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The Obligation of “Due Regard” in the EEZ During Armed Conflict at Sea
Full text linkThis article explores the rights of belligerent warships and military aircraft to engage in hostile operations within a neutral coastal State’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) during armed conflict. It argues that peacetime rules of due regard for coastal State sovereign rights and jurisdiction do not constrain these operations. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established the peacetime obligation of due regard in the EEZ. By 1984, the EEZ had become customary international law binding on all States. The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea suggests belligerent naval forces owe a duty of due regard for a coastal State’s sovereign rights over resources in the EEZ during periods of hostilities at sea. This article suggests that the lex generalis EEZ regime in the law of the sea does not supersede the lex specialis rights of belligerent States to conduct operations in the law of naval warfare
Cosmic Force: A Framework for Applying the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space
Full text linkOuter space is becoming increasingly contested and existing approaches to identifying prohibited force in outer space lack a systematic foundation, hindering their application to novel challenges such as temporary interference with critical satellites or threats involving commercial space actors. This article addresses this gap by developing the first comprehensive, multifactorial legal framework for identifying a prohibited use of force in outer space. This framework provides a structured method for analyzing non-kinetic actions, temporary effects, and persistent hazards like space debris. It fundamentally advances existing legal approaches in three ways. First, it establishes when States can be implicated in a violation of jus ad bellum through the activities of commercial space actors, even absent traditional attribution requirements, due to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. Second, it redefines the concept of victim States of space-based uses of force, offering legal criteria that account for the complex operational realities of space activities, including shared satellites, hosted payloads, and multinational reliance on space-based services. Third, it demonstrates how interfering with critical space-based services or creating space debris through kinetic anti-satellite tests can qualify as prohibited force, addressing scenarios that transcend conventional notions of inter-State force. Through this systematic analysis, the framework operationalizes Article 2(4) of the UN Charter for contemporary space activities, offering a principled method for evaluating unprecedented challenges to international peace and security in the space domain
Episode 19: Maritime Sabotage: The Hidden War Underseas
No full textGuests James Langan, Andrew Rolander, and co-host Jahara ‘Franky’ Matisek join Dave Brown to discuss Maritime Sabotage; the deliberate targeting of undersea, pipelines, ports and energy hubs. It’s a story of hidden infrastructure, high stakes and shadowy actors who operate just below the threshold of open war – i.e. maritime irregular warfare.
Articles: What is known about the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosions?, N. Adomaitis & J. Ahlander, Reuters, 22 Aug 2025 (possible paywall) Italian police arrest Ukrainian man over Nord Stream pipelines blast, K. Connolly, Guardian, 21 Aug 2025 How NATO Patrols the Sea for Suspected Russian Sabotage, D. Michaels, WSJ, 30 Mar 2025 (paywall) Maritime Sabotage: Lessons Learned and Implications for Strategic Competition, A. Powel et al, CNA, October 2021 Implementing Agreement to Enhance Protection of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, R. Pedrozo, Stockton Center for International Law, 106 INT’L L. STUD. 146 (2025) Irregular Warfare on the Sea Floor and the Case for National Resilience, A. Rolander, SWJ, 30 May 2025 How to Counter Chinese Sabotage of Taiwan’s Undersea Cables, T. Boyle, Just Security, 20 May 2025 Sensors, AI Possible Solutions to Preventing Undersea Cable Sabotage, S. Magnuson, National Defense Magazine, 13 May 2025
Guests:
Lt. Col. Jahara Franky Matisek, Ph.D. is a command pilot with over 3,700 hours in the C-17, E-11 BACN, T-6 and T-53 and is a Project Mercury innovation coach. He was recently a military professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval War College and served at the U.S. Air Force Academy as an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department. He has published over 120 articles on warfare, strategy, and national security and been a Fellow at AFWERX, Payne Institute for Public Policy, European Resilience Initiative Center, Modern War Institute, and Irregular Warfare Initiative. He has been a Co-PI on three DOD research projects on security assistance and Russian influence operations.
James Langan is a military policy advisor for the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) at the UK Ministry of Defence, where he focuses on hybrid threats such as the Russian Shadow Fleet and sabotage to Critical Undersea Infrastructure. Prior to this he was awarded a Chief of Airstaff Fellowship to complete a MPhil in European Security at the University of Cambridge. He was also the UK militaries’ chief Information Operations and StratCom instructor and deployed as Commanding Officer of the British militaries’ Combat Camera Team during the 2021 Kabul and 2023 Sudan evacuations. James has also worked as a European energy commodities trader and currently participates in the RUSI Maritime Sanctions Task Force. His research interests include Russian political economy, and the history of international sanctions policy.
