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The Legal Boundaries of (Digital) Information or Psychological Operations Under International Humanitarian Law
Get PDF“Information operations” or “psychological operations” have long been part of armed conflicts. Among Western militaries, they are commonly understood as the employment of communication or other means to influence the views, attitudes, or behavior of adversaries or civilian populations to achieve political and military objectives. Chinese military strategy describes “psychological offense and defense” as “a combat action that uses specific information and media to influence the psychology and behavior of the target object through rational propaganda, deterrence and emotional guidance based on strategic intentions and combat missions.” Likewise, Russian military doctrine elaborates on concepts such as “psychological warfare” and on “war against mentality.” Non-State armed groups conduct such operations, too. With the rapid growth of information and communication technology over the past decade, the scale, speed, and reach of information or psychological operations have increased significantly, raising concerns about their possible humanitarian impact. While international humanitarian law permits information and psychological operations that are militarily necessary as part of military operations, it imposes limits, in particular, on those that are directed against either civilians or military personnel hors de combat and can be reasonably expected to cause harm. This article analyzes these and other limits that international humanitarian law sets on information or psychological operations during armed conflicts
Episode 7: Using Force: The War in Iraq
No full textSynopsis:More than 20 years since the United States launched its invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the origins of the war remain highly contested, both among scholars and policy practitioners alike. As tensions continue to flare in the region and thousands of U.S. troops continue to deploy to military bases within Iraq, understanding the history of U.S. involvement in this country is critical for understanding the United States’s role in the modern Middle East. Joining This episode of The Debrief analyzes the causes and consequences of the Iraq War with Dr. Joseph Stieb, assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College and author of The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990 to 2003.About the Speaker: Joseph Stieb joined the U.S. Naval War College in 2022 after completing a postdoctoral fellowship at The Ohio State University’s Mershon Center for International Security Studies. He received a Ph.D. in U.S. history from UNC-Chapel Hill in 2019. He studies U.S. foreign policy, politics, and ideas in the 20th and 21st centuries, particularly the Iraq War and the War on Terrorism. He is the author of The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003 (Cambridge, 2021) and has also published in Diplomatic History, Modern American History, The International History Review, The Washington Post, War on the Rocks, Foreign Policy, American Purpose, and Arc Digital.The views presented by the faculty or other guest speakers do not reflect official positions of the Naval War College, DON or DOD.
Watch The Debrief Episode 7 on YouTube
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Episode 21: The Cold War
No full textIn this Episode Jon O\u27Gorman hosts Michael Dennis and Daniel Post from the Strategy and Police Department and they discuss nuclear weapons in the context of the Cold War. They start by talking about nuclear diplomacy and its meaning in the Cold War. Next, they discuss how nuclear weapons change the calculus in the military to include wargaming the problems. They also talk about the economic impact of maintaining a nuclear stockpile and how that might have meant the death knell of the Soviet economy. Lastly, they discuss how technology does not replace sound strategic thinking in the contemporary world.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/profiles-in-strategy/1020/thumbnail.jp
Episode 19: The Rise of China and Korea
No full textIn this episode Jon O\u27Gorman hosts Andrew (Dex) Wilson, Nicholas Sarantakes, and Kristin Mulready-Stone to discuss China and Korea. They begin by discussing the warlord period of China as the stage setter for the Chinese civil war. They next move to the problems Chaing has in unifying the country vs. Mao and his easier path. They kick around the concept of how the context of the civil war matters to Mao\u27s victory and how his three-phase model might not be the best insurgent theory in any other place but China. Additionally, it might not even have been how Mao won China exactly. They talk about Chinese and U.S. involvement in Korea and what it meant for Taiwan. Lastly, they end with contemporary relevance and why China is once again making Taiwan an issue in the international arena and how it has more to do with domestic control than unification.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/profiles-in-strategy/1018/thumbnail.jp
HM 30: Reflections on Naval History: Collected Essays
Get PDFReflections on Naval History: Collected Essays, by John B. Hattendorf, Ernest J. King Professor Emeritus of Maritime History, Naval War College, is the third in a series of volumes that bring together scholarly writings originally published in a variety of specialized journals and other publications, many of which are obscure and difficult to access. It includes papers originally appearing in the years 2010–20. The earlier volumes are Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays (2000), and Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays (2011). The latter volume also appeared under the imprimatur of the Naval War College Press.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs/1029/thumbnail.jp
