R-Cube Ritsumeikan Research Repository

君島, 東彦

Japanese

ガルトゥング、リアドンから学んだこと

BOVA, Elio

Italian

Nakajima Atsushi, La donna della casa degli oleandri （Kyōchikuto no ie no onna, 1942）

SATOH, Haruko

（ 391 ）37
Article
Japan and South Korea: Stronger Together
SATOH, Haruko
Missing link: Japan-South Korea partnership
 Amidst anxiety over the diminishing appeal of US (or Western) leadership in global af-
fairs, there is a growing web of minilateral frameworks in the Indo-Pacific, where a small 
group of countries share strategic interests, if not necessarily values, to cooperate on a range 
traditional and non-traditional security issues. The QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 
between Australia, India, Japan, and the US) and AUKUS (Australia, UK, US security 
partnership) and the concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) represent minilater-
als that revolve around the US, driven by the country’s on-going efforts to maintain the 
regional status quo since the early 2000s1.
 Missing, however, from these earlier choices of partners is South Korea, a democratic 
economic power in Asia and a close US ally that would be a natural fit to any of these 
groupings. Or, to put differently, these minilaterals are built upon existing bilateral relation-
ships that share some strategic vision and value among them, and Japan-South Korea 
relationship is undoubtedly one of them. But Japan and South Korea are better known for 
their intensive spats over history than for showing potential as partners. Even though their 
development assistance policies show remarkable similarities and potential for synergy, 
there has been little incentive to cooperate thus far.
 But Japan-South Korea partnership has intrinsic strategic value for the stability of the 
Indo-Pacific region and beyond. First, Japan and South Korea are resourceful middle- or 
second tier powers, each with considerable economic and cultural influence internationally. 
As such, they can pursue “niche diplomacy” in an increasingly complex geopolitical and 
economic landscape that cannot (and should not) be understood through the lens of global 
US-China rivalry alone. Not only that, but Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and 
South Korea’s New Southern policy (under the previous president) have overlapping stra-
tegic national interests and similar vision for the Indo-Pacific region to build resilient 
societies to complex threats.
 Second, Japan and South Korea have both cultivated harmonious and mutually beneficial 
1. Sarah Teo. “The rise and endurance of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific”, The Interpretor, 1 May 2024. 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rise-endurance-minilaterals-indo-pacific.
（ 392 ）38
立命館国際研究　37-3，February 2025
relations with Southeast Asian countries through development cooperation, while also trad-
ing and maintaining cordial relations with China at the same time, regardless of souring 
US-China relations. For both Japan and South Korea, China and the US have been their 
top trading partners, with a high degree of economic interdependence from food supplies 
to manufacturing. Diversification of supply chains and manufacturing away from China is 
a growing trend, but Japan and South Korea prefer “de-escalating” like the European Union, 
however confrontational the US position and rhetoric against China may be. That the first 
Japan-South Korea-US summit (not policy talks) only occurred in 2023 at Camp David, 
while the first China-Japan-South Korea trilateral summit was held back in 2008 is testi-
mony to the fact that separate dynamics and calculations are at work when it comes to 
relations among the Northeast Asian countries and US engagement with these them.
 Japan’s and South Korea’s positionings in the geopolitics of East Asia (Northeast and 
Southeast Asia) should be diplomatic assets for America’s Asia policy, making them attrac-
tive as critical partners to the US in engaging with the region. China’s increasingly bold 
and assertive behaviour toward Taiwan and the Philippines (in the South China Sea) is no 
doubt destabilising, and recent moves for greater trilateral security cooperation between 
Japan, South Korea and the US is a sign that there is a shared threat perception toward 
China (and North Korea) among the three. However, the military security imperative alone 
should not be the driver of bringing Japan and South Korea to cooperate more; rather, the 
two need to (and can) build a sense of partnership, inclusivity and cohesion among other 
Asian states at the time when great powers act in divisive ways, de facto forcing Asian 
states to choose side between the US or China. It is in the interest of the US to have Japan 
and South Korea to work closer to maintain the US-led liberal international order, as 
America’s two main Asian allies. But it is also for the interest of the Indo-Pacific region for 
Japan and South Korea to share a cooperative mindset to be reliable middle, democratic 
and Asian powers in the region that see their partnership as mutually beneficial to all 
stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region.
Japan and South Korea as indispensable middle powers
 In the grand landscape of great power competition between the US, China, Russia and 
possibly India, the second-tier, middle powers, such as Japan, South Korea or the European 
Union (EU) states, may seem like pawns at the receiving end of whatever the big players 
decide to do. A middle power does not on its own have the power to compel another country 
to act one way or the other; the situation is much like how Koreans often describe their 
country’s geopolitical predicament as the shrimp among whales.
 The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have reminded us that military force is once again central 
to international affairs, triggering calls among these middle powers to increase defence 
spending and build more military muscle. The language and reality of power politics can 
overwhelm the need for middle powers as keen supporters of rule-based multilateralism 
and spirit of international cooperation.
 However, the importance in Japan-South Korean partnership is not just in these conven-
tional areas of international security but in areas of non-traditional security. There is a 
