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CMSI Translations #25: A New Pillar for Distant Oceans: Concepts for the Chinese Navy\u27s New Generation of General-Purpose Destroyers
No full textA recent unconfirmed rumor about the Chinese Navy developing a new general-purpose guidedmissile destroyer has stirred debate online. Many commenters argue that the Type 055 already offers exceptional capability across air defense, missile defense, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and general warfare roles, and is more than capable of meeting current mission needs. But because it’s expensive to build, it is not practical to produce in large numbers or to use for routine tasks, so it will likely remain a smaller part of the fleet. In contrast, the more affordable Type 052D class is limited by its size and displacement, which restricts how much it can be upgraded. As a result, it still cannot match the endurance or sustained firepower of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-translations/1032/thumbnail.jp
China Maritime Report No. 45: The PLA Navy\u27s Hospital Ship Fleet: Concerns, Developments, and Future Prospects
Get PDFMain Findings The PRC’s hospital ship ecosystem comprises at least 17 vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates 13 ships, while the state ship building sector has developed (or is developing) at least four civilian hospital ships for domestic and foreign clients. PLAN hospital ships serve two main missions: (1) Provide medical support to PLA personnel, especially those stationed around the mainland or on Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea. (2) Support maritime global health engagement, chiefly through missions conducted by the Peace Ark hospital ship. Almost a third (21) of the Peace Ark’s 71 port visits since 2010 have been in Melanesia and East Africa. A further fifth (12) of all visits have been to ports in the northeast Indian Ocean and West Africa. The launch of the Silk Road Ark in 2023 may increase the PRC’s maritime global health engagement capacity in the coming years. In the event of a conflict, some PLAN hospital ships would not be in compliance with international conventions on the proper identification and uses of these vessels. They lack the required markings, potentially possess armaments, or are not exclusively used as hospital ships. This could complicate the decision making of China’s opponents, especially during wartime. China’s private sector construction of hospital ships could potentially provide the PRC with the skills and knowhow to rapidly expand the PLAN’s hospital ship fleet during a conflict. U.S. Navy planners should consider how the PLAN may use its hospital ships in a conflict and how these vessels may link with other humanitarian activities seen in these settings, such as maritime humanitarian corridors, exchange of prisoners, or civilian humanitarian capabilities.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1045/thumbnail.jp
CMSI Note #12: Finally, A PLA Navy Missile Gap?
Get PDFThis month a PRC government-owned defense magazine published a special report on one of the U.S. Navy’s newer missiles, calling it a “huge threat” and predicting it will “massively change” the future of naval warfare. The missile? The AIM-174B, an air launched variant of the Navy’s Standard Missile 6 (SM-6). What is it about this weapon that warranted a special report by PRC experts?
CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways: A PRC government-owned defense magazine has called the U.S. Navy’s AIM-174B missile a “huge threat” and game-changer for the future of naval warfare. The PRC source says the American missile could shoot down high-value assets at “a shocking distance”, possibly causing the PLA’s operational system to “verge on collapse.” Some defense experts in China believe the U.S. Navy fielded a weapon system that could undermine the PLA Navy’s ability to achieve air and sea control.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1011/thumbnail.jp
The Obligation of “Due Regard” in the EEZ During Armed Conflict at Sea
Get PDFThis article explores the rights of belligerent warships and military aircraft to engage in hostile operations within a neutral coastal State’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) during armed conflict. It argues that peacetime rules of due regard for coastal State sovereign rights and jurisdiction do not constrain these operations. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established the peacetime obligation of due regard in the EEZ. By 1984, the EEZ had become customary international law binding on all States. The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea suggests belligerent naval forces owe a duty of due regard for a coastal State’s sovereign rights over resources in the EEZ during periods of hostilities at sea. This article suggests that the lex generalis EEZ regime in the law of the sea does not supersede the lex specialis rights of belligerent States to conduct operations in the law of naval warfare
Cosmic Force: A Framework for Applying the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space
