SelectedWorks @ Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law
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Building a Market: From Personal to Impersonal Exchange
No full textAdam Smith identified two key components in the wealth creation process of human societies: exchange and specialization. More than two centuries later relatively little is understood about the underlying process by which people build exchange systems and discover comparative advantage. In this chapter we report on a pilot experiment that explores the social mainsprings that give rise to the market. Specifically, using cash-motivated participants we compare and contrast the personal, social interactions within a village with those of the participants engaged in long-distance trade among a system of interconnected virtual villages
Incorporating Instream Flow Values into a Water Market
No full textWe use laboratory experiments to test three different water market institutions designed to incorporate instream flow values into the allocation. The institutions are (1) a baseline with fixed minimum flow constraints, (2) an environmental agent contributing to the cost of providing instream flows, and (3) creating an instream flow right in which an environmental agent can sell the right to reduced flows. Using a smart computer-coordinated market, we find that direct environmental participation in the market can achieve highly efficient and stable allocations. A particularly attractive and practical feature of the third institution is that it nests the status quo in the sense that, should the environmental agent choose not to participate in the market, the default minimum instream flow constraints will be maintained. Although flows may be lower in this institution relative to a fixed constraint on minimum flows, because these flow reductions are voluntary and compensated, all deviations from the status quo (i.e., binding flow constraints) are necessarily Pareto improving in the sense that no agent, including the environment, is made worse off
Why Amendments to Rule 23 Are Not Enough: A Case for the Federalization of Class Actions
No full textClass action litigation can be a useful tool to protect consumers from corporate misconduct, particularly where the individual claims are too small to be economically viable. However, class actions are subject to abuse by unscrupulous counsel, some of whom use the mechanism to enrich themselves at the expense of the clients they claim to represent. As one commentator has noted, In many of these cases, the victimized consumers often receive pennies, or nearly-worthless coupons, while plaintiffs\u27 counsel receives millions in legal fees. Moreover, class actions are increasingly being filed over frivolous matters, often without the knowledge or consent of the proposed class members. Indeed, although they were [o]nce considered a tool of judicial economy... class actions are now often considered a means of defendant extortion
Truth in Gaming: Toward Consumer Protection in the Gambling Industry
No full textThis article proposes a new regulatory regime, Truth in Gaming, designed to aid both recreational and problem gamblers alike, and based on the clear, accurate, and timely disclosure of the true costs of gambling. This proposal is based on research that indicates that pathological gamblers often engage in defective gambling strategies, misjudging their inability to control random events and evaluate their losses. The provision of accurate information about the true costs of gambling and the likelihood of losing may aid pathological and problem gamblers in their efforts to gain control over their gambling habits. Such information is crucial to providing consumer protection for gamblers, giving them the information they need to make informed decisions about whether, where, how often, and how much they gamble.
Unfortunately, gamblers are rarely provided with accurate price information for slot machines, and such information for other electronic gaming devices is often difficult for gamblers to determine. This lack of price information prevents gamblers from shopping effectively and so makes the market for gambling inefficient as casinos do not compete based on an obvious price for slot machines. Without this information, even non-problem gamblers may unwittingly take risks they would deem excessive if they knew the extent of those risks.
The article proposes a regulatory system, Truth in Gaming, that would require casinos to display accurate price information for slot machines and other gaming opportunities, in a way that is clear and meaningful, and that would be interactive so that it would reflect any changing costs based on, for example, how much money is bet. Each slot machine would display the hold percentage, the expected average loss percentage given the bet, for that machine and also a hold amount, which is the expected average amount lost given the bet. These are the true expected average cost of a bet, and should be disclosed to the gambler before the bet.
The article also proposes that gaming devices be configured so that gamblers can track their wins, losses, and hold percentages using smart cards, giving them the ability to accurately determine the true cost of gambling to them.
These proposals will force casinos to provide consumers the information that they need to bet rationally