Norges Banks vitenarkiv
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What Kind of Payments Settle in a Real Time Gross Settlement System?
Get PDFCentral bank settlement systems are vital for payment intermediation and have an important role in monetary policy and financial stability. Few analyses exist that explain the purpose behind the payments that are settled in these systems. In this paper we categorise payments that settle in Norges Bank's settlement system (NBO) based on their economic purpose. Interbank lending, FX trades, and payments by households and companies were the major contributors to turnover based on value and accounted for 22, 21, and 9 percent of the turnover in NBO respectively.publishedVersio
Navigating Normalisation
Get PDFGovernor Øystein Olsen gives a speech at the Bank of Thailand – OMFIF High-level Seminar in Bangkok
Hvordan virker renten?
Get PDFForedrag av sentralbanksjef Øystein Olsen på et seminar i regi av Senter for monetær økonomi (CME)/Handelshøyskolen BI, 25. september 2018
Boligbygging og husholdningsvekst
Get PDFDe siste 10-15 årene har befolkningsveksten i Norge vært sterk, mens boligbyggingen har vært nokså lav. Samtidig bor folk i stadig mindre husholdninger. Økningen i antall husholdninger har vært høyere enn økningen i antall nye boliger, særlig i sentrale områder. Dette byggeunderskuddet har bidratt til den sterke boligprisveksten i denne perioden. Siden slutten av 2015 har befolkningsveksten avtatt og boligbyggingen økt. Det har bidratt til å redusere byggeunderskuddet.publishedVersio
Criteria for “good” justifications
Get PDFMany institutions in a democratic society wield important power by virtue of the decisions they make. These decisions may concern individuals or have a more general impact on society. It goes without saying today that this exercise of power must be accounted for. A supreme court’s reasoning is given in its judgements. A central bank’s reasoning is given in the decision-making body’s minutes. In this paper, we develop criteria for what constitute good written justifications for a decision, not what makes a good decision per se. We look at the two institutions we know best: supreme courts and central banks. Of course, these are not the only institutions that exercise power on behalf of the state, and we also ask whether our criteria could be applied more generally. We assess a selection of supreme court judgements and monetary policy decisions in various countries qualitatively against our criteria, and find that practice largely conforms to the criteria. There are some common features between supreme courts and central banks. In recent years there has been a development in the way the judgments are written in the UK Supreme Court. Earlier, each judge wrote his votum. Now they are writing a common text. With individual writing, there were many different formulations of the normative text. It is easier for the public to relate to one legislative text. The UK Supreme Court, under the presidency of Lord Neuberger, has therefore gradually moved towards writing a joint text. John Roberts, the US Chief Justice, thought that judges should be worried when they are writing separately about the effect on the court as an institution. What about the minutes of the central banks? Professor Alan Blinder at Princeton argues that a central bank that speaks with a cacophony of voices has no voice at all. Professor Otmar Issing, the former Chief Economist and Member of the Board of the ECB, believes that there is a danger that individual minutes provide an incentive for individual members to put themselves ahead of the institution We also test empirically whether the institutions’ decisions and the justifications for these decisions are communicated in clear language. Our analysis is inspired by Bank of England chief economist Andrew Haldane’s speech “A little more conversation, a little less action”, and by the report “Bankspeak: The Language of World Bank Reports 1946-2012” by Franco Moretti and Dominique Pestre at Stanford Literary Lab. We analyse more than 6,000 central bank and supreme court decisions from the past decade and find considerable differences in length and readability across countries and institutions. The grand chamber decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are by far the longest, while the European Court of Justice employs the most complex language. The Danish central bank keeps things briefest and uses the clearest language, but also has the simplest regime to explain. The Swedish central bank’s minutes stand out as both long and complex, while the Norwegian central bank is unusually concise. Moretti and Pestre analysed the text of all World Bank reports and found quantitative indications that the language of the reports had moved in the wrong direction in terms of readability. We