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Growing Up in Ireland: The lives of 9-year-olds of cohort '08. ESRI Growing up in Ireland June 2021.
Get PDFThis report provides a descriptive analysis of the findings from detailed interviews conducted between June 2017 and April 2018 with 8,032 9-year-olds and their families from Cohort ’08 (formerly known as the Infant Cohort) of the Growing Up in Ireland study.
These families were first interviewed when the Study Child was 9 months old (September 2008 to March 2009) and followed
up at 3 years of age (January-August 2011) and 5 years of age (March-September 2013). An inter-wave postal survey was
conducted when the cohort was 7/8 years of age (March-October 2016). Responses at 9 years of age represented 72 per cent of the original sample interviewed at Wave 1. The data have been re-weighted to account for differential response across different groups.
Capturing experiences and outcomes in middle childhood is crucial as peers become more important in children’s lives and they take a more active role in shaping the nature of their play and activities. Middle childhood is also an important period for developing social and cognitive skills and for children’s emerging self-concept. Behaviours at this stage, including physical activity and diet, may have longer-term consequences for physical health and well-being
Zelensky vs. Akhmetov – a test of strength. OSW Commentary Number 420 22.12.2021.
Get PDFIn November, an open conflict broke out between President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine’s richest businessman, Rinat Akhmetov. The main cause was Zelensky’s signing of the so-called law on oligarchs. In response, Akhmetov’s television channels, including the most popular one in Ukraine, began to ruthlessly attack the president and to promote his political rivals, in particular the former chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Dmytro Razumkov, who had been dismissed a few weeks earlier and who until recently had been one of the key representatives of the ruling camp, a person with high public support. In response, Zelensky publicly suggested that Akhmetov was involved in an allegedly prepared state coup and that his entourage was dragging him into a war against Ukraine. Meanwhile the President’s Office stepped up actions against his business.
It is currently impossible to predict how the dispute will end, but the main beneficiaries are other oligarchs, as the president is becoming increasingly dependent on their support (both in the media and in parliament) as he considers re-election. Zelensky’s suggestions to Akhmetov can be seen as a kind of ‘invitation’ to him to negotiate his influence on politics. At the same time, a further escalation of their conflict (which is, however, less likely than a quiet compromise) could result in the destabilisation of the state
Ukraine’s disputes over the 80th anniversary of the Babi Yar massacre. OSW Commentary Number 413 22.10.2021.
Get PDFOn 29 September 2021 and 6 October 2021 in Kyiv two competing ceremonies were held to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the massacre in Babi Yar, which is a site of extermination of Kyiv Jews and representatives of other ethnic and political groups. No comprehensive commemoration of these crimes was offered both in the Soviet era and in the recent 30 years of Ukraine’s independence. It was only in recent years that two projects for the commemoration of the Babi Yar massacre emerged, however, a sharp dispute is ongoing between their initiators. The first project, proposed by the Academy of Sciences and supported by “patriotic” groups, presents the Holocaust against the backdrop of the history of martyrdom of other nations, and views Ukraine as a victim of two totalitarian systems. The other project, which is a private initiative, focuses on commemorating the tragedy of Jews on Ukrainian soil. However, it has sparked controversy mainly due to the involvement of sponsors and contributors from Russia in it. Due to its advanced stage of implementation, its modern form and its focus on issues related to the Holocaust, this project received backing from both Ukrainian and Israeli authorities.
The dispute over the Babi Yar massacre goes beyond historical issues. It has become a tool in the political fight between the camp of President Volodymyr Zelensky and that of his predecessor Petro Poroshenko, as well as a field of personal conflicts and a clash of different models of remembrance. The contentious issues include Ukrainian nationalists’ collaboration with Nazi Germany, discussed in the private project, and the involvement of Russian individuals in the initiative, which enables them to impact on Ukraine’s politics of memory. As a consequence, an important project, which has the potential to both shape domestic debates about the past and affect the perception of Ukraine abroad, is being devised without the participation of the state which – at least at this stage – has abandoned any active policy in this area
The Zapad-2021 exercises. Russian strategy in practice. OSW Commentary Number 405 3.09.2021.
Get PDFThe Zapad-2021 strategic exercises, scheduled for 10–16 September, are the most important training programme yet undertaken held by the Russian Armed Forces and the Belarusian army which cooperates with them. As they involve as many as 200,000 soldiers, they will also be the largest military exercises conducted in Europe for nearly 40 years. The training phase actually began in July, and will peak during the officially announced dates. The accompanying disinformation operation began even earlier, at the end of 2020; the aim was to present the exercises as a defensive action by the alliance of Belarus and Russia against allegedly rising aggression by NATO. The Zapad-2021 (zapad meaning ‘west’) exercises are a test of how ready the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus are to conduct operations on NATO’s eastern flank, but they also represent a test of the state structures, in terms of the comprehensive security of their activities and operation in conditions of armed conflict. Particular importance should be attached to the attempt at verifying how effective both countries will be at conducting information warfare, the goal of which is to confirm the potential enemy in the belief that Russia is militarily superior, and that it is ready to use force for political purposes
Under the radar of big politics: cooperation between China and Ukraine. OSW Commentary Number 395 2.06.2021.