（ 393 ）39
Japan and South Korea: Stronger Together（SATOH）
realm of functional international cooperation that is one step removed from competition 
between the US and China or the presently dysfunctional UN Security Council where Japan 
and South Korea could play a useful role. So how can the potential that Japan-South Korea 
partnership holds be unlocked?
 First, there needs to be political will on both sides to work together. The sharp downturn 
of Japan-South Korea relations in the recent decade under the two leaders, Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzo and Korean President Moon Jae-in has not helped. It has arguably 
impeded efforts for the two countries to cultivate a sense of solidarity as US allies at a time 
when the US was turning to meet the challenges of a more confident and assertive China. 
This may partially explain why the QUAD began as it did, with four countries and not 
“quin” with five countries.
 Identifying areas of cooperation and coordination, instead, is perhaps easier to do at the 
working level, especially in development cooperation in Southeast Asia as mentioned earlier. 
Here, the two countries’ development agencies, JICA and KOICA run between them over 
400 projects (as of 2022) of varying sizes in ASEAN countries. Many small to middle size 
projects besides large-scale infrastructure work are in non-traditional security areas, such 
as capacity building, peacebuilding, disaster risk management, education and public health. 
Despite considerable potential for cooperation and coordination, however, there has been 
little to no efforts to join forces, even though Southeast Asians whisper that this would not 
be a bad idea.2 Enhanced Japan-South Korea policy dialogue on Southeast Asia (and more 
broadly the Indo-Pacific) on non-traditional security issues and economic cooperation would 
coalesce also with ASEAN’s traditional stance to avoid entanglement in great power 
rivalry.
 As pointed out elsewhere, the difference in size of Japan’s and South Korea’s population 
and economy is also compelling reason for the two to cooperate more. Japan’s population 
is currently 125 million; South Korea’s 51.6 million, and both are ageing and declining; 
Japan’s GDP is US$4.23 trillion and South Korea’s US$1.72 trillion, combined not even 
half of China’s GDP at US$14.7 trillion. Working together toward creating markets and 
industrial base in addition to securing supply chains that are resilient to Chinese economic 
coercion makes sense.
Overcoming history
Japan and South Korea are not considered natural partners for the history they share as 
the former coloniser and the colonised. In Northeast Asia, pre-war Imperial Japan’s actions 
cast a long shadow and memory politics affects Japan’s relations with China, South Korea, 
and North Korea. Fundamental issues that constitute post-war Japan’s “history problem”, 
such as the prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the allegations of textbook 
2. The data was collected in 2022 as part of the international collaboration project, “Peace and Human 
Security in Asia: Toward a Meaningful Japan-Korea Partnership” run by the Osaka School of 
International Public Policy, Osaka University, a project supported by the Korea Foundation from 
2021-2023. The analysis and data will be published at the end of the project in 2024.
（ 394 ）40
立命館国際研究　37-3，February 2025
whitewashing and, in the context of the two Koreas, the issues of compensation for forced 
labour and “comfort women”, have not been resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned 
parties. As a result, Japan’s “history problem” has often been a diplomatic stumbling block. 
For the low level of mutual trust, efforts to enhance a regional political setting conducive 
to cooperation have been prone in the past to scepticism and resistance to Japan assuming 
a more active, leadership role.
 Japan-Korea relationship is saddled with this burden of overcoming the past, and it has 
often seemed unthinkable of improving relations without bringing closure to the colonial 
past. However, the view that this is a sequential process, in that Japan and South Korea 
first need to reconcile over the past to move to the next phase of becoming meaningful 
partners risks narrowing the scope of policy (including security) options for both countries. 
Not only is there a pressing need to pursue the latter for regional stability, the option of 
working together on common regional issues that are to each other’s strengths, such as 
development assistance and peace-building, that could have the spillover effect in bringing 
about the former is overlooked.
 Thus far, the bilateral relationship may seem to be operating at the periphery of each 
country’s relations with the US and China. Moreover, substantive interaction between the 
two countries only began after the groundbreaking 1998 Japan-ROK joint declaration be-
tween Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo and President Kim Dae-jung, “New Japan-Republic of 
Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century”.3 The path since then has not been 
smooth, either, as the twenty-first century for Japan’s foreign relations started on the wrong 
footing, with Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro’s annual visits to Yasukuni over five years 
in 2001-2006 caused international diplomatic outrage. It stoked strong anti-Japan senti-
ment in China and South Korea in particular.  South Korean parliament passed a resolution 
to nullify the 1998 declaration, in protest against Koizumi’s first visit in 2001. This Yasukuni 
controversy has left its mark, symbolising as ever the perception that Japan is unrepentant 
of its past. Little, however, is reported internationally that this caused the Japanese to also 
question the wisdom of Yasukuni visits by prime ministers for the high diplomatic price.
 As mentioned earlier, during Abe Shinzo’s second tenure as Japanese prime minister 
(2012-2020), Japan’s relations with South Korea were arguably the darkest since the two 
countries normalised relations in 1965. The two Korea presidencies of Park Gyun-hye (2013-
2017) and Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) took opposite policies toward Japan with regard to the 
past: Park chose the pragmatic step to resolve the “comfort women” issue, where as Moon, 