perform the same tests on central banks and supreme courts and find that these institutions’ language has not moved in the same negative direction. Former Bank of England governor Mervyn King argued that the design of an institution “must reflect history and experience”, and there is no doubt that each institution’s way of writing is influenced by its own history. This is what economists refer to as “path dependence”. We wonder, however, whether there is rather too much path dependence in many cases, and whether the institutions in question might benefit from looking at trends and learning from other institutions both at home and abroad. In our work on this paper, we have been particularly wary of phrases along the lines of “based on a general assessment”. Alarm bells sound whenever we see them, especially with any frequency, as they are liable to conceal rather than illuminate the true rationale.publishedVersio
Pengepolitisk rapport med vurdering av finansiell stabilitet 3/18
Get PDFRapporten blir lagt frem fire ganger i året, i mars, juni, september og desember. Rapporten vurderer utsiktene for renten og danner grunnlaget for Norges Banks råd om nivået på den motsykliske kapitalbufferen. Rapporten inneholder anslag for utviklingen i norsk og internasjonal økonomi. På møtet 12. september 2018 drøftet hovedstyret de økonomiske utsiktene, hovedlinjene i pengepolitikken og behovet for en motsyklisk kapitalbuffer i bankene. På grunnlag av denne drøftingen og en tilråding fra bankens ledelse fattet hovedstyret i møtet 19. september 2018 vedtak om styringsrenten. Hovedstyret vedtok også Norges Banks råd til Finansdepartementet om nivået på den motsykliske kapitalbufferen. Hovedstyrets vurdering av de økonomiske utsiktene og pengepolitikken er gjengitt i avsnittet «Hovedstyrets vurdering». Rådet om nivået på den motsykliske kapitalbufferen sendes Finansdepartementet i forbindelse med publisering av rapporten. Rådet offentliggjøres når Finansdepartementet har fattet sin beslutning
Norges Bank : Annual Report 2017
No full textThe Annual Report for Norges Bank Central Banking Operations (NBCBO) is not available in English. For more detailed information on central banking operations in 2017, please see Norges Bank's reports. Annual reporting for the Government Pension Fund Global is available on the fund's website.publishedVersio
Norges Banks oppgjørssystem : Årsrapport 2017
No full textFormålet med Norges Banks oppgjørssystem (NBO) er å gjennomføre sikre og effektive oppgjør av betalinger mellom banker som har konto i Norges Bank. Årsrapporten omhandler hovedaktiviteter og tiltak for å ivareta formålet.publishedVersio
Monetary Policy Report with Financial Stability Assessment 4/18
Get PDFThe Report is published four times a year, in March, June, September and December. The Report assesses the interest rate outlook and forms the basis for Norges Bank’s advice on the level of the countercyclical capital buffer. The Report includes projections of developments in the Norwegian and global economy. At its meeting on 5 December 2018, the Executive Board discussed the economic outlook, the monetary policy stance and the need for a countercyclical capital buffer for banks. On the basis of that discussion and the advice of Norges Bank’s executive management, the Executive Board made its decision on the policy rate at its meeting on 12 December 2018. The Executive Board also approved Norges Bank’s advice to the Ministry of Finance on the level of the countercyclical capital buffer. The Executive Board’s assessment of the economic outlook and monetary policy strategy is provided in ”Executive Board’s assessment”. The advice on the level of the countercyclical capital buffer is submitted to the Ministry of Finance in connection with the publication of the Report. The advice is made public when the Ministry of Finance has made its decision
Virkninger av pengemarkedspåslag på kronekursen
Get PDFFlere studier viser at endringer i rentedifferansen mot utlandet påvirker kronekursen. Det er vanlig å måle rentedifferansen mot utlandet med forskjellen i pengemarkedsrenter på tvers av land. Pengemarkedsrenter kan dekomponeres i forventede styringsrenter og pengemarkedspåslag. Jeg undersøker om endringer i pengemarkedspåslag påvirker kronekursen like mye som endringer i forventede styringsrenter. Undersøkelsen viser at endringer i pengemarkedspåslag har betydelige effekter på kronekursen. Effektene av påslagene er imidlertid rundt halvparten så store som effektene av endringer i forventede styringsrenter. Dette kan skyldes at endringer i differansen mellom forventede styringsrenter er mer varige enn endringer i påslagsdifferansen. Resultatene er basert på empiriske modeller for kronekursen i forhold til amerikanske dollar, euro, britiske pund og et vektet gjennomsnitt av importlandenes valutaer