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Great Naval Battles of the Pacific War: The Official Admiralty Accounts: Midway, Coral Sea, Java Sea, Guadalcanal & Leyte Gulf
No full textFrom the Archives: Bringing Air to the Sea: Four Competing Paths to Developing U.S. Naval Aviation and Their Lessons
No full textCMSI Note 14: Bridges Over Troubled Waters: Shuiqiao-Class Landing Barges in PLA Navy Amphibious Operations
Get PDFCMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) Offshore & Defense Engineering Company (COMEC) has developed three specialized self-propelled landing barges that link together to form an 820-meter (2690 foot) composite relocatable pier. In early March 2025, the first set of three barges conducted sea trials and formed a relocatable pier on a beach near Zhanjiang, Guangdong, in southern China. A second, identical set of three landing barges is still under construction in southern China. Analysts have dubbed this class of barge “Shuiqiao” (literally “water bridge” (水桥) in Chinese), tentatively categorizing it as “landing platform utility” (LPU). Based on their function, paint scheme, and lack of Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions, the barges are very likely PLA Navy auxiliaries and not civilian vessels. Three types of landing barges with extendable “Bailey bridges” may be classified by their length in meters: Shuiqiao-110, Shuiqiao-135, and Shuiqiao-185 class LPUs. The landing barges are the latest in a series of rapidly evolving capabilities that significantly improve the PLA’s ability to conduct over-the-shore logistics in a Taiwan invasion scenario. While these landing barges help address a critical PLA requirement, they may create additional problems for the PLA in terms of amphibious landing throughput. That is, the potential volume created by the barges may result in challenges moving equipment and materiel out of a landing area in highly restricted and potentially contested terrain on Taiwan. Considering these landing barges in the context of other developments related to amphibious operations suggests the PLA may have significantly advanced its timetable to have sufficient capabilities to conduct a large-scale cross-strait operation against Taiwan in accordance with Xi Jinping’s 2027 centennial military building goal (建军一百年奋斗目标).https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1013/thumbnail.jp
CMSI Translations #14: Manual for Developing Ship Captains
Get PDFIn 1949, the People\u27s Navy set sail from Baimamiao in Jiangsu province. Throughout its journey, the People\u27s Navy has produced numerous heroes, and an increasing number of talented personnel of all types have accelerated their growth on the deep blue waterways. Among them, Navy surface ship captains have become a shining group. How can young aspirants with dreams become captains?
The Dalian Naval Vessel Academy was established on November 22, 1949. It primarily focuses on cultivating military and political command officers for the Navy\u27s surface forces, as well as technical officers in marine hydrology and surveying. Over the past 70 years since its founding, the Academy has trained more than 50,000 military and political command officers for the People\u27s Navy, over 80 percent of ship captains, and more than 200 admirals of the Republic, earning a reputation as the cradle of naval officers.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-translations/1013/thumbnail.jp
Artificial Intelligence and the “Armed Attack” Threshold in International Law
No full textThis article argues that the deployment of artificial intelligence, even in its strong fully autonomous form, does not have significant consequences for the application of the jus ad bellum framework, and in particular the armed attack threshold. As with all new weapons technologies, the deployment of artificial intelligence in the resort to force requires consideration of what “imminence” means in this context. However, artificial intelligence is fundamentally a means of making decisions to resort to force or contributing to the reasons for which such decisions are made by humans. Unlike the jus in bello, the jus ad bellum is not concerned with how or why decisions about resort to force are made, and the definition of “armed attack” contains no “subjective” element, such as fault or intention. Whether a use of force is initiated by human or artificial intelligence, and whether either of those intelligences is mistaken, is therefore not something that can affect whether a use of force meets the armed attack threshold. The mere use of artificial intelligence also seems incapable, by its very nature, of affecting the gravity of a use of force, understood as its scale and effects, such as to make it more or less likely to reach the armed attack threshold. Many implications of the deployment of artificial intelligence for the jus ad bellum will be determined by other rules of general international law, notably the customary international law rules on attribution. However, it would not be appropriate for the jus ad bellum to pre-empt such a development by modifying its own standards
AI and Naval Operations
No full textArtificial intelligence systems in naval operations are reality. They enhance naval capabilities in various respects. Autonomous surface and underwater vehicles depend on such systems. Moreover, these systems contribute to threat detection and identification, to real-time strategy optimization, and to intelligence analysis. The present article provides a brief analysis of the legality of AI systems used by naval forces under the law of naval warfare, which, in many respects, differs considerably from the law of land warfare. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish between attacks from the sea against targets on land and attacks against targets at sea and in the airspace above. The article will conclude with some final thoughts on the need for effective training of AI models and of operators and on the inclusion of operators into all stages of the development of naval AI systems
Episode 21: Casting Shadows on Darkened Fleets; the Maritime Irregular Fight for International Sanctions Enforcement
No full textGuests Michelle Bockmann, John Driscoll, and Tomer Raanan join Dave Brown to discuss the so-called ‘shadow fleet’, describing the large, and growing unregulated network of aging oil tankers and cargo ships, (often older than 15 years), that use deceptive practices like turning off maritime tracking systems, faking identities (false flags/names), and using shell companies to operate outside international sanctions, primarily to transport sanctioned oil (like Russian or Iranian) or conduct other illicit trade, while also posing potential major environmental and safety risks due to lack of proper insurance and oversight.
