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Portland\u27s Keystone Crustacean: Signal Crayfish Behavior, Health, & Habitat in the Tryon Creek Watershed
In the Portland Metro Area, the signal crayfish (Pacifastacus leniusculus) is a keystone species. Signal crayfish consume inaccessible plant matter and detritus, feed various game fish, engineer riverbeds, and are even harvested commercially for human consumption. Recognizing signal crayfishes’ multifaceted ecological and social significance, the purpose of this study was to assess the habitat factors that impact signal crayfish health and behavior in the Tryon Creek Watershed. Data collection revealed that overall, Tryon Creek crayfish were disproportionately likely to be observed in locations with high infrastructure presence levels; substrates composed of silt/sand or a combination of boulders and cobbles; culverts, runs, and pools; and water depths between 10 and 39 cm. Meanwhile, juvenile crayfish were disproportionately likely to be observed in locations with low human impact levels, substrates composed of silt/sand and a combination of cobbles and gravel, and water depths between 0 and 19 cm. Similarly, unhealthy crayfish — specimens that were deceased, immobile, or struggling, or that consisted of severed appendages — were disproportionately likely to be observed in locations with culverts and riffles and water depths between 0 and 19 cm. The study found no evidence for an established population of invasive crayfish in Tryon Creek, although further monitoring (particularly in Tryon Cove) are necessary to ensure the watershed’s continued protection. The analysis also suggested that human-caused ecosystem disruptions can seriously decrease the health and wellness of signal crayfish populations, pointing to a need for better waterway designs that can benefit fish and crustaceans alike
THE EFFECT OF SENTENCE PRESENTATION ORDER ON ANIMACY VIOLATIONS AND THE N400 EFFECT: A MIXED METHODS APPROACH
Semantic memory refers to a portion of long-term memory that processes meaning, understanding, and conceptual facts about the world. Research shows that information processing benefits from a priming effect for access to semantic memory. For example, seeing a certain word or gesture, can form a prediction of what will follow. Encountering information that is incongruent with this priming effect elicits the N400 brainwave. The N400 can be used to identify incongruence in sentences, gestures, and even facial expressions. However, there is emerging evidence that context given to even incongruent information has the effect of lessening the strength of the N400. This study examined the effect of context and condition type on the N400. Thirteen participants were recruited for the purposes of this study. Stories were presented in their original form as well as inter-spliced with sentences from other stories to ascertain if changing the context of the story would elicit different results than previous studies (Nieuwland & VanBerkum, 2006; Boudewyn et al., 2019). Stories presented in their original form had similar effects to previous studies, eliciting an N400 effect in the Inanimate condition in Sentences 1 & 2 and no N400 effect in the Inanimate condition in Sentences 3 & 4 and in any sentence in the Animate Condition. Inter-splicing had an unusual effect. The amplitude during inter-spliced Inanimate condition did not change over the course of the story, in contradiction to iv the effect that was seen in the original story. The inter-spliced Animate condition showed more negativity in amplitude in Sentences 3 & 4 in comparison to Sentences 1 & 2. This study showed that sentence presentation does appear to matter for discourse, but it seems to imply that it has a reversal effect on stories containing Animate subjects
Powers and Properties: On Causal Relevance and the Metaphysics of Mind
[From the introduction]Contemporary trends in philosophy of mind have galvanized non-reductive physicalism, the thesis that (1) the world and its components are essentially physical, and (2) entities cannot be reduced to their fundamental physical parts. Reality is comprised of layers, each one metaphysically affixed to its neighbors while still retaining its own unique ontological status. Higher-level phenomena are thought to be dependent on, but not reducible to, lower-level occurrences. A levels-ontology ostensibly solves the problems bequeathed by a Cartesian worldview as well as those that come with strict physicalism. But ultimately we face the same questions that plague these views. How can disparate substances interact? How does the physical cause the mental, and vice versa? Moreover, can purportedly higher-level phenomena, such as beliefs, cause lower-level phenomena, such as neural reactions, as well as other higher-level phenomena, for instance other beliefs? Non-reductive physicalism precludes any causal junction between these realms whereby they produce effects in one other. “Non-reductive physicalism,” Jaegwon Kim says, “like Cartesianism, founders on the rocks of mental causation.”John Heil addresses these questions in From an Ontological Point of View. It is evident in this text that an adequate theory of causality, particularly of mental causation, must stem from an adequate theory of properties, something current non-reductionist theories overlook. In proposing a revisionary ontology of properties, Heil offers a promising account of causality and also avoids the problem of causal overdetermination, the premise that an event cannot have more than one sufficient cause.In this paper I draw on emergentism, a prevalent non-reductionist theory, in order to present the problem of causal overdetermination in philosophy of mind. I attempt to show that Heil’s theory illuminates the issue of causal overdetermination by virtue of its ontological seriousness. By applying Heil’s insights about the nature of properties, it becomes manifest that the requirement of a one-to-one relation between cause and effect is unwarranted. Therefore, causal overdetermination is fangless. [...