in succeeding Park, made the past the cornerstone of his attack toward Japan. By appealing 
to Korea’s deeply rooted dissatisfaction with Japan’s dealings with its colonial past, Moon 
made prospects for enhancing Japan-South Korea cooperation at a time when US President 
Donald Trump’s unconventional approach to US global policies was undermining, if not 
destabilising, relations with America’s traditional allies in Asia as well as in Europe.
 It is important to remember that Abe himself held revisionist views of history and in his 
3. This paved the way for Japan and South Korea to co-host the 2022 World Cup football. Also of note 
is that it was Kim who opened South Korea to Japanese cultural imports, such as music, anime, 
manga, and movies, which were banned until then.
（ 395 ）41
Japan and South Korea: Stronger Together（SATOH）
first term (2006-7) denied Imperial Army’s part in operating war time brothels, making him 
culpable in prolonging, if not causing, Korean mistrust of Japan. 2019 was particularly a 
poor year as by then President Moon’s use of the history card was deemed excessive, and 
Abe took surprisingly harsh measures against South Korea as a warning, first by restricting 
semiconductor production materials to South Korea, and then removing the country from 
the “whitelist” of Japan’s preferred trading partners. Moon then responded by threatening 
to cancel GSOMIA (General Security and Military Information Agreement that was signed 
in 2016 and was due for extension in November 2019) between Japan and South Korea. 
The US ostensibly intervened at the last minute to prevent this fall out from going too far, 
fearing negative repercussions on regional security.
 Fast forwarding to the present day, South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol has changed 
course since he assumed office in 2022, choosing to push for closer ties with Japan and 
strengthening the alliance with the US. With Joe Biden as the US president and the ideo-
logically moderate Kishida Fumio as Japanese prime minister, this combination of leaders 
allowed Japan and South Korea to turn the page from of the bilateral relationship of dis-
agreement and mistrust. However, the history problem has not been resolved; it simmers 
in the back burners and could flare up again with the next Korea president or Japanese 
prime minister.
Most important bilateral relationship…?
As the main economic and geopolitical theatre of US-China rivalry, the Indo-Pacific visibly 
showcases what Timothy Garton Ash et al described as “à la carte world”, which is “a com-
plex geopolitical landscape in which people in great and middle powers around the world 
do not want to accept only one fixed set of partnerships” as in during the Cold War (2023).4 
The binary of “us versus them” has little use in navigating an environment of intensifying 
US-China competition. Japan and South Korea are two US allies that are consistently 
navigating a difficult path as Asian middle powers.
Nevertheless, even in this “à la carte world” where neither the US nor “democracy” is not 
necessarily the glue that binds, there is a certain draw to keeping the liberal international 
order attractive and functional. The appeal for the liberal order exists, if only because po-
litical freedoms now matter to a greater number of people in the region and around the 
world with the rise of authoritarianism. But at the same time, tenets of the liberal inter-
national order are being contested. They are no longer the monopoly of the US-led West 
that constructed the institutions and promoted their values and norms since 1940s (or as 
Mearsheimer argues, after the Cold War) to manage. Post-colonial, de-colonial challenges 
from the countries of the “global south”, great power shifts, and a general sense of frustra-
tion with the United Nations system (especially since the covid 19 pandemic) combined are 
4. Timothy Garton Ash, Iwan Kratsev, Mark Leonard. “Living in an à la carte world: What European 
policymakers should learn from global public opinion”, European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy 
Brief, 23 November 2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/living-in-an-a-la-carte-world-what-european- 
policymakers-should-learn-from-global-public-opinion/
（ 396 ）42
立命館国際研究　37-3，February 2025
putting great strains on the legitimacy of existing multilateral institutions.
While recent minilaterals may be filling some of the functional gaps, so far, the US led at-
tempts do not seem to be working as they should. The US is being seen as ignoring the 
small shifts, cracks and nuanced differences in the Indo-Pacific, with the QUAD and AUKUS 
being prime examples of cultural and historical insensitivity. QUAD was revamped in 2017 
to mixed reception. China predictably reacted sharply, accusing it as a blatant attempt to 
contain its rise. However, it was also viewed with suspicion and caution by South Korea 
and ASEAN, the region’s oldest multilateral organisation, for ignoring the voices of the 
smaller states. In a recent QUAD plus think tank meeting I heard numerous younger 
Southeast Asians regard QUAD as an American-led ploy that divides rather than unite 
East Asia. As disheartening as it was to hear this, the reality is that American leadership 
is losing its appeal. Had the QUAD started as QUIN with South Korea, whatever the state 
of Japan-South Korea relation may have been back then, perhaps it may have evolved into 
a more substantive forum by now.
In the 1980s, at the height of the Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, 
then US Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield famously described the Japan-US relations 
as “the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.” I would argue that 
the Japan-Korea relationship is today as important as Japan-US relations was during the 
Cold War. For, a robust bilateral relationship that combines the strengths of two major 
Asian powers is a historically first in modern times, and strategically valuable, if not in-
dispensable, to the regional order at a time of great fluidity and uncertainty. Working toward 
developing such a relationship would be an historical “peacebuilding” project in itself and 
a step for the region to move beyond the post-1945 San Francisco system.


