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A Mission in Trouble—Vietnamization and the U.S. Navy
Full text linkThe troubled, expensive, and ultimately failed “Vietnamization” of the U.S. Navy’s assistance to the Republic of Vietnam demonstrates the pitfalls of imposing the American “way of war” on a partner without considering local needs or sustainability
Changes in U.S. Indo-Pacific Military Strategy and U.S. Bases in Okinawa
Full text linkThe U.S. forces based on Okinawa in Japan’s Ryukyu Islands are critical to America’s strategic position in the western Pacific, its defense cooperation with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and U.S. security guarantees to Japan itself. Local opposition to hosting those forces and the subsequent uncertainty and consolidation of bases have bearings on that position and demand reevaluation
Implementing Agreement to Enhance Protection of Critical Undersea Infrastructure
Full text linkSince 2022, there have been several incidents of apparent intentional damage to submarine cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea and in the waters around Taiwan. Affected coastal States correctly complain that malign actors, like Russia and China, exploit gaps in international law that make it exceedingly challenging to hold the perpetrators accountable. None of the international agreements applicable to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure provide for adequate coastal State enforcement authority beyond the territorial sea. Several proposals have been made to provide greater protection for critical undersea infrastructure—adopt a UN Security Council resolution, European Union Action Plan, naval presence operations (NATO Baltic Sentry), impose a Baltic Sea shipping tax, and amend the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). None of these proposals provide an adequate solution to curtail intentional damage to submarine cables and pipelines. This article suggests that the best solution is to adopt a new implementing agreement under UNCLOS that allows for expanded coastal State authority over foreign-flagged vessels that engage in illicit conduct beyond the territorial sea, to include non-consensual boardings. A draft agreement is included as an annex to the article
China Maritime Report No. 46: China\u27s Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia
Full text linkMain Findings Collecting and reporting maritime intelligence is a core mission of China’s maritime militia. Militia forces help fill in “blind spots” (补盲) for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and enhance its situational awareness. They are widely dispersed in the waters of greatest strategic and operational importance to Beijing, available in large numbers, extremely familiar with the operating environment, and, the PLA believes, less provocative than other military instruments. Militia forces that specialize in intelligence collection are organized into “maritime reconnaissance” (海上侦察) units. Located in China’s coastal provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level cities, these units likely number in the hundreds. Militia vessels dedicated to intelligence collection are often called “information boats” (信息船). China’s maritime militia has developed a cadre of intelligence specialists who serve the function of collecting intelligence and reporting it to the PLA. These militia members, called “information personnel” (信息员), generally deploy with militia vessels tasked with reconnaissance missions, but may also embark on boats from other types of militia units. While at sea, maritime militia intelligence personnel maintain close contact with the PLA units that oversee militia operations, called People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs). PAFDs direct militia reconnaissance operations and receive incoming intelligence reports, which they then share with operational PLA forces. As part-time soldiers, often with comparatively low education levels, maritime militia intelligence personnel cannot meet the same performance standards as intelligence specialists in the PLA. However, the existence of a large cadre of maritime militia intelligence specialists ensures a basic level of competence across the force and guarantees that capable personnel are available for important intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Given China’s aspirations to become a global naval power, it makes sense that the PLA leverage the latent ISR capacity of China’s distant-water fishing fleet and Chinese owned/operated merchant vessels. PLA experts have argued for embarking intelligence personnel on Chinese vessels operating abroad, and it is likely that this is already happening.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1046/thumbnail.jp
U.S. Position on the Legal Character of the Law of the Sea Convention\u27s Seabed Mining Provisions: U.S. Intervention on Agenda Item 8, International Seabed Authority Assembly, 30th Session, July 2025
No full textU.S. Intervention on Agenda Item 8, International Seabed Authority Assembly, 30th Session, July 2025, presented by Greg O’Brien, Head of the U.S. Observer Delegation to the International Seabed Authority, explaining the U.S. position and State practice regarding the legal character of the Law of the Sea Convention seabed mining provisions
Episode 10: World War on the Peripheries: Strategic Lessons from Colonial Theaters in WWI
No full textEpisode ten of Strategy Matters aligns with the fourth case study in the Strategy and Policy Course at the Naval War at the U.S. Naval War College. Much of the case study focuses on the European theaters of World War I, but in the podcast, we are exploring the extra-European or colonial theaters of the conflict. Although distinct, they were seldom decisive. Nonetheless, the colonial theaters in WWI hold many lessons for today’s strategists, including the complexities of peripheral theaters and irregular warfare, the role of seapower in a global conflict, and recruitment and motivation to fight. The host, Dr. Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, is joined by two professors from the Strategy and Policy Department: Dr. Tim Hoyt and Dr. Jesse Tumblin. A renowned expert on irregular warfare, Dr. Hoyt examines why, despite much action in the colonial theaters, they failed to break the stalemate or shift the balance between the belligerents. A historian of the British Empire, Dr. Tumblin discusses how the dominions provided it with manpower and enormous resources, but also challenged the empire’s institutions and war strategy.
The opinions expressed on this podcast represent the views of the presenters and do not reflect the official position of the Department of War, The US Navy, or US Naval War College.
Guests:
Dr. Timothy Hoyt, Ph.D.is the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism and, since 2019, has also served as the Director of the Advanced Strategy Program at the U.S. Naval War College. He is the author of numerous publications on irregular warfare, COIN and counterterrorism, and South Asia. Dr Hoyt also serves as the Deputy Editor of The Journal of Strategic Studies.
Dr. Jesse Tumblin, Ph.D.is an assistant professor of strategy and policy specializing in political and military history, ideas of security, and the current and former British world. He earned a Ph.D. and M.A. from Boston College and a B.A. from the University of Tennessee. He is a past fellow in international security studies at Yale University. He is the author of “The Quest for Security: Sovereignty, Race, and the Defense of the British Empire, 1898-1931” (Cambridge University Press, 2020) and an article on Britain’s attempts to secure its Indo-Pacific empire, which won the Saki Ruth Dockrill Memorial Prize for international history from the Institute for Historical Research, University of London.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/strategy-matters/1009/thumbnail.jp
Safeguarding Submarine Cables and Pipelines in Times of Peace and War
Full text linkIncidents involving damage to undersea infrastructure illustrate the vulnerability of submarine cables and pipelines. While damage can occur accidentally in peacetime, recent incidents suggest cables and pipelines are being systematically targeted and that the resulting damage is not accidental or the result of poor seamanship. Most undersea infrastructure can also be attacked as a military objective in wartime. Peacetime adversaries or opposing belligerents during an armed conflict can easily damage undersea infrastructure to further their political, strategic, or wartime objectives. These incidents also highlight the inadequacy of coastal State authority under international law to take measures against foreign-flagged vessels intentionally damaging undersea infrastructure. This article discusses the right of States to lay submarine cables and pipelines at sea, as well as coastal State authority to protect underwater infrastructure. Given the limited authority of coastal States to arrest foreign flag vessels on the high seas, the article proposes a way forward for coastal States to protect underwater infrastructure beyond the territorial sea in peacetime. The article also reviews the status of submarine cables and pipelines during an international armed conflict, to include whether such infrastructure is a military objective or is exempt from attack and whether the law of neutrality applies
A Forgotten Dimension of Naval Diplomacy—The Production of Social Capital in the National Interest
Full text linkNaval diplomacy is a key noncombat mission for fleets to engage in as they communicate their nations’ broader political objectives. Most literature focuses on how different platforms affect this communication but neglects the social dimension of naval diplomacy and how personal relationships supplement and impact the strategic landscape