Get PDFChinese-Ukrainian relations are still defined by the events of 2014: the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Their consequences continue to block high-level political dialogue between Kyiv and Beijing, which Washington (and to a certain extent Moscow as well) also does not want. However, Sino-Ukrainian economic cooperation is expanding rapidly, with trade as its main driver. In 2019 the PRC became Ukraine’s most important trading partner due to the rapid rise in Ukrainian exports. Beijing itself is sceptical of Ukraine’s post-2014 political transition and its turn to the West, but it is interested in Ukraine’s military technologies, raw materials and agricultural potential. Since President Volodymyr Zelensky came to power, Ukraine has clearly been seeking a new opening in its relations with China, looking to widen the foreign policy space in the game between the West and Russia. However, it remains essentially excluded from financial and investment cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. Any significant deepening of relations between Kyiv and Beijing would first and foremost require a resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, the existing dynamic economic cooperation ‘under the radar’ of great-power politics still has considerable potential
Great ambitions: Russia expands on the LNG market. OSW Commentary Number 394 17.05.2021.
Get PDFExpansion on the liquefied natural gas market has become one of the priority areas in Russia’s energy policy in recent years. This has been reflected in the statements made by government representatives and the many strategic documents that have been adopted recently. In particular, on 16 March this year the government approved a document entitled The Long-term Programme for the Development of Liquefied Natural Gas Production in the Russian Federationwhich envisages ambitious plans for further development in this area: an output of 80 to 140 million tonnes of LNG in 2035. The assumptions of the strategy fit in with the trend of regular increases in the production and export of Russian LNG which have been visible in recent years (from 11 to nearly 30 million tonnes in 2016–19). It can be concluded from these announcements that Russia is planning to increase its share in the global liquefied natural gas market to over 10%, and possibly even up to 20–30%. The expansion in this sector is also an argument for Moscow to strengthen its political and military presence in the Arctic. Increasing the Russian share on the European LNG market may also be a kind of remedy for Gazprom’s loss of influence in some EU countries
Sputnik V: research, production, vaccination campaign and export. OSW Commentary Number 377 10.02.2021.
Get PDFIn December 2020, Russia launched a mass-scale action for vaccinating its citizens with the domestically produced Sputnik V coronavirus vaccine. It was only on 2 February 2021 that the Gamaleya Institute, which developed the vaccine, announced the results of its phase-III clinical trials which showed that the vaccine’s efficacy rate was more than 91%. The way the Russian leadership reports on Sputnik V’s production and rollout is chaotic and the published data is incompatible and non-transparent. Only rough information has been shared regarding the number of vaccinations performed thus far: the Ministry of Health has failed to provide precise figures and, according to estimates by the Gamaleya Institute, the immunisation campaign has so far covered 1.5–2 million citizens. However, these figures are inconsistent with the data reported by the individual regions
Enterprise Models and the EU agenda. CEPS Policy Contribution 28 Jan 2021.
Get PDFThe EU is leading the world with its roadmap for companies – the Sustainable Industry as part of the Green Deal, the EU Climate Target plan for 2030 and the New EU Industrial Strategy. At the same time, in pursuit of these crucial objectives, the Union is heavily dependent on the contribution of the private sector.
The question is whether companies are equipped to follow this path and take on the associated responsibilities. Hurdles that so far received little attention now present themselves in the realm of governance and management, organisation structure and culture as the major determinants of corporate behaviour.
This paper argues that the dominant enterprise models, the shareholder model and the stakeholder model, both serve as barriers to the shift from growth-oriented to sustainable, resilience-oriented capitalism. It stresses the need for alternative models and sketches the contours of a new competitive enterprise model that is firmly rooted in values continental Europeans share. It will be called the EU Model. Finally, it proposes an EU agenda for a level playing field, because competition between models should be encouraged.
The day has come for politicians and policymakers to no longer limit themselves to rubberstamping corporate governance codes. They must actively engage in discussions about how the private sector organises itself. Bravery will be rewarded
Russia 2021: Consolidation of a dictatorship. OSW Commentary Number 419 8.12.2021.
Get PDFThe dynamics of the domestic political situation in Russia in 2021 was determined by the authorities' crackdown on Alexei Navalny – the most important opposition figure – as well as on his associates and supporters. The aim was to destroy the nucleus of a nascent political alternative to the regime in view of the parliamentary election in September 2021 and, above all, the presidential election scheduled for 2024.
The September vote revealed the limits of public support for the Kremlin and the considerable scale of the protest vote against those in power. Despite the unprecedented wave of repression and the lack of real competition in the parliamentary election, it was necessary to commit wholesale fraud to achieve the desired official results. The communist party (CPRF) became the main beneficiary of the protest vote, although it is doubtful whether the communists can become a real opposition force.
Post-election polls have revealed a deepening of many trends in public opinion, which are unfavourable to the government – including a further decline in trust in the authorities, growing fatigue with Vladimir Putin's rule, and an increase in social demands. The likely response to it will be an escalation of the regime's repressive course in the coming years. The obsession with control over citizens and the stifling of dissent will above all bring further waves of political emigration
Sputnik over Europe. OSW Commentary Number 387 2.04.2021.
Get PDFSince Sputnik V was registered in Russia in August 2020, a major global promotional campaign for the vaccine has been under way with the involvement of the state authorities, led by President Vladimir Putin. Recent weeks have seen the intensification of such a campaign in the European Union, which has been backed up by disinformation activities targeting Western vaccines. However, Sputnik V production levels have been low so far, and they do not meet the needs of either Russia or the countries that have signed up for it. Russian announcements that its production would soon begin outside the country, including in Europe, have also failed to come true. Available information shows that about a third of all Sputnik V doses delivered to the market are exported. However, an analysis of the contracts signed and the volume of deliveries made places Russia at the bottom of the global list of producers and suppliers. Like other manufacturers, it has to keep choosing who to send vaccines to first (and in what quantities). In effect, Europe and Latin America have been the priority destinations for shipments abroad, although even those contracts are not being fulfilled on time. Bulk quantities of Sputnik V are unlikely to arrive in Europe before autumn 2021