English

Japan and South Korea: Stronger Together

Bergmann, Annegret

Art on Stage : Shift in Kabuki Costumes from Craft to Art

安宅, 望

ATAKA, Nozomu

『南都記雅眤』について : 現存6 種の書誌と名所記としての位置づけ

村尾, るみこ

Murao, Rumiko

北西インド農村における調査報告

加藤, 雅俊

kato, Masatoshi

1「市民社会の変遷に関する現代史的考察」研究会の成果報告
巻頭言
〈特集〉
「市民社会の変遷に関する現代史的考察」研究会の成果報告
Special Issue：
Foreword to “the Study on the Transformation of Civil Society”
本特集号は、「市民社会の変遷に関する現代史的考察」研究会の成果の一
部を取りまとめたものである。本研究会は、立命館大学人文科学研究所・重
点プロジェクト「グローバル化と地域の多様性（diversity）」のなかの、「政
治・経済グループ」の活動から生まれたものであり、若手研究者の研究能力
の向上を主要な目的に活動している。若手研究者にとって、自らの専門領域
において研究を深め、成果を発信していくことがまず重要であり、研究上の
視野を広げることは後手となりがちである。本研究会は、キャリアを積んだ
研究者に加え、専門領域が異なる若手研究者が集まり、社会諸科学の古典や
注目すべき最新の研究書を読む機会を設けたり、それぞれの研究について報
告を行い、意見交換を行う機会を設けるなど、世代や分野を越えた研究交流
を行い、自らの専門的な研究に対して多角的なフィードバックを得ることに
加え、研究者としての視野を広げていくことを目指している。また、本研究
会は、若手研究者がワークショップや研究会を企画・運営することを通じて、
自らの研究ネットワークを構築・拡張していくことの支援も行っている。本
特集号はこの学際的・世代横断的な研究会の成果であり、多岐にわたる成果
が収められている。
本特集号の冒頭にある「シンポジウム『にんげんをかえせ』上映会及びシ
ンポジウム―10フィート運動と戦争体験の「継承」を考える―」は、2023
年 3月 26日に、立命館大学人文科学研究所の主催で開催されたシンポジウ
ムの成果である。本シンポジウムは、コーディネート役を務めた鈴木による
2 立命館大学人文科学研究所紀要（143号）
序言で紹介されているように、原爆被害をはじめとした、戦争被害を記録し
た諸資料を後世に残そうとする社会運動「10フィート運動」の社会的・学術
的意義と残された課題を、多角的に検討するものである。大月による論考は、
「沖縄戦に関する映像資料を市民自らが買い取ることを通じて、戦争の記憶・
記録を後世に継承していく」という沖縄戦 1フィート運動に関するものであ
り、この運動の特徴や経緯・背景などがコンパクトに紹介されている。花田
による論考は、映画評論家である岩崎昶が第二次世界大戦後の中華人民共和
国の核武装を肯定的に評価した背景・文脈を検討するものであり、岩崎論へ
の新たな視座をもたらすだけでなく、10フィート運動の背景・文脈を照射す
るものと言える。若手研究者が中心となって開催された本シンポジウムが、
「戦争の記憶の継承」研究に新たな一面を加えるだけでなく、多世代にわた
る研究者だけでなく、市井の人びととも含めた知的交流の基盤を構築する
