doing. In the case of the moral luck examples, I will give an example that shows the complexity that the two types of blame described. Ultimately, I will be arguing that a correct general theory of blame must take into consideration the blamer’s placement relative to an instance of wrongdoing using the explanatory value of the hypocrite cases