Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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Empedocles and the Other Physiologists in Aristotle’s Physics II 8
Full text linkIn this paper I propose to show: 1) that in Phys. II 8 Aristotle takes Empedocles as a paradigm for a theoretical position common to all philosophers who preceded him: the view that materialism implies a mechanistic explanation of natural becoming; and 2) that, since Empedocles is regarded as a philosopher who clearly expresses the position of all mechanistic materialists, Aristotle builds his teleological arguments precisely to refute him. Indeed, Aristotle believes that refuting the arguments of Empedocles – the champion of mechanism – means refuting the mechanistic theory itself. In order to illustrate this point, I will discuss some passages from Phys. II 8, while also turning to consider the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle’s Physics. I will then endeavour to explain why in 198b19 ff. Aristotle formulates the argument of rain, which has attracted so much attention from scholars of the Physics: I will consider whether Aristotle believes that rain serves a purpose, contrary to what he claims with regard to meteorological phenomena in Meteorologica
Plato: Smp. 212e4-223a9. Alcibiades: An Eulogy of Which Socrates? That of Plato, That of Antisthenes and Xenophon or That of All Three?
No full textIn the Symposium, there are two revelations: one is that of the woman of Mantinea, the other that of Alcibiades. The former (201d 1–212e 3) proposes a Socrates reshaped by Plato, but what Socrates does the latter (216a 6–217a 3) express? Can the praise for Socrates contained in the latter also be considered a tribute by Plato to his teacher? The opinions are divided. I looked at two scholars: Michel Narcy (2008) and Bruno Centrone (20142), whose judgments, as they are set out and argued, are irreconcilable. The contrast may be determined by a certain ambiguity in Plato’s attitude towards Alcibiades. Part One – In order to clarify this ambiguity and to overcome the contrast between the two scholars I have tried to show how in the praise of Alcibiades there overlap different portraits of Socrates that refer to the tradition, to different experiences of various Socratics and of Plato himself in Apologia, and how this differs from the others and from himself by proposing a whole new portrait of Socrates as a representative of an Eros megas daimōn, revealed by the woman of Mantinea, in contrast to an Eros megas theos. Part Two – As instead regards the accusation of hybris, the hypothesis is this: for Plato his colleagues, and especially Antisthenes and Xenophon, offering an image of Socrates founded exclusively on his way of life and not also on the erotic aspects alluding to the super-sensible world, seem to end up arousing laughter and looking like “fools” (nēpioi), like Alcibiades, who at the end of his speech, after making the audience laugh, is unmasked by Socrates for his clumsy attempt to impart a “life lesson” to Agathon, which he did not need at all, paying at his own expenses for his ignorance of the revelation through arriving late at the party.In the Symposium, there are two revelations: one is that of the woman of Mantinea, the other that of Alcibiades. The former (201d 1–212e 3) proposes a Socrates reshaped by Plato, but what Socrates does the latter (216a 6–217a 3) express? Can the praise for Socrates contained in the latter also be considered a tribute by Plato to his teacher? The opinions are divided. I looked at two scholars: Michel Narcy (2008) and Bruno Centrone (20142 ), whose judgments, as they are set out and argued, are irreconcilable. The contrast may be determined by a certain ambiguity in Plato’s attitude towards Alcibiades. Part One – In order to clarify this ambiguity and to overcome the contrast between the two scholars I have tried to show how in the praise of Alcibiades there overlap different portraits of Socrates that refer to the tradition, to different experiences of various Socratics and of Plato himself in Apologia, and how this differs from the others and from himself by proposing a whole new portrait of Socrates as a representative of an Eros megas daimōn, revealed by the woman of Mantinea, in contrast to an Eros megas theos. Part Two – As instead regards the accusation of hybris, the hypothesis is this: for Plato his colleagues, and especially Antisthenes and Xenophon, offering an image of Socrates founded exclusively on his way of life and not also on the erotic aspects alluding to the supersensible world, seem to end up arousing laughter and looking like “fools” (nēpioi), like Alcibiades, who at the end of his speech, after making the audience laugh, is unmasked by Socrates for his clumsy attempt to impart a “life lesson” to Agathon, which he did not need at all, paying at his own expenses for his ignorance of the revelation through arriving late at the party
Structure and Relevance of the Aristotelian Critic toward the Eleatics (Ph. I 2–3)
No full textThe first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature
Aristotle’s Lost Symposium and On Drunkenness. The Content of The Extant Testimonies and Excerpts