Get PDFOuter space is becoming increasingly contested and existing approaches to identifying prohibited force in outer space lack a systematic foundation, hindering their application to novel challenges such as temporary interference with critical satellites or threats involving commercial space actors. This article addresses this gap by developing the first comprehensive, multifactorial legal framework for identifying a prohibited use of force in outer space. This framework provides a structured method for analyzing non-kinetic actions, temporary effects, and persistent hazards like space debris. It fundamentally advances existing legal approaches in three ways. First, it establishes when States can be implicated in a violation of jus ad bellum through the activities of commercial space actors, even absent traditional attribution requirements, due to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. Second, it redefines the concept of victim States of space-based uses of force, offering legal criteria that account for the complex operational realities of space activities, including shared satellites, hosted payloads, and multinational reliance on space-based services. Third, it demonstrates how interfering with critical space-based services or creating space debris through kinetic anti-satellite tests can qualify as prohibited force, addressing scenarios that transcend conventional notions of inter-State force. Through this systematic analysis, the framework operationalizes Article 2(4) of the UN Charter for contemporary space activities, offering a principled method for evaluating unprecedented challenges to international peace and security in the space domain
Of Duty and Distress: Addressing Sea Slavery Through the Duty to Render Assistance
Get PDFSea slavery—men trapped in forced labor on board illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing vessels—exists across the world’s oceans. If confronted with sea slavery while conducting a boarding of a foreign-flagged IUU fishing vessel on the high seas, may a coastal State military officer free the victim? This article answers the question affirmatively, relying on the duty to render assistance under the international law of the sea. That duty requires all mariners who receive information that a person is in distress to proceed with all speed to assist the person in distress. In order to meet the definition of “distress,” an individual must be in grave and imminent danger. This article demonstrates that the conditions sea slaves face are so serious, certain, and inevitable that they meet the requirements of grave and imminent danger, qualifying the men trapped in forced labor as “persons in distress.” This status unlocks the full force of the duty to render assistance. The answer to the question then is not a permissive may but rather a mandatory shall. A coastal State military officer that comes into contact with a person trapped in forced labor aboard a foreign-flagged fishing vessel on the high seas not only may—but must—take action to rescue that enslaved person
Episode 19: Maritime Sabotage: The Hidden War Underseas
No full textGuests James Langan, Andrew Rolander, and co-host Jahara ‘Franky’ Matisek join Dave Brown to discuss Maritime Sabotage; the deliberate targeting of undersea, pipelines, ports and energy hubs. It’s a story of hidden infrastructure, high stakes and shadowy actors who operate just below the threshold of open war – i.e. maritime irregular warfare.
Articles: What is known about the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosions?, N. Adomaitis & J. Ahlander, Reuters, 22 Aug 2025 (possible paywall) Italian police arrest Ukrainian man over Nord Stream pipelines blast, K. Connolly, Guardian, 21 Aug 2025 How NATO Patrols the Sea for Suspected Russian Sabotage, D. Michaels, WSJ, 30 Mar 2025 (paywall) Maritime Sabotage: Lessons Learned and Implications for Strategic Competition, A. Powel et al, CNA, October 2021 Implementing Agreement to Enhance Protection of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, R. Pedrozo, Stockton Center for International Law, 106 INT’L L. STUD. 146 (2025) Irregular Warfare on the Sea Floor and the Case for National Resilience, A. Rolander, SWJ, 30 May 2025 How to Counter Chinese Sabotage of Taiwan’s Undersea Cables, T. Boyle, Just Security, 20 May 2025 Sensors, AI Possible Solutions to Preventing Undersea Cable Sabotage, S. Magnuson, National Defense Magazine, 13 May 2025
Guests:
Lt. Col. Jahara Franky Matisek, Ph.D. is a command pilot with over 3,700 hours in the C-17, E-11 BACN, T-6 and T-53 and is a Project Mercury innovation coach. He was recently a military professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval War College and served at the U.S. Air Force Academy as an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department. He has published over 120 articles on warfare, strategy, and national security and been a Fellow at AFWERX, Payne Institute for Public Policy, European Resilience Initiative Center, Modern War Institute, and Irregular Warfare Initiative. He has been a Co-PI on three DOD research projects on security assistance and Russian influence operations.
James Langan is a military policy advisor for the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) at the UK Ministry of Defence, where he focuses on hybrid threats such as the Russian Shadow Fleet and sabotage to Critical Undersea Infrastructure. Prior to this he was awarded a Chief of Airstaff Fellowship to complete a MPhil in European Security at the University of Cambridge. He was also the UK militaries’ chief Information Operations and StratCom instructor and deployed as Commanding Officer of the British militaries’ Combat Camera Team during the 2021 Kabul and 2023 Sudan evacuations. James has also worked as a European energy commodities trader and currently participates in the RUSI Maritime Sanctions Task Force. His research interests include Russian political economy, and the history of international sanctions policy.
Andrew M. Rolander is a senior IW analyst for Joint Staff J7 in the Office of Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition (OIWC), responsible for formulating strategy and doctrine for the Joint Force. Andrew has expertise in special forces, intelligence, and para-military operations. He served as an intelligence analyst for the FBI and the CIA, and conducted fellowships on IW with USMC University, Grand Strategy as a George C. Marshall fellow, and History and Statecraft for the Clements Center, University Texas. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in maritime strategy and warfighting with the War Studies Department at King’s College London, and a Doctorate in National Security at the Institute of World Politics.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/1018/thumbnail.jp