10170 research outputs found
Sort by
Short-Term Solutions, Long-Term Problems—The U.S. Navy’s Approach to Mines during the Tanker War
Full text linkMine warfare is a persistent threat to naval operations and ocean commerce, and yet it remains a persistent area of underinvestment by the U.S. Navy. The recent history of the Navy’s improvisational approach to emergent mine threats suggests how the Navy might succeed by “preparing to be unprepared” before it faces mines again
Artificial Intelligence and the Prohibition on the Use of Force: Intention and Causation
No full textThis article explores the application of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter to AI-enabled systems that carry out unintended engagements involving the use of force. First, it analyzes whether State responsibility for a breach of the prohibition on the use of force is defined in subjective or objective terms. Most commentators maintain that a State must intend to use force against the victim State in order for the prohibition to apply. However, through an examination of State practice, this article demonstrates that the prohibition is based on objective responsibility. Second, this article assesses whether a State must cause the resulting use of force in order for responsibility to ensue. After determining that causation is a condition precedent for establishing a breach of the prohibition on the use of force, this article explains that causation comprises two elements: factual causation asks whether the harmful effects would have occurred but for the impugned conduct, while legal causation asks whether the use of force was reasonably expected when the operation was launched. This article then examines how these elements apply to AI-enabled systems that engage in unintended uses of force and offers illustrative examples
Symposium—Introduction
No full textIn March 2025 the University of Reading and the U.S. Naval War College convened a workshop at the University of Reading in the United Kingdom to examine the application of the jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and international criminal law to the use of military AI. This is the introduction to the symposium, published as Volume 107 of International Law Studies
Sailors and Scholars: The History of the U.S. Naval War College, 1884–2009, Vol. 2
No full textVolume II, 1984–2009, brings this history of the Naval War College into the modern era. For over 125 years, the institution has left its mark on maritime strategy and the naval profession in the United States. This volume contains chronological appendices listing significant events, College leaders, and distinguished graduates.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/sailors-and-scholars/1001/thumbnail.jp
From the Director
No full textA message from the CMSI Director for Issue 1 of the CMSI Quarterly Review
Military AI and the Specter of the Limitless War
No full textLegal and extra-legal factors related to the development of international humanitarian law (IHL) support the exercise of strategic restraint during armed conflicts. We claim, however, that technological developments in the area of military artificial intelligence (AI) fundamentally do away with many of the technological constraints that limited the capacity of militaries to fully utilize the “license to kill” afforded to them by IHL. Such a violence-enhancing effect can become even more dramatic in cases where other restraining factors are less effective. The upshot of our analysis is that the implicit assumption that IHL would be applied in a context of strategic restraint might no longer hold true. Part II of the article discusses the role of strategic restraint in IHL. In Part III, we consider three principal extra-legal sources of strategic restraint—moral considerations, practical considerations, and technological constraints—and explain why the use of algorithmic decision support systems (DSS) has the potential to seriously erode their restraining effect during armed conflicts. In Part IV, we illustrate the inter-relations between the different sources of strategic restraint by way of referring to the recent conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. In Part V, we consider possible responses to what we consider to be a paradigmatic shift in the application of IHL—introduction of limits on the use of military AI—including baking into the technology elements of restraint—and changes in the contents of IHL and jus ad bellum that could compensate for the erosion of strategic restraint. Part VI concludes
CMSI Note 17: Replacement Removed: VADM/General Wang Houbin—Naval Star Turned Rocket Force Commander’s Terminal Trajectory
No full textKey Takeaways:
• On 17 October, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that General (former Vice Admiral) Wang Houbin (王厚斌), Commander of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), was among nine senior officers expelled for “serious violations of Party discipline.”
• A career naval aviator and seasoned PLA Navy (PLAN) staff officer, Wang rose rapidly—promoted to General (3-star) in 2023 and appointed PLA Rocket Forces (PLARF) Commander to replace disgraced General Li Yuchao.
• The official reason for Wang’s downfall—“serious financial crimes involving exceptionally large sums”—echoes a familiar corruption narrative that seldom tells the full story.
• Alternative explanations point to Wang’s ties to Admiral Miao Hua, inter-service factionalism, and persistent integrity or capability issues inside the PLARF.
• Despite leadership churn, CMSI sees no evidence that PLA capability development or operational readiness has suffered; any internal “taxes” appear offset by strong central prioritization and resource mobilization.
• PLAN operational forces continue to advance rapidly, sustained by an officer corps that punishes corruption, prizes competence, and rewards performance with honor and responsibility.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1016/thumbnail.jp
CMSI Translations #13: Mission Command Is Not The Antidote
Full text link“Mission command” (renwushi zhihui) has become a buzzword across all branches of the U.S. military. The concept came into being in the early 19th century, borne from Prussian military experience, and became a treasured concept in Prussian/German military doctrine. Simply put, mission command is the delegation of decision-making power. The reason for delegating or subordinating decision-making is because, when compared with higher echelon command, front line units often have better situational awareness of their given area, and delegation of decision making authority can allow them to fully utilize this cognitive advantage and seize the time critical battle initiative.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-translations/1012/thumbnail.jp
The 5th Annual Alexander C. Cushing International Law Conference: International Law and Conflict at Sea
Full text linkHosted annually by the Stockton Center for International Law, the 5th Annual Alexander C. Cushing International Law Conference brings together judge advocates, scholars, and practitioners from across the world to analyze international law and conflict at sea. This year, the Conference will focus on Law of the Sea & Maritime Security; Marine Environmental Security; Disruptive Technology at Sea; Armed Conflict at Sea; Indo-Pacific Maritime Security; Great Power Competition and International Law; and the Law of Naval Warfare, among other topics. Event | 5th Annual Alexander C. Cushing International Law Conference: International Law and Conflict at Sea Event Flyerhttps://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cushing-conference/1001/thumbnail.jp