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China’s New Navy: The Evolution of PLAN from the People’s Revolution to a 21st Century Cold War, Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy
Get PDFEpisode 2: (Mis)reading Mahan: Strategy and Sea Power, Past and Present
No full textGuests John Maurer and James Holmes join host Vanya Eftimova Bellinger to discuss the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theories on the strategic environment of the twentieth century and beyond. The guests definitively settle the question of how to pronounce Mahan’s name correctly before diving into how various strategic leaders applied, or misapplied, Mahan’s theories to the formulation of maritime strategy. After analyzing the historical cases of Germany and Japan’s application of Mahanian theories, Dr. Maurer and Dr. Holmes turn their attention to how these ideas influence great power competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
Guests:
Professor John H. Maurer is the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy and served as the Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
James Holmes holds the J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. A former U.S. Navy surface-warfare officer, he was the last gunnery officer in history to fire a battleship’s big guns in anger, during the first Gulf War in 1991. He earned the Naval War College Foundation Award in 1994, signifying the top graduate in his class. His books include Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best Book of 2010 and a fixture on the Navy Professional Reading List.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/strategy-matters/1001/thumbnail.jp
China Maritime Report #50: Foggy With a Chance of Surprise Attack: PLA Amphibious Deception in a Taiwan Scenario
Get PDFMain Findings The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views deception as a force multiplier and war-winning weapon. The PLA leadership reserves a special place of veneration for wartime commanders who can employ deception to obtain surprise, something Xi Jinping refers to as “excelling at stratagem.” In January 1955, the PLA launched a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan islands, then controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei. This campaign remains a case study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for how to conduct amphibious operations and catch defenders off guard. Empirical historical research shows that amphibious operations, while complex and difficult to conduct, almost always achieve their objectives. The critical factor is the shock they cause, and that is often enhanced by deception. PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. They exhort officers at all levels of command to use deception. Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA’s perspective. Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war. American and Taiwanese strategists should account for unique ways the PLA may attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action. War games, simulations, and field exercises that account for a surprise attack on Taiwan could generate insights and help senior leaders rethink the levels of risk associated with current and possible future defense postures. Immediate steps should be taken to cope with deception and minimize reaction times so that any sudden amphibious landings on Taiwan, while dramatic, will not be decisive.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1050/thumbnail.jp
Study No. 2, China\u27s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing\u27s Maritime Policies
No full textStudies in Chinese Maritime Development No. 2: China\u27s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing\u27s Maritime Policieshttps://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-studies/1006/thumbnail.jp