きっかけとなることを期待したい。
つづく、小森論文は、H・アーレント『革命について』および『革命論』
の「社会問題」の章におけるロビスピエール分析を丁寧に読み解くことに
よって、「アーレントが、貧困といった社会問題を十分に考慮してこなかっ
た／もしくは、政治問題を重視し社会問題を軽視してきた」という通説的理
解が不適切であることを示し、新たなアーレント論（とくに、アーレントの
「社会問題」と「政治問題」の関係に関する新たな理解）の端緒を提示する
ものである。下村論文は、M・フリードマンに注目し、彼が「ネオリベラリ
ズム」という用語を使用しなくなった理由として、冷戦構造が激化するなか
で、スコットランド啓蒙思想に知的源泉をもつリベラリズムとの「差異化」
ではなく「継承」が重要となったという社会的背景や学術的文脈があったこ
とを明らかにするものであり、知識の歴史社会学的分析の重要性を示すもの
である。加藤論文は、比較福祉国家研究において近年注目を集めている「家
族主義／家族主義レジーム」という分析概念の有効性を、オーストラリアに
おける福祉国家の発展過程を事例として検討するものであり、福祉国家の
3「市民社会の変遷に関する現代史的考察」研究会の成果報告
（部分的な）特徴を捉える上で両概念が一定の意義を有する一方で、福祉国
家の全体像を捉える上では課題が残ることを指摘する。
そして、下村による書評は、2024年 3月 16日に、立命館大学人文科学研
究所の主催で開催された書評会の成果であり、新進気鋭の歴史社会学者であ
る林凌の新著『＜消費者＞の誕生』を批判的に検討するものであり、本書の
学術的意義と今後の研究課題をコンパクトにまとめている。藤本による書評
は、新自由主義に注目した現代社会分析として重要であるものの難解な著作
として有名なW・ブラウン『新自由主義の廃墟で』に関して、本書の目的に
即してその要点と学術的意義を丁寧に整理するものである。加藤による書評
は、A・ギャンブルによる小著『福祉国家は生き残ることはできるか』の概
要を紹介し、その意義と課題を検討することを通じて、今後の福祉国家論が
向かうべき方向性を考察するものである。
本特集号は、若手研究者の研究能力の向上を目的に、世代や領域を越えて
多様な研究者が集まり、真 に学び合うことを通じて、自身の研究を高めて
いく研究会の成果である。今後も、立命館大学人文科学研究所の研究活動と
して、本研究会を、学際的・世代横断的な研究交流の場として発展させてい
きたいと考えている。本研究会の活動に興味関心をお持ちいただいた方は、
様々な学術企画を開催している（立命館大学人文科学研究所のホームページ
で発信している）ので、ぜひお気軽にご参加いただきたい。なお、諸事情に
より、本特集号に掲載できなかった研究成果もたくさんある。これらについ
ても、この先の『立命館大学人文科学研究所紀要』で発信していきたいと考
えている。
以上
立命館大学産業社会学部教授
加藤　雅俊



特集： 「市民社会の変遷に関する現代史的考察」研究会の成果報告　巻頭言

安藤, 拓生

Ando, Takuo

ホンダのEV 戦略と着脱式バッテリーから見るトランジションデザイン

海道, 清信

Kaido, Kiyonobu

郊外居住地の変容と生活圏モビリティの需給構造 : 岐阜県可児市のケーススタディ

三好, 元樹

大阪府粟生間谷遺跡の石材利用

Ritsumeikan University

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