Guests:
Michelle Wiese Bockmann is a Senior Maritime Intelligence Analyst for Windward and London-based energy commodities writer specializing in sanctioned oil flows and the ‘shadow fleet’, (deceptive and illicit shipping practices, and their regulatory, security and legal implications). Bockmann has more than 25 years’ experience across three continents in shipping and oil markets with a focus on the intersection of global shipping and geopolitics, maritime intelligence, and risk & compliance. Michelle has also worked as a journalist and political writer for The Australian, and worked for Bloomberg News, Lloyd’s List, and Fairplay shipping publications.
John J. Driscoll is a 31-year career officer in the U.S. Coast Guard as an expert in maritime law enforcement, theater security cooperation, and maritime and defense policy. Captain Driscoll commanded five USCG Cutters, enforcing U.S. drug, immigration, and fisheries laws, as well as UN Security Council resolutions against Bosnia, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. He served in defense policy and maritime law enforcement roles, including Chief of Drug and Migrant Interdiction at USCG Headquarters, and Director for Homeland Defense Integration in OSD Policy.
Tomer Raanan is a maritime risk analyst at Lloyd’s List, where his reporting explores how geopolitics and regulation shape seaborne commerce, and how deceptive and high-risk practices are used to evade sanctions and facilitate illicit trade. In 2024, Tomer was named ‘Multimedia Journalist of the Year’ by the Seahorse Freight Association for uncovering a sanctions-skirting LPG shipping network. Before joining Lloyd’s List in 2022 as senior reporter, he worked for a decade in private security.
Articles: Shadow Fleet: How illicit shipping networks broke global oil trade, S&P Global Energy, YouTube, 22 Sep 2025 Swedish Navy Finds Russian Military Personnel Aboard “Shadow Fleet” Tankers, Sania Kozatskyi, Militarnyi, 16 Dec 2025 EU targets Russia’s shadow fleet with new sanctions, hitting businessmen and companies, AP News, 15 Dec 2025 Russia\u27s war of aggression against Ukraine: Council sanctions 9 shadow fleet enablers, Press Release, Council of the EU, 15 Dec 2025 Ukrainian drones hit Russia\u27s shadow fleet tanker in Mediterranean Sea for the first time, source says, A. Terajima, Kyiv Independent, 19 Dec 2025 Ukraine says it struck Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in Black Sea, K. Gak, C. Danaher, C. Nicholls, CNN, 10 Dec 2025 Ghost Busters: Options for Breaking Russia’s Shadow Fleet, B. Jensen and J. Macias III, CSIS, 15 Dec 2025 US May Target Russia’s “Shadow Fleet” if Kremlin Rejects Peace Plan, Vlad Litnarovych, United 24 Media, 17 Dec 2025 Sinking Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’: Has the Ukraine war reached Senegal?, Sébastian Seibt, France 24, 3 Dec 2025 Seizure of rogue oil tanker off Venezuela signals new U.S. crackdown on shadow fleet, J. Goodman & M. Biesecker, AP via PBS News, 12 Dec 2025 Rogue tankers in Singapore: What are shadow fleets and who uses them?, A. Kozul-Wright, Al Jazeera, 19 Dec 2025 Irregular Warfare at Sea: How Russia’s Shadow Fleet Undermines Maritime Security, A. Rolander, SWJ, 11 Dec 2025https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/1020/thumbnail.jp