No full textAncient catalogues of Aristotle’s writings (Diogenes Laertius, Hesychius) mention Symposium in one book, but this does not seem to be a dialogue analogical to that of Plato. Aristotle raised the sympotical and wine-drinking issues differently, as Plutarchus, Macrobius, Philo of Alexandria, Ps. Julian, and first and foremost, Atheaneus relate in their works. In his The Sophists at Dinner, Atheaneus quotes Aristotle’s title Συμπόσιον only once, while the title Περὶ μέθης is cited six times. Some scholars and editors of Aristotle’s fragments combine both titles as belonging to one writing (Laurenti, Zanatta), while others (Gigon, Breitenberger) separate them as their identity is not confirmed by the sources. Irrespective of whether it was a dialogue, just one or two related works, the few extant testimonies and citations from Aristotle provide an interesting source of information concerning the then customs and drinking effects in Greek culture, which, however, should not be directly associated with contemporary drunkenness and alcoholism. Aristotle’s approach to wine-drinking and feasting was in fact investigative, natural, medical, and analogical to the arguments presented in the third book of Problemata, where the matters On the drinking of wine and drunkenness are touched upon.Ancient catalogues of Aristotle’s writings (Diogenes Laertius, Hesychius) mention Symposium in one book, but this does not seem to be a dialogue analogical to that of Plato. Aristotle raised the sympotical and wine-drinking issues differently, as Plutarchus, Macrobius, Philo of Alexandria, Ps. Julian, and first and foremost, Atheaneus relate in their works. In his The Sophists at Dinner, Atheaneus quotes Aristotle’s title Συμπόσιον only once, while the title Περὶ μέθης is cited six times. Some scholars and editors of Aristotle’s fragments combine both titles as belonging to one writing (Laurenti, Zanatta), while others (Gigon, Breitenberger) separate them as their identity is not confirmed by the sources. Irrespective of whether it was a dialogue, just one or two related works, the few extant testimonies and citations from Aristotle provide an interesting source of information concerning the then customs and drinking effects in Greek culture, which, however, should not be directly associated with contemporary drunkenness and alcoholism. Aristotle’s approach to wine-drinking and feasting was in fact investigative, natural, medical, and analogical to the arguments presented in the third book of Problemata, where the matters On the drinking of wine and drunkenness are touched upon
On the Motivations of a Skeptic, and Her Practice
Full text linkThe aim of Pyrrhonism is deceptively simple: to achieve a state of ataraxia, of tranquility and relief from perturbation. But what is the extent of the ataraxia envisioned? Must the Skeptic admit a hard distinction between disturbances apparently related to belief and therefore subject to suspension of judgement, and extra-doxastic disturbances (e.g. everyday anxiety and frustration, or even hunger and fear) that are beyond the scope of the Skeptical method? In this paper I examine passages from Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism that indicate that such a distinction may not stand up to Skeptical scrutiny and that the Skeptical method does not only apply to “philosophical” speculative dogma or to “intellectual” perturbation, contra Barnes’s claim that the person who perceives the fewest anomalies may make “the perfect Pyrrhonist”. But I also, following Massie’s critique of unwarranted causal inferences regarding the relation between equipollence and ataraxia, distinguish cases where tarache (disturbance) presents itself as anomalous and thus lends itself to inquiry from cases where it presents itself with an apparent cause and does not provoke inquiry. Thus, though an apparently extra-doxastic disturbance may actually be rooted in unconsciously-held dogma, the Skeptic cannot demarcate a special class of potentially doxastic disturbances without employing a dogmatic psychology of her own. She must instead suspend judgment regarding the entire scope of her method, entertaining the possibility that any disturbance could be relieved through the Skeptical method. In the process, ataraxia is divested of definite parameters and the Skeptical method becomes effectively endless
Aristotle’s Book Delta of the Metaphysics. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΣΑΧΩΣ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΩΝ Η ΚΑΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΝ On Terms Which Are Said in Many Ways or by Virtue of Addition
No full textThis paper offers a new Polish translation of Aristotle’s Book Delta of hisMetaphysics. It takes into account its original title and subtitle that havebeen preserved in ancient catalogues. It is argued that the title and subtitledid not concerns any “ambiguity” of expressions as it is often mistakenlyassumed, but rather the many ways of predicating (πολλαχῶςλέγεται) of various terms. Nor is it a typical lexicon of philosophicalconcepts, but rather a methodical survey of certain expressions thatbegin with physical and categorical specifications to make the terminologicaldomain of the first philosophy more precise.This paper offers a new Polish translation of Aristotle’s Book Delta of his Metaphysics. It takes into account its original title and subtitle that have been preserved in ancient catalogues. It is argued that the title and subtitle did not concerns any “ambiguity” of expressions as it is often mistakenly assumed, but rather the many ways of predicating (πολλαχῶς λέγεται) of various terms. Nor is it a typical lexicon of philosophical concepts, but rather a methodical survey of certain expressions that begin with physical and categorical specifications to make the terminological domain of the first philosophy more precise
