SelectedWorks @ Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law
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Escogedoras and Molineras in Veracruz, Mexico (1928-32): Exploring the Political Role of Popular Women in Post-Revolutionary Society
No full textThis article suggests that during Revolutionary state formation (1928-32) in Mexico, Veracruzano women had active roles in state politics. This political participation existed despite women in Mexico being denied legal rights to vote or to hold political office. This essay demonstrates how escogedoras (coffee sorters) and molineras (maize grinders) used their economic influence to negotiate with central and regional governments in Mexico. For escogedoras their participation in an export industry provided \u27negotiation power\u27 to participate in politics. For molineras working in an industry which dramatically decreased a woman\u27s work-week from 30 plus hours to 4 hours provided them with similar negotiation power
From Exxon to Engle: The Futility of Assessing Punitive Damages as Against Corporate Entities
No full textWe have long accepted that punitive damages are an appropriate mechanism by which to control corporate misconduct and ensure that the goods and services provided to the community by corporations are not overly harmful to society. In fact, we assume, without really knowing, that the imposition of punitive damages results in an equipoise between innovation and deterrence. But when punitive damages are imposed upon a publicly traded corporate entity, who is actually being punished? In most cases, it is not the individuals responsible for the misconduct, as most, if not all, have long since left the company by the time the judgment is entered. Many assume that it is the shareholders that suffer because the verdict results in falling stock prices and lost dividends. But as demonstrated by section three, infra, the empirical data do not necessarily support that inference because the market adjusts over time to the possibility of punitive damages and corrects for that possibility long before the judgment becomes final. Perhaps, then, it is the consumer who presumably absorbs the cost of the punitive awards; indeed, the data demonstrate that one-third of one percent of the per capita income of every person in the United States is paid out in punitive damages. Nevertheless, that effect is so diffuse that it, by its nature, undercuts the very rationale of punitive damages, which has always been thought to be some combination of punishment or retribution and deterrence