Andrew M. Rolander is a senior IW analyst for Joint Staff J7 in the Office of Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition (OIWC), responsible for formulating strategy and doctrine for the Joint Force. Andrew has expertise in special forces, intelligence, and para-military operations. He served as an intelligence analyst for the FBI and the CIA, and conducted fellowships on IW with USMC University, Grand Strategy as a George C. Marshall fellow, and History and Statecraft for the Clements Center, University Texas. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in maritime strategy and warfighting with the War Studies Department at King’s College London, and a Doctorate in National Security at the Institute of World Politics.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/1018/thumbnail.jp
Episode 8: Interview with John Ferling, Author of Whirlwind and Shots Heard Round the World
No full textThis is a special episode of the Strategy Matters Podcast. Host Brendan Neagle talks with historian Dr. John Ferling to explore the strategic lessons of the American Revolution. This special episode reaches back to provide additional perspective on the third Strategy and War case study at the U.S. Naval War College. Although the timing of this episode does not align directly with the American Revolution case study, Dr. Ferling’s insights illuminate many of the course themes that cut across the entire course. Drawing on his books Whirlwind and his new work Shots Heard Round the World, Ferling assesses the Revolution’s strategic environment and international context and the central choices both sides faced at the outset of the conflict. Dr. Ferling dives into the challenges of forging a cohesive strategy from competing colonial interests, George Washington’s strengths and weaknesses as a strategic leader, and how diplomacy combined with military operations to shape the war’s trajectory. He also provides perspective on some of the strengths of British military decision-making, particularly by General Henry Clinton. The conversation closes with reflections on the Revolution’s most important strategic principles and why they still matter for today’s strategists.
The opinions expressed on this podcast represent the views of the presenters and do not reflect the official position of the Department of War, The US Navy, or US Naval War College.
Guests:
Dr. John Ferling is a leading historian of the American Revolution who spent most of his four-decade academic career at the University of West Georgia, where he taught courses on Colonial America, U.S. military history, and the Revolution. The author of numerous works, including Whirlwind and Shots Heard Round the World, Ferling has long combined scholarship with a passion for writing accessible history. His career began with two years teaching high school in Texas before moving into higher education in Texas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and ultimately Georgia. In 2013, he received the Governor’s Award for the Arts and Humanities in recognition of his lifetime contributions to history and civic culture. A lifelong baseball fan, the first major league game he saw was between Pittsburgh and the Brooklyn Dodgers, a game in which Jackie Robinson scored the winning run. For twenty years he timed his research trips to Boston so that the Red Sox were in town. He has a picture of Fenway Park proudly displayed in his office.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/strategy-matters/1007/thumbnail.jp
Artificial Intelligence and the “Armed Attack” Threshold in International Law
No full textThis article argues that the deployment of artificial intelligence, even in its strong fully autonomous form, does not have significant consequences for the application of the jus ad bellum framework, and in particular the armed attack threshold. As with all new weapons technologies, the deployment of artificial intelligence in the resort to force requires consideration of what “imminence” means in this context. However, artificial intelligence is fundamentally a means of making decisions to resort to force or contributing to the reasons for which such decisions are made by humans. Unlike the jus in bello, the jus ad bellum is not concerned with how or why decisions about resort to force are made, and the definition of “armed attack” contains no “subjective” element, such as fault or intention. Whether a use of force is initiated by human or artificial intelligence, and whether either of those intelligences is mistaken, is therefore not something that can affect whether a use of force meets the armed attack threshold. The mere use of artificial intelligence also seems incapable, by its very nature, of affecting the gravity of a use of force, understood as its scale and effects, such as to make it more or less likely to reach the armed attack threshold. Many implications of the deployment of artificial intelligence for the jus ad bellum will be determined by other rules of general international law, notably the customary international law rules on attribution. However, it would not be appropriate for the jus ad bellum to pre-empt such a development by modifying its own standards
AI and Naval Operations
No full textArtificial intelligence systems in naval operations are reality. They enhance naval capabilities in various respects. Autonomous surface and underwater vehicles depend on such systems. Moreover, these systems contribute to threat detection and identification, to real-time strategy optimization, and to intelligence analysis. The present article provides a brief analysis of the legality of AI systems used by naval forces under the law of naval warfare, which, in many respects, differs considerably from the law of land warfare. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish between attacks from the sea against targets on land and attacks against targets at sea and in the airspace above. The article will conclude with some final thoughts on the need for effective training of AI models and of operators and on the inclusion of operators into all stages of the development of naval AI systems
Episode 21: Casting Shadows on Darkened Fleets; the Maritime Irregular Fight for International Sanctions Enforcement
No full textGuests Michelle Bockmann, John Driscoll, and Tomer Raanan join Dave Brown to discuss the so-called ‘shadow fleet’, describing the large, and growing unregulated network of aging oil tankers and cargo ships, (often older than 15 years), that use deceptive practices like turning off maritime tracking systems, faking identities (false flags/names), and using shell companies to operate outside international sanctions, primarily to transport sanctioned oil (like Russian or Iranian) or conduct other illicit trade, while also posing potential major environmental and safety risks due to lack of proper insurance and oversight.