Multivocity in Topics 1.15
No full textThis paper discusses Aristotle’s account of multivocity (πολλαχῶς/ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται) as expounded in Topics 1.15. This article argues that an inquiry into how many ways (ποσαχῶς) something is said becomes for Aristotle a tool of dialectical examination that he employs throughout his entire philosophical career: investigating the many/multiple ways (πολλαχῶς/πλεοναχῶς) something is said allows one to recognize the ambiguity of the term in question and, consequently, to construct an adequate definition of its referent. The present study reconstructs the various strategies for detecting ambiguity and discusses its different types. Subsequently, the paper accounts for why Aristotle moves so easily from words and their meanings to things and their essences. Finally, the article presents an analysis of the connection between the many ways something is said and the various categories it is predicated in. The considerations are supported by a new translation of Topics 1.15.This paper discusses Aristotle’s account of multivocity (πολλαχῶς/ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται) as expounded in Topics 1.15. This article argues that an inquiry into how many ways (ποσαχῶς) something is said becomes for Aristotle a tool of dialectical examination that he employs throughout his entire philosophical career: investigating the many/multiple ways (πολλαχῶς/πλεοναχῶς) something is said allows one to recognize the ambiguity of the term in question and, consequently, to construct an adequate definition of its referent. The present study reconstructs the various strategies for detecting ambiguity and discusses its different types. Subsequently, the paper accounts for why Aristotle moves so easily from words and their meanings to things and their essences. Finally, the article presents an analysis of the connection between the many ways something is said and the various categories it is predicated in. The considerations are supported by a new translation of Topics 1.15
The Aesthetics of Violence in the Case of Gaius Martius Coriolanus
Full text linkIn the story of Coriolanus, as depicted mainly by Plutarch and Shakespeare, we become aware of the norms and parameters of the nobility, the sincerity and the legitimacy of violence, both in diction and action, both political and personal, both as a rhetorical strategy and as a way of living. These attributes indicate a firm culture of violence and a definite system of values, which, within the span of Roman antiquity and history, comprises an early idea of chivalry and which aims at gloria
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics: Their Common Field of Inquiry and Their Common Reader
No full textThe aim of the article is to indicate that there is quite strong support in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics for the argument that its inquiry is “political” rather than “ethical” in character – the textual evidence provides reasons to challenge the traditional belief that Aristotle separated ethics from politics and started the rise of ethics as a new branch of philosophy. In addition, one can posit a hypothesis (and this has already been done) that the reader, whom Aristotle had in mind while writing what we now know as the Ethics, was a politician-lawgiver (and not just any educated Greek or – which is even less probable – any human being). So the reader aimed at in the Ethics is the same as the reader aimed at in the Politics – a politician-lawgiver. The Ethics and the Politics are a two-part but inseparable compound that together make a textbook for a politician-lawgiver. Both parts should be read together because the one cannot be understood correctly (i.e. as closely as possible to the intentions of their author) without the other. Aristotle studies human good not from the point of view of the individual but from the point of view of the human community. The highest human good – the philosopher’s eudaimonia – is achieved not by individual effort (or not fundamentally by that) but as a result of good laws and a well-organized life in a polis.The aim of the article is to indicate that there is quite strong support in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics for the argument that its inquiry is “political” rather than “ethical” in character – the textual evidence provides reasons to challenge the traditional belief that Aristotle separated ethics from politics and started the rise of ethics as a new branch of philosophy. In addition, one can posit a hypothesis (and this has already been done) that the reader, whom Aristotle had in mind while writing what we now know as the Ethics, was a politician-lawgiver (and not just any educated Greek or – which is even less probable – any human being). So the reader aimed at in the Ethics is the same as the reader aimed at in the Politics – a politician-lawgiver. The Ethics and the Politics are a two-part but inseparable compound that together make a textbook for a politician-lawgiver. Both parts should be read together because the one cannot be understood correctly (i.e. as closely as possible to the intentions of their author) without the other. Aristotle studies human good not from the point of view of the individual but from the point of view of the human community. The highest human good – the philosopher’s eudaimonia – is achieved not by individual effort (or not fundamentally by that) but as a result of good laws and a well-organized life in a polis