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Great Naval Battles of the Pacific War: The Official Admiralty Accounts: Midway, Coral Sea, Java Sea, Guadalcanal & Leyte Gulf
No full textFrom the Archives: Bringing Air to the Sea: Four Competing Paths to Developing U.S. Naval Aviation and Their Lessons
No full textCMSI Translations #14: Manual for Developing Ship Captains
Full text linkIn 1949, the People\u27s Navy set sail from Baimamiao in Jiangsu province. Throughout its journey, the People\u27s Navy has produced numerous heroes, and an increasing number of talented personnel of all types have accelerated their growth on the deep blue waterways. Among them, Navy surface ship captains have become a shining group. How can young aspirants with dreams become captains?
The Dalian Naval Vessel Academy was established on November 22, 1949. It primarily focuses on cultivating military and political command officers for the Navy\u27s surface forces, as well as technical officers in marine hydrology and surveying. Over the past 70 years since its founding, the Academy has trained more than 50,000 military and political command officers for the People\u27s Navy, over 80 percent of ship captains, and more than 200 admirals of the Republic, earning a reputation as the cradle of naval officers.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-translations/1013/thumbnail.jp
CMSI Note 14: Bridges Over Troubled Waters: Shuiqiao-Class Landing Barges in PLA Navy Amphibious Operations
Full text linkCMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) Offshore & Defense Engineering Company (COMEC) has developed three specialized self-propelled landing barges that link together to form an 820-meter (2690 foot) composite relocatable pier. In early March 2025, the first set of three barges conducted sea trials and formed a relocatable pier on a beach near Zhanjiang, Guangdong, in southern China. A second, identical set of three landing barges is still under construction in southern China. Analysts have dubbed this class of barge “Shuiqiao” (literally “water bridge” (水桥) in Chinese), tentatively categorizing it as “landing platform utility” (LPU). Based on their function, paint scheme, and lack of Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions, the barges are very likely PLA Navy auxiliaries and not civilian vessels. Three types of landing barges with extendable “Bailey bridges” may be classified by their length in meters: Shuiqiao-110, Shuiqiao-135, and Shuiqiao-185 class LPUs. The landing barges are the latest in a series of rapidly evolving capabilities that significantly improve the PLA’s ability to conduct over-the-shore logistics in a Taiwan invasion scenario. While these landing barges help address a critical PLA requirement, they may create additional problems for the PLA in terms of amphibious landing throughput. That is, the potential volume created by the barges may result in challenges moving equipment and materiel out of a landing area in highly restricted and potentially contested terrain on Taiwan. Considering these landing barges in the context of other developments related to amphibious operations suggests the PLA may have significantly advanced its timetable to have sufficient capabilities to conduct a large-scale cross-strait operation against Taiwan in accordance with Xi Jinping’s 2027 centennial military building goal (建军一百年奋斗目标).https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1013/thumbnail.jp
Of Duty and Distress: Addressing Sea Slavery Through the Duty to Render Assistance
Full text linkSea slavery—men trapped in forced labor on board illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing vessels—exists across the world’s oceans. If confronted with sea slavery while conducting a boarding of a foreign-flagged IUU fishing vessel on the high seas, may a coastal State military officer free the victim? This article answers the question affirmatively, relying on the duty to render assistance under the international law of the sea. That duty requires all mariners who receive information that a person is in distress to proceed with all speed to assist the person in distress. In order to meet the definition of “distress,” an individual must be in grave and imminent danger. This article demonstrates that the conditions sea slaves face are so serious, certain, and inevitable that they meet the requirements of grave and imminent danger, qualifying the men trapped in forced labor as “persons in distress.” This status unlocks the full force of the duty to render assistance. The answer to the question then is not a permissive may but rather a mandatory shall. A coastal State military officer that comes into contact with a person trapped in forced labor aboard a foreign-flagged fishing vessel on the high seas not only may—but must—take action to rescue that enslaved person
China Maritime Report No. 45: The PLA Navy\u27s Hospital Ship Fleet: Concerns, Developments, and Future Prospects
Full text linkMain Findings The PRC’s hospital ship ecosystem comprises at least 17 vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates 13 ships, while the state ship building sector has developed (or is developing) at least four civilian hospital ships for domestic and foreign clients. PLAN hospital ships serve two main missions: (1) Provide medical support to PLA personnel, especially those stationed around the mainland or on Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea. (2) Support maritime global health engagement, chiefly through missions conducted by the Peace Ark hospital ship. Almost a third (21) of the Peace Ark’s 71 port visits since 2010 have been in Melanesia and East Africa. A further fifth (12) of all visits have been to ports in the northeast Indian Ocean and West Africa. The launch of the Silk Road Ark in 2023 may increase the PRC’s maritime global health engagement capacity in the coming years. In the event of a conflict, some PLAN hospital ships would not be in compliance with international conventions on the proper identification and uses of these vessels. They lack the required markings, potentially possess armaments, or are not exclusively used as hospital ships. This could complicate the decision making of China’s opponents, especially during wartime. China’s private sector construction of hospital ships could potentially provide the PRC with the skills and knowhow to rapidly expand the PLAN’s hospital ship fleet during a conflict. U.S. Navy planners should consider how the PLAN may use its hospital ships in a conflict and how these vessels may link with other humanitarian activities seen in these settings, such as maritime humanitarian corridors, exchange of prisoners, or civilian humanitarian capabilities.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1045/thumbnail.jp
CMSI Note #12: Finally, A PLA Navy Missile Gap?
Full text linkThis month a PRC government-owned defense magazine published a special report on one of the U.S. Navy’s newer missiles, calling it a “huge threat” and predicting it will “massively change” the future of naval warfare. The missile? The AIM-174B, an air launched variant of the Navy’s Standard Missile 6 (SM-6). What is it about this weapon that warranted a special report by PRC experts?
CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways: A PRC government-owned defense magazine has called the U.S. Navy’s AIM-174B missile a “huge threat” and game-changer for the future of naval warfare. The PRC source says the American missile could shoot down high-value assets at “a shocking distance”, possibly causing the PLA’s operational system to “verge on collapse.” Some defense experts in China believe the U.S. Navy fielded a weapon system that could undermine the PLA Navy’s ability to achieve air and sea control.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1011/thumbnail.jp