Guests:
Michelle Wiese Bockmann is a Senior Maritime Intelligence Analyst for Windward and London-based energy commodities writer specializing in sanctioned oil flows and the ‘shadow fleet’, (deceptive and illicit shipping practices, and their regulatory, security and legal implications). Bockmann has more than 25 years’ experience across three continents in shipping and oil markets with a focus on the intersection of global shipping and geopolitics, maritime intelligence, and risk & compliance. Michelle has also worked as a journalist and political writer for The Australian, and worked for Bloomberg News, Lloyd’s List, and Fairplay shipping publications.
John J. Driscoll is a 31-year career officer in the U.S. Coast Guard as an expert in maritime law enforcement, theater security cooperation, and maritime and defense policy. Captain Driscoll commanded five USCG Cutters, enforcing U.S. drug, immigration, and fisheries laws, as well as UN Security Council resolutions against Bosnia, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. He served in defense policy and maritime law enforcement roles, including Chief of Drug and Migrant Interdiction at USCG Headquarters, and Director for Homeland Defense Integration in OSD Policy.
Tomer Raanan is a maritime risk analyst at Lloyd’s List, where his reporting explores how geopolitics and regulation shape seaborne commerce, and how deceptive and high-risk practices are used to evade sanctions and facilitate illicit trade. In 2024, Tomer was named ‘Multimedia Journalist of the Year’ by the Seahorse Freight Association for uncovering a sanctions-skirting LPG shipping network. Before joining Lloyd’s List in 2022 as senior reporter, he worked for a decade in private security.
Articles: Shadow Fleet: How illicit shipping networks broke global oil trade, S&P Global Energy, YouTube, 22 Sep 2025 Swedish Navy Finds Russian Military Personnel Aboard “Shadow Fleet” Tankers, Sania Kozatskyi, Militarnyi, 16 Dec 2025 EU targets Russia’s shadow fleet with new sanctions, hitting businessmen and companies, AP News, 15 Dec 2025 Russia\u27s war of aggression against Ukraine: Council sanctions 9 shadow fleet enablers, Press Release, Council of the EU, 15 Dec 2025 Ukrainian drones hit Russia\u27s shadow fleet tanker in Mediterranean Sea for the first time, source says, A. Terajima, Kyiv Independent, 19 Dec 2025 Ukraine says it struck Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in Black Sea, K. Gak, C. Danaher, C. Nicholls, CNN, 10 Dec 2025 Ghost Busters: Options for Breaking Russia’s Shadow Fleet, B. Jensen and J. Macias III, CSIS, 15 Dec 2025 US May Target Russia’s “Shadow Fleet” if Kremlin Rejects Peace Plan, Vlad Litnarovych, United 24 Media, 17 Dec 2025 Sinking Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’: Has the Ukraine war reached Senegal?, Sébastian Seibt, France 24, 3 Dec 2025 Seizure of rogue oil tanker off Venezuela signals new U.S. crackdown on shadow fleet, J. Goodman & M. Biesecker, AP via PBS News, 12 Dec 2025 Rogue tankers in Singapore: What are shadow fleets and who uses them?, A. Kozul-Wright, Al Jazeera, 19 Dec 2025 Irregular Warfare at Sea: How Russia’s Shadow Fleet Undermines Maritime Security, A. Rolander, SWJ, 11 Dec 2025https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/1020/thumbnail.jp