Two Sorts of Connectionist Models: A Critical Analysis
[From the introduction]The two main paradigms in cognitive science are computationalism and connectionism. The former takes as its starting point the analogy of the mind as a computer, and so attempts to describe cognition in terms of discrete symbol manipulation, in the manner of a digital computer. Connectionism is a more “bottom-up” approach to cognitive science, assuming the neurological structure of the brain to be fundamentally important. It is the task of this paper to demonstrate that connectionist theories of cognitive science face a dilemma: either they are mere descriptions of the physical implementation of a computationalist system, or they fail to predict and account for an apparently crucial and fundamental feature of human cognition, the systematicity of thought
Self-Governing Policies: A Critique of Bratman
Michael Bratman in his essay “Reflection, Planning and Temporally Extended Agency” espouses a reductive view of agency based largely upon what he calls “self-governing policies.” Combining self-governing policies with a Lockean approach to personal identity over time, Bratman’s view stays within the bounds of event causation and attempts to reduce agency to mere attitudes. First I will give the problem Bratman’s approach to agency intends to solve, then move through his view beginning with the planning theory of intention, then on to his Lockean approach to personal identity and finally self-governing policies. I will then pose some problems for his theory
Is Beauty A Valid Criterion for Truth?
[From the introduction]Both beauty and Truth lie beneath many of mankind’s deepest desires and aspirations. The search for beauty drives many people to travel to pristine forests or untouched coastlines to experience awe, while the search for knowledge about the Truth of the universe in which we live compels many to study the tiniest particles or largest spaces we can conceive in order to get a slight hold on our place in a seemingly endless and impartial existence. Our rational proclivities lead us to search for Truth and solid facts; our intrinsic appreciation for natural beauty allows us to deeply appreciate the beauty of a sunrise after a lifetime of daylight. Beauty and Truth both cause people to experience life and their own world in different and unique ways.Though examining Truth and beauty are great adventures in their own rights, examining the relationship between the two is also very interesting. The behavior of the universe when examined on both infinitely large and infinitely small scales can have many elements of beauty. Likewise, many beautiful occurrences in nature can have intriguing scientific explanations. When considering the idea that a proposed theory uniting every phenomenological law of physics will be recognizable because of its intrinsic beauty, however, it seems strange and almost irrational to add an aesthetic criterion to a scientific theory. This invites the question, “Is beauty a valid criterion for scientific Truth?” This question will be examined through a comparison of philosophic and scientific ideas about beauty and Truth, as well as a comparison of the implications of both positive and negative responses. [...
Russell’s Coherentism: Theoretically Impossible
In this paper, I argue that purely Coherentist justifications (or refutations) of theories must rely upon a ‘theory-neutral’ set of sense data with which we are immediately acquainted. First, I explain the function of Russell’s theory of Definite Description and his theory of Acquaintance in his Coherentist epistemology. I take my counter-examples from the natural sciences and ultimately play off the fact that our brains ‘over-correct’ colors we see according to their color contexts in order to question the very idea of an ‘I,’ ‘this,’ and ‘now,’ which Russell uses to define acquaintance (as well as what I call a ‘theory-neutral’ set of sense data). The argument is that our data and theories are mutually dependent, which undermines the project of comparing theories, since distinct ultimate theories cannot have any common ground.Note: Minor typographical corrections made and new version of article uploaded 8.29.2011
Should Contract Pregnancies Be Legally Enforceable?: An Assessment of the Gender Inequality Hypothesis in the Asymmetry Thesis
The legal enforceability of surrogate motherhood is largely contested in bioethics. In this paper, I argue against what Debra Satz terms the “asymmetry thesis,” the idea that there should be an asymmetry (basically, a difference) between how we treat reproductive labor and other forms of labor. Satz’s main support for the asymmetry thesis is that if contract pregnancies are legally enforced, they reinforce a long history of the gender inequality that is pervasive in our culture. I contend that this is not well-supported, and identify three salient empirical questions that the ethicist must ask the sociologist before defending the asymmetry thesis: questions on the population’s thoughts about the sale of reproductive labor, on how many surrogates regret their decisions, and on the impact of contract pregnancy on the mother-child relationship
On the Sensitivity of What is Said (and Heard)
In this paper I present relativism (as found in John MacFarlane\u27s work) using 2-dimensional propositional matrices and other tools from philosophical semantics. I also identify some of the key features of relativism and closely related theories, distinguishing relativism from contextualism and nonindexical contextualism (moderate relativism). Next, I discuss the problem of disagreement, and the problem facing the relativist who tries to capture genuine disagreement. Finally, I gesture at my preferred view, that the sentences under consideration are \u27assessment indexical\u27, and provide an insight into its possible mechanics